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This is a book that Alan Dundes should have put together, or so I told him. He 
probably would have done it, had not death in March 2005 put a halt to his tremendous 
production. !e project came about a5er I read his proposal for a new compilation of his 
essays following Bloody Mary in the Mirror (2002a). I wanted him to do something dif-
ferent from what he planned. Rather than adding another capsule of writing, I cheekily 
told him it was time to re6ect on the body of his major work covering more than forty 
years. He appreciated my suggestion that he should thematize his studies under analyti-
cal headings and produce a critical, retrospective work twenty-'ve years a5er his monu-
mental essay collection, Interpreting Folklore (1980b). Still a vital voice in cultural inquiry, 
Dundes accepted the challenge and was ready to plunge into the project with his charac-
teristic ebullience. He even invited me to write the foreword.
Dundes did not foresee that his life would suddenly be cut short. Or maybe he did. 
He predicted on several occasions that heredity was not in his favor because of the pre-
mature death of his father, and he opined, o5en with humor, that his diet did not 't into 
the “healthy fare” category. Still, with his giving barely a hint of slowing down, news of 
his heart attack came as a shock. When the University of California press o7ce called me 
on the day he died, asking me for a quote to put in the public announcement, I quickly 
responded, “Alan Dundes will undoubtedly go down in history as one of the most in6uen-
tial folklorists, indeed one of the most in6uential minds, the world has known. !at mind 
had an incredible range, reaching into cultures around the globe, and all manner of mate-
rial including literature, narratives, art, customs, speech, and games. His specialty was not 
in a single genre, but in the provocative interpretation.” It 't his devotion to learning that 
his 'nal context when he was struck down was a Berkeley seminar room, as he was about 
to instruct and inspire another eager 6ock of students. !is book, in part, elaborates on my 
soundbite, with the hope of reaching new generations of students with Dundes’s insights.
Even if he had not died, I thought that a project to elucidate, and evaluate, Dundes’s 
contributions to folkloristics was imperative. !e season before he died, he had touched 
o8 a lively debate with an address to the American Folklore Society on the role of psy-
chological perspectives and what he called “grand theory” in the future of folklore stud-
ies (2005c). Outside of the meetings, Dundes’s ears must have been ringing with invoca-
tions of his name and work in global Internet discussions, symposia (including one in the 
Netherlands in which I was a participant), and classrooms. With his correspondence and 
essays stacked high on my desk, I put my words of advice into action. I checked with sev-
eral of Dundes’s con'dants, and I consulted his widow, Carolyn Dundes, on the project. 
She sagely encouraged me to organize it as my book, rather than his, but commented that 
he would have liked the title and sections I had mapped out. !e result of my e8ort testi'es 
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to his lasting legacy, o8ers products of his most fertile mind, and re6ects on his contribu-
tions to the study of culture that he pursued vigorously through the materials of folklore 
and encapsulated as an analytic endeavor of folkloristics.
Why “meaning” as an organizing theme? It comes from Dundes’s frequent refer-
ence to 'nding “patterns of meaning” as the goal of folkloristics. Meaning for Dundes 
was o5en hidden, frequently elusive, but uncoverable through folkloristic analysis. He 
saw meaning as the thinking underlying, and explaining, puzzling images, fantasies, 
and actions that pervade cultural life, o5en outside the awareness of participants in it. 
Rather than being random creations, the expressive texts of folklore—brought together 
in aggregate, traced historically and socially, identi'ed and compared textually, under-
stood in their cultural context, appreciated for their texture or performance, and mined 
for structure, belief, and symbol—showed patterns that the folklorist was trained to dis-
cern, and indeed analyze.
In Dundes’s view, the scholar’s role was more than reporting native exegesis or perfor-
mance, but rather that of broad-based analysis involving scholarly organization and inter-
pretation of folkloric materials. If ethnography reported culture on the natives’ own terms, 
his folkloristics de'ned the terms, and expressions (and “projections”), by which natives 
could be understood. It should be emphasized that for Dundes, his “natives” were fre-
quently “ourselves” rather than exotic others, attested to by his studies of children, stu-
dents, musicians, scientists, and folklorists, in his family as well as his classroom and coun-
try. Frequently relying on the collections of others (his Berkeley folklore archives is one of 
the world’s largest), his strength was to set up in the library and archives a kind of folklor-
istic operating table where he laid out his “corpus of data,” as he liked to say, and surgically 
probed it, thereby revealing its inner workings to an anxious audience. Once the material 
was put back together, the analysis led to ideas on its meaning—with social and psycho-
logical implications—that would not be evident from a surface inspection. In fact, I could 
continue the metaphor by saying that he had a reputation akin to a famed master surgeon, 
bearing the aura of risk-taking ability that surrounds an authoritative 'gure who develops 
novel procedures and ingenious, if controversial, solutions. Elliott Oring (1975a) recog-
nized this persona when he referred to folklorists informed by his incisive “operations” and 
taking on the role of “surgical interns.” Noteworthy in this regard are Dundes’s ground-
breaking essays on the folklore of the medical profession (Dundes and George 1978; 
Dundes, L. Dundes, and Strei8 1999; also see chapter 13 in the present volume).
!e body of material that Dundes worked on was, broadly stated, culture. Dundes 
pointed out that culture worked in strange, sometimes disturbing ways, and he sought to 
explain and even remedy it. Folklore is prime evidence of culture, indeed of humanity, he 
declared, and he came up with memorable phrases to drive the point home—folklore is a 
people’s “symbolic autobiography,” folklore gives an “inside out” view of society. Folklore, 
he a7rmed in keywords of essay titles, was a mirror of culture, a lens for society, a key to 
behavior, a projection of mind. “Folklore is as old as humanity,” he wrote for a de'nitive 
entry in the World Book Encyclopedia (1970). Negating the elitist view of folklore as an 
irrational relic of the past, however, he pointed out that folklore is alive and well today. He 
emphasized that folklore is always created anew, because people need it—for their identity, 
indeed for their existence. !e paradox, and intriguing quality, of folklore was that it was 
always changing, and yet ever the same. It was local and universal; it was old and new. As 
for his resolution of this paradox, he spent his career showing that folklore is a product of 
mind that responds to and constructs culture.
Preface and Acknowledgments ix
I should explain my relationship to Dundes to contextualize my “analytics.” A5er 
all, I was not one of his students, but I have made frequent use of his ideas in my work. 
Nonetheless, I have been known to dispute some of his cherished interpretations. We were 
friendly, and I held him in high esteem, but I hardly call myself one of his disciples. !en 
again, he claimed he did not have any (from my vantage, he certainly had devotees and fol-
lowers), although one might say that all folklorists and psychological anthropologists owe 
him an intellectual debt. I know he appreciated my endeavor to integrate psychological 
theory and critical inquiry into folkloristics, and we shared a common mentor in Richard 
M. Dorson at Indiana University (and instruction from professors Felix Oinas and Warren 
Roberts). We talked about our common ethnic roots, and I provided him with sources 
for his studies of German and Jewish customs. We had a strong bond in a shared desire 
to promote a discipline of folkloristics, and he encouraged my research on its history and 
sociology (see Following Tradition [1998], also published by Utah State University Press, 
and American Folklore Studies: An Intellectual History [1986a] for the University Press 
of Kansas, for which he wrote an endorsement on the back cover). He wrote an a5er-
word (2005a) for my volume Manly Traditions, we shared many a podium together, and 
he invited me to Berkeley to teach. In fact, a5er I edited his a5erword, he told me I should 
edit more of his work. I was taken aback, since he had a reputation for maintaining tight 
control over it. At the time, I did not fathom how prophetic his words would be.
In my selection of his essays, I endeavored to show connections among data in the 
terms Dundes helped to de'ne for the 'eld—expressions of group, identity, worldview, 
and mind. He laid out the basic questions to be addressed: “Why does a particular item of 
folklore exist? And what does it mean to those who transmit and receive it?” Like a coach 
explaining his game plan, he wrote, in an unpublished manuscript, “It is precisely these 
questions which constitute the principal challenge to all of us in the 'eld of folkloristics, 
the academic study of folklore, and which we need to address if this 'eld is ever to achieve 
its rightful place in the academy.” With these questions in mind, I created a sequence of 
essays to tell a story of his quest for meaning, beginning with what he would call struc-
turally a “lack” (the absence of analysis in folklore classi'cation and collection) to a “lack 
Simon Bronner and Alan Dundes at the American Folklore Society’s annual meeting, 1984.
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liquidated” (meaning revealed through analytic means). I included essays that I thought 
had stood the test of time and will be useful to students and scholars working with folklore 
today and in the future; since some essays do go back a way, I updated some of the prose in 
the text and made corrections where necessary.
I once asked Dundes to explain his preference for the intellectual platform of the essay. 
He acknowledged that he was “inclined to use the shorter medium of the article or note” 
rather than the “monograph or book format to report research 'ndings,” but he did not 
elaborate on the folkloristic essay as a literary form, for which he was recognized as a mas-
ter. Like the short story writer, Dundes used the essay to explore a variety of themes, situ-
ations, and settings. Always one to see layers of meaning, he o5en compressed his pointed 
messages into memorable double entendre titles and themes (e.g., “Getting to the Bottom” 
of “Sweet Bugger All,” “Second String Humor,” and my favorite, “Gallus as Phallus: A 
Psychoanalytic Cross-Cultural Consideration of the Cock'ght as Fowl Play”). !e pedes-
trian view of his productivity is his curiosity about all manner of cultural expression—in 
his familiar American home and abroad in exotic locales, in historical and contemporary 
events, and in material as well as oral forms. To be sure, he was naturally inquisitive and, 
some would say, obsessive. His wife was among those making the latter observation; when 
asked about his hobbies, she said that he did not have any—his work was his life. He was 
always pressing for answers to the “why” questions that others had not asked, and he was 
amazingly well-read in a wide range of disciplines. His book collecting in any number of 
languages was legendary. His long reach did not necessarily translate into a lack of concen-
tration or specialization, since he had a special attraction to evidence present in speech and 
narrative, based on the presumptions that people “speak their mind,” and language consti-
tutes a cognitive as well as a structural system.
It became quickly evident, from the 'rst time I met him more than thirty-'ve years ago, 
that the essay was his strongest vehicle for the driving idea. Each essay set forth a core idea 
that he o5en presented as a proposal, supported by evidence drawn from an array of library, 
ethnographic, and archival sources. He then invited commentary, critique, and application 
in extensive tomes by others (sometimes allowing for collaboration), but upon forming the 
thesis, he was ready, as he said to me at one shared podium, to “move on to the next idea.” 
He hinted at self-analysis of this tendency in “On the Psychology of Collecting Folklore” 
(1975f ), where he referred to the anal-ejective personality who prefers to “spread” his out-
put in many outlets rather than “holding on” to his stu8. Most of all, what has distin-
guished Dundes as a writer is not just his proli'c output, but the admirable accomplish-
ment of having so many of his core ideas ripple widely into cultural scholarship.
As my introduction will show, he was o5en misunderstood or dismissed as preoccu-
pied with sexual symbols in folklore, but he saw these, in Freudian terms, as among the 
sensory layers of meaning, and also trenchantly interpreted the ideological and sociologi-
cal rami'cations of cultural expression. I summarize this approach as perceiving cultural 
response (or adaptation) to anxiety and ambiguity (particularly evident in the critical con-
cept of projection), re"ection of belief and worldview (hence his rhetoric of mirror), and 
intention (or consequence) in identity formation and communicative strategy (o5en rep-
resented by the idea of folklore as a key). He called himself a Freudian folklorist (his book 
Parsing !rough Customs [1987h] was subtitled “Essays by a Freudian Folklorist”), but I 
'nd the appellation of “adaptive” or “post-Freudian” more 'tting, considering the systemic 
shi5 which occurred once he displaced Freud’s emphasis on penis envy with male birth or 
womb envy and its anal implications. Dundes’s citations, in fact, make frequent reference 
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to the post-Freudian, symbolist works of Otto Rank, Ernest Jones, Sandor Ferenczi, Karen 
Horney, and Bruno Bettleheim, not only because of their consideration of folkloric evi-
dence, but also because he carried the importance of feminine development and culturally 
relative context further than Freud. Moreover, Dundes distinctively adapted, and revised, 
selective aspects of Freudian theory—particularly the concepts of dream symbolism, anal 
eroticism, and repression—while rejecting notions of evolutionary origins and collective 
unconscious; and emphasized, as a folklorist, variation, text, and style, rather than pursuing 
the clinical interests of a psychologist.
Dundes was hardly a Freudian “one trick pony,” however. He underscored this in an 
unpublished manuscript written before he died: “Unlike most academics that have a life-
long specialization in a particular time period or individual, e.g., nineteenth-century Russian 
novels or William Faulkner, I have been fascinated by a wide variety of subject matters in my 
forty-year career as a professional folklorist. Each topic presents its own challenge to some-
one who seeks to understand it.” As the essays in this volume demonstrate, he pursued cul-
tural enigmas with a variety of methods, including linguistic, historical, cross-cultural com-
parative, ethnographic, feminist, and structural tools. To be sure, he was attracted to psycho-
analytic theory for its exploration of mental and developmental processes that could explain 
folkloric fantasy, taboo, and ritual, but he also proposed corrections and alterations, such as 
his development of the themes of male cultural display, procreation, and aggression.
Folklore Matters, he proclaimed in a title of a previous book (1989d) as well as many 
presentations, to underscore both the range of materials in the subject and the signi'cance 
of the expressive tradition, not coincidentally showing how speech takes on multiple mean-
ings. !e heart of the matter for him, I daresay, was the analysis that the compelling sym-
bolic texts of folklore invite, and indeed demand. As the main platform for this inquiry, 
his essays had a lively, o5en polemical format—the problem statement or intellectual com-
plaint, followed by his detailed exposition of folkloristic identi'cation with a discerning 
eye for underlying structures, and reasoned, if provocative, interpretation. !e scholarly 
audiences he addressed were prepared to be surprised, aroused, or o8ended. “Scholarship 
is not a popularity contest or about feeling good, it’s a search for truth, which can be pain-
ful,” he was wont to announce when an objection arose. He reached beyond academe, on 
television talk shows and in popular magazines, to get the signi'cance of folklore as a sub-
ject and a 'eld across to the public. His studies o5en had a reformist agenda, so that by 
making the “unconscious conscious” through cultural inquiry, social problems—including 
racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and the human proclivity for war—could be 
addressed at their fundamental sources.
Dundes did not claim that his analytic approach was embraced by all folklorists. 
Anything but. Still, he encouraged, and indeed wanted to provoke with his essays, a 
healthy theorizing about the existence and emergence of folklore in everyday life, past and 
modern. “Without symbolist perspectives or other grand theories,” he told the American 
Folklore Society in 2004, “folklore texts will forever remain as mere collectanea with little 
or no substantive content analysis” (2005c). His concern was that folklore be more than 
a subject of descriptive inquiry; he declared o5en that its study should form a body of 
knowledge and analysis constituting a discipline. Accordingly, he unswervingly promoted 
the folkloristic enterprise, especially in the academic settings of folklore programs. He also 
was a missionary among psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, literary scholars, his-
torians, and linguists, urging them to become enlightened by the use of folkloric evidence, 
and the intellectual heritage of folkloristics.
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Besides applying grand theories, Dundes advanced the identi'cation of folklore genres 
and categories. Wide acceptance of what he called the “modern” idea of folklore (as expres-
sive items enjoying multiple, variant existence, rather than restricted by the criteria of time 
and orality), and of the de'nition of folk groups as two or more people with a trait in com-
mon (removing the association of folk with a level of culture or class of society), greatly 
expanded the type of material considered as traditional, or “cultural.” Dundes had a gi5 
of discerning patterns and connections—among global cultures, across genres, and cer-
tainly between texts—based on an extraordinary recall for everything he read and expe-
rienced. His knowledge was encyclopedic; in fact, he wrote many high-pro'le encyclo-
pedia entries de'ning folklore and the work of folklorists. He was elected president of 
the American Folklore Society and was a worldwide leader of the 'eld, starting early in 
his career. Nonetheless, he o5en mentioned that his interpretations met resistance among 
a dominant stream of literal-minded colleagues who seemed timid or unable to propose 
“deep” meanings outside the awareness of informants. Having said this, he delighted in 
cutting against the intellectual grain (his critique in this volume of the “standard” tools of 
the motif and tale-type index in the essay on “emic” units is an example [1962]) to suggest 
meanings that had not been proposed before for well-known items, or to draw attention 
to overlooked or avoided material as folklore. Examples in his work are risque jokes, pho-
tocopied lore, and the speech of scientists and medical professionals. He relished debates 
with skeptics (evident in his plaint in “How Indic Parallels to the Ballad of the ‘Walled-Up 
Wife’ Reveal the Pitfalls of Parochial Nationalistic Folkloristics,” [1995a], also reproduced 
here), and frequently even brought his friends and students to task.
Dundes brought into his arguments a world of knowledge compassed by folklore and 
an astounding bibliographic breadth. His importance as a folklorist, as well as a public 
intellectual, is signi'cant for de'ning what he called the “modern” terms by which tradi-
tion is identi'ed, and framing the questions in, and of, the 'eld. Doubters of his symbolic 
readings still acknowledged that Dundes’s de'nitions and methods had become standard 
equipment in the 'eld’s intellectual package, and he had a loyal legion of students and col-
leagues who absorbed, if not exactly replicated, his approach.
It is a formidable challenge to 'nd all of Dundes’s writing and take in his work as a 
whole. Besides being proli'c, he issued his prose in far-6ung publications. Part of the rea-
son was that he was a peripatetic scholar. Accepting many invitations to speak around the 
world, he o5en gave the texts of his presentations to a local host publication, and tended 
not to retread his material. Although lodged in the disciplinary con'nes of the anthropol-
ogy department at the University of California at Berkeley, he had an agenda of showing 
the applicability of folklore study to any number of 'elds, writing for psychological, linguis-
tic, literary, scienti'c, philosophical, and historical journals in addition to anthropologi-
cal publications. He acknowledged this tendency when he wrote on the manuscript I had 
that “one problem with that style of presentation [the essay] is that one’s 'ndings are o5en 
scattered in a variety of outlets, so much so that even the most dedicated student cannot 
locate all the writings of a particular scholar. My writings on folk speech and folk humor 
(including jokes) have appeared in such forums as Zyzzyva, a prominent West Coast liter-
ary magazine, American Speech, Notices of the American Mathematical Society, and in several 
festschri5s (volumes honoring scholars on the occasion of their retirement or birthday) in 
addition to regional folklore journals such as Western Folklore and Midwestern Folklore.”
I therefore predict that there will be selections in this book that will be unfamiliar to 
even the most devoted of Dundes’s followers. My goal, though, was not so much to unearth 
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buried treasure (although there is some of that) as it was to feature notable statements 
of Dundes’s core ideas, so as to inspire new analyses of “patterns of meaning.” With the 
agenda of a sequel to Interpreting Folklore (1980b) in mind, I made an e8ort not to dupli-
cate its contents, and avoided selections placed in recently published anthologies. Several 
seminal essays included here have not been generally available because they appeared in 
foreign, localized, or specialized publications. Folklorists may be familiar with the crux 
of the idea, but have not had the bene't of studying its original exposition. And for those 
new to his approach, there are classic statements of the method and theory of using folk-
lore to address various cultural issues.
!e selections show a range of analytical work, stretching from the beginnings of his 
career in the 1960s (“Folklore of Wishing Wells” from 1962 is the earliest) into the twenty-
'rst century (“As the Crow Flies” was 'rst published in 2004). In several places, I attached 
notes he penned to serve as postscripts to groundbreaking essays. !e guiding principle 
for inclusion was his call in his last public address to folklorists in 2004, to show ways “to 
understand data that would otherwise remain enigmatic, if not indecipherable.” !e data 
include not only what folklorists study, but folklorists themselves (as the concluding essays 
“On the Psychology of Collecting Folklore” [1975] and “!e Chain Letter” [1966] dem-
onstrate). I have added headnotes to the essays to place these texts in an intellectual con-
text, with attention especially to ways that Dundes’s ideas have been applied or challenged 
in other studies.
!e selections proceed generally from identi'cation (with statements of de'nition and 
method) to interpretation (with special emphasis on sources of expression in the realm of 
the mind). !e 'rst section, entitled “Structure and Analysis,” sets the stage for theoretical 
inquiry with explications of folklore as a concept and type of expression; de'nitions of basic 
terms such as “folk group,” “folk idea,” “folkloristics,” and “metafolklore”; and demonstrations 
of comparative, historical, and structural approaches that were essential tools on Dundes’s 
operating table. !e section opens with the keynote (a term which Dundes, as a musician, 
approved) for the entire volume, looking at “Folklore as a Mirror of Culture,” (1969a) and 
closes, in the controversial “Devolutionary Premise in Folklore !eory” (1975c), with a con-
templation on the way that folklorists make, and skew, their subjects. Essays in the second 
section on “Worldview and Identity” explore the social functions of folklore in expressing 
the identities of people interacting within multiple, small groups; and the broader world-
views inculcated through national and o5en transnational beliefs and narratives. Dundes 
especially de'ed expectations of “the folk” being characterized as a lower sort by showing 
the high-context lore of the learned elite; as an illustration, part 2 includes discussions of 
folklore’s meanings among scientists, musicians, and medical professionals. Religious and 
national identities are treated with analyses of narratives and trans-Atlantic folk speech.
Part 3 gets at the psychological and symbolist analysis, based on Freudian theory. At 
this point, Dundes would probably mention the predominant cognitive patterning of 
tripartite division in academic disciplines, as well as in Western civilization. !e section 
includes his distinctive contributions to modern psychoanalytical interpretation of pro-
jective inversion and womb envy, relations of masculine play to combat, and the symbol-
ist approaches of using allomotifs and symbolic equivalence. !e signi'cation of part 3 
for the entire book is located in the emphatic opening that “folklore means something,” in 
answer to the anti-intellectual popularization of folklore as ephemeral material or “mere” 
entertainment, and that what it means is critical to understanding how and why people 
express themselves. !e closing words of this section, “there will always be folklore,” are 
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also a resounding reminder of the pervasive theme of the book, that folklore exists for a 
reason: it is a social and psychological necessity.
I am grateful to Carolyn Dundes for her cooperation in this project, critical reading of 
the manuscript, and kindness toward me. I also bene'ted from the sage counsel of Alan’s 
beloved colleagues Wolfgang Mieder, Jay Mechling, Elliott Oring, Ronald L. Baker, Gary 
Alan Fine, and Haya Bar-Itzhak, and from the re6ections of his former students Rachel 
Lewis, Perin Gürel, Rosemary Lévy Zumwalt, and Maria Teresa Agozzino. I also bene'ted 
from time with his daughter, Alison Dundes Renteln, who also was a collaborator with her 
father on several publications. Of the many dinners I shared with Dundes 'lled with his 
wit and wisdom, and commands of what to do with my life, one that stands out is a reunion 
of fellow travelers in Salt Lake City at the American Folklore Society in 2004, where he 
revealed much of himself in the company of Jan Harold Brunvand, Linda Dégh, and Patricia 
Turner, in addition to the usual collegial suspects I previously mentioned. Jay Mechling 
gave me the occasion to drop in on Alan’s classroom at Berkeley, and we gained much from 
the experience. Marjolein E5ing Dijkstra, Peter Jan Margry, and the wonderful sta8 at the 
Meertens Institute in Amsterdam, where I was in residence in 2005, were tremendously 
helpful in tracking down Dundes’s European material and sharing their perceptions from 
what he would have undoubtedly called a European worldview. I should also recognize the 
many conversations I had with the late Sue Samuelson, a deep font of Dundesiana and one 
of his devotees, who became my colleague at Penn State. A5er Dundes’s death, two spe-
cial occasions 'lled with reminiscences of and tributes to Alan by numerous participants 
helped me outline the impact of his work: the Western States Folklore Society meeting held 
at the University of California at Berkeley in April 2006, and a symposium on folklore and 
American studies at Columbia University in New York City in March 2006.
At Penn State, School of Humanities sta8 member Sue Etter graciously helped with per-
missions and much more, and my colleague Michael Barton, Professor of American Studies 
and Social Science, suggested the title of the introduction and kindly passed along material 
on Dundes that he had accumulated. John Alley, executive editor at Utah State University 
Press, deserves special recognition for ushering the work along and de5ly steering the proj-
ect through various daunting channels. John Bealle enhanced this book by bringing a sharp 
folkloristic sensibility to his masterful cra5ing of the index. At home, my wife Sally Jo 
Bronner understood the need to complete this work and tell Dundes’s stories.
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1Introduction
The Analytics of Alan Dundes
In a reflective moment upon reaching forty years of age, Alan Dundes intro-
duced his 'rst collection of essays with the declaration, “My principal research inter-
ests focus upon the analysis of folklore” (1975g, xi). His emphasis of analysis signaled 
an unusual take on intellectual purpose. Most scholars respond to the question of inter-
ests with a genre, period, or location. Dundes, however, committed himself to the broad 
mission of uncovering and understanding meaning. Folklore is crucial to a knowledge of 
human experience, he observed, because “as autobiographical ethnography,” it permits a 
view “from the inside-out rather than from the outside-in.” !at is, the advantage of folk-
lore is that it conveys what people think in their own words and actions, and what they 
say or sing in folklore expresses what they might not be able to in everyday conversation. 
Dundes argued that in folklore, more than in other forms of human evidence, “one 'nds a 
people’s own unselfconscious picture of themselves” (xi). !at picture is not always pretty, 
as Dundes exposed in studies of anti-Semitic folklore, ethnic slurs, and abusive initiations. 
He insisted that uncensored, untethered scholarship was necessary to get beyond the pop-
ular urge to romanticize lore. His cause was to confront the harsh realities in expressive 
traditions, toward the twin goals of knowing ourselves internally (that is, psychologically) 
and externally (or socially and politically), and of righting wrongs in the world.
Dundes did not think of traditions as a relic of the past, and o5en took to the lectern 
to show that folklore was very much part of the modern technological world. When asked 
to speak, he gave a generic title of “Folklore in the Modern World” to cover contemporary 
joke fads, customs, and speech that re6ected current issues and conditions. In this concern 
for the emergent nature of folklore, Dundes was a champion of the modern view that folk-
lore is an artistic process rather than a dusty artifact, since, in his words, it is “something 
alive and dynamic” rather than “dead and static.” It is not something relegated to primitiv-
ized others—historically or socially—but rather a behavioral pattern that everyone exhib-
its. Lashing out at the Victorian elitist characterization of folklore as “meaningless surviv-
als,” he emphasized that “folklore is a rich and meaningful source for the study of cognition 
and values” (1975g, xi–xii). Rhetorically, he then linked analysis to the uncovering of that 
which people cannot see—mind and belief—so as to 'nd a meaningful understanding of 
“ourselves.” Stated succinctly in his 'rst collection of essays, his goal was to “bring uncon-
scious content into consciousness” (xi).
!irty years later, he was still promoting analysis and raising consciousness. During 
that time he gained a horde of students, colleagues, and followers—and a good num-
ber of detractors. But one thing for sure, he could not be ignored. His provocative analy-
ses forced scholars from a wide spectrum of 'elds to think with as well as about folklore. 
!at is, Dundes time and again pointed out that in addition to folklore being distinctive 
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as evidence, its study critically engaged issues of the day. To comprehend folklore, he 
preached, one needed to not only know the materials of tradition, but also to grasp the 
long distinguished intellectual heritage of international folklore scholarship. For his e8ort, 
he held the distinction of attracting an astounding number of festschri5en, or volumes 
by associates honoring him (Boyer, Boyer, and Sonnenberg 1993; Mieder 1994b; Bendix 
and Zumwalt 1995; Lawless 2005; Gürel, 2007). In those heartfelt tributes, one inevitably 
'nds assessments of his career and contributions to genre (proverb, humor, custom, leg-
end, and myth), method (structuralism and psychoanalysis), and group studies (American, 
Native American, South Asian, African American, Jewish, and German).
!is introduction contains its share of biographical assessment, but I propose to go 
beyond recounting his accolades to explicating his ideas in the context of folklorists’ intel-
lectual heritage and the issues of his day. I am therefore concerned not only for a reading of 
his work, but also for covering responses to his ideas as signs of a longstanding intellectual 
discourse on tradition and modernity. As an overview for the essays in this volume, I give 
attention to his distinctive rhetoric—drawing on psychological and anthropological theo-
ries, communication of structural and symbolic concepts, philosophical foundations, and, 
to borrow one of his favorite terms, his worldview. My narrative is guided chronologically 
from his 'rst contributions during the 1960s to his 'nal projects at the time of his death 
in 2005. I begin with the early development of his binary rhetoric, which I see as the hall-
mark of the “Dundesian perspective” on 'nding hidden or deep meanings through struc-
tural and symbolic analysis. I follow this section, in “!at Can’t Be Alan Dundes!,” with the 
question of why Dundes, while still a young scholar, came to be mythologized, celebrated, 
and at times demonized for this perspective. In the section on “Folk and Folklorist,” I turn 
to Dundes’s lasting contribution of a “modern” de'nition of folk and his in6uential concep-
tion of the folklorist’s signi'cance in cultural work. Inspired by emergent lore of WWDS 
(What Would Dundes Say?) circulating about Dundes late in his career, I re6ect on the cul-
mination of his hermeneutic mission and the religious devotion he aroused. In sum, I ana-
lyze Dundes’s sense of analysis to illuminate his, and our, quest for meaning in folklore.
Binarism and Deep Meaning
One way Dundes designated his analytical goal was to di8erentiate between folklore as the 
materials of folklore, and folkloristics as its theoretical study. Historically, he pointed to 
precedents in this usage in nineteenth-century folklore scholarship, and rhetorically, to the 
dichotomy between language as the material and linguistics as its study (2002a, vii; 2005c, 
385–86). !e appeal of folkloristics, which he had to insist was not another of his neolo-
gisms, was its analytical bent (1965d, 3; 1970, 324; 2005c, 385–86).
Dichotomies between inside and outside, material and its study, folk and lore, and con-
scious and unconscious pervade Dundes’s work, to the point that binarism merits recogni-
tion as a Dundesian perspective. Introducing his 'rst collection of essays, Dundes’s men-
tor Richard Dorson sketched this intellectual framework, but did not signify it. He wrote, 
“To the lexicon of the folklorist he has added linguistic terms such as ‘etic’ and ‘emic’ unit, 
morphological concepts such as ‘lack’ and ‘lack liquidated,’ typologies of collectors such 
as ‘anal retentive’ and ‘anal ejective.’ In one scintillating article a5er another he has shown, 
or suggested, the ways in which folklore re6ects our conscious and unconscious thoughts” 
(Dorson 1975, vii). To this list I would add “identi'cation and interpretation” (in “!e 
Study of Folklore in Literature and Culture” [1965c]), “deep and shallow play” (in “Gallus 
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as Phallus” [1994]), “folklore and metafolklore” (in “Metafolklore and Oral Literary 
Criticism” [1966c]), “oral and literary” (in “Folklore as a Mirror of Culture” [1969a]), 
and “literal and symbolic” (in “Getting the Folk and the Lore Together” [1976a]), which 
are highlighted in the present volume to exemplify his dichotomous rhetoric. O5en one 
oppositional category is in tension with the other, although unity or resolution may be 
possible. Dundes’s ultimate example was folkloristics, which he described as a unity that 
arose out of the nineteenth-century struggle between anthropological and literary folklore 
“camps” (1975a, 10; 1988b, ix).
Dundes explained his preoccupation with analysis as necessary to overcome the “ten-
dency to treat ‘lore’ as though it were totally separate from ‘folk,’” which could be resolved 
by emphasizing the “fact that it is told by one human being to another” (1980e, viii). He 
contended that “getting the folk and the lore together,” a phrase he used in the title of an 
article in this volume, meant a linkage of the behavioral act and social setting (folk) of the 
telling to content (lore). !us in his view, deriving the meaning of folklore requires more 
than a literal reading of the text; it calls for contextualizing the expression in behavioral 
and social conditions. He emphasized this by referring to folklore as a form of sublima-
tion: “Folklore o8ers a socially sanctioned outlet for the expression of taboo and anxiety-
provoking behavior. One can do or say in folkloric form things otherwise interdicted in 
everyday life” (2005a, 359). To grasp why folklore is needed as an expressive outlet, one 
therefore needs to know the cultural values, taboos, anxieties, and beliefs of the society in 
which individual tradition-bearers operate in everyday life.
“By analyzing folklore,” Dundes wrote, the scholar discovers “general patterns of cul-
ture” and raises “levels of consciousness” (2005a, 359). !e assumption in this statement is 
not just that folklore can be ordered according to form, but that it is cognitively patterned 
(for example, through linear, circular, or binary thinking). Another presupposition is the 
existence of an unconscious—a part of the mind containing repressed instincts and their 
representative wishes, ideas, and images which are not accessible to direct examination. 
Although some critics would posit that mental activity can only be conscious, Freudian 
theory holds that unconscious ideas can be recognized when resistance and repression, 
processes of internalizing disturbing thoughts, are overcome, so that the ideas become con-
scious, that is, externalized.
Folklore holds psychological and cultural signi'cance because, as an o5en momentary 
and a socially sanctioned outlet of expression, it uses symbols in elaborated narratives and in 
rituals to encapsulate (or intensify) experience and provide a release from reality. Folkloric 
evidence is di8erent from historical documentation because it o5en constitutes fantasy, but 
that does not detract from its truthfulness or signi'cance. “!e apparent irrationality of 
much folklore,” Dundes pointed out, “poses problems for literal-minded, historically ori-
ented folklorists. It is not easy to 'nd a rationale for the irrational, to make sense of ‘non-
sense,’ but that is what folklorists seriously interested in interpretation must try to do” (1980e, 
viii). !is statement smacks of a Hegelian process of contradiction and negation leading to 
rational unity, and one might go further to see a connection between Dundes’s construction 
of symbols in the mind as the ultimate source of expression and Hegel’s emphasis on the 
binary in mental operations to represent the mind’s process of comprehension. Although 
scholars have made comparisons between Hegel’s and Freud’s conceptions of consciousness 
and human development, Dundes invoked Freud rather than Hegel because of the central 
concern in Freud’s work—a folkloristic concern, Dundes said—for explaining the irrational 
and fantastic in expressive behavior (Dundes 1987i, 4–5; Butler 1976; Eecke 2006).
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Freud extended the concept of negation to a connection between verbalized expression 
and consciousness (Freud 1961; Eecke 2006). In this view, the danger of repressed material 
becoming conscious through talk is mitigated by the talker’s denial. Tension exists, then, 
between the unconscious and conscious, and between repressed and verbalized thought. 
Analysis resolves the con6ict, and may be con'rmed to the analyst by the teller’s response 
of “I never thought of that.” Folklore is especially important in making the unconscious 
conscious, Dundes a7rmed, because it appears to be a “safe” 'ctive or ritual space in which 
to symbolize, and thereby control, anxiety or ambiguity, but if the realistic basis of the 
symbolism is exposed, repression recurs in another form. !is transformation accounts 
for Dundes’s emphasizing the observer’s “analytical” rather than native posture in assessing 
meaning, although he urged analysts to collect “metafolklore,” tradition-bearers’ comments 
on their own traditions. !ese comments are in themselves part of belief, he observed, or 
else rationalizations for the need for expression (1966c,1975d). !e analyst is essential 
in the Dundesian process of deriving meaning; an outside eye is necessary to discern the 
inside, or hidden, codes of meaning. Some folklorists, Dundes understood, would have the 
tradition-bearers’ explanation of an event be su7cient, viewing the role of the folklorist 
as facilitating self-re6ection by natives. But in a Dundesian perspective, the analyst needs 
to maintain a detached vantage rather than a position of advocacy, precisely because folk 
material involves personal and societal anxieties that are repressed or avoided and, when 
expressed, typically disguised. Discussing photocopy lore full of scatological and sexual 
references, for example, Dundes found that “humor is a veil barely concealing an expres-
sion of most of the major problems facing contemporary American society” (Dundes and 
Pagter 1978, xviii, emphasis added). !erefore, meaning lodges outside the awareness of 
the self, requiring an analyst to recognize it. !at is not to say that folklorists, even more 
than other kinds of analysts, cannot rely on experience or participation to gain an “inside-
out” view of the material. Dundes, for instance, referred to his speci'c Navy duty, home-
ported in Italy in 1955, when he analyzed the taboo on sailors whistling on ship. Using the 
principle of “like produces like” from James Frazer’s law of homeopathic magic, he con-
cluded that whistling represented a “windstorm.” And he drew on his participation in all-
male groups for his interpretation of the roots of war in competitive phallocentric display 
that feminizes an opponent (2005c, 389; 1997e, 27). He also referred to his experience as a 
folklorist, and analyzed folklorists’ folklore, as demonstrated in the last chapter of this vol-
ume, in which he 'nds a relation between collecting items and anal retention.
Despite the desire to be objective observers, folklorists are subject to the biases of the 
society in which they work and their traditions as a subgroup, Dundes iterated (1966a, 
227, 245). For example, he pointed out the devolutionary thinking underlying Dorson’s 
comment that “the idea that folklore is dying out is itself a kind of folklore” (Dundes 2005c, 
406). !e negation of the related pronouncement by Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett that 
the discipline of folklore is “predicated on a vanishing subject” is that folklore is constantly 
emerging, which Dundes averred in the statement, “folklore continues to be alive and well 
in the modern world, due in part to increased transmission via e-mail and the Internet” 
(Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1996, 249; Dundes 2005c, 406). Belief in a vanishing subject 
results in an obsession with collection and classi'cation as an end in itself, a recovery proj-
ect that justi'es rushing into the 'eld to gather folklore before lore and 'eld both disap-
pear. Dundes decried, in natural history terms, the antiquarian “quest for the quaint or...
curious” as “butter6y collecting”: “Items of folklore are treated as rare exotica, metaphori-
cally speaking, to have a pin stuck through them and mounted in a display archival case 
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such that it is almost impossible to imagine the folklore items were ever alive (that is, per-
formed). Context is typically ignored, and it is the text only that is prized by the local col-
lector” (2005c, 388).
A connotation of the devolutionary impulse to “get the lore before it disappears” is the 
need to witness lore for oneself, an empiricist assumption that leads to the glori'cation of 
knowledge discovery via the recording of lore rather than to the interpretation of aggre-
gate data or individual texts/contexts. !e implication is that a struggling or declining 
discipline may project its fear into a collecting praxis and the observation of a “devolving” 
subject. Denying folklore’s persistence as a natural process of culture a7rms the anxiety of 
“falling.” Or the devolutionary belief may disguise a deeper fear involving the folklorist’s 
motivation for interest in the material, linked, according to Dundes, with anal retention in 
the obsessive behavior of gathering, ordering, and piling (1975c; 1975e). !e inference is 
that a way to deal with a problem of self is to attribute the problem to someone else or to 
something outside the self.
An alternative to devolution and the collecting obsession, one promoted by Dundes 
so as to “modernize” the subject, is recognizing that the study of folklore is itself emer-
gent in nineteenth-century Europe, arising out of the perceived con6icts between rural 
life and industrialization, culture-based nationalism and imperial monarchies, and colo-
nialism and cultural relativism (1965c, 1982b). For Dundes, folklore demanded an ana-
lytical project to explain its emergence and ubiquity. !e binary matters to be resolved 
derive from its de'nitive characteristics of multiplicity and variation, leading to its qual-
ity of constantly changing yet staying the same, being speci'cally situated and universal, 
old and yet new (Dundes 1989c, 193–94). Rather than being dragged down by a narrow 
insistence on oral tradition, in the twenty-'rst century the science of tradition 6ourishes, 
expands, and spreads because it has to, if sense is to be made of mass-mediated culture and, 
further, so that this knowledge may be applied to address social problems in the world 
(1965c, 1980h).
Dundes linked dualism (particularly the importance of “double meaning”) in psy-
choanalysis with the binary basis of structuralism. !e pivotal structuralist approaches 
of Vladimir Propp (syntagmatic, relating to a sequential pattern of plot functions) and 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (paradigmatic, relating to a thematic set of contrasting relations), 
while o5en set in opposition to one another in surveys of structuralist approaches, are 
uni'ed by Dundes to reveal mental processes underlying the structural patterns of fan-
tastical expressions. For example, in the article “Binary Opposition in Myth,” reproduced 
in this volume, Dundes concluded, “To the extent that the debate between Propp and 
Lévi-Strauss itself constitutes a kind of academic binary opposition, we earnestly trust that 
this essay will be understood as a form of constructive mediation” (1997a, 48). !e point 
is that binary structure is basic, whether as the basis of a story (lack to lack liquidated), 
method (identi'cation and interpretation), formation of a group (requiring at least two 
persons), authenticity of an item (con'rmed by two or more versions), or indeed in the 
concept of folklore (uniting the social “folk” and the expressive “lore”). !e binary is sig-
ni'cant in this perspective not just as a framework, but as a representation of the way the 
mind works—as a psychological concept—and also as the social basis of transmitting, or 
sharing, folklore. !erefore, dualism constitutes the cognitive grammar of the expression 
itself, and the binary construction of a story or event comprises the drama or tension that 
draws attention to the expression, as apart from other forms of communication. Analysis 
is thus a discernment of this source—in the mind, group, and expression.
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Binarism as a philosophy, even more than a method, that is connected to structural 
analysis is o5en attributed to Ferdinand de Saussure, a Swiss-born contemporary of Freud. 
!e tie between the two is their shared interest in mental processes that are revealed in 
language. Saussure was concerned less with the laws of a particular language than with the 
rules governing all languages, which get at how humans cognitively order reality and create 
culture. Saussure’s structuralism, which was adopted by notable scholars concerned with 
folklore such as Lévi-Strauss, Roman Jakobson, Petr Bogatyrev, and Dell Hymes, is the 
distinction of parole (translated from the French as both “word” and “speech”) and langue 
(“language” or “tongue”; summarized by folklorists following Noam Chomsky as “compe-
tence”) wherein the former represents the utterances of members of a language commu-
nity (in speech acts, or “performance”), which manifest an underlying structure, and the 
latter is the generative structure (Hymes 1972, 47). Of importance to Dundes’s semiotic 
theory of meaning was the resulting conclusion that words do not necessarily possess an 
intrinsic or a historically emergent signi'cance. If langue is the totality of language, then 
parts of that structure have relationships to one another that can be independent of utter-
ances with natural associations in the external world. Such relationships are ones of dif-
ference, because they refer to, indeed create, categories that distinguish signs from others, 
such as a dog not being a cat, horse, or pig. Dundes’s scorn for literal-minded folklorists 
was rooted in their tendency to treat the utterances as reality, rather than analyzing the 
relationships that underlie and generate those utterances and order reality. In this model, 
language is always changing, but it is dependent on the social conventions established in a 
community of speakers as opposed to individual speakers’ wills.
In “Proverbs and the Ethnography of Speaking,” Dundes used the distinction between 
parole and langue to assert that an ethnographic goal of folklore research is geared toward 
communication or context. According to Dundes, folkloristics “is not simply the delin-
eation of the structure of language as an isolated symbolic system or code, but rather the 
attempt to discover exactly how language is used in speci'c situations. . . . In this type 
of study, one is interested in not only the rules of a language, but also the rules for the 
use of the language” (Arewa and Dundes 1964, 71; see also Dundes 1966a. 242; 1976b, 
1504; Ben-Amos 1972). !is methodological statement led to his assertion of the impor-
tance of the social or contextual basis of folklore at the end of the essay: “Let’s put the folk 
back in folklore!” (adapted linguistically from the structure of “Let’s put the Christ back 
in Christmas,” he said). Separating himself from other contextualists, however, Dundes 
warned against confusing surface use and disguised meaning. He inferred meaning from 
symbolic clues that might be outside the awareness of the speaker, and not apparent from 
the context. “Use is observed or collected from natives, while the interpretation” of mean-
ing, he mused, is inevitably made from the analyst’s viewpoint (Dundes 1975c, 52).
If Dundes implied that Saussure’s dualism, which foregrounds the analytical use of cul-
tural context and communication, is liberating, many post-structuralists have been uncom-
fortable with the “value hierarchy” in the binary constructions of either/or statements. !e 
unavoidable domination of one pole over another, critics claim, results from the assump-
tion that one side of the dichotomy, as linguist Katharina Barbe has written, “is seen as 
purer, more positive, and more basic than the other side” (2001, 89). Judging from his 
disapproval of elitism and his mediation of the objective/subjective dichotomy, Dundes 
might have agreed to an extent, but his interpretations suggest that he remained commit-
ted to the idea that the binary is fundamental because it represents the cognitive process. 
Saussure’s semiotic distinction between “signi'er” (an acoustic image) and “signi'ed” (a 
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concept) is evident in the Dundesian di8erence between use and meaning. In Dundes’s 
writing, I do not 'nd the post-structuralist view that binary distinctions are necessarily 
motivated by a desire to dominate, although Dundes, in his exposure of the construction 
of “othering” and “chauvinism” in narrative and speech, was well aware of the logic of impe-
rialism in the intellectual constructions of West/East, civilized/primitive, white/black, 
mainstream/ethnic, men/women, and indeed scienti'c/folk (Dundes 1980h, 2; Dundes 
1980a; Ashcro5, Gri7ths, and Ti7n 2000, 24–25). Dundes brought into consciousness 
the unconscious predilection for binaries to comment on unequal power relations.
Dundes is o5en credited with pointing out the predominant cognitive pattern of tri-
chotomy in American culture, which raises the question of the more universal role of the 
binary. His o5-cited essay, “!e Number !ree in American Culture” [1980d], drew 
meaning from a pattern that is prevalent but is not recognized; indeed, his lead-in is a 
quotation from Bronislaw Malinowski’s A Scienti%c !eory of Culture (1944): “Nothing 
is as di7cult to see as the obvious” (Dundes 1980d, 134). “Folklore,” Dundes asserted in 
this essay, “is prime data for investigations of cognitive patterning” (137). As was his style, 
Dundes gave a broad array of evidence, such as: “In folk speech, one can give three cheers 
for someone, but not two or four. (And each cheer may consist of ‘Hip, Hip, Hooray.’) !e 
starter for a race will say ‘One, two, three, go.’ He will not count to two or four. (Cf. !e 
three commands ‘On your mark, get set, go.’) !e alphabet is referred to as the ABCs and 
in the common folk simile, something is as easy as ABC; one does not speak of learning his 
ABs or his ABCDs” (136). His essential point was that three appears to be culture-speci'c, 
especially when compared to the “obsessive character” of the Native American use of four 
as a ritual or sacred number (135).
Although Dundes went no further in explaining the contrastive use of four in many 
Native American groups, I propose following this analytical approach to demonstrate that 
the signi'cance of four in relation to the cosmology of space is natural; four represents a 
sacred circle, or the state of being symbolically complete, because it represents the four 
cardinal points forming the diameter and radius of circular space. Four stands for every-
where, that is, as far as the eye can see. From this standpoint, the Asian use of 've as a pat-
tern number in rituals and narratives adds the inner self, or center, as a point where the 
directions cross in the circle, suggesting the importance of introspection. Trichotomy, in 
my analysis, implies a bodily representation, apart from the binary mind, especially in the 
triangular importance of the head (as a source of wisdom and humanness) and shoulders 
(representing bodily support and strength) (Bronner 1986b, 15–16; see also Lease 1919, 
72). Exploring the variety of possible meanings, Dundes suggested that trichotomy relates 
to the union that is the basis of society—the mother, father, and resulting child—before 
giving a psychoanalytic interpretation. Dundes used Freud in drawing the symbolic equiv-
alence of three as “a masculine symbol, the phallus cum testiculis” and provocatively added 
that its prevalence in male-dominated Western civilization signi'es “compensatory activ-
ity for not being able to give birth to children as females do.” “!is type of explanation,” 
he mused, “would also make clear why aspects of American culture which are exclusively 
masculine, e.g., the military, the Boy Scouts, baseball, are especially three-ridden. (Note 
also that the Christian Trinity is all masculine. !is would be further evidence that three is 
male creativity denying or replacing female creativity.)” (1980d, 158).
Dualism, Dundes observed, “is probably worldwide” and “assumed to have objective 
universal validity” (1965a, 186). Common “polarities,” he philosophized, “include: life/
death, body/soul, and male/female.” He pointed out that the social extension of cognitive 
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dichotomy was indicated by the concepts of “self/other” and “us/them,” suggesting that 
the singular requires a pair for a sense of identity, to not only a7rm what one is, but also 
what one is not (Dundes 1980d, 135). He also maintained the dyad as the basic unit of 
“sharing” and “transmitting” folklore. As linguistic evidence, he could have mentioned the 
colloquial expression of the base concept of the social in the folk saying, “Two is company 
and three’s a crowd.” Although Dundes did not go further with this line of reasoning, it 
is possible to extend the relation of the binary to the singular. Related to the “two is com-
pany” folk saying is the symbolic equating of one with emptiness in sayings such as “One 
is none, two is some, three is a sort, four is a mort,” “One body is no body,” and “One’s as 
good as none” (Stevenson 1948, 1717–18). To be alone is to be anti-social, or unethical, 
since “only caring for oneself ” implies an extreme egotism or sel'shness (as in “looking out 
for number one”). To be single is to be unattached—marginally a “loner,” or odd (which is 
implied in “being reclusive” or “a hermit”), or jocularly in the wellerism, “Every one to his 
own taste, said the old woman as she kissed her cow”;—and nontraditional, anti-social, or 
unique, expressed in the phrase “going it alone.” Dundes connected an exclusive scienti'c 
or elitist way of thinking with the singular notion of monolithism when he wrote, “inas-
much as folklorists, despite the fact that they are accustomed to thinking of variation in 
the texts of folklore, o5en wrongly assume that there is only one correct meaning or inter-
pretation. !ere is no one right interpretation of an item of folklore any more than there is 
but one right version of a game or song. (We must overcome our penchant for monolithic 
perspectives as exempli'ed in monotheism, monogamy, and the like)” (1975d, 51–52).
!e self, I would add, is a reference point from which historical as well as social con-
nections are made, especially in references to someone being “original” ('rst), in the sense 
of being responsible for a creation (with Adamic overtones of Genesis) that is unprece-
dented and was copied therea5er. !is cognitive association with the creative “ur-form” 
carries over into the frequent assumption that a single source of creation can be found for 
folklore, rather than a trans-cultural or psychological explanation of traditional expres-
sions as “responses.” Dundes was not unconcerned about origins, but he tended to locate 
expressions cross-culturally, o5en in far-6ung environments, and suggested psychological 
responses rather than di8usion to explain the similarities.
Binary segmentation of the self (such as in the psychoanalytic concepts of id and ego), 
is shown in the dichotomous vernacular expressions of “being alone with one’s thoughts” 
or “talking to oneself,” which sociolinguistically implies an agent and a receiver of the mes-
sage, and suggests a conversation between an “outer” and an “inner voice” (see Mechling 
2006). A binary structure di8ers from other structural concepts in that it tends to signify 
psychological and social processes, while singularism and trichotomy typically have corpo-
real associations.1
Taking a cue from the dualism between manifest and latent meanings in “depth” psy-
chology, Dundesian analysis uncovers “deep” meaning in the sense of something being 
about something that turns out to be something else. !is point is probably the great-
est barrier to acceptance of Dundes’s interpretations, since there is frequently an assump-
tion in his interpretations that the message the folklorist hears or sees is a disguise or 
distortion of meaning rather than truth taken at face value (see Dundes 1976b; Cohen 
1980, 47–50; Oring 1975b; Oring 2003; Koven 2005). Even the rhetoric of “informant,” 
used in collecting, suggests that something is revealed rather than in need of “interpreta-
tion” (i.e., as if the message was coded). !e way to get to the “underlying” structure, the 
“hidden” meaning, or the “unstated” reason—to cite some rhetoric of depth analysis—is 
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through identi'cation and comparison of ciphers. Rather than being revealed in observ-
able behavior (what Dundes called “descriptive data”) in the 'eld, symbolic meaning is dis-
cerned “beneath” the surface and traced to the mind. A critical question in this approach 
is whether the meaning can be “proven.” Dundes addressed this issue by underscoring the 
value of interpretation, which presupposes that the subject or text of analysis is polyse-
mous, rather than being misconstrued as having a singularly correct meaning that is, in his 
words, “monolithic” (1975d, 52; 1980e, ix).
Dundes used “interpretation” much as Freud used it in Interpretation of Dreams ([1900] 
1999), to denote the results of an analytical process, that is, possibilities suggested by the 
analyst from attention to talked texts, and which are outside the awareness of the patient. 
Freud studied both dreams and folklore, and in fact related the two (Freud and Oppenheim 
1958). Both are o5en viewed as “unintelligible and absurd,” and as carrying little signi'cance, 
although Freud ventured to show that they are important psychologically (Freud [1900] 
1999, 128). In his essay “!e Method of Interpreting Dreams: An Analysis of a Specimen 
Dream,” Freud called for a “scienti'c treatment of the subject” involving the materialization 
of the content of a dream into comparable texts (132). Freud warned that “the object of our 
attention is not the dream as a whole but the separate portions of its content” (136). He 
described the analysis of the portions as a “decoding method, since it treats dreams as a kind 
of cryptography in which each sign can be translated into another sign” (130). !e inter-
pretation posits “hidden” meanings that the actor is not aware of. !ey are deduced from 
general principles, such as “a dream is the ful'lment of a wish” (154). Freud outlined a mani-
fest content (manifester Trauminhalt), or “objects, actions, settings, and words that appear 
in the dream and are retained in memory,” and latent content (latenter Trauminhalt), the 
“unconscious referents of the manifest content” (Oring 1993, 279). Tests can be applied to 
validate the symbolic conclusion about the unconscious thoughts, motivations, or patterns 
(Traumgedanken)—through corroboration in other “cases,” and a reading of the analyzed 
texts for consistency (see Sherwood 1969, 196–202; Fine 1992; Oring 2003, 58–70).
But what if the patient or tradition-bearer denies the analytical meaning, even if the 
goal of making the unconscious content conscious is to “gain insight” and, ultimately, the 
reintegration of (or rationale for) personality or culture? Dundes took negation as con'r-
mation, for, as he wrote, “if the participants consciously realized what they were doing, they 
would in all probability not be willing to participate. It is precisely the symbolic facade that 
makes it possible for people to participate in an activity without consciously understand-
ing the signi'cance of that participation” (2005a, 357). In other words, if the tradition-
bearers were aware of the “deep” meaning, then they would not need the tradition.
Dundesian analysis identi'es basic patterns or concepts, and consequently arrives at 
interpretations of their associations through symbolic equivalences (allomotifs) and 
social outlooks (worldviews). My thesis regarding Dundes’s analytics is that his project 
to uncover “meaning” depended structurally on binary presumptions, and contextually 
on the “modern” reconstruction of folkloristics to “interpret.” His goals were to centralize 
folklore studies as an academic discipline, and disrupt social hierarchy by conceptualizing 
tradition as human necessity. Meaning and interpretation in Dundesian analysis are typi-
cally doubled. Meaning divides into literal (manifest) and 'gurative (latent) layers, while 
interpretation has literary (textual/contextual) and religious (hermeneutic/mythological) 
as well as psychological and social connotations. With this in mind, in the sections that 
follow I will examine examples of his analysis to answer the doubled question of what folk-
lore means, and what Dundes meant.
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“!at Can’t Be Alan Dundes!”
In 1974, Richard Reuss drew attention to the “folklore of folklorists” by titling his article 
“!at Can’t Be Alan Dundes! Alan Dundes Is Taller !an !at!” !e exclamatory phrase 
was suggested by students at an American Folklore Society meeting, who traded narra-
tives of their special awe for Dundes among the giants of the 'eld. Reuss noted the “niag-
ara of Alan Dundes lore washing over American academe,” but in a bait-and-switch tac-
tic, informed the reader that the essay was not about Dundes at all. !e phrase signi'ed, 
though, that even before Dundes turned forty, he had achieved mythological status and 
had come to represent folklore study as a disciplinary enterprise. !e point of the exclama-
tion, according to Reuss, was that “Alan Dundes in reality is taller than average, 've feet 
eleven and one-half inches to be precise. Even so, it seems fair to say that were he seven feet 
tall he still would be hard put to measure up physically to the larger-than-life image of Alan 
Dundes created in the minds of many students through reading and discussion of his wide-
ranging and proli'c publications, his expansive writing style, and the constant references 
made to him and his work in the classroom of a local university” (1974, 308). !is nega-
tion of reality by expectation and image raises the question of the real life of Alan Dundes, 
and how he came to be mythologized. If this is how others view Dundes, then how has he 
narrated himself in symbolic autobiography?
At the time that Reuss wrote his essay, much about the rising star was ambiguous. He 
revealed little of himself, although Richard Dorson (1975) gave a heroic cast to Dundes’s 
character when he introduced Analytic Essays in Folklore, describing the author as a “bril-
liant” prodigy with an uncanny mental “gi5,” because he obtained his doctorate in folk-
lore at Indiana University while still in his twenties and rose precociously to full profes-
sor by the age of thirty-three at the highly regarded University of California at Berkeley. 
Dorson told the following story: “While in my classes in folklore I insisted on the student 
documenting each textual item of folklore with informant data. Dundes, once a student 
in those classes, went one better on becoming the instructor and required that his student 
collectors in addition interpret the meaning of the recorded text. His quest for meanings 
has led him to seek context along with text, metafolklore as well as folklore, and thereby to 
reorient the conception of 'eldwork; interpretations of tradition bearers should carry at 
least as much weight as those of investigators” (1975, vii). !e junior Dundes, Dorson inti-
mated, had bested the doctoral father and risen triumphantly to take his place among the 
pantheon of the discipline’s gods (perhaps to replace the father). While proud of his boy, 
Dorson, like a disapproving dad, had questioned the rebellious spirit of his gang of “young 
Turks,” and took junior to task for embracing a “school of interpretation most abhorrent 
to orthodox folklorists” (1972a, 25, 45). Perhaps that was the reference that motivated 
Dundes to subtitle a work on Jewish folklore “an unorthodox essay,” playing on the double 
meaning of orthodox with respect to religion and convention as he applied a psychoana-
lytic approach to modern-day customs of circumventing restrictive Sabbath rules (2002c; 
see also Koven 2005).
Psychoanalytic inquiry into folklore was hardly new during the 1960s, when Dundes 
raised its banner as a “grand theory” for folkloristics (Dundes 1987i). Freud, beginning in 
the late nineteenth century, devoted much of his symbolist theory to the analysis of jokes, 
taboos, and myths, and among his followers and critics—Ernest Jones, Géza Róheim, 
Bruno Bettelheim, Karl Abraham, Otto Rank, Carl Jung, and !eodor Reik—extended 
the query of folklore as a form of fantasy and projection that related to human development 
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and mental processes. Yet it was unusual for folklorists to apply psychoanalytic theory; 
both Freud and psychoanalysis were absent from the major mid-twentieth-century refer-
ence work of the 'eld, Funk and Wagnalls Standard Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology and 
Legend, although “anthropological school” and “historic-geographic method” (literary) 
were featured entries (Leach 1949; see also Boas 1920, 318–21; Taylor 1940, 17). Despite 
psychiatrists’ ubiquitous attention to folklore for inquiries into the human psyche, the 
main intellectual project of folklorists in the mid-twentieth-century was to trace the ori-
gin and distribution of folk material. Some of their concern was for showing folklore as 
an ancient source of literature, and for Dundes, that was driven by a devolutionary prem-
ise. !e landmark works of the Motif-Index of Folk-Literature ([1932–36] 1975) and !e 
Types of the Folktale (commonly referred to as the tale-type index [1928] 1961) , prepared 
by Stith !ompson at Indiana University, and other classi'catory compendia for riddles, 
ballads, proverbs, and songs in6uenced by the Finnish “historic-geographic” school, served 
notice, in Dundes’s words, that “folklorists as a group tend to be biased in favor of literal, 
not symbolic, interpretations of folklore. !ey seek historical rather than psychological 
explanations of folkloristic phenomena” (1972, 9). Even among his fellow “young Turks,” 
who were developing ethnographies of performance and communication during the 1960s, 
Dundes stood out. He complained that they had a reductionist tendency to treat folklore 
as “situated events” representing social relations, rather than as symbolic texts of psycho-
logical signi'cation. He derided the favor of his colleagues for Cli8ord Geertz’s in6uen-
tial performative concept of reading events as texts of “deep play” (1972, 1994), which 
Dundes slighted as “shallow play” because it did not posit psychological motivations for 
enacting the play, and remained at the level of social “re6ection” (1994). He accused his 
seniors of dehumanizing folklore “by treating lore as though it had nothing whatever to 
do with folk,” and of prudishly suppressing or ignoring the obscene materials that 6our-
ish in oral tradition and resound with sexual symbolism. Dundes liked to point out that 
!ompson le5 out material under “X” in the Motif-Index that he felt was obscene, even 
though it was this content that was most vibrantly oral in culture (Dundes 1972, 9–10). 
Dundes argued that humanizing folklore, or emphasizing the folk, would lead to psycho-
logical and social interpretations of people rather than a super'cial “literal” (and therefore 
literary/historical) emphasis on lore.
From what mysterious roots had Dundes come out of the horizon, as either heretic or 
prophet? I cannot document a miraculous birth, but by his account, there were formative 
experiences (usually described in pairs of events and characters) and a moment of conver-
sion that led him to take a career path of folklore study. His early life was 'lled with both 
city and country. He was born on September 8, 1934, in New York City, to a lawyer father 
and musician mother. When Dundes was still an infant, the couple moved the family sixty-
've miles north of the city to a farm located near Patterson, New York, and there, in 1936, 
a sibling was added—his sister Marna. Being close in age, she was likely a factor in his later 
observations about the signi'cance of sibling rivalry in the content of children’s folklore. 
His father died in 1952, leaving the teenager in di7cult emotional and 'nancial straits as 
he pursued his education. Dundes recalled, many years later, “I lost my father when I was a 
sophomore, in 1952, and I have never completely gotten over it. . . . I have a picture of him 
on my dresser in the little room o8 our bedroom and so I see him every morning of my 
life” (Mieder 2006, 215). He recollected his father as an in6uence on his folklore interest 
because of his talents as a raconteur, and his early exit from Dundes’s life may have in6u-
enced the folklorist’s thinking about the father 'gure, as well his reputation for taking a 
12  !e Meaning of Folklore
paternalistic role toward students (Dundes 1962c; Dundes 1976d; Dundes and Edmunds 
1995; Dundes 1987c; see also Bendix 1995, 58–62).
Re6ecting on his family’s ethnic background, Dundes acknowledged that while his par-
ents were both Jewish, he was raised in a secular environment. In fact, he attributed their 
move to the farm as an escape from religious piety. He recalled, “I gathered from numerous 
conversations that both my parents had felt somewhat su8ocated by the close Jewish atmo-
sphere in which they lived in New York City and so when I was just one year old, they 6ed 
to a rural area near Patterson, New York, about sixty miles north of the city. . . . Although 
almost all of our family friends were Jewish, I did not have much exposure to formal reli-
gious practices. As a result, although I was always proud of my heritage, I felt quite ignorant 
of the religious elements in Judaism” (xii). Still, he absorbed reformist values expressed in 
tikkun olam, literally translated as “repairing the world,” which is o5en invoked to connote 
a Jewish commitment to social justice, with the implication that learning can e8ect change. 
He said that he certainly related to Freud so strongly later because of the power of his ideas, 
but also because Freud, as a secular Jew, was seeking to explain issues of identity and anti-
Semitism, which connected with what Dundes faced in life.2 In his own analytics, Dundes 
considered Freud’s use of exemplary Jewish jokes in the light of the Vienna’s scholar’s secu-
lar Jewish background. Dundes also recognized the linkage of cultural relativity espoused 
by another in6uential scholar with a Jewish background, Franz Boas, the father of modern 
anthropology (Dundes 1987i, 23–24).
Re6ective of his ambivalent feelings about his ethnicity, Dundes’s analytics tended to 
emphasize gender, rather than religious di8erence, as primary (1997c, 155–57). Dundes’s 
experience with anti-Semitism and his emotional response to the horrors of the Holocaust 
were nonetheless signi'cant factors in his later writing on German national character, eth-
nic slurs, blood libel and wandering Jew legends, and JAP ( Jewish-American Princess) and 
Auschwitz jokes (Dundes 1984a, Dundes and Hauschild 1987, 1987e).3 He held misgiv-
ings about regulation in organized religion, perhaps as a result of his parents’ conversa-
tions about the “su8ocation” of the synagogue, and he knew that some of his writing on 
religion was taken as irreverent, if not sacrilegious (2005c, 405). Nonetheless, in his book 
Holy Writ as Oral Lit, Dundes avowed that he held “a lifelong love of the Bible”; his “fam-
ily Bible,” he wrote, was the King James version (1999, vii). Rather than being a believer in 
one creed, however, he claimed to be interested in the nature of religion, especially to test 
Freud’s comment that “a large portion of the mythological conception of the world which 
reaches far into the most modern religions is nothing but psychology projected to the outer 
world” (Dundes 1976b, 1505, emphasis in original).4
I see a connection between the ambiguity of his religious a7liation and his later asser-
tion that a crucial consequence of folkloric transmission was a person holding simultaneous 
identities (1980h, 9; see also 1989c). He did not want to be essentialized into one mono-
lithic stereotype; he had many other traits by which he socially identi'ed himself at di8erent 
times (folklorist, musician, father, professor). Although his father had been the president of 
a Jewish fraternity at City College of New York, the son did not associate with Jewish com-
munal organizations in the same way. He re6ected that when he became a folklorist, it was 
not to 'nd his roots, although there are hints of a concern for social justice. He was preoc-
cupied with groups outside his heritage that had su8ered discrimination or colonialism: 
“Native Americans, African Americans, and the peoples of India, among others,” accord-
ing to his memoirs. It was not until a fateful trip to Israel in 1999, he acknowledged, that 
he “set about learning about Jewish religious ritual in earnest,” although he did not become 
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religious (2002c, xii). Even when he began writing on Jewish customs, he wanted to show 
that they were not exclusive, and he identi'ed trans-cultural sources, a strategy that he also 
applied to the Christian Bible and Muslim Qur’an (1999, 2002c, 2003a). He also raised eye-
brows by explaining customs of kashrut and Sabbath laws in relation to an anal-erotic cul-
tural personality, and 'nding homoeroticism in Islam’s position of prayer (2002c; 2004c).
When Dundes “set about learning,” he read everything he could get his hands on, and 
at times referred to himself as more of a “library scholar” than a 'eldworker. His voracious 
appetite for reading owed to a childhood regimen. His parents gave him an incentive to 
read as a young boy; they o8ered him a dollar for every hundred books he read, and he was 
free to choose the subjects. To earn the money, he had to keep a record of the books he 'n-
ished. Standing out in number and memory in his accounting were anthologies of fairy 
tales. His parents’ home was 'lled with books, and he remembered that “there was a multi-
volume series called Journeys !rough Bookland . . . [in which] were interspersed fairy tales, 
and I recall thumbing through the pages of the various volumes in search of these tales” 
(2002a, xi). If his eyes were already set on folk literature, his ears perked up for orally told 
jokes, and he developed a lively repertoire of his own. He recalled, “from grade school on, 
I became avidly interested in jokes, frequently repeating favorites to anyone who would 
listen to me. I recall with nostalgia how my father, despite his fatigue a5er a day of work 
sixty miles from home, would o5en share a ‘new’ joke he had heard during the day.” As 
would occur so o5en later in life, an interest in oral material led him to scour the library. 
He added: “During my high school years, I eagerly devoured the few compilations of pub-
lished jokes available in local libraries. . . . In college, as an English major, I learned to appre-
ciate humor in more literary terms” (1987c, v).
Alan Dundes’s library in his 
home, with cultural artifacts. 
Photo by Simon Bronner
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A childhood passion for music, o5en overlooked in intellectual biographies of Dundes, 
deserves mention (Zumwalt 1995; Georges 2004; Mieder 2004; Hansen 2005; Gürel 
2006; Nader and Brandes 2006). In6uenced by his piano-playing mother, he was accom-
plished in music, studying the clarinet for many years and attending the Manhattan School 
of Music to take up music theory. Dundes recognized musical notation as a structural 
and symbolic system. He had a trained eye and ear for rendering performances in read-
able form, and seeing the relations of multiple parts. In “!e Number !ree in American 
Culture,” he o8ered musical systems as a prime example of the principle that trichotomy 
consists of positions located in reference to some initial point. “In music,” he authorita-
tively wrote, “the point of reference may be ‘middle C,’ which serves, for example as a mid-
point between the [bass] and treble clefs in addition to functioning as a point of reference 
from which to describe voice ranges (e.g., ‘two octaves above middle C’)” (1980d, 136). 
He used music, too, to contrast Western and “primitive” music, in which “ternary time is 
not common . . . and thus its presence in Western and American music is all the more strik-
ing” (148). He also criticized ballad scholars for excising music from discussions of the 
text, and pointed out the nominal connection of the ballad to linguistic roots of “dance.” If 
scholars made this connection, Dundes opined, they would realize that the ballad was not 
universal, as it tended to appear when they equated it with the folk-narrative text, but was 
culturally limited to Indo-European areas (1996b, ix–x).
When Dundes entered Yale, he declared music as his major. But a job in the library, 
working with the 'ction collection, piqued his interest in literary classics, and he 
switched to English literature, to his mother’s chagrin. His entrée into psychoanalytic 
theory occurred in a Yale classroom, through the reading of Otto Rank’s !e Myth of the 
Birth of the Hero ([1909] 2004) during his sophomore year. Rank had been a student 
of Freud’s, and Dundes was mesmerized by his interpretation of the structural similarity 
in the hero cycles of di8erent cultures. It provided a stark contrast to the dehumanized 
rhetoric of stimuli and reinforcement he heard in an elective course on behavioral psy-
chology the previous semester. He recalled feeling disappointed in the material on behav-
ioral psychology, because “it dealt only with explaining how homing pigeons managed 
to 'nd their way and how white mice succeeded in running through mazes” (2002a, xii). 
!us, Dundes’s later equation of psychology with psychoanalysis was not out of a lack of 
awareness of other approaches; his conversion experience came from viewing the mind, 
rather than the body, as source (Dundes 1991a). Re6ecting on what he called his “Aha!” 
response, he wrote, “perhaps it was my early attraction to fairy tales that made me check 
out the book, but in any event, I can still recall the thrill of discovery as I read Rank’s 
remarkable essay” (2002a, xii). Even before he encountered the professional study of folk-
lore, he had immersed himself in reading Freud. !e later in6uence of Rank’s analysis of 
traditional narrative can be discerned speci'cally in Dundes’s writing on the hero cycle, 
and more generally in a concern for the psychological impact of birth and the mother’s 
role in development, matters that forced a parting of the ways between Rank and Freud 
(Dundes 1990). Rank challenged Freud’s assertion that myth and religion were rooted 
in the Oedipal complex by positing a pre-Oedipal phase, involving a separation anxiety 
([1924] 1993; [1909] 2004; see also Lieberman 1998). Dundes referred to this phase, 
absent from Freud’s theories, in his interpretations of 6ood and creation myths as male 
fantasies of female birth (1987b; 1988a).
Dundes’s Yale classroom experience was one of two events that he called life-changing. 
He connected Rank’s and Freud’s studies of myths and jokes with his literary studies when 
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he asked Paul Pickrel, his instructor for a course on the nineteenth-century English novel, 
whether he could investigate allusions to rural customs in the novels of !omas Hardy. 
Uncertain of his ability to guide the young Dundes down this route, Pickrel referred him 
to faculty who could at Indiana University. Dundes completed his master of arts in teach-
ing of English at Yale, and prepared for doctoral study at Indiana that would allow him, 
he said, “to combine my earlier interest in Freud with my chosen 'eld of study: folklore” 
(2002a, xiii). In light of his writings—on the representation of the Civil Rights movement 
in folklore, and on conditions in the Soviet bloc—I believe that his attraction to folklore 
was also driven by what he perceived as its social relevance at a time of rising racial con6ict 
nationally and Cold War political tension internationally. !is is evident in pleas early in 
his writing career for cross-cultural attention to folklore as a way to bridge social and polit-
ical di8erences (1969a; 1971b; 1973; Dundes and Abrahams 1969).
Another factor in his turn to folklore study was his talent as a joke teller. Psychoanalytic 
literature broached jokes together with folk and fairy tales because of their apparent sym-
bolism of anxiety and aggression, but folklore studies, oriented toward literary and anthro-
pological concerns for the purity of ancient texts and the sanctity of pre-modern cultures, 
respectively, rarely interpreted them psychologically. Dundes also was drawn to psycho-
analysts’ consideration of folk narrative, 'nding meaning in his childhood immersion in 
fairy tales as an alternative to the political uses of Märchen in the cause of romantic nation-
alism, including the Grimm Brothers in the nineteenth century and the Nazis and Soviets 
in the twentieth century (1966a, 233–34; 1969a, 472–73; 1970, 337; Oinas 1978; Dow 
and Lixfeld 1994; Bronner 1998, 184–236).
Reacting negatively to romantic nationalism and the conventional division of folklore 
studies by nation, Dundes’s philosophical inclination was toward a global view of culture 
as well as politics (Dundes 1969a, 472–73). He believed that a fuller international aware-
ness of folklore taught tolerance and social unity. One can read this sentiment in his com-
plaint, published in a Britannica yearbook, that “folklore has too long been the tool of 
regionalism and nationalism.” Lamenting that “folklore has more o5en been a divisive 
than a unifying in6uence in the world,” he philosophized that “surely it is di7cult to con-
sider as an enemy someone who shares the same folktales and customs,” and gave as exam-
ples the common traditions of peoples of Europe, Arabs and Jews, and Turks and Greeks. 
“If the world is ever to be truly united,” he mused, “then the world’s peoples as a ‘folk’ must 
have a world folklore. Some of this may come from the identi'cation of old traditions held 
in common and some from newly generated ones” (1970, 337).
Dundes spent a year in France before he ventured out to the Midwest for doctoral study, 
and the tutelage of eminent folklorists Richard Dorson (known for historical approaches 
to American folklore), Erminie Wheeler-Voegelin (a specialist on Native American lore), 
Felix Oinas (an Estonian scholar from whom he learned of Russian formalist Vladimir 
Propp), David Bidney (a philosophical scholar of mythology and humanistic anthropol-
ogy who was also accused of bucking scholarly orthodoxy), and Warren Roberts (a disciple 
of folktale scholar Stith !ompson’s historic-geographic school). He traveled there with 
his bride Carolyn M. Browne, a graduate student of playwrighting in Yale’s Drama School, 
whom he married in September 1958. He taught conversational English and managed to 
collect folklore in French, resulting in his 'rst publication on tongue twisters in the French 
Review of 1960. Even in this early note, he demonstrated his attention to structure by not-
ing a discernible pattern in the prevalence of word sequences containing the /s/ and /š/ 
phonemes (giving the English example of “She sells sea shells by the sea shore”). A5er this 
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identi'cation, he o8ered a functional interpretation involving the psychological e8ect of 
“the sense of power” children feel upon mastering the twisters (1960, 604–5).
!e following year, while still a graduate student, Dundes published a note in the top-
rank Journal of American Folklore, brashly suggesting that contemporary folklorists move 
from “worldwide collecting” of texts to considerations of the ultimate origins of folklore in 
individual development. Dundes applied Freudian theory in asserting that with increased 
parental discipline, the infant suppressed desires, which came out in dreams. “With matu-
rity, however,” Dundes wrote, “comes the ability to express these dreams in the form of 
folktales dealing with 'ctitious characters who are able, unlike the raconteur, to gratify 
their obscene wishes, at least temporarily” (Dundes and Schmaier 1961, 142). An example 
he gave was the role of humor “as an intrinsic quality of civilized manifestations of socially 
obstructed scatologic tendencies,” that is, the symbolic reference by adults in obscene jokes 
of the pleasure of excrement in childhood (143–44).
Dundes gave an idea of the negative reception of his teachers to the psychoanalytic 
interpretation of scatalogic tendencies in his reminiscence of Professor Wheeler-Voeglin’s 
course on North American Indian folklore. A memorable class took up the creation myth 
of the Earth-Diver, in which an animal brings up a tiny bit of mud from 6oodwaters, and 
the mud consequently expands magically to form the earth. A classmate gave a presenta-
tion on the myth that drew the professor’s extra attention, since she had published com-
mentary on it (Dundes 2002a, xiii–xiv). Dundes remembered, “When I heard the oral 
report, I could see immediately that it was a classic case of male anal-erotic creativity (in 
which males attempt to compete with females by creating from a substance produced by 
their bodies). I said as much in the seminar and was ridiculed by all assembled for this 
seemingly bizarre interpretation. I was su7ciently annoyed by this total rejection of my 
idea that I was inspired to write a paper on the subject that was later published in the 
American Anthropologist in 1962 [and reproduced in this volume]” (xiv). Dundes did not 
get much support for psychoanalytic interpretation from his adviser Richard Dorson, 
either. Dundes had thought that Dorson might be an advocate when he requested sources 
from Dundes, on psychoanalytic theory, for a survey of current folkloristic theories he was 
preparing for publication (Dorson 1963). Dundes felt betrayed by the published result, 
and told a revealing coming-of-age story, with himself shi5ing roles from naive seeker to 
hero-warrior: “Dorson did ably summarize all the sources I had so carefully given him, but 
only for the purpose of making fun of them. Instead of helping my cause, I had unwittingly 
aided and abetted the enemy. I had foolishly thought my professor had an open mind and 
that he sincerely wanted to learn something about the approach. Far from contributing to 
a greater understanding of the psychoanalytic approach to folklore, I had provided much 
of the ammunition used by Dorson to demean and ridicule it” (2002a, xv).
David Bidney, according to Dundes, had a more open mind toward psychoanalytic 
approaches to myth and folklore, but he criticized them for being reductionist (Bidney 
1967, 8). Contributing an essay giving a psychoanalytic consideration of American foot-
ball for Bidney’s festschri& in 1979, Dundes wrote, “It is a pleasure to dedicate this essay 
to Professor David Bidney who taught me that there is no cultural data which cannot 
be illuminated by a judicious application of theory” (1979b, 237). Bidney questioned 
Freudian claims for the universality of symbols, and was attracted to Géza Róheim’s 
revision of Freud’s notion of the innateness of the content of the unconscious (Bidney 
1967, 6–7). Róheim posited a situational understanding of folklore in which the content 
of tradition in di8erent cultures expresses various dispositions to react emotionally to a 
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common human experience. Bidney gave the example of a snake as a symbol of the penis. 
He explained Róheim’s position that the snake as penis “is articulated by some individuals 
in a wide variety of cultures and is then accepted by others, who in turn utilize this sym-
bol in their dreams as a means of expressing their psychological con6icts” (7). From this 
discussion with Bidney, Dundes was moved to edit for publication a volume of Róheim’s 
essays, which he introduced with the remark, “His bold and sometimes startling interpre-
tations of folklore have been an inspiration in my own research in the psychoanalytic study 
of folklore” (Dundes 1992, xxii). Although Dundes disagreed with Róheim’s theory that 
folk narratives have their origin in dreams, and that the roots of these dreams are necessar-
ily found in infancy, a signi'cant lesson Dundes drew from Róheim and Bidney was that 
“there are no universals in folklore; not one single myth or folktale is found among every 
single people on the face of the earth, past and present” (xxiii).
Dundes completed his dissertation on a structural approach more acceptable to his 
teachers than psychoanalytic theory (1964b). A class project on a local collection of beliefs 
turned into an exercise in de'nition; it would be followed by many others that showed the 
structural characteristics of folklore genres, o5en ordered around a fundamental binary 
(Dundes 1961; Dundes and Georges 1963; Dundes 1975f ). Writing on “!e Binary 
Structure of ‘Unsuccessful Repetition,’” Dundes extended his application of Vladimir 
Propp’s morphology to Native American tales that begin with a “lack” and end with a “lack 
liquidated” (1962a). In an early challenge to the literary foundation of the tale-type index 
(!ompson [1928] 1961], Dundes identi'ed a common binary of folk tales with “two 
moves, ‘one of which ends positively and the other negatively,’” crossing Aarne-!ompson 
lines. !e basis of his proposal to replace !ompson’s etic (from phonetic) to emic (from 
phonemic) units of analysis that same year derived from his observation that “form is 
transcultural, content monocultural” (38). !erefore, tale types tended to overemphasize 
literal details associated with a single culture, rather than the cognitive patterning indi-
cated by underlying structures. He concluded boldly with the declaration of a “new science 
of folklore which includes the structural study of folk tales” (174; emphasis added).
For beliefs, Dundes proposed a fundamental duality of condition and result. !is led 
him to think about the belief in wishing wells, consisting of the condition “if you drop a 
coin in the well and make a wish,” and the result “your wish will come true.” And he came 
up with a Freudian alternative to the “literal” reading of magic: “Essentially there are two 
material objects involved in the action of an individual engaging in the custom: the well 
and the o8ering, which is usually a penny. Part of the key to the puzzle is provided by the 
very materials of folklore. !e well is a frequent womb or maternal symbol” (1962f, 29). 
He drew the signi'cance of the penny from its symbolic equivalence with feces, and there-
fore the custom involved “a fecal o8ering in return for either the good will of the mother 
or the avoidance of punishment” (31).
Having announced that he would not be deterred by naysaying folklorists, he landed 
an enviable post in anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley in 1963, and 
two years later helped create, with William Bascom, the M.A. folklore program there. 
From anthropology, he added another concept to the theoretical package that composed 
a Dundesian perspective. It drew from anthropological roots in Franz Boas’s use of folk-
lore texts to 'nd re6ections of a culture’s distinctiveness (Boas 1916, 1935, 1938; see also 
Bascom 1954, 337–41). Dundes noticed two levels at which folklore acts as a re6ective 
“mirror” of culture (1969a). First is the social commentary that folklore provides when 
tellers adapt old forms to new conditions, such as relating elephant jokes to the Civil 
18  !e Meaning of Folklore
Rights movement (the dark African elephant is ignored even though it is hard to miss) or 
dead baby jokes to the abortion debate during the 1960s (Dundes and Abrahams 1969; 
Dundes 1979a). At an ideational level, the aggregate of folk wisdom in speech, proverbs, 
and riddles signi'es “folk ideas” that constitute a “worldview,” or cultural outlook (Dundes 
1971a). Examples are future orientation and lineal thinking in the progressive American 
worldview, which Dundes contrasted with past orientation and circular representation in 
Chinese culture (1969b, 2004a).
Dundes worried that his demonstration of folklore’s disquieting re6ections of society 
would be taken by some reformers as an invitation to quash folklore. He sounded defen-
sive, for instance, when publishing his interpretation of German concentration camp jokes 
as psychological mechanisms to “come to terms with the unimaginable and unthinkable 
horrors that occurred at Auschwitz” (Dundes and Hauschild 1987, 28). He explained that 
“we are reporting these jokes not because we think they are amusing or funny, but because 
we believe that all aspects of the human experience must be documented, even those that 
most re6ect the darker side of humanity. Unless or until the causes and extent of prejudice 
are recognized, that prejudice will persist.” He asked, “If the mirror image is unattractive, 
does it serve any purpose to break the mirror?” His answer was, “!e ugly reality of society 
is what needs to be altered, not the folklore that re6ects that reality” (38).
Dundes used the mirror concept to emphasize that the distinctive social historical con-
ditions of a group make cultures relative to one another, rather than being arranged in 
evolutionary or universal hierarchies (1966a, 241–45). !is cultural relativism was espe-
cially important to his adaptation of Freudian theory. He challenged the psychoanalytic 
assumption that Freudian mechanisms are cross-culturally valid. He took psychoanalysts 
to task for a “cavalier disregard of cultural relativism, the notion that each human culture 
is to some extent a unique, noncomparable entity” (Dundes 1987i, 23). Yet he was also 
critical of anthropologists who extended historical particularism to what he considered 
an “absurd” extreme. He wrote, “In applying the concept of cultural relativism to Freudian 
theory, one comes up with the still all too o5en heard comment that psychoanalytic theory 
applies only to Viennese Jewish culture. Any theory of culture developed in any particu-
lar cultural context may or may not apply to other cultures. It should and must be tested 
in other cultural contexts in order to determine whether or not it has cross-cultural valid-
ity” (23–24). In this critique of relativism, he was in6uenced by his teacher David Bidney’s 
comparativist plaint that cultural relativism had obviated the evils of national ethnocen-
trism by establishing another type of ethnocentrism, one he called “serial.” By this term 
he meant the parochial attitude of viewing each culture from its own perspective only 
(Bidney 1967, 427). Dundes set up his Freudian folkloristics, then, as a new comparative 
approach to 'nding the psychological sources of culture, resulting from the mediation of 
the seemingly polar opposites of psychoanalysts’ classical Freudianism and anthropolo-
gists’ cultural relativism.
Whereas Boas’s use of “re6ection” emphasized the unique historical conditions which 
are embedded as collective memory in texts, and therefore construct a “particular” culture, 
Dundes o5en found representations of trans-cultural connections in texts, which called 
for psychological as well as historical readings, such as his frequent reference to Western 
ideological beliefs. Considering that expressions o5en distorted reality in the process of 
re6ecting culture, folklore, in Dundes’s view, could be more accurately described as a key 
to unlock puzzles (Dundes 1962e). !e concept of worldview in this unlocking process is 
structural, because worldview ideas are underlying themes that drive expression. It relates 
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to psychoanalytic perspectives by assuming that there is a projective mechanism by which 
values are symbolically embedded and encoded in folk material, o5en outside the aware-
ness of tellers. With these re6ective and projective concerns organized into the binary 
of identi'cation and interpretation, the Dundesian perspective became generalized as 
method (Dundes 1989e, 194–95).
If the Dundesian quest for meaning became regularized, if not normalized, how did 
the leading proponent of folkloristic interpretation become mythologized? One answer is 
that, unlike many of his cohorts who were characterized as noble “seekers,” Dundes came 
to be narrated as an adventurer/warrior. He had a brash style that in reviewers’ rheto-
ric epitomized “heroic,” “visionary,” “ambitious,” and “unparalleled” action (Oring 1983, 
88). His uncanny ability drew recognition, characterized this way in one review: “Alan 
Dundes probably knows more about folklore and folklore studies than any other living 
human being,” and his mythological pluck elicited the description, “no matter how much 
his critics try to muddy the waters or thunder and rail, Alan Dundes will always come from 
behind and win the Grail” (Oring 1998, 64; Carroll 1993, 20). Students knew him as “!e 
Master,” “God,” and “Himself ”; colleagues referred to him as “the giant, our hero, the truly 
big man” and “sacred guide” (Bendix 1995, 50–51; Mieder 2004, 290; Bendix 2005, 487). 
Regina Bendix, who studied under him, remembered, “!e capitalized ‘He’ . . . remains 
most prominent, for to those studying folklore at Berkeley, he is indeed the high priest of 
what he makes appear the most desirable discipline to work in: folkloristics” (1995, 51).
His hero story took the form of the young “gi5ed” prophet denied; undeterred, he 
ventured out on a crusading mission in which he shared insight with any audience that 
would listen, and implied the corruption of the elders. His proselytizing orations were 
delivered with extraordinary speed, giving him an aura of superhuman physical as well as 
cerebral ability (Bendix 1995, 51–52). Known for his polemics, Dundes read his essays 
like homiletic jeremiads, warning of the wrong path taken by the 6ock, stirring dedica-
tion to the cause, and impelling believers to “carry the torch” (see Bercovitch 1980; Bendix 
2005, 488; Dow 2005, 335). He thus attracted admirers outside the temple, who assigned 
him a priestly or seer status (in the unconventional dream land of California), despite his 
depiction of himself as a “leader without followers” (Nader and Brandes 2006, 269). Even 
a5er becoming 'rmly established in academe, Dundes constructed a self-description in 
which he skirted the mainstream of his 'eld, and reveled in doing battle as well as breaking 
ground. Untethered to a specialized area, genre, or group, the world was his domain, the 
sky the apparent limit of subjects open to investigation. His pronouncements toward the 
end of his life sounded like pleas as well as prophecies (when not heeded, he could invoke 
the proverbial wisdom that “a prophet is not without honor except in his own country and 
in his own house” [Matthew 13:57]). His death in the classroom, preceded by a surprising 
one-million-dollar gi5 to endow a chair for folklore studies in his honor, only added to his 
mystique (Hansen 2005, 247).
Although reminiscences focused internally on battles he had with foes in the realm, 
narratives about Dundes could also be read as a projection of desires to spread folkloristic 
inquiry externally. !e intimation was that folklore study is a repressed or belittled 'eld 
struggling to achieve a wide intellectual priority (Nader and Brandes 2006, 270). Dundes 
was fond of referring to the goal of academic respectability accorded by analysis, and leg-
endary depictions of his pugnacity against the disciplinary dragons guarding the ivory 
tower suggest a transference from “us” (folklorists) to “them” (the power elite of the acad-
emy). Dundes’s 'ght for mainstreaming “deep” interpretation became emblematic of the 
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cause to instill a consciousness of folklore, and to establish the authority of the folklorist 
universally. !e negation of “!at can’t be Alan Dundes” became con'rmation, in his own 
words, that “the promise of . . . folkloristics may yet be ful'lled,” a variation of “the wish 
(dream) of folklorists may yet be ful'lled” (2002a, xvii).
Folk and Folklorist
!e irony in Dundes’s self-description of marginalization is that many of his ideas about 
folklore in fact became integrally linked with central modern concepts of folklore. One 
foundational example is the de'nition of folklore most folklorists have used since the 
1960s. As a result of his widely used textbook, !e Study of Folklore (1965b), Dundes 
largely succeeded in undoing the prevalent view that folklore is restricted to oral trans-
mission. First, he pointed out that some orally learned items, such as driving a tractor or 
brushing one’s teeth, are not ordinarily considered folklore. An orally transmitted item 
may be folklore, but Dundes logically concluded that “by itself [oral transmission] is not 
su7cient to distinguish folklore from non-folklore” (Dundes 1965d, 1; emphasis in origi-
nal). Arguing that many forms of folklore such as autograph-album verse, epitaphs, and 
chain letters are exclusively written, Dundes further insisted that the criterion of oral 
transmission does not apply to many expressions considered traditional. He gave a long 
list of folkloric forms to suggest that folklore can take material forms, as well as oral ones. 
Lore did not mean only the spoken word, he insisted. But as Elliott Oring complained in 
his later textbook, Folk Groups and Folklore Genres, Dundes did not state a principle that 
connects all of these genres under the heading of “folklore” (1986, 15).
Dundes’s answer to Oring was to avow that folklore repeats and varies (1989e, 193; 
1998, 160). !is characterization allowed for visual humor produced by photocopiers and, 
later, word processors, to be viewed as folklore, along with other non-oral forms. In Work 
Hard and You Shall Be Rewarded, Dundes demonstrated that “the materials contained 
in this study are traditional: they manifest multiple existence in space and time, and they 
exist in variant forms” (Dundes and Pagter 1978, xvii). Lore is “authentic,” he averred, if it 
contains two or more versions, and change leading to the creation of variants is inevitable. 
Using his logic, one could construct the syllogism, “folklore is tradition and tradition is 
variation, so therefore variation is folklore.”
Dundes recognized that the above characterization put the burden of proof on the lore, 
and he sought to contextualize its production socially in “folk.” !is modern folk di8ered 
from the Eurocentric idea of folk as a lower stratum of society. In an expansive de'nition, 
a folk group was, according to Dundes, “any group of people whatsoever who share at least 
one common factor” (Dundes 1965d, 2; emphasis in original). !e pre-modern represen-
tation of folklore, coming from the soil/soul of the peasantry, in6uenced the perception 
of lore as artistry of the unlettered and survivals of the remote past (Dundes 1980h, 1–6; 
Bronner 1998, 184–236). Taking away a connection to the land, or to a lack of learning, 
emphasized that all people, by the nature of social interaction, use folklore as an instru-
mental, communicative device.5 It can therefore emerge anew, or adapt old forms with 
di8erent social associations, whether in conventional ethnic, occupational, and regional 
categories, among a group of friends, or in an organization. Much as Dundes’s elastic folk 
has now been adopted as a given, a potential problem for folkloristics as a 'eld is that it 
takes away the need for “folk” as a special modi'er, for if all groups are by de'nition folk, 
then folk as a social category is potentially unnecessary (Oring 1986, 4). Jay Mechling 
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questioned, in fact, whether one needed two persons to generate folklore, since expressive 
culture can be produced between a person and a pet, an imaginary object, or even oneself 
(Mechling 1989a, 2006). From a Dundesian perspective, the binary social premise still 
holds, even in “solo folklore,” since an entity outside the self is created to share a tradition 
(Mechling 2006).
Implicit in Dundes’s apparently structural de'nition was a criterion of bonding that 
merits evaluation. Dundes collapsed hierarchies by asserting that the folk “are us” (sug-
gesting that every group produces some folklore), but atomized folk as well in contend-
ing that “there are an in'nitude of folk groups” (1980h, 10). By describing what folk is, 
Dundes invited contemplation on what it is not, even though he was more interested in 
demonstrating its “rich variety” (9). It is possible to think of a group sharing a factor, but 
which does not traditionalize, or bond, through folklore (people on a bus, shopping at a 
store, driving the same car). !e key test for the “folk group” is whether folklore is pro-
duced out of the social experience. O5en overlooked, therefore, as Dundes’s de'nition 
became standardized within folkloristics, is his quali'cation that “what is important is 
that a group formed for whatever reason will have some traditions which it calls its own.” 
!us the unstated part of the de'nition is that two or more persons who share a linking 
factor use traditions to bond, so to gain, in Dundes’s words, “a sense of group identity” 
(1965d, 2). In other words, folklore is produced by groups who use folklore for the pur-
pose of creating groupness. Despite the circularity of this logic, it has an instrumental pur-
pose. It extends and democratizes the concept of folklore by a7rming what Dundes called 
a “6exible” notion of tradition, and thereby negates folk as “monolithic” and “homoge-
neous” (1980h, 8).
In large measure, Dundes’s “modern” de'nition re6ects an American worldview, and 
in fact, in an early presentation, Dundes called it a characteristically “American concept of 
folklore” because of its di8erences from European models, geared toward the study of peas-
ants and primitives (1966a). Unlike European class-based hierarchy, his social heterogene-
ity and simultaneity were democratic, in the sense of allowing mobile, “code-switching” 
participants to “choose” rather than inherit their identities (see Bronner 1986a, 94–129). 
“Part-time folk,” as Dundes called typical “code-switching” moderns, have multiple, over-
lapping identities and “locate” their lore variously in city and country, street and home, 
profession and trade (1980h, 8–9). Instead of isolating tradition-centered groups, he pro-
posed that all people have access to traditions; everyone creates them. Appearing integrative 
by sketching a variegated social landscape with a multiplicity of groups, he avoided racial-
izing lore, and removed the devolutionary criteria of historical lineage, isolation, or illiter-
acy. Dundes implied agency in the groups’ production of folklore, rather than the groups 
passively following or blindly receiving tradition, which he criticized as a “superorganic” 
model of culture, referring to the neologism of early Berkeley anthropologist A. L. Kroeber 
(Kroeber 1917; Dundes 1962g, 97; Dundes 1989a, 71–72; Dundes 1991a, 100; see also 
the critique of the superorganic by his teacher, David Bidney, in Bidney 1967, 329–33). If 
extended too far, though, Dundes’s “6exible” de'nition could render everything as folk-
lore, raising the specter that nothing is categorically folklore. Dundes, though, maintained 
a binary interpretation that the construction of folklore depended on something that folk-
lore is not, ultimately turning to structural rather than social characteristics.
An example is his comparison of games to narratives in “On Game Morphology,” repro-
duced in this volume. Although games and narratives are typically separated into social and 
oral genres, respectively, Dundes found a similar binary pattern of “lack to lack liquidated” 
22  !e Meaning of Folklore
prevalent in both (1964a). !e implication for Dundes, therefore, was that they could 
and should be studied together as related traditions. In a consideration of culture-speci'c 
examples of trichotomy, he compared a scholarly article with a tale type because they both 
expressed such cognitive patterning. He related organized football to backyard games, 
Disney movies with orally transmitted tales, and television commercials and old sayings. 
!is relying on folklore for treatment of all things cultural again raised the question of 
authenticity, that is, how to di8erentiate folk from popular materials. Dundes’s structural 
answer was that a production based upon a folk model can be compared with, but distin-
guished from, “the folk model itself ” (1965d, 1–2). !e folk model, unlike the popular 
production, is more variable; the production tends toward 'xed form. Variations char-
acterizing di8erent groups and individuals invite analysis of folklore’s sociopsychological 
uses to explain diversity. Dundes editorialized that in contrast, “Literature and mass cul-
ture seem hopelessly rigid. . . . In studying them one must either seek to reconstruct the 
intellectual Zeitgeist or governing world-view paradigm present when the literary e8ort 
or popular/mass cultural product was created, or else abandon such a historical approach 
in favor of ‘new criticism’ or its successors in an attempt to investigate how an old literary 
favorite is understood by yet one more set of readers” (1998, 193).
Variation could de'ne both folklore and the folklorist. !inking about what di8eren-
tiated the folklorist from the anthropologist, historian, literary scholar, or linguist—all 
occupations concerned with expressive culture—Dundes underscored the ability of the 
folklorist to deal with variations and continuities. He did not spare psychoanalysts from 
his criticism, because he pointed out mistakes caused by ignorance of textual variations, 
generic di8erences, and cross-cultural examples. He was especially critical of psychoana-
lysts, who based interpretations of fairy tales on the corpus of the Grimm brothers; such 
tales were not typical of tradition, since they were “'xed” by the brothers as composites of 
di8erent versions (Dundes 1989e, 195–97; Dundes 1989f, 117–22; see also Carroll 1993, 
6–7). He also sharply criticized Joseph Campbell and his Jungian followers for the univer-
salist assumption that “all peoples share the same stories,” leading to an unfounded conclu-
sion of psychic unity that confused myths and folktales, which have di8erent functions 
and variant structures (2005c, 394–98).
Variation is not only a prime characteristic of folklore, according to Dundes, but it is 
also one of folkloristics, which allows for theoretical diversity. Pointing this out was a way 
to justify incorporating psychoanalytic perspectives into a range of theories. Discussing 
the ballad of the “Walled-Up Wife,” for instance, Dundes insisted, “just as literary criticism 
reveals genuine and legitimate di8erences of opinion about the meaning(s) of a short story 
or novel, so folkloristics must similarly encourage diversity in seeking to understand some 
of the 'nest specimens of human creativity, namely folklore” (1996b, xi). Dundes explained 
the resistance of folklorists and other cultural workers to psychoanalytic approaches as an 
avoidance of the traumas and taboo subjects raised by “plumbing the depths to explore the 
latent (as opposed to the manifest) content of folklore.” “Folklorists, like other academics,” 
he observed, “o5en choose an intellectual speciality as a form of escape from neurotic ten-
dencies,” and 'nding unconscious meanings in others’s traditions would expose personal 
problems in their own (1992, xxii).
What, then, were the essential issues Dundes proposed for folkloristics in a modern, 
untethered analysis of folklore? !e answer is evident in Dundes’s outline of !e Study of 
Folklore (1965b), roughly proceeding from the oldest concerns to the newest: origin, form, 
transmission, and function. He thereby suggested a historical progression, from where 
!e Analytics of Alan Dundes 23
folklore came from in the past to what it does in the present. He then boiled folkloris-
tic inquiry down to dual issues when he stated that “the two traits of folklore which most 
troubled folklorists were (1) the multiple existence of folklore, and (2) its apparent irratio-
nality” (1987i, 4). It is possible to unfold these two characteristics into four concerns a5er 
examining Dundes’s body of work:
1.  Multiple Existence across Space. It is one thing to say that folklore spreads 
because it is appealing, but why does it pop up in the places it does, some-
times not connected by a social link? With the assumption that variation 
is inevitable as a result of multiple existence, why do certain patterns of 
variation emerge?
2. Persistence through Time. Frequently folklore is epitomized as being 
passed from generation to generation, as if it mindlessly survives. But 
what gets selected and what does not in the transmission and learning 
process? Related to this question is the role of modernization, since it 
is assumed in many Western industrial countries that modernization 
displaces, rather than creates, folklore. Yet new technologies associated 
with modernization foster folkloric creation, typically using “traditional” 
forms.
3. Poetics and Projections. Folklore draws attention to itself through both 
its content and style. It contains symbols and metaphors that raise ques-
tions about their sources and e8ects. Considering the social basis of lore, 
how does this lore re6ect, distort, or project the values, feelings, and 
ideas of the groups that possess and perform the material?
4. Rationale of Fantasy. Folklore is frequently described as being fantastical, 
odd, or bizarre. Is there a rationale for this behavior that is given license 
as play, narrative, drama, and tradition? !is problem involves the role 
of context and situation in the perception of lore by asking why some-
thing is appropriate in one instance but not in another. How do mem-
bers inside a group (esoteric function) symbolize a group and its lore in 
contrast to non-members (exoteric function)?
In addition to delineating the problems of folklore that drive analysis, Dundes outlined 
a method of interpretation. Although he wanted to di8erentiate folklorists from other 
scholars concerned with cultural expression, he saw continuity in some of their methods 
of inquiry. Dundes suggested that the basic underlying structure of folkloristic research is 
identi%cation and interpretation. !e terms came from Archer Taylor’s comparison of mid-
twentieth-century literary and folkloristic methods, but Dundes did not limit interpre-
tation, as Taylor did, to manifest readings using historical and formalistic background as 
the source of meaning (Taylor [1948] 1965). Interpreted meaning, according to Dundes, 
involved “plumbing the depths to explore the latent (as opposed to the manifest) content 
of folklore” (Dundes 1992, xxii). Dundes’s use of identi'cation and interpretation normal-
ized a folkloristic division between description and analysis, although he o5en complained 
that what was presented as interpretation was too “literal” to provide insight or render 
analytical meaning (Dundes 1976d; Dundes 1998; Zolkover 2006, 45–48). A closer look 
at Dundes’s polemical essay style, however, reveals a more multi-phased method than he 
acknowledged in asserting this basic binary.
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Before identi'cation, he o5en had a problem statement, involving an extended sur-
vey of bibliographic sources on the subject and the variations of the material under con-
sideration. !is opening section established the signi'cance of his query, and, on many 
occasions, his dispute. He strove to break new ground in each essay by either reconsider-
ing a previous interpretation (for example, in essays in this volume on the cock'ght and 
earth-diver myth); complaining of a monocultural limitation, which he addressed with 
cross-cultural comparison or contrast (as in his writing in this volume on the ballad of the 
“Walled-Up Wife,” and phrases using “bugger”); pointing out an action that had not been 
considered as a subject for inquiry (such as collecting as a praxis by folklorists); showing 
that an unlikely, usually learned or elite group was folk (among them scientists, mathema-
ticians, trained musicians, and medical professionals); noting the e8ects of changing units 
of analysis (for example, etic to emic units); or correcting a nonfolkloristic treatment of 
folkloric material (such as Lévi-Strauss or Campbell on myth).
Dundes followed with an identi%cation, predicated on the description of an item and 
the genre or genres to which it belonged. For Dundes, identi'cation o5en involved mate-
rial that had been neglected in previous collections, especially the extent of an item’s varia-
tions, its various cultural contexts, behaviors associated with it, or the available metafolk-
lore. Dundes constantly pointed out that previous scholars stopped short of analyzing the 
descriptive data, or analyzed the wrong thing. He thus moved to the analysis, which he 
de'ned as operating on the data to signify cultural patterns. !is involved exposing under-
lying structures, or extracting symbols from a text for closer examination (“read out of ” 
rather than “in” the data, he insisted); presenting contextual descriptions of an item’s use 
(as in the invocation of proverbs in child rearing within Nigerian culture); using cross-
cultural examples to draw comparisons and contrasts (such as “bugger,” found in British 
speech, not being used as a derisive term in the United States); 'nding signi'cance in ety-
mologies and names as signs (for example, noting “testes” is the root of “contest,” or the 
double meaning of “bull” as male genitals and “blowing,” or commenting on the selection 
of Apollo as a name for a space program, when Apollo’s sister Diana, the moon, is associ-
ated with virginity); or constructing the developmental chronology of an item or culture 
(such as the sources—in historic German farm practices, where display of manure piles 
represented prosperity—of feces as status symbols).
To Dundes, interpretation provided the critical leap from identifying patterns to rec-
ognizing cognition. It typically involved discerning meaning by reference to grand theory, 
and deducing generalizations that can serve to solve intellectual enigmas, resolve appar-
ent paradoxes, and uncover hidden motivations (Dundes 2005c, 387–91). Dundes fre-
quently turned to psychoanalytic theory because of his special concern for symbolic and 
developmental questions, but he also used suppositions from feminism (Karen Horney’s 
idea of “womb envy”), linguistics (the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, Kenneth Pike’s emic and 
etic units, and Saussure’s langue and parole), comparative ethnology ( James Frazer’s idea 
of homeopathic magic and Arnold Van Gennep’s rites de passage), and cognitive anthro-
pology (Dorothy Lee’s premise of a lineal worldview). In its attention to functional causes, 
his interpretation frequently took as a given, following Malinowski, that folklore persisted 
because it served social and psychological functions that bene't people as individuals and 
members of groups, o5en as a response to ambiguity or anxiety.
Dundes typically did not stop at the point of interpretation. Frequently his conclu-
sion constituted a 'nal phase of what I call implication, and there I 'nd his most original, 
and controversial, contributions. As others have pointed out, he did not introduce new 
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paradigms as much as adapt social and psychological theories, so as to present provocative 
possibilities of folkloristic meaning, many of which had not been previously considered 
(Oring 1983; Carroll 1993, 7–8; Georges 2004). In his conclusions, though, he extended 
his analysis in o5en novel ways. His implications di8ered from many folklorists’ application 
(the basis of applied or public folklore), because he usually did not propose programming to 
edify the public or procedures for professionals (1962g; 1980e, x; 2005a, 359–61; for the 
praxis of application, see M. O. Jones 1994). Instead, Dundes used his analysis and interpre-
tation to consider either the social and political signi'cance of the outlooks he uncovered, 
or the symbolic relationships among apparently diverse forms and traditions. He was not 
the 'rst, for example, to claim that a German obsession with cleanliness and order has an 
anal-erotic character. Besides using folklore as a mirror of culture, however, he pointed to 
the implication of political uses of “elaborate purges,” including the Holocaust, by compar-
ing enemies to feces, and suggested that such purges could happen again (1984a, 141).
An implication he particularly touted came out of his interpretation of male competi-
tive traditions such as football, cock'ghting, and verbal dueling. In those studies, he argued 
that the aggressive behavior in these games represented attempts to demonstrate mascu-
linity by feminizing one’s opponent. He contended that this pattern was a reaction to the 
“female-centered conditional experience from birth through early childhood until adoles-
cence” (1997e, 42). His implication was that such a behavior pattern constituted a cause 
of war. Claiming this as a “new argument,” he wrote: “!ose who may be skeptical of my 
attempt to o8er a plausible rationale underlying male behavior in such activities apparently 
as diverse as games, hunting, and warfare will probably be pleased to hear that in none of 
the vast literature devoted to the psychology or sociology of sport—or for that matter in 
the even vaster scholarship devoted to seeking to articulate the causes of war—will they 
'nd anything like the theoretical argument I have proposed in this essay” (1997e, 42).
In making the argument for the sources of war, religion, male chauvinism, or folktales, 
Dundes used two key concepts that deserve discussion. !e 'rst was the idea of “projec-
tion,” and the second was that of “symbolic equivalence.” Both built on previous scholar-
ship, psychoanalytic and linguistic, respectively, but Dundes revised them to apply his own 
stamp. Both also involved binary relationships between characters and representations, 
categorically referred to as A and B within the frame of a narrative or ritual.
!e term projection has entered popular discourse through Freud. Dundes cited Freud’s 
idea of projection from a 1911 paper, “Psycho-Analytic Notes upon an Autobiographical 
Account of a Case of Paranoia,” in which Freud posited that the repression of “I hate him” 
becomes transposed to “He hates me” (Dundes 1987i, 37). It was Otto Rank, however, 
who in !e Myth of the Birth of the Hero ([1909] 2004) described the transposition in folk-
tales using Oedipal wish-ful'llment. Dundes argued that the label “projective inversion” 
is more appropriate than “transposition,” since desires are not only inverted, but external-
ized. In a Dundesian perspective, Freud’s projection can be read as symbolizing “I hate 
him,” using slurs or stories in which the object of hate is victimized. Dundes de'ned pro-
jective inversion this way: “a psychological process in which A accuses B of carrying out 
an action which A really wishes to carry out him or herself ” (1991b, 353). Dundes dis-
tinguished this kind of transposition from the transference of feelings onto an external 
object, which he called “projection.” Dundes’s projection is a way to deal with anxieties or 
pent-up emotions, and involves disguising the object in the external expression. Dundes 
especially discussed examples of projection in rituals and jokes such as “dead baby jokes,” 
which expressed anxiety over abortion; “light bulb jokes,” which showed the importance 
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of social organization through the double entendre of technology and sex expressed by 
“screwing in a light bulb”; Jewish-American Princess jokes, which projected unease over 
the independence of women generally through the stereotype of the self-centered Jewish 
daughter; and “Bloody Mary rituals,” with representations of blood both in the name of 
the girl and the act of drawing blood, expressing fear of menstruation among pre-adoles-
cent girls (1987c, 2002a).
Dundes found that projective inversion is especially prevalent in folktales and legends, 
suggesting that their narrative elaboration signi'es a heightened level of taboo. Examples 
include the themes of incest and infanticide, evident in a classic Oedipal plot in which a 
father-king attempts to kill his newborn son, a projective inversion of the son’s wish to kill 
his father. Dundes’s contribution was to view such a tale according to female projection, 
and take early psychoanalysts to task for their male-centeredness because they missed the 
signi'cance of a father-king’s act of locking up his daughter to protect her. Dundes pro-
claimed that early Freudians were mistaken in assuming that this merely re6ected a father’s 
wish to marry his own daughter. He asserted instead that the daughter would like to marry 
her own father. Examining the folktale plot underlying Shakerspeare’s King Lear, Dundes 
concluded that “the daughter’s wish to marry her father is transformed through projective 
inversion into the father’s wish to marry his daughter, just as the son’s wish to kill his father 
is similarly transformed into the father’s wish to kill his own son. Both transformations 
leave sons and daughters guilt free. Fairy tales, a5er all, are always told from the child’s 
point of view, not the parents’. I concluded that King Lear was essentially a girl’s fairy tale 
told from the father’s point of view” (1987i, 37; see also 1976d).
Dundes frequently presented projective inversion as a way to explain enigmatic features 
of the world’s best-known traditions and themes. He was concerned, for instance, that 
approaches to the widely (but not universally) known vampire legend focused on either 
the repulsion or seduction of the 'gure. Building on the folkloric variations of the legend 
featuring attacks on younger family members and e8orts of the vampire to drink milk 
rather than blood, Dundes hypothesized that the vampire is an incarnate expression of 
a child’s ambivalence toward his or her parent of the opposite sex. !e inversion is that 
instead of infants sucking from adult breasts, adults thrive on children’s bodies. !e life-
giving liquid can be water, blood, or milk. Vampires according to this theory are blood-
thirsty because death is debirth, represented by sucking, but as the dead are angry, they 
suck their victims to death (Dundes 1998).
Another of Dundes’s provocative reinterpretations used projective inversion to ana-
lyze the “blood libel” or “ritual murder” legend, a source of European anti-Semitism. In 
the legend, a Christian child is killed to furnish blood for consumption during Jewish rites 
(Aarne-!ompson motif V361). !e story has been recognized as one of the most persis-
tent anti-Semitic narratives among European Christians since the twel5h century. As a 
legend, it is frequently told as a true event, in spite of its implausibility, since the consump-
tion of blood by humans is forbidden in Jewish law (Genesis 9:4; Leviticus 3:17, 17:12). 
Dundes purports to solve this puzzle, noting especially its coincidence with the Easter/
Passover season, by pointing out the projection of guilt to another group through the pro-
jective inversion of Christians committing murder.
For the commission of an aggressively cannibalistic act, participants in the 
Eucharist would normally feel guilt, but so far as I am aware, no one has ever sug-
gested that a Catholic should ever feel any guilt for partaking of the Host. Where 
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is the guilt for such an act displaced? I submit it is projected wholesale to another 
group, an ideal group for scapegoating. By means of this projective inversion, it 
is not we Christians who are guilty of murdering an individual in order to use his 
blood for ritual religious purposes (the Eucharist), but rather it is you Jews who 
are guilty of murdering an individual in order to use his or her blood for ritual 
religious purposes, making matzah. !e fact that Jesus was Jewish makes the pro-
jective inversion all the more appropriate. It is a perfect transformation: Instead 
of Christians killing a Jew, we have Jews killing a Christian!” (1991b, 354).
As the above example demonstrates, Dundesian interpretations were derived from content 
analysis, conceptualized as a “systematic, objective description of the content of commu-
nication” (Dundes 1962h, 32; see also Pool 1959). Dundes’s approach was heavily depen-
dent on the assumption that wishes and feelings were disguised in the form of textual sym-
bols, and expressed through the “safe” outlet of narrative.
Aware of the criticism that symbolist interpretations of texts are di7cult to empiri-
cally verify, Dundes responded with the concept of “symbolic equivalence,” using units of 
analysis he called allomotifs and motifemes. Dundes asked, “How do we know, in short, 
that A is a symbol of B (or B of A)? Is it only a matter of accepting a proposed symbolic 
equation on faith, or is there in fact a methodology which would permit a measure of cer-
titude in determining the meaning(s) of symbols?” (1987j, 167). Heading o8 the objec-
tion that the discernment of symbols is impressionistic, he arranged functions within a 
structural system that could replace the prevalent non-structural classi'cation of motifs as 
minimal units in narrative. His structural system was the sequence of functions for drama-
tis personae outlined by Vladimir Propp’s “morphology” (Dundes 1968b; Propp [1928] 
1968). !e motif is based on plot features which Propp asserted were “vague and di8use,” 
while the function relies on “exact structural features” (Dundes 1962g, 101; see also Ben-
Amos 1980). Dundes highlighted the distinction between functions and motifs by apply-
ing linguist Kenneth Pike’s distinction between etic units, constructs created by the analyst 
to handle comparative cross-cultural data, and emic ones that deal with particular events 
as parts of larger wholes, to which they are related and from which they obtain their ulti-
mate signi'cance (1962g, 101–2). A function is an emic unit because, in Dundes’s words, 
it stays “closer to the tale as it exists when told by a raconteur to an audience” (1987j, 
168). Dundes proposed that Propp’s function in Pike’s scheme of analysis would be called a 
“motifeme,” while “allomotif ” would designate a motif that occurs in any given motifemic 
context. Applying a linguistic analogy, Dundes o8ered that allomotifs are to motifemes as 
allophones (any of various acoustically di8erent forms of the same phoneme) are to pho-
nemes (speech sounds designated by speakers of a particular language), and allomorphs 
(variant phonological representations of a morpheme) are to morphemes (minimal mean-
ingful language units) (1962g, 101).
Dundes’s goal in establishing this structural system was to gain access to implicit native 
formulations of symbolic equivalences (Dundes 1984c; Dundes 1987j; Carroll 1992b). 
!is could be done, he asserted, by “empirically reviewing the content of 'eld-collected ver-
sions of a tale type.” !e explanatory logic, Dundes pointed out, was, “If A and B both ful-
'll the same motifeme, then in some sense is it not reasonable to assume that the folk are 
equating A and B. In other words, allomotifs are both functionally and symbolically equiva-
lent.” !us he disavowed that the interpretation came from “some biased folklorist wrongly 
imbued with a particular mindset belonging to one symbolic school or another” (1987j, 
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168). Dundes insisted that instead of an analyst “reading in” an idea to the text, the sym-
bolic equation is “read out” of it. !us, Dundes concluded his controversial interpretation of 
German national character with the disclaimer, “It is not I who is claiming that the German 
love of order may stem from a love of ordure—it is in the folklore” (Dundes 1984a, 153).
To make the case for the symbolic equivalence of nose and phallus, for instance, Dundes 
cited 'eld-recorded texts from apparently di8erent traditions: one is an anti-Jewish joke, 
while the other is a Texas blason populaire.
Two Jews were walking beside a lake. One of them struck his 'nger in the water 
and said, “Wow, the water’s cold!” !e other one stuck his nose in and said, “Yes, 
and deep, too.”
Two Texans are walking across the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco. In the 
middle of the bridge, they decide to take a leak [to urinate]. One says, “Boy, this 
water’s cold”; the other comments, “But not very deep.” (1987j, 169)
Dundes realized that the placement of the nose and phallus within the telling of the text 
had similar “functions,” but that did not conclusively prove symbolic equivalence. He 
explained, “It is perfectly true that examining the allomoti'c gamut within a particular 
motifemic slot shows only functional equivalence. We can tell that A and B are functional 
or symbolic equivalents, but not necessarily that A is a symbol of B or that B is a symbol of 
A. On the other hand, if we 'nd evidence in a given culture that either A or B is a tabooed 
subject, then we might well expect that the non-tabooed subject might be substituted for 
the tabooed subject rather than vice versa” (1987j, 170). Dundes corroborated the nose/
phallus equation by 'nding additional instances in a variety of genres, or by establish-
ing the cultural contexts in which it occurred. He modi'ed the frequent psychoanalytic 
assumption that symbolism is universal, though, with cultural relativism, and echoed the 
“sometimes a cigar is just a cigar” quote attributed to Freud: “Please keep in mind that I am 
not arguing that a nose always stands for a phallus—even just within Western cultures, the 
provenience of the above-mentioned materials. Sometimes a nose is a nose!” (171). In the 
other examples I cited of traditions symbolically involving blood, for instance, the liquid 
has culturally based meanings. Dundes found evidence in the vampire legend of a paren-
tal link in the equivalence of blood and milk in a motifemic slot. In the religious context 
of the European-Christian blood-libel legend, Dundes saw evidence of blood’s representa-
tion of the Eucharist, but in the American context, in which rituals for menarche are rare, 
blood as expressed by pre-adolescent girls symbolized menses.
Dundes’s method of using emic units raises a number of questions about identifying 
symbols in one context with references to symbols in another. Besides the nose/phallus con-
nection, one should ask about the substitution of Texans for Jews, if the Jewish joke indeed 
preceded the Texan narrative; and its concluding negation of “deep,” if in fact that is a rep-
resentative ending. Dundes warned that several variants need to be examined, since he is 
himself a critic of choosing one form of the text as emblematic of a type. Elliott Oring, a 
frequent reviewer of Dundes’s work, called the methodology of symbolic equivalence “the 
surrogate symbolic nexus syndrome,” and worried that “the soundness of this operation 
should to some extent prove inversely proportional to the ‘distance’ the interpreter must 
travel from his primary symbolic context to establish the symbol-referent nexus.” Although 
purportedly an objective process, allomotif analysis, according to Oring, still appears sub-
jective because the selection of symbol-referent nexes may exclude “a number of possible 
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and perhaps contradictory nexes for a single symbol.” In considerations of cultural relativ-
ism, one needs to ask why a trait in society A informs the meaning of an item in societies B 
and C. !e question remains, then, as Oring put it, “Why should the key to the meaning 
of folklore in one cultural and geographical context be found only in another?” (1983, 86).
One answer from Dundes was to separate, as levels of analysis, the transcultural structural 
interpretation and the culturally speci'c textual one. In Dundes’s approach, formal analysis 
precedes content analysis. On this formal level, the structure survived translation, indepen-
dent of language. Dundes gave the proverb, which he formally de'ned as combining a topic 
and a comment, as an example of this (1962h, 37). !e simplest form of proverb could be 
rendered in English with the example “money talks”; it can be extended by 'lling structural 
slots, as in the examples “Barking dogs seldom bite” or “Still waters run deep.” But the struc-
ture presumably could be identi'ed in any language, Dundes proposed (36–37). !e con-
tent tended to be variable, as opposed to the constancy of the form. One can also identify a 
linguistic level dependent on the particular language in question. Borrowing the term “tex-
tural” from linguist !omas Sebeok, Dundes pointed out that textural elements, or stylis-
tic features, ordinarily cannot survive translation. In the proverb, equational forms (A = B) 
such as “Time is money” or “Seeing is believing” are independent of language or code. But 
“A friend in need is a friend indeed” has the textural feature of rhyme, which “reinforces the 
structural pattern in that the two sides of the equation rhyme” (1962h, 37; see also Sebeok 
1962; Dundes 1975f; Dundes 1980g; Sein and Dundes 1964).
When Dundes interpreted the content of the “A = B” proverbial form “seeing is believ-
ing” as meaning, he found the American context of dependence on sight for judgments to 
be symbolically equivalent to the active eye taking precedence over the passive agent of the 
ear (1980f, 90). !e source of action in the mind is even expressed visually in the phrase 
“the mind’s eye.” !e priority of seeing over touch also established an expansive, outer-di-
rected worldview (“looking as far as the eye can see”), in contrast to the inner or tradition-
directed outlook of an intimate community (expressed by “stay in touch”) (89; see also 
Bronner 1982; Bronner 1986b, 1–4). !e American hierarchy of senses he identi'ed also 
suggested, for him, the priority of written language that must be seen in a future-oriented 
society. !e implication, according to Dundes, was that “much of the study of ‘natural his-
tory’ o5en turns out to be ‘cultural history’ in disguise. !eories and ideas about the natu-
ral world are invariably couched in terms of a speci'c human language and are based upon 
data obtained from human observation. With human observation expressed in human lan-
guage, one simply cannot avoid cultural bias.” !is insight allowed him to comment, too, 
on why so many social theorists fail to notice folklore, to their detriment, despite the fact 
that it can reveal so much: “We do not see the lens through which we look” (1980f, 92). 
Dundes held up folklore as crucial evidence of human thought and action, but pointed 
out that many scholars miss it because it is too close to their own experience. It is viewed as 
ordinary, although for Dundes that made it especially important to re6ect everyday life, or 
to serve as an outlet for anxieties not communicated by other means.
WWDS
A simple lapel button cra5ed with Dundes in mind, and containing several layers of sig-
ni'cance, encapsulates some of his impact on the intellectual heritage of folkloristics. One 
of Dundes’s students placed it in my hand at a folklorists’ conference in 2005, and beamed 
with the message, “I guess I don’t have to explain to you what it means.” I looked down and 
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saw the crisp black letters WWDS against a plain white background. Her comment made 
me think that she must have received some puzzled reactions to the initialism, but the 
process of 'guring it out forced the viewer to engage in a Dundesian enterprise of digging 
beneath the textual surface for meaning. It was an invitation to talk, and break into folk-
lore. !e initialism, as verbal lore, had 6oated around Berkeley for years before the button 
commodi'ed the message for a wider audience.6
WWDS immediately signals it is an initialism not only because of the succession of 
capital letters, but also because of the two Ws in a row, not found in English. !e capitaliza-
tion indicates that the combination of letters is important, a signi'er for something larger 
and longer. !e four letters recall the popular initialism WWJS used in Christian circles. 
It stands for “What Would Jesus Say?” and reminds listeners of an ethical message amid 
today’s hectic, acronym-'lled, modern world.7 Its form is reinforced by the popularity of 
text-messaging initialisms (such as WTMI for Way Too Much Information), and indeed 
WWJS circulates widely in electronic communication.8 By recognizing the initialism, reli-
gious believers created a social bond through esoteric knowledge. Among some Christian 
believers, such initialisms are common as mottos or devotional meeting starters. For 
instance, one can also hear or see the initialisms JCLU ( Jesus Christ Loves You) and CTR 
(Choose the Right, popular among Mormons), or acronyms such as ACTS (Adoration, 
Contrition, !anksgiving, Supplication), FROG (Fully Rely on God), and PUSH (Pray 
Until Something Happens). One might even get variations of WWJS as WWJD (Walking 
With Jesus Daily or What Would Jesus Do?) and WWYD (What Would You Do?).9 
Folklore collections from Catholic school students include the practice of inscribing ini-
tialisms on examinations to summon aid: JPFM ( Jesus Pray For Me) or SJOC (Saint 
Joseph of Cupertino, colloquially known as the patron saint of the stupid) (Huguenin 
1962). Some Christian initialisms use negation by substituting new meanings to worldly 
initials, such as turning TGIF, “!ank God It’s Friday,” to “!ank God I’m Forgiven” or 
“!ank God I’m Free.” Rather than the proverbial topic and comment, these phrases have 
an interrogative structure of an agent/sender, and action with an implied receiver. In other 
words, the ritual of 'guring out the button’s message implies a communication model in 
which the message draws attention to itself, and meaning is produced or perceived.
WWDS button.
Photo by Simon Bronner
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!e ubiquity, or righteousness, of WWJS has also led to many parodies in talk and 
written prose, suggesting the repression or resentment of the sentiment or commenting on 
the modern irreligious/existential state of the world:
WWJS—Who would Jesus shoot?
WWJS—What would Jesus smoke?
WWJS—Who would Jesus spank?
WWJS—Where would Jesus surf ?
WWJS—Where would Jesus shop?
WWJB—Who would Jesus bomb?
WWJD—Who wants jelly donuts?
WWJD—What would Jesus drive?
WWJD—What would Jerry [Garcia] do?
WWJD—What would [Michael] Jordan do?
Low approval ratings for WWJCD (What would Jackie Chan do?) and WWSWJS 
(What Web site would Jesus surf ?), in online discussion threads with the metafolkloristic 
online feature of ranking variants, suggest the importance of the four-letter form. I suspect 
that Dundes might have commented on the double-binary form and the Western cultural 
bias for four, signifying an abundant quantity (four corners of the world, four seasons, 
four quarters in sports) (see Dundes 1980d; Brandes 1985).10 He also might have pointed 
to the nominal suggestion of double meaning in the linguistic clue of WW, spoken as 
“double-u, double-u,” which also denotes “world wide” (e.g., World War, World Watch, 
World Wide Web, and indeed WWDS for World Wide Day in Science) and trouble (as in 
WWW for What Went Wrong and Wet, Wild, and Wicked).
Dundes might have compared analysis of this form to his exegesis of light bulb jokes 
(“Many Hands Make Light Work” [1987g]) that feature the question “How many x does it 
take to screw in a light bulb?” !e answers are based on social stereotypes: Californians—
ten, one to screw it in and nine others to share the experience; New Yorkers—three, one 
to screw it in and two to criticize; psychiatrists—only one, but the light bulb has to really 
want to change; Iranians—one hundred, one to screw it in and ninety-nine to hold the 
house hostage; Jewish mothers—I would rather sit in the dark. !ere he read, out of 
the many variant forms, a future-oriented worldview in which groups, not individuals, 
were agents of change. !at orientation created anxiety in individuals to keep up with 
change, from a fear of falling behind. !e joke, with all its variants assigned for di8er-
ent groups, grades and mocks social inadequacy, as demonstrated by technological fail-
ure. !e symbolic signi'cance of technological energy (a light bulb) is heightened by an 
implied meaning of sex, as in the alternative answer for Californians: “they don’t screw in 
light bulbs, they screw in hot tubs.” !erefore, in the American context where the jokes 
arose, the acutely felt, repressed fear of sexual inadequacy is wrapped up with constant 
striving for social success, political power, and national progress. Dundes concluded that 
“when we joke about the impotence of others, we are joking about our own potential lack 
of power” (1987g, 149).
Following the line of reasoning in “Many Hands Make Light Work,” WWDS might 
imply spiritual failure, coupled with the anxiety over intellectual inadequacy. !e sym-
bolic action in WWDS of putting Dundes on an iconic pedestal is to turn the question “Is 
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Dundes smarter than us all?” into “Am I smart enough?” Yet the acronym is also ambigu-
ous enough to create the possibility of distance; it can be perceived as meaning he is not 
holier or smarter but marginal or di8erent, indeed far-fetched and outlandish. If there 
is a double meaning, it is an extension from the self to the folklorist group that turns 
“What would Dundes say about us or our world?” into “Are we signi'cant/spirited/global 
enough?” !e text connotes a binary opposition of Dundes’s meaning to our meaningless 
scholarship. !is opposition has a value hierarchy according superiority to the Dundesian 
'rst pole, shown in couplets such as deep/surface, latent/manifest, emergent/vanishing, 
symbolic/literal, and mind/body. Rather than 'nding strength in the support of a main-
stream majority, the text glori'es the de'ant, pietistic few who follow the introspective, 
interpretative path.
At a structural level, the multiplicity of the form WWJS re6ects the essentializing 
of folklore as textual repetition and variation, but perhaps less obvious is the contextual 
idea of folklore as creation—emerging constantly in modern settings and with new media 
(Dundes 1980h, 17–19; see also Jakobson and Bogatyrev 1980; Abrahams 1977; Ben-
Amos 1977). Pursuing the esoteric Dundes connection to the button further, one can 
detect biographical references to Dundes’s scholarly investment in folk speech, includ-
ing his 'rst publications on mnemonic devices and interrogative replies; belief and reli-
gion, especially his study of the Jesus hero cycle, suggesting a transference from subject to 
author; and of course the communicative frame of humor and play (including the initial-
isms and acronyms in Dundes 1980d, 140–41). One might argue that the legitimacy of 
WWDS as a variant comes from both the maintenance of the four-letter form with WW 
as the 'rst function, and the inclusion of both D and S from the tradition of asking what 
Jesus would do as well as say.
As a representation of a community of believers, the button obviously equates Dundes 
with Jesus. However, the frame of play that usually accompanies the presentation of the 
button denies a genuine sacrilegious intention. But there is clearly an assignment of savior/
prophet status to Dundes, and the implication that he, too, had a gospel to spread. I can 
imagine Dundes might recognize a response to anxiety as well, since here folklore emerges 
from the impulse to explain his prodigious output as somehow supernatural, and to express 
a fear of inadequacy in those unable to match his standards. Produced in Dundes’s end days 
and coming from students known for devotion to his causes as well as pursuit of his sup-
port, the button also represents the fear of losing Dundes as a father 'gure and mentor (see 
Bendix 1995, 50–51). Personal fear of loss is projected to a disciplinary “lack.” !e message 
is, at another level, a reminder of the power of communication generally and words speci'-
cally. In concluding with “say,” the button highlights the signi'cance of speech, and per-
haps equates the D of what Jesus would do with the D of Dundes as a hero 'gure. Dundes 
is singled out, not just as a Freudian folklorist, structuralist, or functionalist preaching to 
the masses to change their ways, but as Dundes, a unique persona who cast a long, if o5en 
not fully appreciated, shadow. Most of all, it suggests the distinctiveness of Dundes’s struc-
tural and psychoanalytic commentary on what scholars do, imparting that they might be 
enlightened by taking his perspective into account. !ere is also a jeremiad implicit in the 
question of what he would say, since his rhetoric o5en carried polemical disapproval of the 
worldly or disciplinary state of things. In sum, Dundes has been mythologized because his 
representation o8ers revelation, and thereby serves a redemptive function for those on a 
cultural quest for meaning. Even if one does not agree with his interpretations, his con'-
dence in having found the truth gives hope that the goal can be reached.
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Set in hermeneutic terms, Dundes’s analytics was about 'nding sources—in mind, in 
society, in the past, in scholarship. Folklore is itself a source for genesis and for modern 
existence, from culture, tradition, and belief. Folklore is the scripture, Dundes suggested, 
that can be read for meaning here (within the local) and there (out in the world). Folklore 
can be parsed for both the immediate and the ultimate, for the particular and the univer-
sal, and the innovative and the traditional (Dundes 1987b). Dundes indeed referred to 
the metaphor of folklore as cultural scripture when he pointed out that those documents 
known as scripture, such as the Hebrew and Christian Bibles and the Qur’an, incorporate 
folklore. To show his logic in connecting the sacredness of religion with the spirituality of 
tradition, he provided the following syllogism in Holy Writ as Oral Lit:
1. Folklore is characterized by multiple existence and variation.
2. !e Bible is permeated by multiple existence and variation.
3. !e Bible is folklore! (1999, 111)
He then stated that Jesus would have understood his argument, because when asked for a sign 
from heaven, Jesus cited a belief from tradition, a variant of the widely known saying “Red 
sky in the morning, sailors (shepherds) take warning.” (Matthew 16:2–3; Dundes 1999, 
112). Dundes saw himself 'nding meaning, as Jesus did, out of the signs of folklore, “the 
signs of the times.” I am not suggesting that Dundes’s essays are holy chapter and verse. But 
they arguably can be read as scholarly homilies that seek folkloristic meaning. He addressed 
fundamental questions of existence by pointing to folklore as an expression of the human 
condition. He asked, historically, how and why our ideas of culture got started; socially, how 
and why they are transmitted and shared; and psychologically, how and why they are con-
ceived and perceived. In his analytics, Dundes collapsed the social/artistic binary of folk and 
lore to locate cultural identity, comprehend thought, and capture the human spirit.
Alan Dundes’s desk in his basement workroom.
Photo by Simon Bronner
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Notes
1. Dundes was not consistent in connecting mind to the binary and body to the trinary. In “!e 
Number !ree in American Culture,” he cited the precedent of Emory Lease who proposed 
that “the primary divisions of the human arm and leg, not to mention the 'nger, tend to 
support trichotomic thinking,” but re6ected that “anatomical datum would appear to rein-
force ‘two’ rather than ‘three.’” He argued, “!ere are two sexes, two ears, eyes, nostrils, arms, 
legs, and so forth. !ese universally recognized pairs would help to explain why dualism is 
probably worldwide.” Yet he then goes on to present dualism as a cognitively based concept 
by referring to the fundamental dichotomies of “self/other” and “us/them” to underscore 
that “there seems little doubt that ‘two’ is more widely distributed in the world than ‘three’” 
(1980e, 135).
2.  Dundes shared these re6ections with me when we were invited guests at the Hoosier Folklore 
Society meeting, Terre Haute, Indiana, in 1997. Dundes was hardly alone in his attraction, 
attributed to both Jewish and scholarly background, to Freud’s subversion of biological deter-
minism, which was used to justify racist attitudes toward Jews (Gilman 1993a, 6–10; Gilman 
1993b, 3–48). Yet as Elliott Oring points out in !e Jokes of Sigmund Freud,, there is also an 
implied ambivalence toward Jewish identity in Freud’s analysis of Jewish jokes, and the the-
sis could be extended to Dundes (Oring 1984, 102–18). Indeed, Oring’s book is dedicated to 
Dundes. Indicative of Dundes’s concern for drawing more attention to Freud’s Jewish back-
ground is the 'rst English translation of Isidor Sadger’s Recollecting Freud ([1930] 2005), 
edited and introduced by Dundes, with a chapter on “Freud and Judaism” (90–100).
3.  His “strong outrage” at the Holocaust was related to me by Carolyn Dundes at the Western 
States Folklore Society meeting in Berkeley, April 2006. Another indication is Dundes’s cor-
respondence to Wolfgang Mieder ( July 3, 2001), in which he singled out the Holocaust as “a 
great human tragedy” (see Mieder 2006a, 174).
4.  !e way his wife, Carolyn Dundes, expressed his attitude toward religion to me was that “he 
was interested in all religions” (conversation, Western States Folklore Society meeting, Berkeley, 
California, April 2005).
5.  Gary Alan Fine has pointed out the precedent of what he calls a “sociological” view in Joseph 
Jacobs’s “!e Folk” ( Jacobs 1893; Fine 1987). Dundes was aware of Jacobs’s view, since he 
reprinted his essay in Folklore: Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies, edited 
by Dundes (2005b). My discussion of the in6uence of Jacobs’s Jewish background and con-
sciousness of diasporization on his view, in 1893, of folklore created in contemporary situa-
tions, could be applied to Dundes’s situation when he proposed his “modern” concept of folk-
lore in 1962 (Bronner 1998, 135–37). Although Jacobs (1854–1916) was a di8usionist, while 
Dundes called himself a structuralist and psychoanalytic folklorist, they arguably also shared a 
protest against prevalent trends promoted by the senior guard of their 'elds. For Jacobs, evo-
lutionary doctrine was his target, whereas for Dundes it was historic-geographic methodology. 
For Jacobs’s contrary position in British folklore studies, see Dorson (1968, 266–73). Dorson 
did not give Dundes the same kind of biographical treatment, but he did write the foreword to 
Dundes’s Analytic Essays, in which he compared him more to another British folklorist, Andrew 
Lang, for “the gi5” of an “inquiring mind” (1975).
6.  September 17, 2006 correspondence from folklorist Maria Teresa Aggozino, a long-time asso-
ciate of Dundes at Berkeley. “WWDS” also shows up in a discussion thread on the Hebrew song 
Had Gadya (Little Goat) at the website LiveJournal (http://rymenhild.livejournal.com/42896.
html, accessed September 22, 2006). Shuduri_sour posted a message labeled “WWDS” on 
April 14, 2005, and wrote, “a5er seven classes with the late Professor Alan Dundes, I can con-
'dently say that this song is indicative of some oral aggressive tendencies.” Charles Clay Doyle, 
in his 2006 Archer Taylor Lecture, “Is the Pope Catholic? Some Un'nished Business about 
Proverbs,” at the Western States Folklore Society meeting, Berkeley, California, April 21, 2006, 
prefaced the lecture with a reminiscence of hearing WWDS at Berkeley.
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7.  A Google search of the Internet on September 22, 2006, revealed other meanings of WWDS, 
including World Wide Day in Science, What Would Dad Say, Watson Wyatt Data Services, 
and What Would the Democrats be Screaming. But for most receivers of the button, there is 
an awareness of WWDS as an adaptation of WWJS for “What Would Jesus Say?” It uses the 
form of the initialism to replace the usual association of such worldly signi'ers as corporate or 
media representations (e.g., WWDS in Muncie, Indiana, for a radio station or WWE for World 
Wrestling Entertainment) and self-actualization messages (e.g., SALT for Self Actualization for 
Leadership Training).
8.  WWJS is listed on the online Urban Dictionary, a reference list for contemporary slang, at 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/de'ne.php?term=wwjs, accessed September 22, 2006. It 
lists an example of conversational usage as, “Hey, should I abort this baby? WWJS?”
9. Lists of variations can be found at a webpage for “Christian Acronyms” at the website man-
aged by the Creative Ladies Ministry, http://www.creativeladiesministry.com/acronyms.html, 
accessed September 22, 2006.
10. Dundes discussed acronyms as expressions of cognitive patterns in “!e Number !ree in 
American Culture” (1980d, 140). Although he emphasized the ubiquity of three names for 
organizational names, he implied that four is a symbol of “more than enough” when he delin-
eated “general statements about the nature of trichotomy.” His second statement was, “If there 
are more than three terms, the additional ones will not infrequently be de'ned primarily in 
terms of one of the extremes. For example, in shirt sizes, one 'nds small, medium, and large. 
!e size ‘extra-large’ is certainly linguistically and very probably conceptually derived from 
‘large,’ rather than possessing separate individual status” (136). !e symbolic meaning of four as 
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Folklore as a Mirror of Culture
Introduction
Alan Dundes was considered a master teacher as well as a scholar. His study of folklore 
o8ers insight into instruction, since folklore is an essential way that cultural knowledge 
and wisdom is passed down from generation to generation and from peer to peer. He prac-
ticed what he preached, for in 1994 he received a distinguished teaching award from the 
University of California at Berkeley, an accolade he greatly cherished. In his own educa-
tion, he received a graduate degree in teaching of English from Yale University in 1955. 
In this 1969 essay, originally appearing in an English education journal, he urged K–12 
teachers to use folklore as an instructional tool to develop tolerance, and to use the stu-
dents’ own cultural traditions to enhance learning. Unlike many educational approaches 
encouraging adults to concoct, and o5en sanitize, literary materials for children to digest, 
he called on teachers to rely on raw oral lore “performed by children for other children.” 
He was famous, in fact, for requiring his own college students to collect '5y items of folk-
lore that they would then describe and interpret. In this essay, he provided sociopsycho-
logical perspectives that can be used to decipher folk material.
Dundes pointed to children’s folklore, not as something to be repressed, but rather to 
be brought out into the open. As he showed, it re6ects, as only folklore can, issues of sib-
ling rivalry, puberty, and parent/child relations. He distinguished folklore—as evidence—
from the use of other materials, because it is “autobiographical ethnography, a people’s own 
description of themselves.” He evaluated what children typically relate in folklore to “areas 
of special concern,” or anxieties that are expressed more readily in folklore than in every-
day conversation.
Dundes’s concern for the plight of African Americans and Vietnamese was voiced in 
his writings during the Civil Rights movement and the Vietnam War. He referred to the 
presence of the Cold War in relating alternative answers to the riddle joke of “what’s black 
and white and red all over?” Other con6icts mentioned in the essay have outlasted the 
Cold War, such as ethnic and international tension grounded in cultural misunderstand-
ing. Folklore, as a mirror of culture, reveals di8erences and similarities in ways of thinking, 
and he hoped that its study could therefore be a tool for teaching cultural understanding.
!is essay encapsulates, at an early stage in Dundes’s career, many of the principles of a 
“modern” concept of folklore that became in6uential in folkloristics. He distanced him-
self from the Grimm brothers’ legacy of romantic nationalism, and advocated folklore as 
an adaptive strategy of modern life. He also expanded the scope of folk materials from oral 
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to written and material items. His advocacy of the idea that folklore is constantly being 
created anew in contemporary life was especially important. It is not a relic of the past, as 
many people believe, but an expression of present-day issues.
Dundes’s title invokes the “mirror” concept of Franz Boas, considered the father of 
modern anthropology, that folklore is invaluable as a re6ection of a particular culture’s 
conditions and values. He expanded Boas’s inquiry by suggesting that the interpretation 
of symbols lodged within folkloric performances were a result of folklore serving the func-
tion of a socially sanctioned outlet for suppressed wishes and anxieties. He also inferred 
the strategic use of folklore to upset power relations, as his examples of child/parent com-
munication demonstrate. Characteristically—given his fondness throughout his writing 
career for re6exively turning the analyst’s cultural mirror back on the analyst as a way to 
disrupt the hierarchies of observer and observed—he examined the folklore that teach-
ers possess, a5er spending time showing the value of understanding children’s folklore. In 
the process, he identi'ed the common cognitive pattern of trichotomy as a Western schol-
arly, as well as cultural, bias, a point he later expanded in “!e Number !ree in American 
Culture” in Interpreting Folklore (1980b). !is essay is also signi'cant for separating the 
hierarchical view of folk as a lower stratum, which he associated with the nineteenth-cen-
tury approach of the Brothers Grimm, from the modern concept, which contains the key 
social de'nition of folk as “any group of people whatsoever who share at least one linking 
factor.” !us, he concluded that “we all are folk”—whether urban or rural, young or old, 
religious or secular.
In folkloristic writing, the “mirror” concept is still applied to relate historical and cul-
tural information about a group, with the presumption that it is also a marker of a particu-
laristic social identity. (See, for instance, Clements 1996; Rey-Henningsen 1994; Wilson 
1995, 2006; and Georges and Jones 1995.) It is also referenced when the details of folk-
lore appear not to re6ect culture, suggesting the psychological possibility of folklore dis-
torting or inverting reality (see chapter 14, “Getting the Folk and the Lore Together”). In 
Dundes’s words, “It was not understood [in Boas’s mirror concept] that an item of folklore 
can serve as a vehicle which requires an individual to do what he may not be permitted to 
do in everyday reality (e.g., in courtship games, complete strangers may kiss, in games of 
chase, acts of physical aggression are mandatory)” (Dundes 1966a, 243; see also chapters 
15 and 17 in this volume).
Alan Dundes continued his interest in children’s folklore throughout his career, 
connecting folklore to human development and infantile anxieties. He also drew on 
children’s humor, such as dead baby jokes, to underscore the emergent nature of folk 
humor, which he typically analyzed psychoanalytically (1987c). He wrote the foreword 
to Martha Wolfenstein’s Children’s Humor (1978), and the title essays of his anthologies 
From Game to War (1997b) and Bloody Mary in the Mirror (2002a) delve into children’s 
rituals and games. For more interpretative sources on the folklore of children and their 
teachers, see Bishop and Curtis 2001; Bronner 1988, 1995; Factor 1989; Knapp and 
Knapp 1976; McDowell 1979; Opie and Opie 1969, 1972; Sutton-Smith 1972; and 
Sutton-Smith et al. 1999.
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The various forms of folklore: myths, folktales, legends, folksongs, prov-
erbs, riddles, games, dances and many others can provide a vital resource for a teacher who 
seriously wishes to (1) understand his students better, and (2) teach those students more 
e8ectively about the world and about the human condition. For folklore is autobiograph-
ical ethnography—that is, it is a people’s own description of themselves. !is is in con-
trast to other descriptions of that people, descriptions made by social workers, sociologists, 
political scientists or anthropologists. It may be that there is distortion in a people’s self 
image as it is expressed in that people’s songs, proverbs, and the like, but one must admit 
that there is o5en as much, if not more, distortion in the supposedly objective descriptions 
made by professional social scientists who in fact see the culture under study through the 
culturally relative and culturally determined categories of their own culture. Moreover, 
even the distortion in a people’s self image can tell the trained observer something about 
that people’s values. Out of all the elements of culture, which ones are singled out for dis-
tortion, for special emphasis?
Folklore as a mirror of culture frequently reveals the areas of special concern. It is for 
this reason that analyses of collections of folklore can provide the individual who takes 
advantage of the opportunities a8orded by the study of folklore a way of seeing another 
culture 'om the inside out instead of 'om the outside in, the usual position of a social sci-
entist or teacher. Whether the “other culture” is far from the borders of our country or 
whether the “other culture” is lodged within these borders, a world shrunk by modern 
technological advances in transportation and communications demands that education 
keep pace. We need to know more about Vietnamese worldview; we need to know more 
about African American values.
One or the greatest obstacles impeding a better understanding of Vietnamese, African 
American or any other culture is what anthropologists term “ethnocentrism.” !is is the 
notion, apparently held in some form by all the peoples of the earth, that the way we do 
things is “natural” and “right” whereas the way others do them is “strange,” perhaps “unnat-
ural” and maybe even “wrong.” !e Greek historian Herodotus described ethnocentrism, 
without, of course, using the term, as follows:
If one were to o8er men to choose out of all the customs in the world such as 
seemed to them the best, they would examine the whole number, and end by 
preferring their own; so convinced are they that their own usages surpass those 
of all others.
One of the purposes of studying folklore is to realize the hypothetical premise. Man 
cannot choose out of all the customs in the world until he knows what these customs 
are. Traditional customs are part of folklore. Obviously the point in collecting, classify-
ing, and analyzing the customs and other forms of folklore is not necessarily to allow the 
investigator to choose a way of life other than his own. Rather by identifying the simi-
larities, the actual historical cognates such as hundreds of versions of Cinderella, a tale 
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which folklorists label as Aarne-!ompson tale type 510 in the internationally known 
index of Indo-European folktales 'rst published in 1910, or by identifying the near-
similarities, the probably noncognate folkloristic parallels which seem to depend upon 
universal or quasi-universal human experiences (such as the introduction of death into 
the world because of some unthinking or foolish action on the part of a culture hero 
or trickster 'gure), one has convincing data which can e8ectively be used to promote 
international understanding. If only the Turks and Greeks realized that they had the 
same folktales and the same lovable wise fool of a Hodja 'gure in many of these tales. 
!e same holds for the Arabs and the Jews. In this light, it is sad to think that folklore, 
instead of being used as a constructive force for internationalism, has all too frequently 
been the tool of excessive nationalism.
!e history of folklore studies reveals that folklorists in many di8erent countries have 
o5en been inspired by the desire to preserve their national heritage. !e Grimms, for exam-
ple, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, imbued with nationalism and romanti-
cism, and armed with the fashionable methodology of historical reconstruction, collected 
folktales and legends with the hope of rescuing something ur-German, that is, something 
truly Teutonic, before it faded from the scene altogether. !e Grimms were surprised 
and probably more than a little disappointed when they discovered that many of their 
“Teutonic” tales had almost exact analogues in other European countries. !e Grimms 
incidentally, like most nineteenth century collectors, rewrote the folklore they collected. 
!is retouching of oral tales continues today in the children’s literature 'eld where recon-
structed, reconstituted stories written in accordance with written not oral conventions are 
palmed o8 as genuine folktales.
One can see that the basic mistrust of folk materials is part of a general ambivalence 
about the materials of oral tradition, the materials of the folk. On the one hand, the folk 
and their products were celebrated as a national treasure of the past; on the other hand, 
the folk were wrongly identi'ed with the illiterate in a literate society and thus the folk 
as a concept was identi'ed exclusively with the vulgar and the uneducated. (!e folk to a 
modern folklorist is any group of people whatsoever who share at least one common link-
ing factor, e.g., religion, occupation, ethnicity, geographical location, etc., which leads to: 
Jewish folklore, lumberjack folklore, African American folklore, and California folklore. 
As an American I know American folklore; as a professor I know campus folklore; as a 
member of a family, I know my own family folklore.) !e equation of folklore with igno-
rance has continued. !e word folklore itself considered as an item of folk speech means 
fallacy, untruth, error. !ink of the phrase “!at’s folklore.” It is similar to the meaning of 
“myth in such phrases as “the myth of race.” !is is not, however, what folklore and myth 
mean to the professional folklorist. A myth is but one form or genre of folklore, a form 
which consists of a sacred narrative explaining how the world and man came to be in their 
present form. Folklore consists of a variety of genres most of which are found among all 
peoples of the earth. Nevertheless, the association of folklore with error (consider “folk” 
medicine as opposed to “scienti'c” medicine) has made it di7cult for the study of folklore 
as a discipline to gain academic respectability and has generally discouraged the use and 
study of folklore by educators.
It is still mistakenly thought that the only people who study folklore are antiquarian 
types, devotees of ballads which are no longer sung and collectors of quaint customs which 
are no longer practiced. Folklore in this false view is equated with survivals from an age 
past, survivals which are doomed not to survive. Folklore is gradually dying out, we are 
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told. Moreover, since folklore is de'ned as error, it is thought by some educators to be 
a good thing that folklore is dying out. In fact, it has been argued that one of the pur-
poses of education is to help stamp out folklore. As humans evolve, they leave folklore 
behind such that the truly civilized human is conceived to be folkloreless. From this kind 
of thinking, one can understand why education and folklore have been on opposite sides 
and also why when well meaning educators move into other cultures, e. g., in Africa or in 
a ghetto school, they actually believe they are doing their students a service by helping to 
suppress local customs, superstitions, folk speech, and other folkloristic traditions. So it is 
that African students are taught Shakespeare and Chaucer as great literature while their 
own superb oral literature is not deemed worthy of classroom treatment, assuming that 
the western educated teacher even knows of its existence. How many teachers of litera-
ture, of the epic in particular, are aware of the fact that the epic is a living oral form and 
that epics up to 13,000 lines are now being sung in Yugoslavia, among other places? How 
many teachers of African American children have ever heard of the “dozens” (or “rapping 
and capping” or “sounding” etc.) or of the “toast,” an important African American folk-
lore genre in rhyme reminiscent of epic form? Yet, the technique of verbal dueling known 
as the “dozens” and the epic toast are extremely viable forms of African American folklore 
and they encapsulate the critical points and problems in African American family struc-
ture and in black-white relations. One could teach both literature and social studies from 
such folkloristic texts (were they not “obscene” by our standards) with the advantage that 
these texts would be known by the students from their own lives and experience.
Why not teach children about the nature of poetry by examining their own folk poetry: 
nursery rhymes, jump rope rhymes, hand clap rhymes, ball bouncing rhymes, dandling 
rhymes, and autograph book verse among others? !ere is almost no method or approach 
found in the study of literature which could not also be applied to folk materials. One 
could discuss formal features such as metrics, rhyme, alliteration; one could discuss con-
tent features such as characterization, motivation, themes. By using the materials of folk-
lore as a point of departure, the educational process may be comprehended as dealing with 
the real world rather than with a world apart from the world in which the students live. 
With folklore, the classroom becomes a laboratory or forum for a consideration of “real 
life” as it is experienced and perceived by those being educated. Let me brie6y provide just 
a few examples of folklore and try to illustrate how they might be used to enliven and stim-
ulate classroom discussions.
One technique which can immediately show children something important about the 
nature of oral tradition is to select one item of folklore and ask each child to tell the other 
members of the class his or her version of the item. It doesn’t matter what the item is: when 
Christmas presents are opened (Christmas Eve, Christmas morning, one on Christmas 
Eve and the rest on Christmas day, etc.) or what one says near the end of Hide and Seek 
to summon all the other players: Olly, olly oxen free, Olly Olly Ocean free, (All ye, all ye 
“outs” in free?????), Home free all, etc. A5er a number of versions have been elicited, the 
students should be able to see that although there is considerable diversity, there is also 
considerable uniformity. If there are di8erences—such as how many candles are placed 
on the birthday cake (some have the number of candles equal to the number of years old 
while others have that number plus one with the extra grow on, etc.), even these di8erences 
are traditional. How many children believe that the number of candles le5 burning a5er 
the attempt to blow them out signi'es the number of children one will have? How many 
believe the number le5 burning signi'es the number of years to pass before one’s wish 
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(made right before the blowing attempt) comes true? !rough such devices, the children 
can learn that there are frequently subtraditions within traditions. !en the teacher may 
ask the children “Which version is correct?” “Which version is the right one?” Normally, 
there will be extended debate on this, individual students championing their own individ-
ual versions, perhaps pointing to the statistical evidence available within the classroom to 
support one version over another. Gradually, the children will come to realize that in folk-
lore as in life, there is o5en no one correct or right version. One traditional version is just 
as traditional as another version. A’s way of observing Christmas or birthday rituals is no 
better and no worse than B’s. Isn’t this a marvelous way of showing what ethnocentrism 
is: people insisting that the way they know is best and proper while the strange unfamiliar 
way is wrong? And isn’t this a marvelous way of teaching tolerance? If children can learn 
that their fellows’ ways are not “wrong” but “alternative, equally traditional” ways of doing 
things, this could be one of the most important lessons they are ever likely to learn.
Having illustrated the nature of variation in folklore, the teacher might wish to discuss 
why there is variation. Here the di8erence between oral and written (or printed) tradi-
tions is crucial. Folklore is passed on by means of person to person contact. And an item 
of folklore may be changed by di8erent individuals in accordance with their own individ-
ual needs, the demands of a particular social context—the make-up of the audience—is it 
boys and girls, just boys, children and grown-ups, etc. or the requirements of a new age. So 
it is that each item of folklore is passed on through time, sometimes remaining the same, 
sometimes changing. !is is why the task of collecting and analyzing folklore can never be 
completed. Tomorrow’s version of a folksong may or may not be the same as the one we 
know today which in turn may or may not be the same as the one which was known in the 
past. !is is in marked contrast to the products of written tradition. If one reads a play of 
Shakespeare or a novel of James Joyce today, one can be reasonably sure that one hundred 
years from now, the identical text will be read by others.
!ere is a tendency to underestimate the di8erences between a visual/written record 
and an aural/oral record. It has only recently been suggested that the mass media, radio, 
television, motion pictures, etc. have, by discouraging or impinging upon time formerly 
spent in reading, made us an oral rather than a written culture. Actually, one should say, 
has made us an oral culture again. In evolutionary terms, pre-literate society which was 
orally oriented became literate, but now we have “post-literate” man who is in6uenced 
by oral communication once more. Yet the education system has not always kept pace. 
!e traditional emphasis has been upon “reading and writing.” What about “speaking?” 
Oratory, valued so much by oral cultures around the world, has become almost a lost art 
in literate societies. Interestingly enough, in African American culture there is tremendous 
value placed upon rhetoric as one aspect of style. !e “man of words” is highly esteemed 
and anyone who has heard African American preachers use their voices surely recognizes 
the eloquent power of that oral style.
It is a pity that our educational philosophy continues to worship the written word. Note 
that “literacy” is still thought by some to be a sine qua non for an individual to be able to vote. 
!e fact that intelligent peoples all over the world are capable of reaching decisions without 
anything more than oral communication seems to be overlooked. We tend to trust what is 
“down in black and white.” “Put it in writing” we say; we tend to distrust oral testimony, 
regarding it as unreliable. We forget that much of what is written down—in newspapers, in 
books, circulated as oral communication 'rst. Even the Bible was in oral tradition before 
it was committed to written form! With such bias in favor of written tradition, it is easy to 
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see why there has been relatively little interest in the study of oral tradition. But by failing 
to recognize the di8erences between oral and written traditions, we do a disservice to our-
selves as well as our students. Who has never heard someone give orally an address which 
was written out in advance? Yet relatively few written works read well aloud. Similarly, 
students taking written notes from an instructor’s free-6owing oral classroom delivery are 
o5en dismayed by the sentence fragments, the agreement errors, etc. !ere are major lexical 
and stylistic di8erences between oral and written tradition. “Indeed, Moreover, One can-
not escape the conclusion . . .” are acceptable written conventions, when seen on a printed 
page, but they may sound stilted when heard in speech. A word or phrase may look right, 
but sound wrong. But by the same token, a word or phrase which sounds 'ne, may look 
terrible in print. In oral speech, one can use slang, folk similes (as cool as a cucumber) and 
folk metaphors (to 6y o8 the handle). In written tradition, these are branded as “clichés” 
by diligent teachers of English composition. Such teachers are wont to warn their students 
to “avoid clichés.” !e folklorist would urge that children not be told never to use clichés 
but rather that they be taught the di8erence between oral and written traditions and not to 
confuse the conventions of each. In oral tradition, originality is neither desired or expected. 
!e more traditional (= unoriginal) the better. However, in our written tradition, original-
ity is essential. But children can not avoid clichés. Do they not learn to speak before they 
learn to read and write? !e point is simply that children should not be taught to write as 
they speak and they should not be taught to speak as they write. !e unfortunate confu-
sion of oral and written conventions is one reason why most printed collections of folklore 
are spurious. !ey have been edited and rewritten to conform to written rather than oral 
style. !e expletives, meaningful pauses, the stammers, not to mention the eye expressions, 
the hand movements and all the other body gestural signals are totally lost in the transla-
tion from oral to written tradition. !is is why it is impossible to learn what folklore is by 
reading books. If one is interested in learning about folklore, one must elicit oral tradition. 
A useful class exercise might be to have a child tell a joke or legend to his classmates whose 
task it becomes to write it down. One could then discuss at length just what was “le5 out” 
in the written version that had been in the oral version.
In order to more fully understand and utilize folklore, one must have some idea of the 
functions of folklore. Folklore re6ects (and thereby reinforces) the value con'gurations 
of the folk, but at the same time folklore provides a sanctioned form of escape from these 
very same values. In fairy tales, the hero or heroine is inevitably told not to do something; 
don’t look in the secret chamber, don’t answer the door, etc. Of course, the protagonist 
violates the interdiction. He may be punished for his disobedience, but usually he comes 
out ahead in the end. For example, the hero marries the princess. !e escape mechanism 
is equally obvious in traditional games. On the one hand, educators urge that games be 
played to teach “teamwork,” “cooperation,” and “fair play.” On the other hand, once in 
the game, children can compete and they can compete aggressively. One can “steal” the 
bacon or “capture” the 6ag of the opposing team. In “King of the Mountain,” boys can 
push rivals o8 the ra5. In adolescent games such as “Spin the Bottle,” “Post O7ce,” or 
“Padiddle,” the rules require the participants to do that which they would very much 
like to do but which they might not otherwise do. Folklore provides socially sanctioned 
forms of behavior in which a person may do what can’t be done in “real life.” One is not 
supposed to push anyone around in real life—at least if one believes the “Golden Rule,” 
but in games one is supposed to take a chair and leave someone else without one to sit 
on (in “Musical Chairs”). As a young adolescent, one cannot kiss a casual acquaintance 
60  !e Meaning of Folklore
without feelings of guilt or hearing cries of derision. Yet in kissing games, one must do 
so. !e folkloristic frame not only permits, but requires the taboo action and it also 
thereby relieves the individual from assuming the responsibility (and guilt) for his or her 
actions. !e individual has no choice; it is a mere spin of the bottle or some other act of 
chance (such as seeing a car with only one headlight working) which dictates the sexual 
behavior. In children’s games, the drama of real (adult) life is o5en enacted, Yet neither 
teacher nor student may be fully aware of just what is involved in a particular game. In 
much the same way, folk—and social—dances allow for heterosexual body contact in a 
society which true to its Puritan heritage has consistently condemned the body and its 
domain. !e fact that boys can dance with girls, girls can dance with girls, but boys can-
not dance with boys in American culture re6ects our great fear of homosexuality. !is is 
striking when one recalls that most societies even have men’s dances from which women 
are excluded. Americans remain slaves to a tradition in which the body is seen as dirty, 
as something to be denied or repressed. Note that we still insist on physical (corporal) 
punishments for intellectual/mental lapses. !e body is punished, not the mind, every 
time a child is struck or spanked!
As a speci'c example of how folklore functions, let me cite one riddle text. A child 
comes home from school and at the dinner table asks his parents: “What is black and 
white and red all over?” !e parent, if he or she is alert and has a good memory, replies: “A 
newspaper” which in fact is one of the older traditional answers to this riddle. But there 
are other modern traditional answers. Some of these are: a sunburned zebra, an embar-
rassed zebra, a zebra with measles, a wounded nun, a bloody integration march, and for the 
sophistocate: Pravda, the Daily Worker, or the New York Times which involves an interest-
ing play on the original “newspaper” answer. Now what precisely is going on? What func-
tion, if any, does this riddle or the hundreds like it serve? I believe that this kind of riddle 
provides an e8ective mechanism for reversing the normal adult-child relationship in our 
society. In our society, it is the parent or teacher who knows all the answers and who insists 
upon proposing di7cult if not “impossible” questions to children. However, in the riddle 
context, either the parent doesn’t know the answer to the elephant or little moron joking 
question—in which case the child can have the great pleasure of telling him or her what 
the answer is or the parent gives the “wrong” answer (e.g., “newspaper” would be consid-
ered “wrong” by the child who has another answer in mind—and aren’t there plenty of 
instances where the child answers an adult’s question perfectly well but fails because his 
answer was not the particular answer the adult desired’? !is is also what happens whenever 
an unthinking adult asks the kind of questions which can be labeled as being “Guess what’s 
in my mind” questions. In this instance where the parent has given the “wrong” answer, the 
child has the even more exquisite pleasure of correcting rather than merely informing the 
parent.) Children also use riddles with their peers where a similar function is evident. A 
child goes one up if he or she has a riddle which stumps a friend. I should perhaps mention 
that riddles or joking questions are by no means con'ned to children’s usage. Many adults 
use such devices in daily interpersonal rituals. Some of these riddling questions provide 
serious re6ections of our culture. Do you remember the “knock-knock” cycle? Well, have 
you heard the World War II knock-knock joke? No? Okay, “Knock-knock” (audience): 
“Who’s there?”—(long silent pause—signifying that no one would be le5 to answer in the 
event of total nuclear world war).
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Literature for Children or Literature of Children
!e analysis of the content of children’s folklore could help anyone seriously interested in 
understanding children. I refer speci'cally to that portion of children’s folklore which is 
performed by children for other children. !is is distinct from that portion of children’s 
folklore which consists of materials imposed upon children by parents and teachers. !e 
analysis of the latter kind of children’s folklore would probably give more of an insight into 
parents and teachers’ worldview than the worldview of children. I suspect that in courses 
dealing with children’s literature, it is this latter category which receives most of the atten-
tion. In other words, the emphasis is on “literature for children” rather than “literature of 
children’’! (By “literature of children” I mean their oral literature, their folklore, their tra-
ditions, not their little individual written compositions or poems.) !is is, in my opin-
ion, the same kind of thinking that makes Peace Corps teachers teach Shakespeare and 
Chaucer to African students instead of utilizing African folktales and proverbs, that is, 
using some of the “native” literature as the basis for an understanding of the nature of prose 
and poetry. Educational, as well as foreign, policy is invariably made in accordance with 
the value system of us, the teacher or the American. Such decisions may be rational from 
our point of view; they may even prove to be “correct,” but in the majority of cases, these 
decisions are probably all too o5en made without su7cient knowledge of the groups we 
honestly want to help. We tend to think of the “other” people be they inhabitants of vil-
lages in Asia or children in our classroom as poor little sponges who need to soak up as 
much of our material as they possibly can.
!e phrase “culturally deprived” is a prime example of this faulty kind of thinking. 
From an anthropological perspective, of course, there can be no such thing as culturally 
deprived. Culture in anthropological usage refers to the total way of life of a people, and 
not to a very select group of elitist materials such as opera, the great books, etc. All human 
beings have culture in general; some people share one culture rather than another. Hopi 
culture is di8erent from Vietnamese culture. So it is impossible in this sense for any indi-
vidual to be “culturally deprived”; our minority groups have just as much culture as any-
body else. !e point is simply that it is another culture, a di8erent culture. To call a minor-
ity group “culturally deprived” is a kind of survival of nineteenth century “white man’s 
burden” thinking. !e real question is: Do we want “them”—and “them’ could be African 
Americans, South Vietnamese, children in our classrooms, etc.—to give up their culture 
and accept our culture in its place or do we not insist on a melting pot metaphor with the 
pot to take on the consistency of the dominant ethos? In my opinion, the “unmelting pot” 
might be a more apt metaphor. If so, then perhaps we should allow or better yet, encourage 
“them” to enjoy, understand, and take pride in their own culture. Obviously, the culture of 
our children is closer to our adult culture than the culture of a distinct ethnic minority or 
some foreign population to our culture in general. Nevertheless, the principle in terms of 
educational philosophy is the same.
What kinds of things do we see in our children’s own folklore?
Teacher, teacher, I declare
I see so and so’s underwear.
Charlie Chaplin went to France
To see the ladies’ underpants . . .
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I see London; I see France
I see so and so’s underpants.
We see the child’s curiosity about the body and the immediate body covering. !e child 
'nds it di7cult to accept the adult’s apparent rejection of the body and its natural func-
tions. Consider the following jump rope rhyme:
Cinderella, dressed in yellow
Went downtown to see her fellow.
On the way her girdle busted.
How many people were disgusted? 1, 2, 3, etc.
Clearly, children, in this instance little girls, are fascinated by a particular undergar-
ment, the girdle. Note that the girdle busts while Cinderella is on the way to see, or in some 
versions to kiss, her fellow. Do children really know what they are saying?
Folklore and Sibling Rivalry
Less symbolic, but equally important are the sentiments underlying these familiar jump 
rope verses:
Fudge, fudge, tell the judge
Mama’s got a new born baby.
It ain’t no girl, it ain’t no boy
Just a newborn (or “common” or “plain ol’” or “ordinary”) baby
Wrap it up in tissue paper
!row (send) it down the elevator.
First 6oor, miss
Second 6oor, miss, etc. (until the jumper misses)
!is is really an extraordinarily revealing rhyme. First of all, why is the judge informed 
about the newborn baby? Is the judge the person who can take away children from parents 
or the person who has the power to punish parents for mistreating children? In any case, 
here is explicit sibling rivalry. What child does not resent the arrival upon the scene of the 
new born child who threatens the previously existing relationship between the older chil-
dren and the mother? Notice how the poor baby is demeaned. It is sexless. It’s not a girl, 
not a boy, in other words, it’s nothing. It’s just—and that word “just” tells all—an ordinary 
baby, nothing exceptional, nothing to make a fuss about. And what does the jumper-re-
citer recommend should be done with the baby? !row it down the elevator. !e jumper 
then jumps as many 6oors as she can without missing. !us by being a skillful jumper, a girl 
can send her baby sibling far away. !e more jumps without misses, the further the baby is 
sent away. !us through jumping rope, a young girl is able to do something “constructive” 
about getting rid of her inevitable aggression against the new sibling rival. !is inter-sib-
ling hostility, I submit, is an integral part of American children’s world-view. Look at the 
following jump rope rhyme:
I had a baby brother
His name was Tiny Tim.
I put him in the bathtub
To teach him how to swim.
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He drank up all the water;
He ate up all the soap.
He tried to eat the bathtub
But it wouldn’t go down his throat.
He died last night
With a bubble in his throat.
!is is an equally blatant example of an expression of sibling rivalry. Note the tense of 
the verb in the 'rst line. I “had” a baby brother. Here is wishful thinking, a common ele-
ment in all folklore. !e baby rival is gone, and before the rhyme really gets started. What 
of the rest of the rhyme’s content? Precisely where is it that the newborn baby gets so much 
obvious physical attention? In American culture, it is the bath. It is during and a5er bath-
ing that the baby is fondled, powdered, played with, etc. So the older child takes things into 
his own hands. He puts the baby into the tub pretending to teach him how to swim. What 
does the baby do in the tub? He tries to eat everything. Babies are in fact orally inclined as 
it is this body zone which provides the initial point of contact with the world, a body zone 
which operates by incorporating what is needed, i.e., mother’s milk. From the older child’s 
point of view, the baby is always being fed—hence it appears to have an insatiable appetite. 
What then is more appropriate from the older child’s perspective than to have his baby 
brother choke to death from eating something he shouldn’t be eating, from trying to eat 
too much, that is, symbolically speaking, from trying to take too much, more than his share 
of their common parent’s bounty. Of course, children hate their parents too:
Step on a crack (line)
Break your mother’s back (spine) 
Symbolism in Folklore
No doubt many people who are unsympathetic to psychology and symbolism may doubt 
the validity of the above interpretations of children’s folklore. Such interpretations, they 
would argue, are being read into innocent folklore rather than being read out of the folklore. 
Yet the astonishing thing is that much the same symbolism is contained in the folklore for 
children as communicated by parents and teachers. It has long been wrongly assumed that 
folktales—e.g., Grimms’ Kinder und Hausmärchen and nursery rhymes are strictly children’s 
fac e. !is is not true. !ese materials were related by adults to other adults as well as chil-
dren. If adult males have Oedipus complexes, then it is clear why it is they who relate the 
story of Jack and the Beanstalk. A boy lives alone with his mother, throws beans out of a win-
dow at his mother’s request, climbs a tall magic beanstalk, hides from the threatening giant 
in the friendly giant’s wife’s oven, kills the giant by cutting the giant stalk with an axe which 
is o5en helpfully provided by his mother waiting at the foot of the stalk, and 'nally lives 
happily ever a5er with his mother! (Parents, of course, to the infant’s eye view or the world 
appear to be giants!) For women with Electra complexes, it is normally a girl versus a wicked 
stepmother or witch. Whereas the donor 'gure in male folktales may be a female (cf. Jack’s 
mother, the giant’s wife), in female folktales, the helper may be a male (cf. the woodsman in 
“Little Red Riding Hood”), although to be sure sometimes kind father 'gures help boys and 
kind mother 'gures (e.g., fairy god-mothers) help girls. In Hansel and Gretel, the children 
are tempted orally and they nibble at the witch’s house. (!e children were not given food by 
their parents.) !e witch, like so many cannibalistic villains in fairy tales, intends to employ 
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the infant’s 'rst weapon (eating, sucking, biting) by devouring the children. In this tale, the 
heroine, Gretel, succeeds in duping the witch into being burned up in her own oven. !e 
female-oven symbolism is consistent. In Jack and the Beanstalk, the boy hides in the giant’s 
wife’s oven to escape the giant; in Hansel and Gretel, a tale featuring a girl’s point of view, the 
heroine eliminates the female villain by making her enter her own hot oven! And what of 
Cinderella who we noticed in jump rope rhymes? What is the signi'cance of the story of a 
girl who marries a prince because of a perfect 't between a foot and a glass slipper? What has 
the ideal marriage to do with a foot 'tting into a slipper? And why do we still tie old shoes 
on the bumpers of cars carrying newlyweds o8 on their honeymoon?
One clue to the symbolism of slippers and shoes comes right from Mother Goose. One 
of the rhymes which parents read to children is:
!ere was an old woman who lived in a shoe.
She had so many children she didn’t know what to do.
A literal, historical interpretation would have to locate a place where women once lived 
in actual shoes, But how would one explain the stated connection between “living in a 
shoe” and “having lots of children.” Fortunately, another verse to this rhyme reported in 
the Ozarks in the 1890’s makes the symbolism even more overt:
!ere was another old woman who lived in a shoe.
She didn’t have any children; she knew what to do.
With symbolic systems, it is never a matter of one isolated instance. Within a given 
culture, there are whole consistent patterns of symbolism. !e symbolism of a culture will 
be manifested in the folklore of that culture. So we should not be surprised to 'nd other 
nursery rhymes:
Cock a doodle doo
My dame has lost her shoe
Her master’s lost his 'ddling stick
!ey don’t know what to do.
Remember these are part of the children’s folklore which is transmitted to children by 
parents and teachers. I do not necessarily believe that parents are aware of the symbolic 
content of folklore any more than I believe that children are consciously aware of all the 
symbolism. Clearly, folklore could not function successfully as an outlet if there were con-
scious awareness of its being so used. Folklore is collective fantasy and as fantasy, it depends 
upon the symbolic system of a given culture. I should be remiss if I did not state my con-
viction that the communication of collective fantasy and symbols is a healthy thing and 
I would strongly oppose those educators who advocate placing Mother Goose and fairy 
tales on a high shelf or locked case in the library. Folklore is one way for both adults and 
children to deal with the crucial problems in their lives. If our folklore sometimes deals 
with sexuality and the interrelationships between members of a family, then this is obvi-
ously something of a problem area in our daily lives. We know that folklore in all cultures 
tends to cluster around the critical points in the life cycle of the individual (e.g., birth, ini-
tiation, marriage, death) and the calendrical cycle of the community (e.g., sowing, harvest-
ing, etc.) In fact, if one collects the folklore of a people and then does a content analysis 
of that folklore, one is very likely to be able to delineate the principal topics of crisis and 
anxiety among that people. So if American folklore, both adult and children’s folklore, 
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has a sexual element, then we must face the problem which is re6ected in the folklore. 
Squelching folklore as if such a thing were really possible—it is impossible to censor oral 
tradition as opposed to print—would not help in solving the original problems which gen-
erated the collective fantasies in the 'rst place.
Folklore About Teachers
!ere can he no doubt that folklore re6ects culture and as a 'nal example, I will brie6y 
mention teacher folklore. !e folklore of and about teachers re6ects both teachers’ atti-
tudes about themselves and students’ attitudes about teachers. !ere is the resentment of 
administrators as illustrated in the numerous dean stories, e.g., “Old deans never die; they 
just lose their faculties.” !ere are the parodies of teaching methods. An English teacher is 
explaining to her class how to write a short story: It should have religion, high society, sex, 
and mystery. Within a few moments, a little boy says, “OK. I’m 'nished.” !e teacher, sur-
prised at the speed of the boy’s composition, asks him to read his short story aloud to the 
class. “My God,” said the duchess, “I’m pregnant! Who did it?” !ere are also commentar-
ies on teachers who run their classes without any regard for what their students might like 
or think. A professor gives an advanced seminar in algebraic functions. Only one student 
shows up. However, he strides to the lectern and reads his hour-long lecture. Each day, the 
professor does the same thing. He sets up his notes and reads his lecture. One day, while at 
the blackboard writing a long series of equations and formulas, the professor sees the one 
student’s hand raised. “Excuse me, professor, but I don’t see why x cubed equals y cubed. 
Why wouldn’t x cubed equal y cubed plus z cubed?” !e professor replied, “!at’s a very 
interesting question but I don’t want to take up valuable class time with it. See me at the 
end of the hour.” In a variant of this joke, it is a professor of art history who o8ers a semi-
nar in advanced Burmese vase painting. Again there is one student and again the profes-
sor reads his lecture. !is time, the professor is at the faculty club talking to his colleagues. 
When they discover that he has only one student for the seminar, they ask him what he is 
doing in the class. He tells them that he reads his lecture just as he always has. “Good heav-
ens,” one colleague exclaims, “with just one student why don’t you run the class as a discus-
sion?” whereupon the professor replied, “What is there to discuss?” Of course, I don’t have 
to say how distasteful modern students 'nd this philosophy of education.
!e folklore of teaching includes elementary school teachers too. For example, there’s 
the story of the elementary school teacher who taught look-say reading. One day in back-
ing her car out of a parking place on the street, she banged into the car parked behind her. 
She immediately got out to survey the possible damage and looking at her rear fender 
she said, “Oh, oh, oh, look, look, look, Damn, Damn, Damn!” Notice the threefold rep-
etition in the punchline. !ere are three words each of which is repeated three times. Is 
this unusual? Certainly not. !ree is the ritual number in American folklore. Whether 
it’s three brothers in folktales, three wishes, a minister, a priest, and a rabbi, or the fact 
that there are frequently three action sequences in jokes and three repetitions of lines in 
folksongs: John Brown’s body lies a moulderin’ in the grave, Polly put the kettle on, Lost 
my partner what’ll I do? etc., the pattern is the same. !is pattern is not universal; most 
American Indian peoples have the ritual number four. Here is yet another illustration of 
how by analyzing the folklore we gain insight into the culture which it mirrors. !ree is a 
ritual number not just in American folklore, but in all aspects of American culture: time—
past, present, future; space—length, width, depth; and language—good, better, best, etc. 
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!is is why we have the three R’s (Reading, ‘Riting and ‘Rithmetic), Primary, Secondary, 
and Higher Education, the latter with its three degrees B.A., M. A., and PhD., the 'rst of 
which can be cum laude, magna cum laude, and summa cum laude. !is is why we have 
such pedagogical principles as: “Preview, Teach, and Review” which retains its tripartite 
form in the folk translation: tell ‘em what you’re going to tell ‘em, tell ‘em, and tell ‘em what 
you told ‘em.
Folklore as a subject of study can be a most rewarding one. It does serve as a mirror of 
culture and it is a mirror well worth looking into. !e teacher who encourages his or her 
class to examine their own folklore or better yet sends them out with collecting projects, 
such as collecting the folklore of a group from another “culture” can give students as well 
as him or herself an educational experience of immeasurable value. We need to use every 
available means to better understand ourselves and our fellow men and women. Folklore is 
one such means, one available for the asking. We are all folk. All one needs to begin such 
work is people, people to ask and people to listen. Whether individuals ask about their 
own folklore or ask others about their folklore, if they listen, they will learn.
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2
The Study of Folklore in Literature 
and Culture: Identification and 
Interpretation
Introduction
At the time Dundes wrote this essay, during the 1960s, most scholars concerned with the 
study of folklore aligned with either literary or anthropological camps, a result of their 
educational background or organizational a7liation in a humanities or social science 
department. Dundes observed that what he called the “binary division” in the 'eld had lit-
erary scholars, on one side, stressing the text and anthropologists, on the other, emphasiz-
ing context. In this seminal essay, Dundes proposed a folkloristic method that combined 
the pursuit of texts and contexts, and provided a foundation for a distinctive modern dis-
cipline of folkloristics.
To be sure, scholars had a methodological toolkit at their disposal, but it was o5en 
divided into approaches for speci'c genres, such as the historical-geographic literary 
method for 'nding the origin and distribution of folktales, or the ethnographic 'eld obser-
vation of customs. While being an advocate of comparative approaches, Dundes recoiled 
at the comparative method associated with Victorian anthropologists, which treated folk-
lore as “meaningless” survivals or relics of an evolutionary lower rung of a cultural ladder 
amidst humanity’s upward climb toward “civilization.” !is natural history model adapted 
nineteenth-century evolutionary doctrine to propose a universal psychic unity, and a uni-
linear model of culture that all societies pass through (i.e., stages of savagery, barbarism, 
and civilization). !e question that Dundes asked was whether an integrative approach 
could be established that connected various genres of folklore, and that had a culturally 
relative perspective which accounted for the emergent quality of folklore.
!e folklorist, to Dundes, was a scholarly identity that signaled an overarching con-
cern for the study of tradition, and emphasized the study of “text within context,” past and 
present. In a rhetoric reminiscent of a homiletic jeremiad, Dundes bemoaned folklorists’ 
literary-oriented collecting of texts as an end in itself. At the same time, he was critical of 
anthropological studies that did not account for textual evidence, or were narrowly focused 
on a single culture. While identi'cation sounds straightforward, it is a demanding task to 
account for contextual and textural (or performance) information, in addition to record-
ing texts. Dundes recognized that folklore research depends largely on 'eld-collected 
68  !e Meaning of Folklore
texts, so as to know the circumstances and communication of an item in folklore, but he 
also included working with historical and literary sources as a legitimate part of the iden-
ti'cation stage. In this essay, the text was annotated using standard references, such as the 
tale-type index prepared 'rst by Finnish scholar Antti Aarne (1910) and later revised by 
American folktale specialist Stith !ompson ([1928] 1961) and German literary acade-
mician Hans-Jörg Uther (2004). !e annotation checked the item’s provenance and dis-
tribution, and allowed Dundes to make statements to the e8ect that the tale uttered by his 
informant was European, probably French. Interpretation was necessary, he asserted, to 
draw meaning out of the material, and to gain academic respectability for the folkloristic 
enterprise. !e interpretation he demonstrated here uses psychoanalytic and sociological 
theory, preceded by an analysis of aspects of the tradition: the nominal (e.g., the signi'-
cance of French names in the Native American text), the symbolic (e.g., the equivalence 
of mother to sweetheart in Ulysses), and the functional (e.g., the action whereby Stephen’s 
character kills the mother).
!ere is a narrative structure underpinning this method, suggesting that it has connec-
tions to a quest of discovery for hidden meaning. Dundes posited that a story basically 
proceeds from a lack (something missing) to liquidation of that lack (something found 
or rescued). Similarly, a folkloristic method, in the very least, comprises identi'cation and 
interpretation in search of buried or disguised meaning that is not apparent from a literal 
reading. In addition, a narrative may contain other functions, such as an interdiction and 
violation, to extend the plot. So too, did Dundes imply that “analysis,” an operation upon 
the data—and especially formal and content analyses—led to an interpretation that pro-
posed a meaning.
Dundes’s methodological purpose in this essay was to show the way that proper identi-
'cation, folkloristically derived, was crucial to a convincing interpretation. By calling the 
conclusion “interpretation” rather than “explanation,” Dundes suggested a possibility of 
meaning, instead of positing causation (such as a chronology of events). Dundes’s inter-
preted meanings are frequently “latent,” hidden beneath the literal surface details of the 
text, and are corroborated by reference to the context. !eoretically, Dundes’s social and 
psychoanalytic meanings are not the only ones that could be posited, although he advo-
cated for these kinds of inquiries because of their connections to cognitive patterning, 
which he hypothesized was a source for expressive culture.
Dundes’s terms of “identi'cation” and “interpretation” had a precedent in eminent 
folklorist Archer Taylor’s essay “Folklore and the Student of Literature” ([1948] 1965), 
which Dundes reprinted in his textbook !e Study of Folklore (1965b). In his essay, Taylor 
observed that a fundamental problem connecting folklore and literature “concerns the 
identi'cation and interpretation of popular elements in a piece of literature.” Taylor, how-
ever, was, to Dundes’s way of thinking, stuck on literal aspects of texts rather than on 
uncovering the deeper psychological meanings and ethnographic considerations of con-
text. For Taylor, “the description of gestures, the determination of the times and places in 
which they have been used, and their interpretation—such are the tasks in folklore.”
In addition to constructing a folkloristic methodology, Dundes’s research contrib-
uted to Joyce (1978b, 1962i), Oedipal myth (Dundes and Edmunds 1995), and Native 
American folklore studies (1964b, 1978c).
Dundes’s methodological concerns are evident in “Metafolklore and Oral Literary 
Criticism” (1966c) and “!e Symbolic Equivalence of Allomotifs: Towards a Method 
of Analyzing Folktales” (1984c), reprinted in this volume. Dundes gave an overview 
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of folkloristic study in “!e American Concept of Folklore” (1966a) and “Ways of 
Studying Folklore” (1968c). For other statements on the formation of a distinctive folk-
loristic method, see Bronner 2006c; Abrahams 1979; Dorson 1972c, 1983; Fenton 1967; 
Georges and Jones 1995c; Goldberg 1984; Ketner 1973; Krohn 1971; Oring 1988, 1986; 
and Toelken 1996.
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!e Study of Folklore in Literature and Culture: 
Identi'cation and Interpretation
Many of those outside the discipline of folklore and even some of those within 
tend to divide folklorists into literary or anthropological categories. With this binary divi-
sion comes a related notion that each group of folklorists has its own methodology appro-
priate for its special interests; hence there is thought to be a method for studying folklore in 
literature and another method for studying folklore in culture. Looking at this dichotomy 
from the viewpoint of a professional folklorist, one can see that it is false; moreover it is a 
dichotomy whose unfortunate persistence has tended to divide unnecessarily scholars work-
ing on similar if not identical problems. !e basic methodology of studying folklore in litera-
ture and studying folklore in culture is almost exactly the same; in other words, the discipline 
of folklore has its own methodology applying equally well to literary and cultural problems.
!ere are only two basic steps in the study of folklore in literature and in culture. !e 
'rst step is objective and empirical; the second is subjective and speculative. !e 'rst 
might be termed identi'cation and the second interpretation. Identi'cation essentially 
consists of a search for similarities; interpretation depends upon the delineation of di8er-
ences. !e 'rst task in studying an item is to show how it is like previously reported items, 
whereas the second is to show how it di8ers from previously reported items—and, hope-
fully, why it di8ers.
Professional folklorists who are usually skilled in the mechanics of identi'cation are 
apt to criticize literary critics and cultural anthropologists for failing to properly identify 
folkloristic materials before commenting upon their use. And folklorists are quite right to 
do so. Naive analyses can result from inadequate or inaccurate identi'cation. Plots of tra-
ditional tale types might be falsely attributed to individual writers; European themes in a 
European tale told by American Indians might be mistakenly considered to be aboriginal 
elements. However, folklorists themselves might be criticized for doing no more than iden-
tifying. Too many studies of folklore in literature consist of little more than reading novels 
for the motifs or the proverbs, and no attempt is made to evaluate how an author has used 
folkloristic elements and more speci'cally, how these folklore elements function in the 
particular literary work as a whole. Similarly, listing the European tales among the North 
American Indians does not in itself explain how the borrowed tale functions in its new 
environment. !e concern of folklorists with identi'cation has resulted in sterile study of 
folklore for folklore’s sake and it is precisely this emphasis on text and neglect of context 
which estranged so many literary critics and cultural anthropologists. !e text-without-
 context orientation is exempli'ed by both anthropological and literary folklore scholar-
ship. Folklorists go into the 'eld to return with texts collected without their cultural con-
text; folklorists plunge into literary sources and emerge with dry lists of motifs or proverbs 
li5ed from their literary context. !e problem is that for many folklorists identi'cation 
has become an end in itself instead of a means to the end of interpretation. Identi'cation is 
only the beginning, only the 'rst step. Folklorists who limit their analysis to identi'cation 
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have stopped before asking any of the really important questions about their material. 
Until folklorists are prepared to address themselves to some of these questions, they must 
be resigned to living on the academic fringe in a peripheral discipline. As illustrations of 
how interpretation must follow initial identi'cation in the study of folklore in context, the 
following brief discussion of a folktale found in James Joyce’s Ulysses and a European tale 
found among the Prairie Band Potawatomi is o8ered.
In Joyce’s Ulysses, one 'nds many di8erent kinds of folklore, including tale types, nurs-
ery rhymes, tonguetwisters, folksongs, mnemonics, palindromes, and children’s games.1 
Joyce’s keen interest in folklore is further attested by his use of one of the minor characters, 
Haines, as an English folklorist come to Ireland to collect Irish folklore. Of all the exam-
ples of folklore in Ulysses, I have selected the riddle Stephen Dedalus asks his class to dem-
onstrate the techniques of identi'cation and interpretation. A5er reciting the opening for-
mula and 'rst line of a well known riddle for writing, Stephen asks his class this riddle:
!e cock crew
!e sky was blue:
!e bells in heaven
Were striking eleven.
’Tis time for this poor soul
To go to heaven.
!e 'rst riddle that Stephen recites in this situation—“Riddle me, riddle me, randy ro / 
My father gave me seeds to sow”—has been identi'ed by scholars as the 'rst part of riddle 
number 1063 in Archer Taylor’s great compendium, English Riddles 'om Oral Tradition, 
and also has received interpretive examination (Weldon !ornton says, for example, that 
Stephen’s suppression of the last part of the riddle may be an admission of his failure as 
a writer2)—but so far as I know, no one has correctly identi'ed the riddle Stephen puts 
to his class. Stephen’s students are as much in the dark as the literary critics, though he 
gives them the answer, “the fox burying his grandmother under a hollybush.” Work has 
been done on the problem of identi'cation, since because of Joyce’s frequent allusions to it 
throughout the book it is obviously of some importance to the interpretation of the book 
itself.3 Several scholars have pointed out the similarity of Joyce’s riddle with one in P. W. 
Joyce’s English as We Speak It in Ireland:4
Riddle me, riddle me right
What did I see last night?
!e wind blew
!e cock crew,
!e bells of heaven
Struck eleven.
’Tis time for my poor sowl to go to heaven.
Answer: the fox burying his mother under a holly tree.
P. W. Joyce did not identify the riddle and he even commented upon what he called “the 
delightful inconsequences of riddle and answer.” Yet a trained folklorist knows immediately 
that the riddle is closely related to a subtype of an international tale type, Aarne-!ompson 
955, !e Robber Bridegroom. In this subtype, which is very popular in Anglo-American 
oral tradition, the villainous suitor is frequently named Mr. Fox. Mr. Fox plans to do away 
with his betrothed and o5en the frightened girl, hidden in a tree, actually watches Mr. Fox 
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digging her grave-to-be. Later at a large gathering the girl recites the riddle describing the 
villain’s actions and thus unmasks the villain and reveals his nefarious plot. !e folklorist 
can tell from the riddle text alone that there is a reference to the whole folktale, but there 
is additional evidence that Joyce himself knew the tale. In the memorable Circe chapter, 
the mob shouts derisively at Bloom as a disgrace to Christian men, a vile hypocrite, and the 
like: “Lynch him! Roast him! He’s as bad as Parnell was. Mr. Fox!” 5 !is very last allusion is 
what T. S. Eliot calls an objective correlative in that the mob scene in the folktale is evoked, 
a scene in which all those present cry out at the evil designs of the wicked Mr. Fox. So much 
for the identi'cation of Stephen’s riddle. What about the interpretation?
All previous interpretations of the signi'cance of the riddle and fox imagery have been 
made without the bene't of a correct initial identi'cation. William M. Schutte, for exam-
ple, suggests that Stephen thinks of himself as a fox in that the fox as the wily foe of the 
hounds employs the weapons of silence, exile, and cunning. Schutte also says that the fox 
must be Stephen who killed his mother without mercy and who cannot stop scratching at 
the ground where she is buried.6 However, in terms of the folktale the fox only plans to kill 
his sweetheart; he does not actually commit the crime. !e fox is judged by his thought 
rather than by his act. In the novel Stephen did not kill his mother, but he judges himself 
in thought: “I could not save her”; earlier Buck Mulligan had spoken of Stephen killing his 
mother.7 Of even more interest is the fact that in most versions of the tale Mr. Fox’s victim 
is his bride-to-be, whereas in the Joyce variant the fox’s victim is a mother. If the mother 
is equivalent to a sweetheart, then this would be part of the extensive Oedipal aspect of 
Stephen’s character which I have discussed elsewhere.8 In this light, Stephen the fox kills 
his mother instead of marrying her as she expected. If the P. W. Joyce text of the riddle was 
the source for James Joyce, then Stephen’s changing the mother of the original to grand-
mother in the answer he gives the class also points to Stephen’s Oedipal problem, for it is 
clear that in Stephen’s own mind the fox’s victim is a mother, not a grandmother.
!e folktale source also clari'es the puzzling association of the fox and Christ. 
“Christfox” is described as a “runaway in blighted treeforks.”9 !e latter description sug-
gests not only a cruci'xion but also the striking scene in the tale when the girl victim, 
hiding in a tree, looks down upon Mr. Fox digging her grave. !e accom panying phrase 
“women he won to him” could allude to the Bluebeard Mr. Fox plot as well as to Christ 
and His faithful females. Stephen as “Christfox” is both victim and villain, both innocent 
and guilty. !e point is, however, that unless the reader understands Joyce’s skillful use of 
the riddle from the tale type as an objective correlative, he cannot appreciate the paradox.
One could proceed in similar fashion to identify and interpret other folkloristic ele-
ments in Ulysses. For example, one might examine Joyce’s ingenious adaption of the rid-
dling question “Where was Moses when the light went out ?”10—or the impact of Stephen’s 
singing the anti-Semitic ballad “Sir Hugh” or “!e Jew’s Daughter” (Child 155) at that 
point in the novel when the Gentile Stephen has been invited to stay the night at the home 
of the Jew Bloom, who has a marriageable daughter;11 but these and other examples would 
only demonstrate the point made here in the exegesis of the Fox riddle.
So the literary critic without proper knowledge of folklore can go wrong in identi'-
cation and consequently in interpretation—but so can the anthropologist who knows 
only the basic tools of his discipline’s trade. In April of 1963 I collected a 'ne example of 
folklore in culture from William Mzechteno, a 74-year-old Prairie Band Potawatomi in 
Lawrence, Kansas. Here is the raw story as I transcribed it, with myself identi'ed by the 
initial D and my informant with the initial M.
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M. Well there was once, there was a little boy. !ere was always a little boy, you know, 
and he had a name, his name was ah—[pause of six seconds’ duration]—P’teejah. His 
name is P’teejah, and ah—
D.  P’teejah?
M.  Yeah. And he, he had a little, let’s see now—[pause of three seconds’ duration]—oh, 
he had a little tablecloth, you know. He can eat, you know, there’s food every time he 
spreads that tablecloth on the ground or anywheres; he name many food, any kinda 
food he wants. It’d just appear on the, right on the tablecloth and was eaten. Well, all 
he had to do to clean up, you know, is just shake; everything was disappear, you know, 
into thin air. And he was goin’ long the road one time, he met a soldier, he had a cap 
on. Uniform caps, you know, those soldiers wear. And the soldier was hungry. [!e 
boy asked] “You got anything to eat?” [!e soldier answered] “Oh, I got this hard 
bread.” It’s all he had. [!e boy said] “Let’s see that bread,” he told him, “oh, that’s 
hard, that’s no good, not 't to cat,” he told him. He throw it away. [!e soldier said] 
“Mustn’t do that, it’s all I got to eat.” (!e boy said] “I’ll give you something better,” 
he told him. He pull out his tablecloth, and spread it on there, on the ground. “You 
name anything you want, ANY THING! So he, ah, he named all he wanted to eat, 
Soldier, he was real hungry. “So, if you want any of that red water, you can have that 
too,” he told him, whiskey.
D.  Red water?
M.  Yeah, they call it red water [laughing].
D.  Who called it red water?
M.  !e Indian boy. !ey called it red water.
D.  Yeah?
M.  Yeah, ‘cause it’s red, you know. He didn’t call it 're water. 
D.  !is is an Indian boy?
M.  Yeah, yeah, And, oh the soldier enjoyed his meal; he 'lled up, you know, and “Well, I 
got something to show you,” he told me. He [the soldier] took his cap o8, you know, 
and he throwed it on the ground and said, “I want four soldiers.” And sure enough, 
four soldiers, there, well armed, stood there at attention. “It’s pretty good,” he [the 
boy] told him, “but you can go hungry with those four soldiers,” he told him [laugh-
ing]. So, he put on his cap, you know. Course the soldiers disappeared, and he start 
to go and then the soldier said, “Say, little boy, how you like to trade? I’ll give you 
this cap for that cloth.” Naw, he wouldn’t trade. “I’d go hungry without it.” Oh, he 
got to thinking, you know. He said, “Well soldiers could get me something to eat,” 
he thought, I guess. So, he traded, fair trade. He kept looking back, the little boy, you 
know. He had that little cap on. He thought about his tablecloth. He sure hated to 
lose it. So he, come to his mind, you know, “I’ll get it.” He took o8 [laughing] that 
cap and throwed it on the ground. “Four soldiers,” he told ‘em. Soldiers come up, you 
know, stood up right there and [he] says, “See that man goin’ over there. He took my 
tablecloth away from me,” he told ‘em, “you go and git it [giggling laugh].” So they 
went [laughing] a5er that man; he fought ‘em like every-thin’. “You belong to me,” he 
said, “No [laughing] we belong to him over there,” they said. So then he got his table-
cloth and the boy got it back. And he had the cap too. !at’s where.
D.  !e boy was, you say, an Indian boy?
M.  Yeah.
D.  But the soldier was a white man.
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M.  Yeah.
D.  So the Indian boy was fooling the white man.
M.  Yeah, [laughing] he put it on him.
D.  In a trade, too.
M.  Yeah, it was a fair trade but he was using his noodle [laughing].
D.  !at’s very nice. I didn’t know it was an Indian boy.
M.  Yeah.
D.  I see.
M.  Yeah.
D.  Well, that’s good, that’s a 'ne story.
In order to analyze this tale in terms of Potawatomi culture, one must 'rst identify the 
tale not as an indigenous Indian story, but as a European tale type. From the detail of the 
magic food-providing tablecloth (Motif D 1472.1.8), the professional folklorist can eas-
ily identify the tale as a version of tale type 569, !e Knapsack, the Hat, and the Horn. 
Moreover, from internal evidence one can without di7culty demonstrate that the tale was 
borrowed originally from a French source. !e Indian boy’s name is P’teejah and the long 
pause before the utterance of the name shows the narrator’s praiseworthy concern with 
getting the name right. P’teejah is a recognizable corruption of the French folktale charac-
ter of Petit-Jean. As a matter of fact, Franz Boas in his essay “Romance Folk-Lore among 
American Indians” observed that the name of this French 'gure had been taken over by 
a number of American Indian groups.12 Another trace of French culture is the allusion to 
“red water” which is probably wine although the narrator interpreted it as whiskey. So the 
tale has been identi'ed: It is a borrowing from a French version of Aarne-!ompson tale 
type 569 and certainly not an aboriginal tale type. But the statement that it is a European 
tale does not answer such questions as what have the Potawatomi done with the tale?—
how have they changed it and how do these changes tell us something about present-day 
Potawatomi culture? As a general rule European tales among American Indian groups can 
be used as indexes of acculturation. If the European tale is little changed, then it is prob-
able that the borrowing Indian culture is waning if not defunct. If on the other hand the 
European tale is reworked and adapted to 't American Indian rather than European val-
ues, then it is more than likely that the American Indian culture in question is still a going 
concern. What about this Potawatomi tale?
First of all, the hero has been changed from a French character to an Indian boy. !e 
narrator was questioned repeatedly about the identity of P’teejah and each time he insisted 
that P’teejah was an Indian boy. Secondly, the magic cap which belonged to the white sol-
dier worked magic in American Indian symbolic terms rather than in European. Four sol-
diers were produced, not three; four is the ritual number of the Potawatomi as of most 
American Indian groups. !us the magic soldier-producing hat (Motif D 1475.4) operates 
in American Indian terms and this in a sense is precisely what the whole tale does. In the 
tale the soldier o8ers to make a trade—protection in exchange for food, an exchange not 
unusual in the light of American colonial history. One senses that the exchange is unfair 
and that the adult European soldier is tricking the young Indian boy into giving up his 
only source of food. But in this folktale the Indian boy gets the best of the trade, the “fair 
trade” proposed by the white man. Although the hero does not appear to have planned his 
actions in advance, the narrator commented a5er telling the tale that the boy had “used 
his noodle,” that is, he had out-thought the white man. In this tale of wish ful'llment, the 
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Indian boy has su7cient force to overpower the European soldier antagonist and to regain 
his original abundance of food.
In the cultural phenomenon which anthropologists term nativistic movements, it is 
common for the borrowing, dominated culture to dream of taking over the dominat-
ing culture’s artifacts without the presence of members of that culture.13 In this tale the 
Potawatomi has control of European artifacts; it is the Indian boy who is able to o8er the 
soldier “red water” rather than soldier o8ering the Indian liquor—it is the Indian boy who 
uses the white man’s object to defeat the white man. One can see even from these few com-
ments why this particular European tale could easily have been accepted by Potawatomi 
raconteurs and audiences. A few de5 changes made it a tale with considerable appeal for 
most Potawatomi. One can see from a “mistake” made by the narrator that he identi'ed 
with the Indian boy. A5er the soldier 'nished eating, be told the boy he had something to 
show him. At this point, Mr. Mzechteno said “Well, I got something to show you,” he told 
me. !is use of “me” instead of “him” strongly suggests that the story was in some sense 
about Mr. Mzechteno and perhaps other Potawatomi. !is detail plus the informant’s fre-
quent laughter demonstrate his enjoyment of and involvement with the tale.
!e study of Joyce’s use of a riddle and the study of a Potawatomi adaptation of a 
European tale appear to be distinct, but the methodology employed in both studies was 
the same. Identi'cation was equally necessary. Failure to identify the Mr. Fox riddle in 
Ulysses could result in one’s being unable to appreciate fully Joyce’s use of this folkloris-
tic element and accordingly limiting in a small way one’s comprehension of the novel; 
failure to identify the Potawatomi tale as a standard European folktale might have made 
it di7cult to determine just what changes the Potawatomi had introduced. One might 
have assumed, for example, that it was a Potawatomi idea to cast the dupe as a soldier, but 
in fact the soldier is frequently the dupe in European versions of the tale. But identi'ca-
tion though necessary was only the 'rst step, a prerequisite for interpretation. If it is true 
that folklorists too o5en identify without going on to interpret whereas literary critics and 
anthropolo gists interpret without 'rst properly identifying folklore, then it seems obvious 
that some changes are needed. Either folklorists are going to have to educate their literary 
and anthropological colleagues in the mechanics of identifying folklore or they will have 
to undertake some of the problems of interpretation themselves. Ideally, both alternatives 
might be e8ected so that the study of folklore could become something more than a schol-
arly series of shreds and patches or a motley medley of beginnings without ends and ends 
without proper beginnings.
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Dundes combines the linguistic concept of “metalanguage” (a language used to make 
statements about other languages) with literary criticism (usually associated with thematic 
readings of expressive language in novels and poetry) to propose an “oral literary criticism” 
using the evidence of “metafolklore.” Dundes de'ned oral literary criticism as tradition-
bearers’ comments on their traditions, and metafolklore as stories or sayings about folk-
lore. For folkloristics, the signi'cance of this kind of material is what it reveals about atti-
tudes toward, and perceptions of, folklore from a native viewpoint. It can provide contex-
tual information for folklorists assessing the role of folklore in a society or situation.
Dundes’s complaint was that long lists of beliefs, proverbs, games, and tales compiled 
by collectors typically le5 out the tradition-bearers’ commentaries that accompanied their 
rendition of the material. He pointed out that the information tradition-bearers provided 
o5en signaled meanings perceived by performers and audiences of folklore. !e com-
mentaries may describe something about the telling, but they may also be a type of folk-
lore that makes statements about folklore. For instance, I have frequently heard from my 
Pennsylvania neighbors, who eat pork and sauerkraut on New Year’s Day to insure good 
luck, that the reason for this is expressed in a traditional saying: “Pigs root forward and 
chickens scratch backwards.” !ey thus view eating pork as leaving the past behind and 
pushing ahead to the new year. Folklorists have asked the question, however, about the 
combination of pork with sauerkraut, to which residents o5en respond, “It’s a tradition,” 
suggesting a link to German heritage in the region, or to the now routine annual fam-
ily gathering on New Year’s. Comparing that tradition to other New Year’s food tradi-
tions involving items which expand (such as black-eyed peas and rice in the South), and 
using the principle of like actions producing like results, I interpreted my neighbors’ tradi-
tion as being based on the idea that both pigs and cabbage symbolize tremendous growth 
in a year. Pork also has a cultural context, since, for many residents, it raises images of 
Pennsylvania German farm life, but the tradition is not restricted today to residents of 
German background, and commercial supermarkets promote the consumption of the folk 
dish by advertising it before the New Year.
Since Dundes’s essay was originally published in 1966, soliciting commentary about col-
lected material has now become standard 'eldwork procedure. See, for example, William 
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Wilson’s “Documenting Folklore” (1986), and Martha Sims’s and Martine Stephens’s chap-
ter on “Fieldwork and Ethnography” in Living Folklore (2005). Yet as Jan Harold Brunvand 
noted, in introducing Dundes’s essay in his Readings on American Folklore, while folklorists 
give more attention to the meanings tradition-bearers provide for their expressions in vari-
ous situations, as a result of Dundes’s concept, “many folklorists stop, however, with sym-
bolic interpretations where no 'nal proof can be found for the suggested meanings” (1979, 
405). !at is, the analyst collecting the oral literary criticism might hesitate to propose 
“symbolic interpretations” that are outside the awareness of the tradition-bearer. Dundes 
pointed out that the “deep meanings” of the material may be repressed, because they are 
disturbing, or disguised within the metafolklore. An example is Dundes’s interpretation of 
a popular American girls’ ritual of summoning a ghost out of a mirror in a darkened bath-
room by repeating “Mary Worth,” “Mary Whales,” or “Bloody Mary” multiple times. !e 
metafolkloric commentary on the ritual, in a birthday or pajama party event, as “Bloody 
Mary” was signi'cant, according to Dundes, connecting it with bleeding as a sign of matu-
ration. Its oral literary description as a tradition restricted to girls suggested a meaning to 
Dundes that the girls did not directly acknowledge: a projection of anxieties about menar-
che. !e cultural context is the de'nition of menstruation, in a male-dominated society, as 
something unpleasant and disgusting. Dundes concluded, “Rather than being persuaded 
by their culture to feel shame and embarrassment about menstruation, the ritual might be 
construed as an attempt to celebrate the onset of menses” (2002a).
Of note in the essay is Dundes’s call for a “!ematic Apperception Test” for folklore. 
Folklorist Wolfgang Mieder reported that proverbs, especially, have been used in vari-
ous psychological tests as measures of intellectual functioning and verbal comprehension 
(1978). Psychologists have also come up with tests to assess “superstitious behavior” and 
“paranormal belief ” that relate to folklorists’ collections of beliefs. A danger is that such 
tests pathologize faith and belief as abnormal, and do not take into account the cultural 
contexts and social situations in which beliefs are expressed. Further, oral literary criticism 
may reveal attitudes that tests miss. Many people may conversationally express the tradi-
tional phrase “knock on wood” to insure that a string of luck continues, for instance, but 
would not say they are superstitious. Folklorists tend to relativize belief according to the 
traditions from which people come, rather than for personal functionality. In sum, oral lit-
erary criticism and metafolklore can be especially important tools in assessing individual, 
as well as social, di8erences in attitudes toward tradition. For psychological literature on 
tests to assess belief, see Tobacyk and Milford 1983; Pronin et al. 2006; Rotton and Kelly 
1985; and McClearn 2004.
Dundes demonstrated the use of oral literary criticism in a later essay, also reprinted in 
this volume, on the anti-Semitic blood libel legend. !ere, he analyzed as a kind of lore the 
frequently expressed commentary that the story is either true or not. Another location in 
which oral literary criticism and metafolklore are analyzed, expanding the present essay’s 
discussion of Yoruba folklore and the metafolkloric saying “A proverb is like a horse,” is in 
“Proverbs and the Ethnography of Speaking Folklore” (Dundes and Arewa 1964). In it, 
Dundes underscored the use of folklore as a means of communication, and o8ered exam-
ples not only of how particular Yoruba proverbs were performed in a particular setting, 
but also of how their meanings were perceived, based on the commentary of the tradition-
bearer, Arewa. Especially evident throughout his essays on the concept of folklore found 
in this volume, Dundes frequently referred to the popular comment, “!at’s just folklore,” 
as a kind of folklore in itself, revealing ambivalent modern attitudes toward tradition. He 
Metafolklore and Oral Literary Criticism 79
o5en used it to launch a discussion of the disconnection between the objectively viewed 
centrality of folklore in modern everyday life, and people’s subjective popular perceptions 
of it. For him, it underscored the dire need for the serious study of folklore, and its chal-
lenge of achieving academic respectability.
A number of titles by other authors feature Dundes’s idea of metafolklore, including 




The theoretical assumption that folklore was limited to a survival 
and re6ection of the past was a crippling one for the study of folklore in context. For if in 
fact folklore did re6ect only the far distant past, then clearly there was no point in bother-
ing to attempt to collect the present context of folklore. A past-oriented folklore collector 
would tend to regard his or her informants as relatively unimportant carriers of precious 
vestigial fragments, fragments which might prove useful in the central task of historically 
recon structing the past. For the execution of historico-comparative studies, one needed 
only minimal information concerning the place and date of collection. It is clear that for 
the kinds of theoretical and methodological questions that nineteenth century folklor-
ists were asking, e.g., “what was the original form of an item of folklore and what were the 
genetic relationships between various forms or subtypes of that item of folklore?” place 
and date of recording were su7cient.
In the twentieth century with the increasing amount of ethno graphic 'eldwork, it 
became glaringly apparent that folklore re6ec ted the present as well as the past and that 
there was certainly a context in which folklore was used. Nevertheless, custom is strong 
even among scholars and the “butter6y” or “object-curio-collecting” philosophy has con-
tinued. Long lists of proverbs are published in folklore journals accompanied by no expla-
nation of either use or meaning. Anthropologists append to their ethnographies a token 
section consisting of folktales and myths but with little or no com ment on their relation-
ship to other aspects of the culture. !e “object-collecting” philosophy is itself a survival 
of the antiquarian days of folklore studies. Folklore texts without contexts are essen tially 
analogous to the large numbers of exotic musical instruments which adorn the walls of 
anthropological or folk museums and grace the homes of private individuals. !e instru-
ment is authentic as is the folklore text, but the range of the instrument, the tuning of the 
instrument, the function of the instrument, and the intrica cies of performing with the 
instrument are rarely known.
It was Malinowski who was most vociferous in calling for context. In his important 
1926 essay “Myth in Primitive Psycho logy,” he repeatedly pointed out the fallacy of col-
lecting mere texts, calling them mutilated bits of reality. Here again is the notion of folk-
lore as fragments, but not fragments of the past, fragments of the present. In one formu-
lation, Malinowski observed, “!e text, of course, is extremely important, but without 
the con text it remains lifeless.”1 More recently, Bascom has continued the call for con-
text. Auguring well for future folklore 'eld research is Goldstein’s praiseworthy concern 
for context in his valuable Guide for Field Workers in Folklore. He speci'cally lists “folk-
lore processes” as one of the principal kinds of folklore data to be obtained in the 'eld.2 
In another recent development in the study of folklore context, it has been suggested that 
the ways and means ,of using folklore are just as highly patterned as the materials of folk-
lore themselves. !e identi'cation of the rules for the use of an item of folklore, or the 
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“ethnography of speaking folklore” as it has been termed, suggests that to the “laws” of 
form (Olrik) and the “laws” of change (Aarne) may be added the “law” of use.3 !e discov-
ery of such laws or rules opens a new area of folklore research.
!e current interest in the collection of context, however, has partially obscured the 
equally necessary and important task of collecting the meaning(s) of folklore. One must 
distinguish bet ween use and meaning. !e collection of context and preferably a number 
of di8erent contexts for the same item of folklore is cer tainly helpful in ascertaining the 
meaning or meanings of an item of folklore. But it cannot be assumed that the collection 
of context per se automatically ensures the collection of meaning. Suppose a folklorist col-
lected the following Yoruba proverb:
A proverb is like a horse: when the truth is missing, we use a proverb to 'nd it.4
Let us assume that he or she also collected the typical context of this proverb in which 
it is employed in an introductory capacity prior to uttering another proverb which was 
designed to settle a particu lar dispute, !e introductory proverb announces to the audi-
ence that the arbitrator is planning to use a proverb and reminds them of the great power 
and prestige of proverbs in such situations. But from this text and context, does the collec-
tor know precisely what the proverb means? What exactly is meant by comparing a prov-
erb to a horse? While the meaning(s) of a proverb are unquestionably involved in an indi-
vidual’s decision whether or not the quotation of that particular proverb is appropriate in 
a given context, the folklore collector may miss the meaning(s) even though he or she has 
faithfully recorded text and context. One cannot always guess the meaning from context. 
For this reason, folklorists must actively seek to elicit the meaning of folklore 'om the folk.
As a terminological aid for the collection of meaning, I have proposed “oral literary 
criticism.”5 !e term is obviously derived from “literary criticism,” which refers to a host of 
methods of ana lyzing and interpreting works of written literature. Even a beginner in liter-
ary criticism soon discovers that there are alternative and rival interpretations of one and 
the same work of art. !e identical phenomenon occurs in the case of folklore which for 
the sake of the discussion we may call “oral literature” (although this unfortu nately tends 
to exclude nonverbal folklore). For each item of oral literature, there is a variety of oral 
literary criticism. !is is an important point inasmuch as folklorists, despite the fact that 
they are accustomed to thinking of variation in the texts of folklore, o5en wrongly assume 
that there is only one correct meaning or interpretation. !ere is no one right interpreta-
tion of an item of folklore any more than there is but one right version of a game or song. 
(We must overcome our penchant for monolithic perspec tives as exempli'ed in mono-
theism, monogamy, and the like.) !ere are multiple meanings and interpretations and 
they all ought to be collected. One could ask ten di8erent informants what each thought 
a given joke meant and one might obtain ten di8erent answers. It is di7cult to determine 
the gamut of interpretation because there has been comparatively little collection of oral 
literary criticism.
!e interpretation which is made is inevitably from the collec tor’s point of view. !ere 
is nothing wrong with analytic as opposed to native interpretations, but the one does not 
eliminate the need for the other. Unfortunately, in a few instances, the analyst-collec tor 
suggests that this interpretation is really the natives’ own inter pretation. Melville Jacobs, 
for example, tries to “see the literature as it appeared to Chinooks,”6 but one wonders if the 
Chinooks would have agreed with Jacobs’ interpretations. Jacobs has recon structed oral 
literary criticism but this may not be the same as the oral literary criticism he might have 
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collected. !e nature of his criticism is revealed in his discussion of Clackamas Chinook 
humor when he speaks of his methodology. “. . . I enumerated 130 instances in the 
Clackamas collection where I was certain that an audience at a folkloristic recital responded 
with smiles or laughter” or “. . . I took each of the 130 fun situations and attempted to pin-
point each fun generating factor or stimulus to humor which I believe to have been pres-
ent in them” make the analytic bias clear.7 Jacobs was not present at a Clackamas Chinook 
tale-telling session—he collected the tales from a highly acculturated informant in relative 
isolation—and he can give little more than educated guesses. Even in our own culture, it 
would be di7cult to guess whether or not a “funny” story got a laugh and more particu-
larly to know just at what points in the joke laughs were stimulated. One must not only 
record laughter (distinguishing types of laughter—a giggle, a bellylaugh), but one must try 
to 'nd out what was funny and why the audience members laughed or did not laugh.
It is not easy to collect oral literary criticism. Much of it has probably never been con-
sciously formulated. Yet the meanings and traditional interpretations of folkloristic mate-
rials are transmitted from individual to individual and from generation to generation just 
as is folklore itself. But some types of oral literary criticism are easier to collect than others 
and it might be well to mention them 'rst.
One source of oral literary criticism comes from folklore itself rather than directly from 
the folk. !ere are a limited number of folkloristic commentaries on folklore. As there is 
a term “metalan guage” to refer to linguistic statements about language, so we may suggest 
“metafolklore” to refer to folkloristic statements about folk lore. Examples of metafolklore 
or the “folklore of folklore” would be proverbs about proverbs, jokes about joke cycles, folk-
songs about folksongs and the like. Metafolklore is not necessarily intra genre. !ere are prov-
erbs about myths, for example. !e previous ly cited Yoruba proverb would be an instance 
of metafolklore. It is a folkloristic commentary about a folklore genre, namely, the pro verb: 
“A proverb is like a horse: when the truth is missing, we use a proverb to 'nd it.” !is clearly 
indicates an attitude towards a key function of proverbs in Yoruba culture, the function 
being the determination of truth in problem situations or disputes. Of course, since meta-
folklore is still, a5er all, folklore, it is necessary to elicit oral literary criticism of the metafolk-
loristic texts them selves. !e meaning of the Yoruba proverb, according to one in formant, is 
that by mounting a horse, as opposed to goats, sheep, dogs, and other animals found among 
the Yoruba, one can quickly obtain a superior perspective. From the back of a horse, one can 
see further than one can from the ground and the immediate local problem may be seen in 
a new and better light. A proverb is like the horse inasmuch as it also provides a speedy and 
e7cacious means of getting above the immediate problem-situation and of placing it in a 
perspective which is more likely to result in 'nding a just and proper solution.
An example of a metafolkloristic joke is the following: It was a dark and stormy night 
and this guy goes up to this old farm house. He’s a salesman and he says to the farmer, “I’m 
a salesman, my car broke down, and I need a place to stay.” And the farmer says, “!at’s all 
right, but there’s just one thing, we have no extra rooms to spare so you’ll have to sleep with 
my son.” And the salesman says, “Oh my God, I must be in the wrong joke.” Here is a folk 
comment on the nature of the traveling salesman joke cycle. Invariably the jokes involve 
the seduction of the farmer’s daughter and/or wife. In most jokes in the cycle, as you may 
know, the farmer explains to the salesman that he can stay but that the only available space 
is in his daughter’s room. !is is thus a joke about a joke cycle and it draws attention to 
one of the critical content features of the cycle. Once again, one could elicit oral literary 
criticism of this bit of metafolklore. One might 'nd, for example, that the substitution of 
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homosexuality for hetero sexuality is particularly signi'cant in the light of our culture’s 
taboo against homosexual activities. !e mere suggestion of such activities to a traveling 
salesman, the epitome of unrestrained heterosexual impulse, is so shocking as to call a halt 
to the story. In other words, at the very mention of homosexuality, the American male 
wants out because this activity is “wrong”: the salesman is in the wrong joke. (!e break-
ing out of the joke is analogous to the breaking of the “fourth wall” in theatrical parlance.) 
Actors normally regard the proscenium as the fourth wall of a room. Occasionally, an actor 
will break the convention and will speak directly to the audience. Some plays, like this trav-
eling salesman joke, speci'cally call for the breaking of the conventional vehicle.
Sometimes the metafolklore may comment on the formal features rather than on the 
content of folklore. For example, consider the following melafolkloristic joke based upon 




Here attention is drawn to the distinct characteristic reduplicative opening formula of 
jokes in this cycle: knock, knock. !e use of just one “knock” is incorrect but is ratio-
nalized by reference to a proverb: “opportunity only knocks once.” Such parodies of 
and plays on folkloristic forms can be useful sources of the folk’s own attitudes towards 
their folklore.
Another source of overt literary criticism besides metafolklor istic texts consists of the 
asides or explanatory commentary made by raconteurs as they tell tales or sing songs. !ese 
asides are sometimes unwisely eliminated by the overscrupulous editor but they should 
not be. Two examples from a Potawatomi informant may illustrate the nature of these 
asides. At the beginning of one tale, my informant said, “Well there was once, there was a 
little boy. !ere was always a little boy, you know, and . . . ”8 !e line “!ere was always a 
little boy” is a folk con'rmation of one of the im portant characteristics of certain folktales, 
namely that the protag onist is a little boy. Such a comment might be particularly valu able 
if the folklorist-collector did not know in advance what kinds of tales were in his infor-
mant’s repertoire. !e comment indicates that there are a great many tales with little boys 
in them and it also serves to authenticate the particular tale he is recounting. It is as if to say 
that traditional tales must have little boys in them as protagonists and so in this traditional 
tale I am about to tell there is this required stereotyped character.
Another self-critical aside made by my informant came in a version of Big Turtle’s War 
Party. In the mock plea (Motif K 581.1, drowning punishment for turtle) episode, the vil-
lagers are devising ways to kill the captured turtle. First they discuss throw ing him into a 
kettle of boiling water, but the turtle threatens to splash the water and scald their children. 
Next, the villagers suggest tying him to a tree and shooting him with buckshot—at which 
point the narrator observed “I don’t know whether they had any buckshot in those days 
or not” before concluding with the 'nal throwing of the turtle into a river à la the tarbaby 
rabbit into the briarpatch. !is commentary challenges the historical accuracy of the tale. 
Given the time setting of this American Indian tale—when animals were like people, the 
occurrence of such an obvious acculturated element of material culture as buckshot upset 
the sensibilities of my sensitive story-teller. However, he did not deny or alter the tradi-
tional tale as he knew it. He merely inserted a partial disclaimer, thereby expressing his 
own parenthetical doubts.
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!e problem with metafolklore and with the raconteur’s asides is that they provide at 
best only an incomplete picture of the folk’s evaluation of their folklore. For some folklore, 
no metafolklore has been recorded; for some genres few asides have been published. What 
is needed is the rigorous and systematic elicitation of oral literary criticism. A tale or song 
might be treated by the folklorist-collector much as a modern psychiatrist treats a dream. 
As the psychiatrist asks his dreamer-patient to “free associate” and to com ment on the 
various elements in the dream, so the folklorist-collec tor should ask his informant to “free 
associate” in the same man ner, attempting to explain or comment on each element in the 
tale. Too o5en the text-hungry folklorist immediately a5er the recita tion of a tale or song 
will say, “!at’s 'ne, do you know any more like that . . .” and he will not patiently seek to 
have the informant provide a folk exegesis of the tale just told. Perhaps the collector should 
consider the item of folklore collected as a projective test or should we say “projective text” 
and in that event he should ask the informant to make up a story about the story.
Even more desirable would be to elicit the oral literary criti cisms of both raconteur 
and audience. !e meaning for the tale teller is not necessarily the same as the meaning 
for the audience or rather the di8erent meanings for di8erent members of the audi ence. 
It is incredible that folklorists speak of the meaning of a folktale. Moreover, the existence 
of multiple meanings suggests communication blocks. One might assume that if A and 
B, mem bers of the same culture, both know a given folklore text that this text serves as 
a strong bond linking A and B. However, if A and B interpret the text di8erently, then 
A’s addressing it to B might result in misunderstanding rather than understanding. !e 
follow ing may serve to illustrate multiple meanings.
!ere is a folk metaphor (proverbial phrase) “to have an axe to grind” and to me it means 
to have a bias as a lobbyist might have. If I said, “Watch out for so and so, he has an axe to 
grind,” I would be warning against accepting what that individual said at face value inas-
much as his words or actions would be in6uenced by what I considered to be a vested inter-
est. Archer Taylor told me that he thought the metaphor connoted the asking of a favor inas-
much as it takes two men to grind an axe, one to spin the whet-stone and the other to hold 
the axe. !us if one individual came to another and announced that he had an axe to grind, 
he would be asking the other person to stop what he was doing and help him grind the axe. 
!e dictionary supports this interpretation by saying “to have an object of one’s own to gain 
or promote.”9 However, there is another traditional meaning of this metaphor, the meaning 
of “grudge.” According to informants, “to have an axe to grind” is similar to having a “bone to 
pick” with someone. One informant related that if he had neglected to do one of his assigned 
household chores, say taking out the garbage at the end of the day, the next morning his 
mother would say to him “I’ve got an axe to grind with you, you didn’t take the garbage out 
last night.” !e informant explained that “I’ve got an axe to grind with you” meant “!ere’s 
going to be friction, sparks were going to 6y, just as sparks 6y when an axe is ground.” I dis-
covered that my wife also uses this meaning. Our neighbor’s dog occasionally knocks over 
and ri6es our garbage can. My wife indicated that she would think it appro priate to call up 
our neighbor and say, “I have an axe to grind with you,” meaning there was something she was 
angry about. Here then are two distinct interpretations of the same folk metaphor.
In some instances the meaning may be fairly constant, but the evaluation of the com-
mon meaning may vary. For example, the proverb “A rolling stone gathers no moss” means 
that a person who moves around from place to place, not staying in any one place for very 
long, will never belong to a place, or look as though he belongs to that place. !e oral lit-
erary critical di8erence concerns whether this is good or bad. In the older tradition, it was 
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bad and the proverb might be cited to keep someone from roaming too far and wide, to 
urge him to stay at one place. But in modern usage, at least in some quarters, the accumu-
lation of moss is considered to be a negative characteristic and the “rolling stone” is con-
ceived of as the ideal unencumbered life. Admittedly these di8erences could be gleaned 
from printed contextual instances of the proverb in novels and newspapers, but the point 
is that folklore collectors ought to obtain direct oral interpretations of the proverb at the 
time of collection.
As has been noted, it is not always easy to elicit oral literary criticism. !e folk know 
and use folklore without bothering to articulate their aesthetic evaluations. For some types 
of oral literary criticism, e.g., symbolism, an indirect method of eliciting might be recom-
mended. !e problem in symbolism is that the folk may not be completely conscious of 
the one or more symbolic meanings of an element of folklore. !is is understandable in 
view of the fact that it is o5en the taboo activities and ideas which 'nd expression outlets 
in symbolic form. If the folk consciously recognized the symbolic signi'cance of the joke 
or folksong element, this element might not be able to continue to serve as a safe, socially 
sanctioned outlet. (Cf. the popular belief that analysis of a work of art inter feres with or 
ruins ones enjoyment of it.) Fortunately, much of the symbolism in folklore is baldly stated 
and may be obvious enough to some of the members of the culture concerned. But the 
study of symbolism would surely be greatly advanced if symbolic interpreta tions of folk-
lore were obtained from the folk rather than from Freudian folklorists. No one likes to 
accept an ex cathedra pro nouncement that a shoe can symbolize female genitalia. Even the 
folkloristic “evidence” such as is provided by nursery rhymes among other genres leaves the 
issue in some doubt.
!ere was an old woman who lived in a shoe
She had so many children she didn’t know what to do.
People don’t live in shoes and the possible connection between a woman’s living in a shoe 
and having lots of children requires explanation. !e sequel verse: “!ere was another old 
woman who lived in a shoe, she didn’t have any children, she knew what to do” suggests the 
sexual nature of the symbolism with the implicit statement that a knowledge of contracep-
tive measures can allow a woman to live in a shoe and not have children. One might also 
consider the possible symbolism in:
Cock a doodle doo!
My dame has lost her shoe
My master’s lost his 'ddling stick
And doesn’t know what to do.10
Maybe there isn’t a reference to a woman who has lost her vagina matched by a man who 
has lost his phallus, but if not, the logical connection between a shoeless dame and 'ddle 
stick-less master remains to be seen. But the point is that one should not guess at such 
interpretations; one should go to the primary sources and ask the folk. Let 'eld data prove 
or disprove armchair guesswork. What does the shoe suggest to the informant? Can the 
informant draw a picture of the old woman and her shoe? Perhaps a modi'ed !ematic 
Apperception Test based upon the nursery rhyme (or other folklore) can be devised and 
administered. While it may be true that not all informants will be equally facile in articu-
lating oral literary criticism, some will be able to do so. Even a passive bearer of tradition (as 
opposed to the active bearer who tells the tale or sings the song) may he able to contribute 
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an interpretation. Folklorists should be just as anxious to collect variant interpreta tions of 
a folksong’s meaning as they are to collect variants of the folksong’s text!11
As a 'nal argument for the collection of oral literary criticism, I would note the inter-
pretation of the word folklore itself, espe cially among the folk. !e meaning of “folklore” 
in the phrase ‘!at’s just folklore’ is similar to one of the meanings of myth, namely false-
hood, error, and the like. I suspect that it is this pejor ative connotation which has encour-
aged some folklorists to consciously avoid the term substituting instead “verbal or spoken 
art,” “oral or folk literature,” and many others. More serious is the fact that this “folk” inter-
pretation of the word “folklore” makes it di7 cult for the discipline of folklore and its prac-
titioners to gain academic status. If folklore is error, then a Ph.D. in folklore is the height of 
folly, and the notion of a whole discipline devoted to error is unthinkable in the academic 
context of the search for truth. To use the term folklore without an awareness of the folk 
interpretation of the term is unwise.
One 'nal point concerns the necessity for the continued and repeated attempts to elicit 
oral literary criticism. It is a common place that each generation reinterprets anew its folk-
lore, but do we have records of these interpretations and reinterpretations? Sometimes the 
text is altered to 't new needs, but probably it is the interpretation of texts which changes 
more. !e task of collect ing oral literary criticism from a folk can never be completed 
any more than the task of collecting folklore from that folk can be. Even if both texts and 
interpretations remained almost exactly the same over a long period of time, this would 
still be well worth knowing. It might be an important index of the overall stability of that 
folk. Here also is an opportunity to use the scores of texts without commentary which line 
library shelves and archives. !ese texts may be taken back into the %eld and folk explication 
de texte’s sought. Our goal for future folklore collection should be fewer texts and more 
contexts, with accompanying detailed oral literary criticisms.
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From Etic to Emic Units in the 
Structural Study of Folktales
(Postscript) !e Motif-Index and the Tale Type Index: A Critique
Introduction
Dundes opened this essay on folk material with a binary division of diachronic and syn-
chronic perspectives of time. Diachronic approached the development of material histori-
cally, whereas synchronic analysis examined items contemporaneously. Dundes observed 
that diachronic approaches had dominated thinking about folklore, leading, he argued, 
to analyses of lore without the folk, that is, without the social basis of the material. One 
result, he claimed, was the identi'cation of original forms without questioning how those 
forms came into being in the 'rst place. A move toward synchronic approaches raised the 
issue of the basic unit of analysis, especially if comparative work was to be carried out. 
Pointing out problems with the literary “motif ” as a comparative unit of narrative, Dundes 
proposed the use of structural units such as motifeme and allomotif. !ese were drawn 
from the formalist theories of Vladimir Propp, who conceived of predictable “functions” 
or actions that occur in certain places within the sequence of the story.
!e advantage of the structural units of motifeme and allomotifs, according to Dundes, 
was that they represented the elements of a story as they were told by a narrator. In this way, 
they composed “emic” units (applying a term proposed by linguist Kenneth Pike). Drawn 
from “phonemic,” a sound used in a language community, emic generally refers to native 
categories. Etic is comparable to “phonetic,” a system devised by the analyst’s rendering of 
speech sounds, thus forming what is thought of as an “analytic” category.
!e rhetoric of “type” and “motif ” came from literary study, in which key incidents 
and objects were used to categorize the composition of stories and to suggest subjects 
for imaginative treatment. Applied to oral literature, type referred to recognizable uni-
'ed plots that tended to remain intact in collected stories around the world, and could 
be organized into various themes, such as “animal tales” (types 1–299), “tales of magic” 
(300–749), and “formula tales” (2000–2399). Motifs were components of stories that 
drew attention to themselves, such as the object “glass shoes” (F823.2) or the incident of 
“Slipper test. Identi'cation by 'tting of slipper” (H36.1) in Cinderella. !e letters before 
the numbers range from A (mythological motifs) to Z (miscellaneous groups of motifs). 
!eir arrangement suggests a hierarchy of narrative, giving primary place to the oldest or 
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most developed myths, and secondary position to folktales, going from “Animals” (B) to 
“Traits of Character” (W). Humor, presumably more contemporary and concise, is rel-
egated to the end in the famous “X” slot (“Humor concerning sex” was X700–799). !e 
classi'cation system of the motif-index has been likened to the Dewey decimal system of 
library classi'cation, because decimal points allow for expansion as the corpus of known 
folktales grows.
!e tale-type and motif indexes, now standard reference works identifying folk narra-
tive building blocks, were conceived of in the early twentieth century as a way to global-
ize the study of folktale, with the intent of 'nding the origins and distribution of its ele-
ments. Even before the landmark original volumes on tale types by Antti Aarne (1910) 
and Stith !ompson ([1928] 1961), there had been classi'cations of songs and stories 
that attempted to identify units of narrative so as to facilitate international comparison. 
Although recognizing Dundes’s criticisms, folkloristic advocates of motif and type indexes, 
such as Hasan El-Shamy, have noted that !ompson’s motif-index was the 'rst reference 
to go beyond “mere alphabetical lists of terms” and di8erentiate between motifs and folk-
tale types. !ompson also incorporated more folk material than Aarne, since !ompson 
included ballads, fables, local legends, and jokes. Aarne’s tale-type index systemized mostly 
European wonder tales into a numerical list, and identi'ed subtypes. It implied that all 
versions of a type had a genetic relationship, but !ompson’s motif index did not ([1932–
1936] 1975). !e extent of classi'catory work, according to the principles established by 
Aarne and !ompson, is indicated by 186 entries in David S. Azzolina’s Tale Type- and 
Motif-Indexes (1987). It is a list that has continued to grow (see El-Shamy 2004; Jason 
2000; Goldberg 2000; Tatum 2000; Jauhiainen 1998; Würzbach 1995; Neugaard 1993; 
and Stitt and Dodge 1991).
Attached to Dundes’s original 1962 polemic against the tale-type and motif indexes is 
a postscript with a more temperate tone, published thirty-'ve years later. He pointed out 
additional problems of the indices, based on etic units, but announced that they still pro-
vided “two of the most valuable tools in the professional folklorist’s arsenal of aids for anal-
ysis.” Some of Dundes’s concerns for expanding the coverage of the indices were addressed 
in the three volumes of Hans-Jörg Uther’s !e Types of International Folktales (2004). !e 
commentaries on classi'cation by motif and type by Uther, Dundes, and other folklorists 
can be read in a special issue of the Journal of Folklore Research (1997), and in Archetypes 
and Motifs in Folklore and Literature (Garry and El-Shamy 2005). See also Ben-Amos 
1980; Georges 1983; and Holbek 1990.
!e structural analysis of motifemes and allomotifs, as it turns out, has not displaced 
the identi'cation of motifs and types in folkloristics. However, for the purposes of com-
parison and interpretation, Dundes’s o5-cited essay signaled more attention paid to alter-
native, emic systems of representing narratives as they are learned and communicated. 
Dundes demonstrated the symbolic equivalence of allomotifs for a single tale type in “!e 
Symbolic Equivalence of Allomotifs in the Rabbit-Herd (AT 570),” reprinted in Parsing 
!rough Customs (1987j). He also used a Proppian classi'catory approach in his doctoral 
dissertation, published as !e Morphology of North American Indian Folktales (1964b). 
Dundes’s in6uence is apparent in the essays in Patterns in Oral Literature, edited by Heda 
Jason and Dimitri Segal (1977), which took up the challenge of structural models for oral 
literature. Other studies using allomotifs include S. S. Jones 1990; Lovell-Smith 1996; 
Holbek 1993; and Carroll 1992a, 1992b.
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Traditionally, the study of folklore in general and folktales in par-
ticular has tended to be diachronic rather than synchronic. !e emphasis has clearly been 
upon the genesis and development of folkloristic materials rather than upon the structure 
of these materials. Folklorists of the late nineteenth century were much more concerned 
with how folklore came into being than with what folklore was. Genetic explanations were 
considered su7cient to de'ne the nature of folklore. !us the solar mythologists claimed 
that the bulk of folkloristic materials was primitive man’s poetic translation of celestial 
phenomena such as the rising and setting of the sun. A5er the “eclipse of solar mythol-
ogy” as Richard M. Dorson has so felicitously phrased it,1 there came the Anthropological 
School. !e members of this group were convinced that folklore evolved from historical 
facts and primordial customs. In the course of the unilinear evolution of all cultures, there 
were preserved vestigial remains of the archaic origins. !ese remains were termed surviv-
als in culture, and the study of these survivals was called folklore. !e modern version of 
this form of diachronic study is fostered by the advocates of the myth-ritual theory who 
claim that all myth evolves from ritual. Since no attempt is made to explain the ultimate 
origin of the ritual, one can see that the question of genesis has been dropped in favor of 
the question of evolutionary development. Similarly, in the most modern method of folk-
lore study, the so-called Finnish historical-geographical method, questions of ultimate ori-
gin are eschewed. !e aim of this method is the delineation of the “complete life history of 
a particular tale.”2 !e users of the historical-geographical method attempt to determine 
the paths of dissemination and the process of development of folkloristic materials. By 
assembling all the known versions of a particular tale, the folklorist seeks to reconstruct 
the hypothetical original form of the tale. !ere is, however, no attempt to explain how 
this original form may have come into being in the 'rst place. !us there has been a move-
ment away from the early interest in genesis and cause towards an interest in the process 
of transmission and evolutionary development. But in any case, the study of folklore has 
remained diachronic.
All three approaches to folklore—the mythological, the anthropological, and the his-
torical-geographical—are alike not only in that they arc diachronic, but also in that they 
are comparative. All three utilize materials from many cultures. !is was why it became 
apparent to folklorists, no matter which of these approaches they favored, that for com-
parative studies there had to be some convenient means of referring to individual parts 
or pieces of folkloristic items as well as to these items as wholes. In the second place, in 
order to have trustworthy comparison, one needed to operate with comparable units. !is 
was particularly important to the members of the Finnish school inasmuch as it was pre-
cisely the di8erences of some of the smaller units of a given folktale upon which the con-
clusions of a historical-geographical study were o5en based. Unfortunately, the system of 
units which was developed was primarily intended to answer only the 'rst need, that is, of 
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supplying a means of referring to individual parts and pieces of folklore as well as to larger 
chunks of folklore. !e criterion of having genuine comparable units did not enter into the 
construction of either the motif-index or the Aarne-!ompson tale-type index. !us how-
ever useful the motif-index and tale-type index may be as bibliographical aids or as means 
of symbol shorthand, their basic units, namely the motif and tale type, do not provide an 
adequate basis for comparative studies.
In order to see the inadequacy of the motif and tale type as units to be used in the com-
parative study of the folktale, one must have some idea of what any kind of a basic unit 
should consist of. Units are utilitarian logical constructs of measure which, though admit-
tedly relativistic and arbitrary, permit greater facility in the examination and comparison 
of the materials studied in the natural and social sciences. It is important that units be 
standards of one kind of quantity (e.g., units of heat, length, and so forth). Units can be 
conceived as being abstractions of distinct entities which may be combined to form larger 
units or broken down into smaller units. !ere is an in'nitude of units since they are man-
made categorical attempts to describe the nature of objective reality. With a relativistic per-
spective, one can see that no matter what unit one considers, other smaller subunits may 
be postulated. Historically, this is what has happened in the development of the neutron 
from the atom which in turn developed from the molecule. A minimal unit may thus be 
de'ned as the smallest unit useful for a given analysis with the implicit understanding that 
although a minimal unit could be subdivided, it would serve no useful purpose to do so.
Folklorists are not alone with regard to encountering di7culties in de'ning appro-
priate units. As Kluckhohn points out: “Most anthropologists would agree that no con-
stant elemental units like atoms, cells, or genes have as yet been satisfactorily established 
with culture in general.”3 On the other hand, in one area of anthropology, namely linguis-
tics, such units as the phoneme and the morpheme have been delimited. Roman Jakobson 
remarks in connection with the phoneme that “Linguistic analysis with its concept of ulti-
mate phonemic entities signally converges with modern physics which revealed the gran-
ular structure of matter as composed of elementary particles.” However, most anthropol-
ogists and linguists seem to feel that the units of linguistics, although extremely useful 
in the study of language, are of little or no use outside the linguistic area.5 One notable 
exception is Kenneth Pike, who has even tried to employ linguistics-like units in an analy-
sis of all human behavior. In his ambitious Language in Relation to a Uni%ed !eory of the 
Structure of Human Behavior, Pike makes a number of stimulating theoretical statements 
which appear to be applicable to folklore. Although Pike makes no mention of folklore 
by name, he begins his study with an analysis of a party game which falls, of course, in the 
realm of folklore. If one examines Pike’s theoretical presentation, one can see that it may 
well be that folklorists can pro't from the model provided by linguists. True, it is always 
dangerous to use ready-made patterns since there is the inevitable risk of forcing material 
into the prefabricated Procrustean pattern. However, this technique is justi'ed if it aids in 
solving a problem, in this instance, namely the determination of units in folklore. It there-
fore remains to be demonstrated that 'rst, the motif and tale type are nonstructural, or to 
use Pike’s apt term, etic units, and second that there are empirically observable structural 
or emic units in folktales which may be discovered through the application of quasi-lin-
guistic techniques.
One cannot criticize the motif on the basis of its not being monomial or indecompos-
able. As has already been stated, any unit can be subdivided into smaller units. However, 
the motif is open to criticism as a unit in that it is not a standard of one kind of quantity. 
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!ompson’s discussion of the motif makes this clear. According to !ompson, a motif is 
“the smallest element in a tale having a power to persist in tradition.”6 It is noteworthy that 
in this de'nition, the crucial di8erentia is what the element does (i.e., persists in tradition) 
rather than what the element is. !e de'nition is thus diachronic rather than synchronic. 
!ompson speaks of three classes of motifs. First there are actors; second are “items in the 
background of the action—magic objects, unusual customs, strange beliefs and the like”; 
and third there are “single incidents” which, according to !ompson, “comprise the great 
majority of motifs.” Exactly what an incident is is never stated. If motifs can be actors, 
items, and incidents, then they are hardly units. !ey are not measures of a single quantity. 
!ere are, a5er all, no classes of inch or ounce. In addition, the classes of motifs are not 
even mutually exclusive. Can one conceive of an incident which does not include either 
an actor or an item, if not both? It is reiterated that without rigorously de'ned units, true 
comparison is well-nigh impossible. Can an actor be compared with an item?
Perhaps the most important theoretical consequence of the use of the motif as a mini-
mal unit has been the tendency to regard motifs as totally free entities which are indepen-
dent of contextual environments. Moreover, the superorganic abstraction is o5en given 
a life of its own. When !ompson in speaking of motifs asks: “Do some combine freely 
everywhere?” the wording is no accident. !e abstract units are the subject of the verb and 
the question is whether they do the combining. !is is made clear by !ompson’s follow-
ing question: “Are some isolated, living an independent life as a single-motif tale-type?”7 
But the most critical consequence of chopping up folklore into motifs is that mentioned 
above, namely that the motif is considered to be a completely isolable unit. Furthermore, 
such a unit is o5en assumed to be able to enter freely into limitless combinations. Lowie, 
for example, speaks of a “perfectly free” element of folklore which could appear in vari-
ous combinations.8
Yet if motifs are truly free to combine, then the larger unit, the tale type, appears to be on 
somewhat shaky ground. A type, according to !ompson, is “a traditional tale that has an 
independent existence.” Once again, it may be seen that the tale type is not de'ned in terms 
of morphological characteristics. Instead, just as in the case of the motif, the criterion of 
existence through time is employed. !ompson notes that a complete tale or type is “made 
up of a number of motifs in a relatively 'xed order and combination.” If the motifs are in a 
relatively 'xed order, then it appears to be unlikely that they “combine freely everywhere.” 
However, if one presumed from the description of a tale type that a tale type was simply a 
unit made up of smaller units called motifs, one would have to take account of the fact that 
one class of motifs, namely incidents, may serve as “true tale-types,” and, in fact, according to 
!ompson, “By far the largest number of traditional types consist of these single motifs.”9 If 
this is so, then the distinction between motif and tale type seems somewhat blurred.
!e Hungarian folklorist Hans Honti has given probably the best description of the tale 
type as a unit.10 He observes that there are three possible ways of looking at the tale type as 
a unit. First, the tale type is a binding together of a number of motifs; second, the tale type 
stands as an individual entity in contrast with other tale types; and third, the tale type is, 
so to speak, a substance which is manifested in multiple appearances called variants. Honti 
then points out that in purely morphological terms, a tale type is only a formal unit when 
contrasted with other tale types. He rejects the other two types of unity a5er making a com-
parison with botanical classi'cation. He notes that plants are composed of similar morpho-
logical elements: roots, stalks, leaves, and so on. However much these elements may di8er 
in di8erent types, they are uniform within individual types. !us one can put plants into a 
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structurally based classi'cation system according to the constitution of their roots, stalks, 
leaves, and so on. But, in the case of folktales, the type is either made up of a variable com-
bination of motifs or a great number of variants. In other words, the constituent elements 
of folktales, according to Honti, are not constant, but rather extremely variable. !is makes 
strictly morphological classi'cation di7cult. It should be noted here that folklorists have 
somehow sensed that there is something of a 'xed pattern in the arrangement of motifs in 
a folktale, but at the same time they have realized that the motifs may vary considerably. 
!e very heart of the matter of folktale analysis is to ascertain what is constant and what is 
variable. !is may well involve the distinction between form and content.11 Form would be 
the constant while content would be the variable. In this light, one can see that the Aarne-
!ompson tale typology is based upon the content, that is, the variable.
Aarne has three major divisions of folktales: Animal Tales, Ordinary Folktales, and 
Jokes and Anecdotes. !e second division, which is the largest, has numerous subdivi-
sions including: A. Tales of Magic, B. Religious Tales, C. Novelle or Romantic Tales, and 
D. Tales of the Stupid Ogre. Moreover, subdivision A., Tales of Magic, is further subdi-
vided into: Supernatural Adversaries, Supernatural or Enchanted Husband (Wife) or 
Other Relatives, Superhuman Tasks, Supernatural Helpers, Magic Objects, Supernatural 
Power or Knowledge, and Other Tales of the Supernatural. Aarne then groups his tales, 
which by the way were restricted to collections from northern and western Europe, under 
these subjective headings. Only the Formula Tales category, which is listed under Jokes 
and Anecdotes, may be said to be based upon structural criteria.
One can see from even a cursory examination that this classi'cation is not based upon 
the structure of the tales themselves so much as the subjective evaluation of the classi'er. 
And yet this is all that folklorists have in the way of tale typology. If a tale involves a stupid 
ogre and a magic object, it is truly an arbitrary decision whether the tale is placed under 
II A, Tales of Magic (Magic Objects), or II D, Tales of the Stupid Ogre. With regard to 
the subdivisions of Tales of Magic, where would one classify a folktale in which a superhu-
man task is resolved by a supernatural helper who possesses supernatural power? Perhaps 
the best illustration of the fact that Aarne-!ompson typology is based upon the variable 
and not upon the constant may be found by examining tale types which di8er only with 
respect to the dramatis personae. In the Animal Tale (Type 9), !e Unjust Partner, there 
is a version listed in which in the division of the crop, the fox takes the corn while the 
benighted bear takes the more bulky cha8. Under the Tales of the Stupid Ogre, one 'nds 
Tale Type 1030, !e Crop Division. It is the same story except that the dramatis personae 
are a man and an ogre. Under the Stupid Ogre listing, Aarne notes that the tale sometimes 
appears with a fox and a bear as the principals, and in fact he even comments in his preface 
to the type index upon this duplication of materials: “!is narrative has been listed among 
the ogre tales, to which apparently it originally belonged; but it is also found with a note 
as to its proper place, among the animal tales as a transaction between fox and bear or man 
and bear.” !is example is by no means unique. One may see the same kind of distinction 
with regard to di8erences in the dramatis personae by comparing such tale types as 4 and 
72; 43 and 1097; 123 and 333; 153 and 1133; 250 and 275; and 38, 151, and 1159; to 
name just a few.12
Another serious di7culty with the tale type as a unit is the fact that o5en one or more 
tale types are included in another tale type. !is is analogous to the occurrence of actor 
and item motifs in incident motifs. !us in some versions of Tale Type 1685, !e Foolish 
Bridegroom, there appears the incident in which the fool, when told to cast “good eyes” 
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at the bride, throws ox-eyes and sheep-eyes on the plate. !is “incident” also appears as 
Tale Type 1006, Casting Eyes, listed under Tales of the Stupid Ogre. !is blending and 
incorporation of tale types is indicated by the fact that in the case of a complex tale such 
as Type 300, Dragon Slayer, there are no less than eight other tale types which the classi-
'ers recognized were sometimes commingled. One can see that even Honti’s claim, that 
tale types were morphological units in that one tale type contrasted with other tale types, 
is not demonstrable. Actually, any professional folklorist engaged in folktale research 
knows very well that folktales, as collected from informants, very o5en are combina-
tions of two or more Aarne-!ompson tale types. !e point is that no matter how useful 
the Aarne-!ompson index may be in locating critical studies and variants, the Aarne-
!ompson tale type as a structural unit of folklore leaves much to be desired. In fairness, 
it should be stated that neither Aarne nor !ompson ever intended the index to be any 
more than a reference aid. “It is, of course, clear that the main purpose of the classi'ca-
tion of traditional narrative, whether by type or motif, is to furnish an exact style of refer-
ence, whether it be for analytical study or for the making of accurate inventories of large 
bodies of material. If the two indexes can in this way promote accuracy of terminology 
and can act as keys to unlock large inaccessible stores of traditional 'ction, they will have 
ful'lled their purpose.”13
However, what has happened is that this laudable index terminology has begun to be 
thought of as a kind of typology. Some folklorists tend to regard Tale Type 1030, !e Crop 
Division, as a generic kind of unit. What is more, because the Aarne-!ompson tale typol-
ogy has achieved international currency and has done a great deal to facilitate international 
folktale research, folklorists are afraid to introduce an entirely new system. For example, 
Honti notes that if tales could be arranged according to a theoretically appropriate mor-
phological system instead of a theoretically inadmissible logical system, it might be some-
what easier to work through folktale material. Nevertheless, he states his conviction that 
this does not constitute enough reason to replace the well-established Aarne-!ompson 
system. He comments on the inconvenience which would result from putting the catalogs 
of the various national folklore archives under a new system.14 !is kind of thinking is very 
dangerous and leads to intellectual stagnation, which the 'eld of folklore can ill a8ord. In 
any 'eld of learning, particularly in the natural or social sciences, if something is faulty 
or inadequate and recognized as such, it should be changed. Folklorists are supposed to 
study tradition, not be bound by it. Tradition and convenience are hardly su7cient reasons 
for scholars to perpetuate an acknowledged error. Comparative studies in folklore require 
carefully de'ned units, and if the motif and Aarne-!ompson tale type do not meet these 
needs, then new units must be devised.
New units have been suggested through the application of something like linguistic 
methodology to folkloristic materials. In particular, a Russian folklorist, Vladimir Propp, 
in 1928 published Morphology of the Folktale. In this work Propp pays tribute to Joseph 
Béier for being the 'rst to recognize that folktales contained invariant and variable ele-
ments. However, Bedier, whose key work, Les Fabliaux, was published in 1893, despite 
an attempt to express these related elements schematically, failed to determine the exact 
nature of the invariable units. Propp, borrowing the schematic technique, set himself the 
task of de'ning the invariable units of folktales.
Propp’s aim was to delineate a morphology of fairy tales, and by fairy tales, he meant 
those tales classi'ed by Aarne between 300 and 749, which Aarne termed “Tales of 
Magic.” Propp’s study was synchronic, which was in marked contrast to the rest of folklore 
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scholarship. Propp hoped to describe the fairy tale according to its component parts and to 
indicate the relationship of these components to each other and to the whole. He begins by 
de'ning a new minimal unit, the function. He did this because he noticed that the names 
of the dramatis personae as well as their attributes changed but that the actions or func-
tions of the dramatis personae did not change. In other words, to use an example men-
tioned previously, on a functional level, the tale of Tale Type 1030, Crop Division, is the 
same whether the dramatis personae are animals or humans. Hence Propp states that “!e 
functions of a folktale’s dramatis personae must be considered as its basic components; 
and we must 'rst of all extract them as such.”15 To illustrate how the minimal constituent 
unit of the function may be extracted from the dramatis personae, Propp, drawing material 
from four separate fairy tales, gives the following example:
1. A king gives an eagle to a hero. !e eagle carries the hero (the recipient) 
away to another kingdom.
2. An old man gives Súčenko a horse. !e horse carries Suenko away to 
another kingdom.
3. A sorcerer gives Ivan a little boat. !e boat takes him to another 
kingdom.
4. !e princess gives Ivan a ring. Young men appearing from out of the ring 
carry him away into another kingdom and so forth.
Clearly, though the dramatis personae vary, the function is the same. Structurally speak-
ing, it does not matter whether the object which carries the hero to another kingdom is 
an eagle, a horse, a boat, or men. Propp then proceeds to further de'ne the function, and 
his further de'nition of the function is one of the most revolutionary and important con-
tributions to folklore theory in decades.16 Propp states that “an action cannot be de'ned 
apart from its place in the process of narration.”17 !is single statement reveals the unmis-
takable fallacy of thinking of folklore in terms of isolated motifs. !e action or function 
can only be de'ned in its place in the process of narration. Honti, who was not familiar 
with Propp’s work, had said that it was di7cult to conceive of a motif other than as part of 
a type,18 but Propp went much further. Not only is the minimal unit to be considered as 
part of a type, but it must also be considered with respect to where it occurs in that type.
Propp does succeed in distinguishing between the constant and the variable in folk-
tales. He notes: “Functions serve as stable, constant elements in folktales, independent of 
who performs them, and how they are ful'lled by the dramatis personae.”19 A5er analyz-
ing a randomly selected sample of 100 Russian fairy tales, Propp was able to draw the fol-
lowing startling conclusions. First, the number of functions known in the fairy tale is lim-
ited. In fact, Propp discovered that there are thirty-one possible functions. Furthermore, 
the sequence of functions is always identical. !is does not mean that all thirty-one func-
tions are in every fairy tale, but only that “the absence of several functions does not change 
the order of those remaining.” As a result of his analysis, Propp is able to suggest a new 
unit to replace the Aarne-!ompson tale type. “Tales evidencing identical functions can 
be considered as belonging to one type. On this basis, an index of types can be created not 
relying upon plot features which are essentially vague and di8use but, rather, upon exact 
structural features.” Propp 'nds that every one of the 100 tales in his sample will 't into 
one formula and he concludes that “All fairy tales, by their structure, belong to one and 
the same type.”20
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!e distinction between the old minimal unit, the motif, and the new minimal unit, 
the function, may be seen very well in terms of Kenneth Pike’s valuable distinction between 
the etic and the emic. !e etic approach is nonstructural but classi'catory in that the ana-
lyst devises logical categories of systems, classes and units without attempting to make 
them re6ect actual structure in particular data. For Pike, etic units are created by the ana-
lyst as constructs for the handling of comparative cross-cultural data.21 In contrast, the 
emic approach is a mono-contextual, structural one. “An emic approach must deal with 
particular events as parts of larger wholes to which they are related and from which they 
obtain their ultimate signi'cance, whereas an etic approach may abstract events, for par-
ticular purposes, from their context or local system of events, in order to group them on 
a world-wide scale without essential reference to the structure of any one language or cul-
ture.” “. . .  emic units within this theory are not absolutes in a vacuum, but rather are points 
in a system, and these points are de'ned RELATIVE to the system. A unit must be stud-
ied, not in isolation, but as a part of a total functioning componential system within a total 
culture. It is this problem which ultimately forms the basis for the necessity of handling 
emics as di8erent from etics. . . .”22 Pike believes that the emic structure is a part of the pat-
tern of objective reality and is not merely the construct of the analyst. Whether one fol-
lows Pike on this point or whether one considers that emic units are like beauty in being 
solely in the eyes of the beholder, one can see that the distinction between structural and 
nonstructural units is sound. For a complete discussion of the distinction between etic and 
emic (coined by using the last portions of the words phonetic and phonemic), one should 
consult Pike’s work.
Pike’s delineation of the simultaneous trimodal structuring of emic units is of con-
siderable importance for folktale analysis. Pike’s three modes are the feature mode, the 
manifestation mode and the distribution mode. At the risk of oversimplifying Pike’s elab-
orate scheme, one might translate the modes into Propp’s analysis by seeing the feature 
mode as exempli'ed by the function, the manifestation mode by the various elements 
which can ful'll a function, and the distribution mode by the positional characteristics 
of a particular function, that is, where among the thirty-one possible functions it occurs. 
One reason for bothering to put Propp’s analysis in Pike’s terminology is an extraordi-
nary verbal coincidence. Pike’s minimum unit of the feature mode is the EMIC MOTIF 
or MOTIFEME.23 In other words, Propp’s function in Pike’s scheme of analysis would be 
called a MOTIFEME. Since the term function has not yet achieved any amount of cur-
rency among folklorists, it is here proposed that MOTIFEME be used instead.
With the establishment of the structural unit, MOTIFEME, one can see the useful-
ness of the term ALLOMOTIF for those motifs which occur in any given motifemic con-
text. Allomotifs would bear the same relationship to motifeme as do allophones to pho-
nemes and allomorphs to morphemes. !e term MOTIF would continue to be used, but 
only as an etic unit like the phone or morph. !e di8erence between etic and emic analysis 
of folktales, that is the di8erence between analysis by motif and analysis by motifeme, is 
considerable. For example, Propp’s twel5h function or motifeme refers to the hero’s being 
tested, interrogated, or attacked in preparation for his receiving either a magical agent or 
helper. For instance, a prospective donor may test the hero by assigning him di7cult tasks. 
On the other hand, the twenty-'5h motifeme involves the assignment of a di7cult task, 
usually by the villain. In other words, etically, or in terms of motifs, the same motif may be 
used in di8erent motifemes. !is means that the mere analyzing of folktales into motifs 
may be misleading. Folklorists are accustomed to treat all occurrences of a particular motif 
From Etic to Emic Units in the Structural Study of Folktales 97
as being of equal or identical signi'cance. !is is, in Pike’s theory, tantamount to treat-
ing homophonous or homomorphic forms as identical in meaning.24 However, one might 
legitimately ask how one recognizes the appropriate motifeme for a particular motif. If 
one observes a speci'c motif, how can one ascertain which motifeme it subserves? Propp 
addresses himself to this very question. Again, it is the notion of a function or motifeme 
in the frame of sequential context, i.e., in situ. It is always possible to de'ne a function or 
motifeme according to its consequences. Accordingly, if the receiving of a magical agent 
follows the solution of a task, then the motif belongs to the twel5h motifeme and it is 
clearly a case of the donor testing the hero. If, on the other hand, the receipt of a bride and 
a marriage follow, then the motif belongs to the twenty-'5h motifeme, the imposition of 
a di7cult task.
It is not only important to realize that the same motif may be used in di8erent 
motifemes, but it is equally important to realize that di8erent motifs may be used in the 
same motifeme. !us the helpful animal could be a cow, cat, bird, 'sh, and so on. Recalling 
that motifs are actors and items, it is obvious that for a given function or motifeme, there 
may be literally hundreds of motifs which would he appropriate. (Of course, not all “appro-
priate” motifs would necessarily be traditional, i.e., actually found in folktales.) An exam-
ple of the alternation of motifs is provided by the di8erent versions of the Potiphar’s wife 
story. !is is the story of a son-'gure whom a mother-'gure tries to seduce. When the son-
'gure refuses, the mother-'gure accuses the son of attempting to violate her, whereupon a 
father-'gure metes out punishment to the son-'gure. In many versions the punishment is 
blindness. In other versions, the hero’s feet are cut o8. In probably the oldest known ver-
sion of the tale, that of “!e Story of the Two Brothers,” dating from the fourteenth or 
thirteenth century B.C., the son-'gure, Baîti, castrates himself.25 One could say that the 
consequences of the seduction attempt include the cutting o8 of the hero’s leg or phallus 
and blindness. Since these consequences are distributionally similar, they would appear to 
be part of the same motifeme, that is, they would appear to be allomotifs. Castration and 
blindness do not seem to be in complementary distribution but rather appear to be in free 
variation. In fact, it is probable that one element could be substituted for the other with-
out changing the plot structure. In this light, a curious Greek version of the Potiphar’s 
wife story becomes a little more intelligible. Phoenix, the son of Amyntor, was accused 
by Phthia, Amyntor’s concubine, of having violated her. !e father, on the strength of the 
concubine’s false accusation of seduction, blinded his son and cursed him with childless-
ness.26 If blindness and castration are allomotifs, then the connection between blindness 
and childlessness is not so remote.
An example of allomotifs in the folklore of a primitive culture may be found in the 
North American Indian test tales. In Boas’s important study of the Tsimshian versions of 
the test theme, a jealous uncle or brother subjects the hero to tests.27 In order to obtain 
a wife, the hero must survive any one of the following elements: a snapping door, caves 
which open and close, a closing tree cle5 or canoe, a clam with crushing shells, danger-
ous animals guarding a door, or a vagina dentata. All these elements appear to be allomo-
tifs of the same motifeme, which, incidentally, looks very much like Propp’s twenty-'5h 
motifeme, “A di7cult task is proposed to the hero.”
!e notion of allomotifs has important theoretical implications for the Finnish his-
torical-geographical method. In this method, considerable signi'cance is placed upon the 
di8erences occurring in the variants of a given tale. By plotting the time (historic) and 
place (geographic) of a given story element, one attempts in this method to reconstruct 
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the original form of the tale and its mode of development and dissemination. If, however, 
the arsenal of a storyteller included allomotifs, that is, if there are two or more traditional 
motifs any of which would ful'll a particular motifeme, then the analyst would have to be 
extremely cautious in evaluating such alternations. !is would also explain why a given sto-
ryteller might tell the same tale di8erently upon di8erent occasions. !e choice of a spe-
ci'c allomotif (e.g., an obscene one) might be culturally conditioned by the type of audi-
ence. Furthermore, what folklorists have hitherto considered as two separate tale types 
or blends of tale types might be rather a case of the alternation of allomotifs or allomotif 
clusters. As Propp points out, although the storyteller apparently creates within a de'nite 
sequence of motifemes, he is “absolutely free in his choice of the nomenclature and attri-
butes of the dramatis personae.”28
!e phenomenon of the limiting nature of a sequential formula of motifemes merits 
study. It would be of interest, for example, to ascertain whether there is an absolute mini-
mum number of motifemes necessary for the construction of a folktale. Propp speaks only 
of an upper limit. It would also be interesting to know if the sequence corresponded in any 
way with the structure of other cultural elements, such as ritual. In addition, a psychologi-
cal study of the motifemic sequence might help to elucidate the etiology of the pattern. 
It should be noted that as yet no attempt has been made to see if there is motifemic pat-
terning in folktales other than fairy tales, to say nothing of the other genres of folklore. 
Moreover, it has not yet been determined whether motifemic patterning varies from cul-
ture area to culture area. It is not even known whether or not there is such patterning in 
the folktales of primitive cultures. Motifemic analysis of all types of folktales in all types 
of cultures must be accomplished before any reliable comparative work may be attempted. 
Just as comparative linguistics is based upon emic analysis,29 so ultimately must compara-
tive folklore and mythology. In other words, solid synchronic analysis is needed to de'ne 
adequately the formal structural characteristics of folkloristic genres before truly meaning-
ful diachronic, i.e., historical, studies may be undertaken.
It seems safe to say that the emic unit of the motifeme (Propp’s function) marks a 
tremendous theoretical advance over the etic unit of the motif. With regard to larger 
units, such as tale types, Propp was quite right when he said that “Types do exist, not on 
the level outlined by Aarne, but on the level of the structural properties of folk-tales. . 
. .30 However, the use of the emic unit should not he construed as in any way replacing 
the need for the etic units. !e emic unit replaces the etic unit as a structural unit to 
be used as the basis for comparative studies; but with respect to the practical matters of 
classi'cation and cataloging, there is certainly a de'nite place for etic units. As Propp 
himself observed, his basic task was “clearly the extraction of the ‘genera.’”31 Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, in a lengthy commentary on Propp’s work, notes that before such formal-
istic studies, folklorists tended to ignore what folktales had in common, but that a5er 
formalistic analysis, folklorists are deprived of the means of seeing how folktales dif-
fer.32 If Propp has found, so to speak, a “generative grammar” for Aarne-!ompson tale 
types 300 to 749, how can individual variants of the same structural tale type be dis-
tinguished? !e point is that a structurally based tale typology does not in any way 
eliminate the need for a practical index such as !ompson’s. As Honti suggested, syn-
thetic and morphological typology should not be used instead of analytical indices 
and systems, but in addition to them. Assuming that there may be di8erent formulaic 
sequences of motifemes for di8erent kinds of folktales or for folktales in di8erent cul-
ture areas, there could well be a tale-type index based upon morphological criteria. But 
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this index would be in addition to the Aarne-!ompson type index and would be cross-
referenced so that a folktale scholar could tell at a glance what Aarne-!ompson tale 
types belonged to which morphological tale types. As Pike notes, etic analysis must 
precede emic analysis. It is therefore obvious that folklorists need both and further that 
they should not mistake the one for the other.
!e structural study of folklore has really just begun. Except for a few scattered studies 
such as Sebeok’s study of charms,33 there has been very little work of this kind. With the 
aid of the rigorous de'nition of structural units, the future of structural studies in folklore 
looks promising indeed.
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Postscript
!e Motif-Index and the Tale Type Index: A Critique
It must be said at the outset that the six-volume Motif-Index of Folk-Literature 
and the Aarne-!ompson tale type index constitute two of the most valu able tools in the 
professional folklorist’s arsenal of aids for analysis. !is is so regardless of any legitimate 
criticisms of these two remarkable indices, the use of which serves to distinguish schol-
arly studies of folk narrative from those carried out by a host of amateurs and dilettantes. 
!e identi'cation of folk narratives through motif and/or tale type numbers has become 
an international sine qua non among bona 'de folklorists. For this reason, the academic 
folklore community has reason to remain eternally grateful to Antti Aarne (1867–1925) 
and Stith !ompson (1885–1976) who twice revised Aarne’s original 1910 Verzeichnis 
der Märchentypen—in 1928 and in 1961—and who compiled two editions of the Motif-
Index (1922–1936; 1955– 1958).
!ere has been considerable discussion of the concepts of motif and tale type. Highlights 
of the motif literature include Bodker 1965:201–202; Meletinski 1977; Ben-Amos 1980; 
Courtes 1982; Bremond 1982; and Warzbach 1993. Representative views of the tale type 
may be found in Honti 1939; Greverus 1964; Jason 1972; and Georges 1983. !ompson 
de'ned the motif as “the smallest element in a tale having a power to persist in tradition” 
(1946:415; 1950b:1137).
Perhaps the most lucid delineation of the concept of tale type was made by the brilliant 
Hungarian folklorist János Honti. In his 1937 essay in Folk-liv, Honti proposed three dif-
ferent ways of considering a tale type as a viable unit of analysis. First, it consisted of a spe-
ci'c binding together of motifs; second, any one tale type could stand as a unique entity 
in contrast with other tale types, e.g., Cinderella is not the same story-plot as Little Red 
Riding Hood; and third, a tale type could be perceived as a kind of cookie-cutter Platonic 
form or model which manifested itself through multiple existence (such multiple instances 
being termed versions or variants). In an extended essay on “!e Tale—Its World,” Honti 
makes it perfectly clear that he understands that “the concept of ‘type’ is merely an ideal 
construction.” But by the same token, Honti does not recognize the genuine utility of the 
concept: “. . . for the researcher, behind all these variants, only one ‘type’ exists . . . and 
therefore scholarship is entitled to construct a conceptual unity, considering the variants 
as constantly changing phenomena of an unchanging process” (1975:35). Although Honti 
employs the term “vari ants,” his de'nition of type seems eminently sane. It should be kept 
in mind, however, that a tale type is a composite plot synopsis corresponding in exact verba-
tim detail to no one individual version but at the same time encom passing to some extent 
all of the extant versions of that folktale.
!ere have been at least two major criticisms of the concepts of motif and tale type 
to date. !e 'rst, articulated most e8ectively by Scandinavian folklorists, concerns the 
alleged “independence” of the units. Anna Birgitta Rooth in a “Digression” entitled “!e 
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Tale as Composition,” appended to her classic dissertation on Cinderella (1951:237–40), 
suggested that indi vidual motifs were more o5en than not found to be interdependent 
upon other motifs in a given tale, and she proposed the notion of “motif-complex” to 
describe such tradition collocations of motifs. Similarly, Bengt Holbek argued that stan-
dard Aarne-!ompson tale typology “does violence” to the actual material collected in 
the 'eld insofar as so-called types were o5en combined (1964:160). Yet despite his life-
long reservations about the con cept of tale type—“It is not very clear”—Holbek did reluc-
tantly admit that “types do exist to some extent” (1987:157, 158). It is certainly true that 
inasmuch as the magic tale (AT 300–749) typically ends with marriage—according to 
Propp’s Morphology of the Folktale (1988:63–64)—AT 480, !e Spinning-Women by the 
Spring. !e Kind and the Unkind Girls, which does not end with a marriage, frequently 
serves as the introduction to another tale type that does end with a marriage, e.g. AT 510A 
Cinderella (Roberts 1994:102).
!e second criticism has to do with the alleged Eurocentrism of the concepts of motif 
and tale type. !e argument in a nutshell is that these concepts were developed from a 
European data corpus and hence may not be applicable to nonwestern material, e.g., African 
folk narrative (Finnegan 1970:327–28). !e idea in part stems from the correct observa-
tion that African storytellers in general favor improvisation more than do European sto-
rytellers and that this penchant for improvisation makes the notions of 'xed motifs and 
tale types super6uous and irrelevant. !e empirical evi dence, however, would disprove 
this largely anti-European, anti-colonist ideological position insofar as there do seem to 
be identi'able African narrative motifs and stable traditional tale types (cf. Dundes 1977 
and especially Bascom 1992).
!ree other criticisms of the motif and the tale type might conveniently be grouped 
under the rubrics of 1) Overlapping, 2) Censorship, and 3) Ghost Entries. !ompson rec-
ognized the fuzziness and vagueness of his de'nitions of motif and tale type, but he actually 
went so far as to defend such de'nitions because supposedly they avoided “long debates” (cf. 
Dundes 1964:54). !ompson admitted that “somewhat more than half of the types” in the 
tale type index “consist of a single narrative motif ” (1946:417, 439). !is means that to a 
large extent the motif and tale type systems are overlapping. !e vast majority of animal tales 
(AT 1–299) are both single tale type numbers and single motif numbers. !e same holds true 
for “Tales of the Stupid Ogre” (AT 2009–2430) among others. So then what is the essential 
di8erence, if any, between a motif and a tale type? In these instances, virtually none. !e dis-
tinction becomes more meaningful in more complex tales, e.g., “Tales of Magic” (AT 300–
729) which consist of sequences of numerous motifs rather than just one. One of the key 
di8er ences between a motif and a tale type is that all versions of a tale type are assumed to be 
genetically related, that is, they are assumed to be cognate, whereas all narratives listed under 
a motif heading may or may not be related. Any account of the origin of the sun, for example, 
could be listed under motif A710, Creation of the Sun. To be fair, !ompson himself was 
well aware of this distinction (1946:415–16; 1950a:753).
!e problem of “overlapping” goes far beyond the confusion of motif and tale type in 
so many narratives. It occurs within both the conceptualization of motifs and tale types. 
In de'ning motifs, !ompson claims they fall in to three classes: actors, items, and inci-
dents (1946:415–16). (It is the latter category of “incidents” that overlaps with tale types.) 
!e obvious di7culty is: how can there possibly be an “incident” motif that does not 
include either an “actor” motif or an “item” motif ? !e categories of motifs delineated by 
!ompson are thus not at all mutually exclusive and in fact are unavoidably overlapping.
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Tale types are also overlapping although this problem was caused by Aarne’s original 
classi'cation scheme and cannot be blamed on !ompson. Aarne elected—in retrospect 
unwisely—to classify folktales partly on the basis of dramatis personae. !us his 'rst sec-
tion consisted of animal tales (AT 1–299) in which the principal actors in the tales were 
animal characters. (For the inconsistencies even within Aarne’s animal categories, see von 
Sydow 1948.) Aarne’s mistake was not classifying tales on the basis of narrative plot rather 
than the dramatis personae. !e reality of folktales, for example, demonstrates that the 
same tale can be told with either animal or human characters. As a result of Aarne’s mis-
take, we o5en 'nd the very same tale, that is, tale type in the true genetic sense, listed twice 
in the Aarne -!ompson index under two separate numbers. !ompson tried his best to 
alleviate the problem through a system of cross-referencing, but the funda mental theo-
retical issue was not really resolved. A substantial number of animal tales, for example, 
are clearly also tales involving ogres or numskulls. AT 9B In the Division of the Crop the 
Fox Takes the Corn = AT 1030 !e Crop Division. Russian folklorist Vladimir Propp 
pointed out this obvious overlap in 1928 (1968:5–6). In similar fashion, AT 43 = AT 
1097; AT 121 = AT 1250; AT 123 = AT 333; AT 126 = AT 1149, etc. !e point is that 
the same tale should not have two or more di8erent tale type numbers! So we can see that 
in some instances, motifs overlap with tale types, and in others, tale types overlap with 
other tale types. Such overlapping surely suggests that both the current motif and tale type 
systems are 6awed.
Another serious problem with both the motif and tale type indices in volves the recur-
ring issue of censorship. !ompson indulged in what can only be described as absurd and 
excessive prudery. To the extent that folkloristics is a science, albeit a social science, it can-
not or should not be victimized by self-imposed censorship. !is is especially grievous in 
the case of folkloristic data because so much of folklore deals with unabashedly taboo top-
ics. In that context, a decision by a scholar to omit “obscene” data from standard collections 
and indices is inexcusable. !ompson states his philosophy with respect to such motifs in 
an obscure footnote in the Motif-Index (1957:514, n. 1): “!ousands of obscene motifs 
in which there is no point except the obscenity itself might logically come at this point, 
but they are entirely beyond the scope of this present work. . . . In view of the possibility 
that it might become desirable to classify these motifs and place them within the present 
index, space has been le5 from X700 to X749 for such motifs.” One cannot possibly help 
but wonder at !ompson’s skewed logic in leaving only '5y numerical slots for “thou-
sands of obscene motifs.” (For an incisive critique of !ompson’s prudery, see Legman’s 
1962 essay “Toward A Motif-Index of Erotic Humor.”) So obscene folklore motifs were 
simply intentionally omitted by !ompson in the Motif-Index. A slightly di8erent strat-
egy was employed in the tale type index. In this index, !omp son does assign numbers to 
some obscene tales, but his accompanying verbal synopsis is either too brief to be of much 
use or is absent altogether. Two examples should su7ce. AT 1420G Anser Venalis (Goose 
as Gi5) is followed by the following oblique sentence: “!e lover regains his gi5 by a ruse 
(obscene).” !is is not a very informative synopsis. What is the ruse? (For a version of this 
tale, see Afanasyev 1966:56–57, 268–69). Even worse is !ompson’s listing of AT 1355*. 
Here the number is followed only by “(obscene),” which tells us absolutely nothing what-
soever about the content of the tale. Why even bother to include such a useless entry? (For 
a possible version of this tale, see Afanasyev 1966:183–84.) !is sort of conscious omis-
sion of “obscene” folklore from the tale type and motif indices surely impairs the utility of 
these otherwise helpful scholarly aids.
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Finally, a problem which is more of an annoyance is what might by termed “ghost 
entries.” Now it must be understood that in a mammoth compilation of the scope of the 
indices under discussion, it is quite understandable that typographical errors or occasional 
omissions are bound to occur. !omp son did, a5er all, carry out his enormous labors in 
the pre-computer era. Still, such errors can be frustrating to would-be users of the indices. 
!ere is no point in listing all such errata, but several examples may illustrate the prob-
lem. !ompson’s bibliographical code of signalling monographic studies of a particular 
tale type with a double asterisk pre'x as opposed to mere lists of versions by a single aster-
isk is employed throughout the Aarne-!omp son tale type index, but is never explained. 
!e explanation is, however, to be found in the introduction to the Motif-Index (1955:23) 
where the same system is utilized.
Many of the errors are minor. For instance, under motif B31.1 Roc. A giant bird which 
carries men o8 in its claws, we 'nd a cross-reference to K186.1.1, Hero sewed up in an ani-
mal hide so as to be carried to height by bird. But inspection reveals that there is no such 
motif as K186.1.1! !ere is, however, motif K1861.1 which is the correct motif. It is just 
a typographical error involving a mere decimal point, but it could prove terribly frustrat-
ing to even an experienced user of the Motif-Index. In volume 6, the index volume of the 
Motif-Index, under the entry “Book” we 'nd the last reference to be “value to b. depends 
on appreciation of it through J1061.5.” In the relevant J section, we 'nd J1061.1 through 
J 1061.4, but no J1061.5.! In the same volume 6 under the entry “Shadow,” we 'nd “unde-
sired lover asked not to step on s. K1277.6.” A quick check shows that there is no motif 
K1277 at all. Similar discrepancies occur in the tale type index. Under AT 74C Rabbit 
!rows Coconut, we 'nd “Cf. Type 22.” But there is no tale type 22! A5er AT 1510 !e 
Matron of Ephesus, we 'nd “Cf. Type 1752” but there is no such tale type listed. !ese 
sorts of errors could be corrected in future editions of these indices.
Less easy to correct is one last basic theoretical de'ciency to be found in the tale type 
index. Whereas the Motif-Index o8ers worldwide coverage of folk narrative, the tale type 
index does not. According to !ompson’s introduction, “the folktales of all the world” 
are not considered in the index. Rather, it is only the Indo-European folktale which is the 
acknowledged delimited corpus covered. In !ompson’s own words, “Strictly then, this 
work might by called ‘!e Types of !e Folk-Tale of Europe, West Asia, and the Lands 
Settled by !ese Peoples’” (Aarne and !ompson 1961:7). By de'nition, then, native 
American tale types and African tale types, among other nonwestern narratives, are inten-
tionally excluded. !e problem is that some of the tales presently included in the tale type 
index are not Indo-European tales at all, but rather are incontrovertibly native American 
or African tale types! Two examples may su7ce to illustrate this claim. AT 297A, Turtle’s 
War Party, is a classic native American tale type (cf. Dundes 1978). It is not found in the 
Indo-European narrative tradition at all. Its occurrence in Japan alone was apparently the 
basis for its inclusion in the AT index. Taking !ompson’s introduction to the index at face 
value, an unwary index user might wrongly assume that the native Americans borrowed it 
from the Indo-European corpus, but this is not the case. AT tale type 291 Deceptive Tug-
of-war, is an equally classic A'ican tale type. It is not found in the Indo-European corpus 
except for one lone text reported in Peru. Again, it is evidently this single Peruvian text 
that convinced !ompson to include it in his 1961 revision of the Aarne index. (For ref-
erences to sixty-one African versions of this tale, see Paulme and Bremond 1980.) Again, 
the naive user of the index might wrongly conclude that all of the many versions in Africa 
and in the African diaspora had been borrowed from the Indo-European tradition, but 
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this is not the case. One day when there are comprehensive published tale type indices for 
all African tale types and for all native (North and South) American tale types, such errors 
will be easier to correct.
!e overlapping di7culties of the motif and tale type indices aside, the unfortunate 
omission of obscene folk narrative notwithstanding, and over looking or ignoring the 
ghost references and the misleading inclusion of native American and African tale types 
in the AT index, the fact remains that the motif and tale type indices with all their faults 
remain indispensable for the identi'cation of traditional folk narratives. Since identi'ca-
tion is a necessary prerequisite for interpretation, we folklorists simply cannot do without 
these standard indices. Moreover, the individual tale type indices for particular cultures 
or countries (cf. Assolina 1987) can serve as 'eld guides or “'nding lists” for prospective 
'eldworkers. Imperfect though they may be, they represent the keystones for the compar-
ative method in folkloristics, a method which despite postmodernist naysayers and other 
prophets of gloom continues to be the hallmark of international folkloristics.
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How Indic Parallels to the 
Ballad of the “Walled-Up Wife” 
Reveal the Pitfalls of Parochial 
Nationalistic Folkloristics
Introduction
Dundes frequently emphasized the need for cross-cultural research, with the goal of form-
ing an international folkloristics. He complained of a tendency among scholars to divide 
folklore into national categories, which might lead to problematic claims that traditions 
belong to a unique location. In cross-cultural comparisons, Dundes identi'ed key features 
that remain consistent across cultures, as well as those distinctive details that are part of 
“oicotypes” (also called ecotypes), a term he borrowed from Swedish folklorist Carl von 
Sydow, to describe di8erences in narratives owing to the cultural and geographical envi-
ronment in which they are told. In the ballad of the “Walled-Up Wife,” for instance, the 
feature that makes it distinctive among foundation sacri'ce narratives is the position of a 
woman as the sacri'ced victim. Dundes noted, however, that in contrast to European ver-
sions of the ballad, where the wife has to be duped into entering the partly built construc-
tion, in India “the young bride knows ahead of time that she is the intended victim to be 
sacri'ced.” Another di8erence is that the structure being built in India is a well or water 
tank, while in Europe it is typically a bridge, castle, or monastery. Dundes attributed these 
di8erences to diverging worldviews and value systems, but saw an important continuity in 
the woman’s role as sacri'ce so the structure will remain erect. !e family connection is 
in the detail of an adversely a8ected child being le5 behind, or an infant seeking to nurse 
from the immured woman’s breast. Within European versions, Greeks predominantly 
place the sacri'ce in a bridge, while Romanians refer primarily to the construction of a 
monastery. !e consistent motif is that despite the best e8orts of a group of men to con-
struct the magni'cent structure by day, it falls at night (!ompson motif D2192, Work of 
Day Magically Overthrown At Night). !e sacri'ce insures that the structure will stand, 
but at a tremendous human price for the male builder.
Dundes turned his attention to the ballad and legend of the “Walled-Up Wife” because 
in over two hundred years of scholarship, it has gained status as one of the most famous 
poetic texts in the world. It gained renown in 1824, when Jacob Grimm translated into 
German a version sent to him by Serbian folklorist Vuk Karadžić, and then sent it to the 
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revered writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. As a result of public interest in southeast-
ern Europe in the wake of the Crimean War (1854–1856), with the British allied with the 
Ottoman Empire against the Russians in southeastern Europe, versions of the ballad, as 
an example of Balkan tradition, appeared widely in English publications. It also inspired 
literary adaptations, such as English poet W. M. W. Call’s “Manoli: A Moldo-Wallachian 
Legend” in 1862 (see Tappe 1984).
Emphasizing the key symbolic role of the woman in this narrative, Dundes typi'ed 
the narrative as the “Walled-Up Wife,” but it is known in di8erent countries by a host 
of di8erent names. Serbian folklorists have concentrated on “!e Building of Skadar,” 
while Hungarians have been primarily concerned with “Clement Mason.” In Romania, 
“Meşterul Manole” holds sway (280 variants in the study by Ion Taloş [1997]), and 
Greek folklorists have given attention to “!e Bridge of Arta” (328 variants, according 
to Georgios A. Megas [1976]). Dundes pointed out that even for comparativists, the 
ballad had been associated with the Balkans, and was o5en presumed to originate there, 
although he found evidence for an Indic origin because of the relation of “A Feast for the 
Well” (Keregehara) to the foundation sacri'ce motif. Other theories of origin hold that 
it has a classical source, in Greek myths of the passage over a bridge from life to death, 
or a Biblical connection to the story of Jephthah’s sacri'ce of his daughter for victory in 
battle ( Judges 11:30–40).
!e most common origin theory applied to the widespread ballad was that it had roots 
in an ancient custom whereby female victims were ritually killed as a form of foundation 
sacri'ce. It advanced the thesis that details of the ritual were preserved, in the expressive 
forms of song and story, a5er the ritual was no longer practiced. Dundes objected that the 
myth-ritual theory was not an “ultimate origins explanation.” Although it posited a his-
torical connection as a source for the text, it did not answer the questions of why the ritual 
was practiced or where it came from. It was also frequently at a loss to explain why particu-
lar rituals persisted in folklore and others did not. Dundes criticized the theory for its fal-
lacious assumption of a causal link between a ritual that occurred in the distant past, and 
the performance of the ballad.
Another issue in the history of scholarship on the ballad was, how did it di8use across 
borders if it was not the sole creation of a single country? Dundes pointed to the in6uence 
of mobile Gypsies as a conduit of the tradition, and others have also considered a Jewish 
diasporic possibility (see Shai 1976). Folklorist Paul Brewster has suggested that the bal-
lad reached American playgrounds in the form of the well-known rhyme “London Bridge 
is Falling Down,” with its lines about a falling bridge and a trapped “fair lady” (1971). A 
narrative connection with motifs of the ballad are also apparent in American legends of 
haunted bridges, such as material collected by folklorist Linda Dégh about a “big, mod-
ern bridge” with a woman or child in the foundation (1968). !e feature that suggests a 
link is the action of the woman/child unwittingly becoming entombed when going to 
retrieve a metal object (in the ballad it is o5en a ring). Other cognates have been identi-
'ed in Germany and Africa (see Schmidt 1995). Dundes resisted the historic-geographic 
idea that the feature of the bridge or dam is blindly inserted into the story because it was 
heard that way along its path of di8usion. For instance, in this essay, he asked why the edi-
'ce that fell was so o5en a dam, bridge, castle, or well. He discerned symbolism in these 
objects, related to womb enclosures by shape or water content. In material culture, they are 
also visible technological achievements, o5en associated with male occupations, that defy 
feminine nature or stand out on the landscape and invite narrative commentary. Dundes 
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discussed further the psychoanalytic idea of a tomb/womb equation in relation to the 
vampire legend (1998).
Plot similarities of ballad texts of the “Walled-Up Wife” in a number of countries 
raises the question of symbolic meanings that could apply across cultures, and might 
therefore explain the appeal of the ballad through time and across space. (For another 
example in which Dundes found that adding texts to the Eurocentric data used to ana-
lyze a narrative suggested an interpretation di8ering from previous scholarship, see his 
discussion of “Little Red Riding Hood” [1989e].) In the present essay, Dundes pointed 
out that these meanings varied according to the perspective taken—in this case, whether 
male or female. !e text could have multiple meanings, and the folklorist could also 
evaluate whether some meanings arose more prominently than others because the story 
was told more frequently from a particular perspective. Dundes applied a feminist psy-
choanalytic interpretation from symbolic evidence in the ballad, at least from a woman’s 
perspective, of entrapment in married life. He adapted Freud’s male-oriented “Oedipus 
complex” into what he called the “male edi'ce complex” in the story, a working out of 
guilt by a man prioritizing career over family. !e male “erection” by day, according to 
Dundes, was contrasted to family time at night, when the structure falls. Male hubris 
brings death in the story, he observed. Dundes predicted that as attitudes toward non-
egalitarian marriage and the suppression of women change, the ballad will likely not be 
needed psychologically.
A5er the “Walled-Up Wife” essay appeared, Romanian folklorist Nicolae 
Constantinescu took up Dundes’s challenge to observe the meanings that derive from 
di8erent-gendered perspectives. He noticed that performances of the Romanian colind, 
or Christmas carol, containing the walled-up wife motif were usually plaintive songs that 
were sung by women to other women. According to Constantinescu, its apparent “funeral 
function,” bemoaning the death of female freedom upon marriage in Balkan social orga-
nization, supported Dundes’s contention. But he observed a complication in that ballad 
versions were performed by male professional singers for a male audience in designated set-
tings, such as wedding parties and co8ee shops. Constantinescu accounted for this mascu-
line appropriation of what appears to be a feminist symbolic song by noting that the cen-
tral themes changed according to the gender of the performer and the associated genre. In 
the carol, women altered the emphasis from the master mason’s deeds, in the men’s ballad, 
to the wife’s acts: her determination to bring her husband’s lunch against all obstacles, and 
her responsibility to the infant le5 behind (2003).
Dundes devoted a volume to di8erent collections and interpretations of the ballad in 
!e Walled-Up Wife. In light of the themes of sacri'ce and marriage that he considered in 
the present essay, readers may want to know that he “lovingly dedicated” his book to his 
“wife, Carolyn, whose many sacri'ces made my career as a folklorist possible” (1996b). 
Dundes implied that his interest in the ballad was not just because of its long history of 
scholarship and its lessons about comparativist work, but also as a result of his relating to 
the theme he identi'ed in this essay, the “di7culties of balancing career and marriage for 
males.” !is is a viewpoint he did not include in a prior study of the ballad, “!e Building 
of Skadar (1989b).
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The governing intellectual paradigm in 19th-century folkloristics 
was the historical reconstruction of the past, modeled in part on the parallel disciplines of 
archaeology and philology. !ere were, to be sure, competing forms of diachronic searches 
for origins, but most involved some type of historical-comparative-di8usionistic bias. 
Synchronic concerns with structure, function, context, performance, and the like would 
not emerge until the next, that is, the 20th, century. 
Among the most prominent 19th-century folklore theories of origins was the so-called 
Indianist hypothesis. One of the acknowledged starting points of the argument that much of 
European folklore had originated in India was !eodor Benfey’s (1809–1881) introduction 
to the 'rst German translation of the Panchatantra in 1859. Champions of the “Indianist” 
school of folkloristics included William Clouston (1843–1896), Joseph Jacobs (1854–
1916), and Emmanuel Cosquin (1841–1919), among others. !e in6uence of Max Müller 
(1823–1900), a leading Indologist (despite the fact that he never once set foot in India) and 
the Aryan-migration notions that he espoused gave further credence to the Indianist school 
inasmuch as it was believed that “the Aryan peoples emigrated from India and carried their 
language and myths with them” (Dorson 1968:178). !e Indianist theory has gone the way 
of most 19th-century folklore theories. In other words, it has been relegated to a long foot-
note in the history of 19th-century folkloristics. It is not my purpose here to attempt to 
resuscitate the Indianist theory, but I cannot forbear noting that the theory was primar-
ily applied to folk narrative with special emphasis on myths and folktales. !e ballad genre 
seems to have been pretty much ignored by those advocating Indic origins.
!e Walled-Up Wife
One of the most famous ballads in the world in terms of the amount of scholarship devoted 
to it is surely “!e Walled-Up Wife.” Found widely reported throughout the Balkans, it 
has intrigued and bedeviled East European folklorists for more than one hundred and '5y 
years. Romanian folklorist Ion Taloş, who has devoted a book-length monograph to the 
ballad (1973), has this to say about it: “!e song about the mason’s wife is a ballad of rare 
beauty, perhaps the most impressive in world folklore” (1987:400). !is echoes the senti-
ment of Jacob Grimm, who called the ballad “one of the most outstanding songs of all peo-
ples and all times” (Dundes 1989:156).
!e basic plot involves a group of men who seek to construct a castle, monastery, or 
bridge. !rough supernatural means, whatever is constructed during the day is undone at 
night. A dream revelation or some other extraordinary means of communication informs 
the would-be builders that the only way to break the negative magic spell is to sacri'ce the 
'rst woman (wife or sister) who comes to the building site the next day. When the chief 
architect’s own young wife arrives, she is duly immured. O5en the process is thought to 
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be a joke or game by the female victim until a poignant moment in the ballad when she 
suddenly realizes that she is being sacri'ced by her husband and his colleagues. In some 
versions, she begs for an aperture to be le5 so that she can continue to nurse her baby. 
Sometimes a milky spring marks the site of the alleged event, a site where infertile women 
or mothers su8ering from a lack of lactation later come in the hope of obtaining a folk 
medical cure. !is brief synopsis does not by any means do justice to this powerful bal-
lad (and legend), but it should be su7cient to identify it for those not familiar with it. 
Since the ballad is apparently not in the English and Scottish canon and does not appear 
in Western Europe generally, it is not particularly well known among folklorists in Western 
Europe and the United States.
In Eastern Europe, in contrast, however, it is extremely common and well known. In 
Serbia, it has the title of “!e Building of Skadar”; in Hungary, it is o5en called “Clement 
Mason”; in Romania, it is “Master Manole”; in Greece, it is “!e Bridge of Arta”; and 
so on. !e numbers of collected texts of this ballad are truly staggering. Greek folklorist 
Georgios Megas based his study of the ballad on 333 Greek versions (Megas 1976:5) for 
example. Bulgarian folklorist Lyubomira Parpulova analyzed 180 Bulgarian versions of 
the ballad (Parpulova 1984:425). When one adds the numerous Hungarian, Romanian, 
Serbian, and Albanian versions to the Greek and Bulgarian texts, we are dealing with a bal-
lad for which we have more than seven hundred texts available.
!e ballad of the walled-up wife has fascinated some of the leading folklorists of the 
19th and 20th centuries. One of the earliest versions was a Serbian text of “!e Building 
of Skadar” collected by Vuk Karadžić’s (1784–1864), the founder of Serbian folkloris-
tics. He began publishing his Narodne srpske pjesme in Vienna in 1814. At that time, Jacob 
Grimm (1785–1863) was serving as a delegate to the Vienna Congress (from October 
1814 to June 1815), and he eventually wrote a review of Karadžić’s 'rst volume of folk-
songs (Wilson 1986:112). In 1824, Karadžić’s sent a new edition of the folksongs to 
Grimm, who was so delighted with “!e Building of Skadar” that he began to translate 
it. He sent his translation to Goethe in May of the same year, but Goethe was appalled by 
what he considered to be the heathen-barbarity of the ballad (Dundes 1989:156; Milović 
1941:51). Grimm would later discuss the ballad as a prime example of “foundation sac-
ri'ce” in his Teutonic Mythology (1966:III, 1143). But that was just the beginning of the 
enormous mass of scholarship devoted to the ballad. Among the dozens—note the use of 
the plural—of monographs on the topic, there are major studies by such distinguished 
scholars as Cocchiara, Eliade, Megas, Taloş, and Vargyas. Much of the earlier scholarship 
has been ably surveyed by Vargyas in his magisterial essay “!e Origin of the Walled-up 
Wife,” which is chapter III of his excellent Researches into the Medieval History of Folk 
Ballad (1967:173–233). Vargyas, arguably one of the leading ballad authorities of the 
20th century, continued his detailed and meticulous investigation of the ballad in his 
Hungarian Ballads and the European Tradition II (1983:18–57). Vargyas considers vir-
tually all texts available in print and reviews their contents, not to mention summarizing 
the incredible number of essays and monographs on the ballad written, I might add, in a 
bewildering variety of languages.
If one wished to describe the bulk of scholarship treating the ballad, one could say that 
two principal features characterize the literature. From Jacob Grimm on, there has been a 
host of essays using the ballad to illustrate a conventional myth-ritual thesis that the story 
represented a survival from an actual practice of the past of o8ering a human sacri'ce in 
order to appease supernatural spirits who were believed to be involved in or threatened 
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by the proposal to build some kind of structure, for example, a bridge. An example of 
the logic adduced: the river goddess will be deprived of “food” by a bridge that will per-
mit all passengers to cross the stream safely. Hence a human sacri'ce must be o8ered to 
appease the goddess (Mitra 1927:41). Famed comparativist Reinhold Köhler’s 1894 paper 
('rst published in 1873) is representative, but one could easily cite many others includ-
ing Gittée 1886–1887, Krauss 1887, Feilberg 1892, Sartori 1898, Sainean 1902, De Vries 
1927, O’Sullivan 1945, Cocchiara 1950, and Brewster 1971 (see also Taloş 1973:25). !e 
second observable trend in the scholarship is the persistent attempt to establish a national 
origin for the ballad. !rough a modi'ed form of the comparative method, folklorists 
have sought to “prove” that the ballad originated in one locale rather than another. Zihni 
Sako ends his discussion of Albanian versions with the unequivocal statement: “it seems 
to us that the original source of the ballad is Illyria, that is, Albania” (1984:165). Similarly, 
Georgios Megas ended one of his several essays on the ballad this way: “I hope that it is 
clearly demonstrated from the publication of my full-6edged investigation that Greece 
must be considered as the cradle and homeland of our ballad” (1969:54, my translation). 
Megas reiterated this position at the very end of his 1976 monograph on the ballad when 
he (rightly) rejected the idea that polygenesis could be responsible for the di8erent versions 
of the ballad found throughout the Balkans, and (wrongly) concluded that the single ori-
gin of the ballad must have been the Greek territory in early Byzantine times (1976:179). 
It is not di7cult to see a high correlation between the hypothetical country of origin and 
the nationality of the researcher! (For a convenient chronological summary of the long-
standing origins debate, see Vargyas 1967:178–179 and its continuation 1983:55–57; for 
other comprehensive accounts of previous scholarship devoted to the ballad, see Dundes 
1989:153–155, Megas 1976:125–179, and Taloş 1973.) I am by no means the 'rst to 
underscore the extreme nationalistic bias in ballad origin scholarship. Ballad specialist 
David Buchan, in his essay “British Balladry: Medieval Chronology and Relations,” has 
this to say about Child 73, “Lord !omas and Fair Annet”: “Grundtvig thought its ori-
gin Danish, Gerould thought its origin British, Doncieux thought it French, which per-
haps tells us more about the ethnocentricity of ballad scholars than about ‘Lord !omas’” 
(Buchan 1978:104). As to why the ballad as opposed to other genres of folklore should 
have been the focus of nationalistic proprietary “wars,” one can only speculate that the bal-
lad’s hallowed status vis-à-vis other folklore genres—either as the detritus of glorious epics 
of the past or alternatively as a relatively late medieval elitist creation, not related to any 
primitive origins—might account for why ardent nationalistic scholars were so anxious to 
claim exclusive “ownership” of such treasures. Also since two or more neighboring nations 
appeared to have the “same” ballad, it was perhaps almost inevitable that it would become 
a natural bone of contention.
For more than a century, there has been a brisk many-sided debate among Balkans folk-
lorists as to which country had the right to claim “credit” for originating the walled-up 
wife ballad. It may be di7cult for some modern folklorists to appreciate just how heated 
the debate was over which of the numerous nationalistic competing claims was “correct.” 
One illustrative example may su7ce to indicate the intensity of the furor. In 1863 the 
noted Hungarian collector of folksongs, János Kriza (1811–1875), a Unitarian minister 
from Transylvania in6uenced in part by Herder and Percy, published a collection of folk-
songs. He called the songs “the collection of the 6owers of the mind of the Székeley peo-
ple—its wild roses, if I may so describe them” (as quoted in Ortutay 1973:498). In that 
collection, entitled Vadrózsák (Wild Roses), Kriza included a Hungarian version of the 
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walled-up wife ballad: Kömives Kelemennë. Almost immediately upon publication of the 
collection, one Julian Grozescu (whose name clearly suggests Romanian origin) accused 
Kriza of having plagiarized this ballad and one other from a Romanian source. !ese accu-
sations became the basis of a famous court trial in Budapest. Although Kriza was not guilty 
of plagiarism, the Vadrózsák lawsuit saddened him for the rest of his life. Ortutay’s com-
ment on the matter is of interest in the present context: “It has come to light on the basis of 
more recent collections and European comparative ethnographic research that the charges 
of plagiarism brought against Kriza were unfounded, and that the two ballads in question, 
like the others, constitute an integral part of both Hungarian and European folk-poetry, 
including the Romanian. It is obvious today that the accusations were groundless; they 
were inspired by the awakening Rumanian nationalism, Hungarian nationalism defended 
itself against them” (Ortutay 1973:501).
An Indianist Origin via the Gypsies
None of the many scholars involved in the dispute over the origin of the walled-up wife 
were aware of the fact that the ballad was extremely popular in India as well. (For refer-
ences to published texts in Telegu and Kannada, see Dundes 1989:165, n. 25.) !e 'rst 
hint of a possible Indic origin of the ballad came from Francis Hindes Groome (1851–
1902), who included the “Story of the Bridge” in his 1899 Gypsy Folk-Tales. Groome 
had translated into English a somewhat-garbled Gypsy version reported by Alexandre G. 
Paspati (1870:620–623). Of particular interest is Groome’s endnote, which begins with 
an apology: “I hesitated whether to give this story; it is so hopelessly corrupt, it seems 
such absolute nonsense. Yet it enshrines beyond question, however confusedly, the wide-
spread and ancient belief that to ensure one’s foundation one should wall up a human 
victim” (Groome 1899:13). Later in the same note, Groome makes the following obser-
vation: “!e Gypsy story is probably of high antiquity, for two at least of the words in 
it were quite or almost meaningless to the nomade [sic] Gypsy who told it” (cf. Paspati 
1870:190–191). Groome continues: “!e masons of southeastern Europe are, it should 
be noticed, largely Gypsies; and a striking Indian parallel may be pointed out in the Santal 
story of ‘Seven Brothers and !eir Sister’ (Campbell 1891:106–110). Here seven broth-
ers set to work to dig a tank but 'nd no water, and so, by the advice of a yogi, give their 
only sister to the spirit of the tank. “‘!e tank was soon full to the brim, and the girl 
was drowned.’ And then comes a curious mention of a Dom, or Indian vagrant musician, 
whose name is probably identical with Doum, Loin, or Rom, the Gypsy of Syria, Asia 
Minor, and Europe” (Groome 1899:13). To my knowledge, this is the only suggestion in 
print that there might be a connection between the Balkans ballad of the walled-up wife 
and a cognate story in India.
In 1925, B. J. Gilliat-Smith published another Gypsy version of “!e Song of the 
Bridge” in the Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society. !e text was accompanied by a learned 
comparative note by W. R. Halliday. Halliday summarily dismisses Groome’s suggestion 
of a possible Indic parallel: “Actually the parallel does not extend further than the building 
of a tank by seven brothers and the drowning of their sister (not the wife of one of them), 
in order that the tank may 'll with water. !e similarity, in fact, is derived merely from the 
common origin of the two stories in the belief in the necessity for Foundation Sacri'ce, 
which we have noted to be world-wide. I have personally no doubt whatsoever that the Song 
of the Bridge is a localized form of story arising out of this wide-spread custom and belongs 
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properly to the Balkan area” (1925:111, emphasis added). Halliday was dead wrong in fail-
ing to see that the Indic narratives were cognate with the Balkans ballad. But then again, 
every scholar who has written on the ballad has also failed to consider the many Indic ver-
sions of the narrative. (Vargyas too dismissed the two Gypsy texts [1967:194] as being of 
little or no consequence.)
Objective readers who take the time to read through the hundreds of Balkans texts 
and the Indic versions can easily see for themselves that they are unquestionably part of 
a common Indo-European tradition, although the ballad apparently never became popu-
lar in Western Europe. (It is worth noting that folklorist A. H. Krappe (1894–1947) pos-
ited an Indic origin for a legend involving the foundation sacri'ce of a child (rather than 
a wife-bride), a legend that may or may not be cognate with the walled-up wife (Krappe 
1927:165–180). Given the possible/probable Indic origin of the ballad, the Gypsy texts, 
garbled though they may be, support this hypothesis inasmuch as the origin of the Gypsies 
is presumed to be India. A Bulgarian Gypsy text of the ballad reported in 1962 (Čerenkov 
1962) tends to con'rm the traditionality of the narrative among Gypsy groups. If this is 
so, then all of the petty arguments between Balkans folklorists about which country’s ver-
sions are the earliest become more or less beside the point. !e moral of this exemplum is 
that the comparative method can be e8ective only when all available versions of a ballad or 
folktale are taken into account.
Consider one of the issues raised in Halliday’s dismissal of a possible Indic parallel. 
!e Indic text involves the drowning of a “sister” of the water-tank builders rather than 
“the wife of one of them.” But as Vargyas observes, “!e victim is not always a wife: in the 
Serbian, Albanian, and Roumanian she may be the sister of the builder. !is appears to be 
a secondary element” (1967:202). It should also be noted that in many modern Indic texts 
the victim is a daughter-in-law, that is, a wife. So both the wife and sister appear as victims 
in the Indic texts. !e “sister instead of wife” argument therefore cannot constitute a legiti-
mate objection to the cognation hypothesis.
Formulaic Evidence
Not only are the Balkans ballad and Indic song-tale plots cognate, but there are formulaic 
features that provide indisputable evidence of the genetic relationship between the two 
sets of texts. In the Balkans, the entombment of the female victim is o5en described in a 
moving series of lines in which the poor girl is ever so gradually covered, typically from the 
lower body to the upper body, from toe to head so to speak. !e girl speaks of being walled 
up to the knees, to her breast, to her throat; or knees, breast, eyes; or knees, waist, breast, 
and throat (Vargyas 1983:46–48). In the Rumanian text analyzed in such depth by Mircea 
Eliade (1907–1986), “the wall rose over higher, burying her, up to the ankles, up to the 
calves, up to the ribs, up to the breasts . . . up to the eyes” (Eliade 1972:168).
Let us brie6y consider three Santal folktales. In the 'rst, “!e Magic Fiddle” (Campbell 
1891:52–56), the sister is sent to get water, but the water vanishes when she tries to scoop 
some up in her pitcher. Gradually the water “reaches to my ankles . . . to my knee, to my 
waist, to my breast, to my neck . . . to a man’s height” and the girl drowns. In a second tale 
(Campbell 1891:106–110), the girl goes to 'll her pitcher “but she could not do so, as 
the water rose so rapidly. !e tank was soon full to the brim, and the girl was drowned.” 
In a third Santal tale, entitled “How Sabai Grass Grew” (Bompas 1909:102–106), the 
sister is sent to the tank to draw water. “Directly the girl drew near to the bank the water 
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began to bubble from the bottom; and when she went down to the water’s edge, it rose 
to her instep.” Gradually the water rises to her ankle, knees, waist, and neck. “At last it 
6owed over her head and the water-pot was 'lled, but the girl was drowned.” In a mod-
ern Kannada text published in 1989, the water touches the daughter-in-law’s feet, knee, 
and waist:
She climbed a step and the water came up
She climbed two steps and the water touched her feet 
She climbed three steps and the water touched her knee 
She climbed four steps and the water touched her waist 
She climbed 've steps and the water drowned her 
!e youngest daughter-in-law Bhagirathi
She became a feast for the well [Aniketana 1989:371]
In an unpublished version from northern India collected in 1991 (Kirin Narayan, personal 
communication, 1994), the beleaguered female victim begs her brothers: “Don’t brick up 
my feet . . . my midri5 . . . breasts . . . neck . . . mouth . . . eyes . . . head.” !is version is 
even closer to the southeastern European texts inasmuch as the woman in this instance is 
bricked up into the foundation of a waterway under construction.
!e demonstration of this formulaic parallel alone—even without the obvious plot 
similarity—would obviously o8er strong support for the proposed Indic origin of the 
Balkans ballad.
What is especially fascinating in the light of the likely Indic source for the ballad is the 
fact that a number of the Balkans texts end with the formation of a magical spring that 
contains either pure water or nourishing milk (Vargyas 1967:203). In the Romanian ver-
sion cited by Eliade, Manole, the master builder, is so saddened by the sacri'cial death of 
his beloved young wife that he killed himself: “and from the woodwork high on the roof, 
he fell, dead; and where he was shattered a clear fountain sprang up, a trickle of water, salt 
with his tears” (Eliade 1972:169). !e “spring” motif could well be an instance of what 
folklorists call peripheral distribution or marginal survival. Certainly the “spring” motif 
is reminiscent of the water-tank image so common in the Indic versions. For that matter, 
even the suicidal jump may not be a Romanian innovation. In a Kannada text, for example, 
the bereaved husband wept and “jumped into the well” (Aniketana 1989:38).
!e Pitfalls of Parochial Nationalism
It is truly sad to think of so many eminent folklorists writing lengthy essays and learned 
monographs on this ballad in total ignorance of the Indic texts. It is especially distress-
ing for those scholars who tried so hard to 'nd the “origin” of the ballad and were misled 
by (1) wrongly limiting the areas of their comparative e8orts—that is, failing to consult 
available Indic texts in print, and (2) by yielding to an excessively emotional and ideologi-
cal nationalistic bias. !e methodological lesson to be learned seems simple enough. !e 
comparative method cannot possibly succeed if whole sets of cognate versions of an item 
of folklore are ignored. Folklorists who insist upon working in narrow parochial nation-
alistic mindsets are no better than unsophisticated anthropologists who are utterly con-
vinced that a tale or song they collect from “their” people or “their” village is absolutely 
unique when in fact it is but one version of a narrative to be found among many peoples. 
!e impressive veneer of comparativism found in the numerous monographic treatments 
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of the walled-up wife ballad cannot cover the egregious error of having failed to take Indic 
cognate texts into account.
To be sure, Indian folklorists are no less parochial. !ey are just as unaware of the mas-
sive Balkans scholarship on the ballad as Balkanologists are unaware of the ballad’s exis-
tence in India. Accordingly, Indian scholars analyze “their” local version of the ballad (see 
Govindaraja 1989; Srikantaiah 1989) without reference to any other versions just as, say, 
Romanian scholars, analyze only the Romanian text of the ballad (see Anghelescu 1984; 
Filiti 1972).
Another instructive illustration of the consequences stemming from excessive nation-
alistic zeal concerns aesthetics. Invariably, investigators claim that their “national” version 
of the ballad is the most beautiful. Romanian scholar L. Sainean contended, for example, 
“From the point of view of beauty and comparative originality, the Serbian and Romanian 
versions take 'rst place; the Bulgarian songs, because of their loose form, give the impres-
sion of being detached fragments; the Albanian traditions are pale imitations of the 
Greek or Serbian ballads . . . the Hungarian variants seem to echo the Romanian ballad” 
(1902:360–361, as translated in Eliade 1972:174). Not surprisingly, Hungarian scholars 
disagreed with this assessment. Vargyas notes, “I think the examples shown make it clear 
on the uniform evidence of several details that the Hungarian formulation shows the pur-
est form,” although to be sure, he does suggest a Bulgarian rather than a Hungarian ori-
gin (1967:222, 228; 1983:37). Of course, it is the height of ethnocentric subjectivity to 
claim that one national version of a cross-culturally distributed folksong is more “beauti-
ful” or “aesthetically pleasing” than that of another nation. !e texts from India are surely 
every bit as poignant and eloquent as those from the Balkans—and remember, these were 
not even known to the myriad of Balkanologists making aesthetic assessments of the rela-
tive merit of ballad versions. Again, it can hardly be coincidence that the national version 
adjudged best or purest just happens to come from the same nation of which the scholar 
making the judgment is a citizen!
Parochial nationalism also turns out to be a critical factor in the few attempts to inter-
pret the ballad. Greek scholars, seizing upon the “bridge” motif in “!e Bridge of Arta,” 
have suggested that the ballad may have originated from the mythological hair bridge 
over which the souls of the dead are required to pass on their way to the a5erlife (Beaton 
1980:122–124; Megas 1976:72). !e problem here is that other versions of the ballad 
involve a castle, monastery, or water tank, rather than a bridge. So while the mythological 
“hair bridge” may appear plausible to those who know only the Greek “Bridge of Arta” tra-
dition, it is highly implausible in the light of the total range of ballad variants. (It would 
also require that the Bridge of Arta be the original form of the ballad, which seems unlikely 
given the many versions from India.)
Another striking instance of a nationalistic interpretation of the ballad is Zimmerman’s 
suggestion that “!e Founding of Skadar” with its “immurement” can “represent the 
subjugation of the Serbian peoples at the time” of the Turkish domination. Moreover, 
“the survival of the infant” would accordingly represent “the ultimate survival of the 
nation” (Zimmerman 1979:379). It is certainly possible that the ballad could have such 
allegorical signi'cance to nationalistic-minded Serbs, but this reading could scarcely 
apply to the Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Hungarian, Romanian, and Indic versions of 
the ballad.
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Cross-Cultural Interpretation
What is needed in international folkloristics—as opposed to nationalistic folkloristics—
are interpretations of items of folklore which could in theory apply to most if not all of the 
versions of that item of folklore. !is is not to deny the importance of identifying oico-
types and analyzing those oicotypes in terms of national or regional personality character-
istics. But it does stress the inevitable limitations of nationalistic readings of folklore items 
with cross-cultural distribution. (One can compare Geertz’s classic reading of the cock-
'ght in Bali with a cross-cultural interpretation of the same event [Dundes 1994:94–132, 
241–282].) Clearly the comparative method continues to be essential for establishing the 
distribution pattern of any particular item of folklore. But merely demonstrating historic-
geographic trait distributions is no substitute for searches for the meaning(s) of folklore. It 
is one thing to note that the ruse of sending the wife-victim into the foundation to retrieve 
an intentionally dropped wedding ring is “encountered in the Bulgarian, Greek, Albanian 
and Serbian versions” (Vargyas 1983:37), but what is the signi'cance, if any, of this motif ? 
And how does it relate to the possible overall meaning(s) of the ballad?
Over the past one hundred and '5y years of thinking about this ballad, the only “cross-
cultural” theory to be consistently applied is that of myth-ritual. Speci'cally, it has long been 
assumed that the ballad is a survival-reminiscence of human sacri'ce, a ritual required to 
appease otherwise hostile supernatural spirits who for various reasons oppose the building 
of some ambitious construction. What this theory utterly fails to illuminate is why the vic-
tim to be sacri'ced must be female. In theory the supernatural spirit could just as well be 
appeased by the sacri'ce of a male victim. In fact, the myth-ritual theory of foundation sac-
ri'ce explains very few of the actual details of the ballad plot. How, for example, does the 
myth-ritual theory account for the ring-dropping device to induce the wife-victim to enter 
the foundation? !e myth-ritual theory also su8ers from being a literal one; that is, it is pred-
icated upon the notion that the construction ritual is historical. !is is why so many Balkans 
scholars have spent so much time trying to locate the actual monastery or bridge that sup-
posedly inspired the story (see Sapkaliska 1988:170; Zimmerman 1979:374). If the ballad 
did originate in India as now seems probable, all those e8orts would appear to be in vain. 
(!ey do, however, show how ballads and legends in their paths of di8usion tend to become 
localized in a particular place, tied to a particular topographic feature in the landscape.)
A few women scholars have sought to 'nd metaphorical meaning in the bal-
lad. Zimmerman proposes a Christian reading of the ballad in which “the traditional 
Christian beliefs in an ultimate reward for su8ering and the triumph of good over evil” 
are emphasized (1979:379). It is not entirely clear how these values are re6ected in the 
sacri'ce of a woman in a wall. Zimmerman also refers to “guilt-ridden cultural memories 
about foundation sacri'ces” indicating that she has not completely abandoned the stan-
dard myth-ritual theory (1979:379). In her analysis of the Bridge of Arta, Mandel argues 
a Lévi-Straussian opposition of nature and culture. Speci'cally, uncreative male culture 
“relies on the appropriation of female nature” (Mandel 1983:180). Although Mandel 
identi'es women with nature, she also insists that women are liminal “between nature 
and culture” and act “as the mediator[s] between the worlds of the living and the dead” 
(1983:182). It is not immediately apparent how women can be both nature and medi-
ating 'gures between nature and culture. However, Mandel’s suggestion that the ballad 
deals with the men’s attempt to “exercise power and control over the woman’s sexuality 
and fertility” has merit (1983:182). But when she speaks in similar terms of the “bridge” 
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as a liminal construction—“contiguous to both banks of the river” but belonging to nei-
ther (1983:181), she falls into the nationalistic parochial pitfall of thinking only in terms 
of the Greek versions of the ballad. !e bridge may well be liminal, but what about a 
castle or a water tank? Once again we see the theoretical di7culties arising from inter-
preting an item of folklore in terms of just one culture (or one set of versions), when that 
same item of folklore is found in many di8erent cultures. It is noteworthy that Mandel, 
in typical anthropologist fashion, dismisses all of the many published studies of the song 
because they only address “questions of di8usion and origin” and hence are deemed “not 
relevant to the argument presented here” (1983:175, n. 4).
Another interesting interpretation is o8ered by Lyubomira Parpulova when she has 
recourse to Van Gennep’s celebrated rites of passage. Parpulova gives the myth-ritual the-
ory a new life when she argues that the ballad re6ects a ritual of transition. But she, too, 
cannot escape the older theoretical bias. She suggests that, rather than looking for a rite 
that underlies the ballad, “why not assume . . . a myth lying at the root of both the rite and 
the ballad.” And she speaks further of “the di8erent forms of constructional human sac-
ri'ce, probably practiced in the past and preserved as legend” (Parpulova 1984:427). She 
hints at a possible connection of ritual separation of girls (e.g., a5er childbirth) with the 
ballad, although she maintains that there may not necessarily be a direct link (1984:435). 
One serious problem with the linkage to childbirth is that not all of the ballad texts refer 
to either a pregnant victim or an infant to be nursed through the wall. Still, Parpulova does 
cite a Bulgarian song in which a prison “is decoded as married life” (1984:433), and she 
insightfully suggests that the walling up may express “the inevitability of a woman’s fate: 
to be transformed into the foundations of a new construction, a new world, a new family” 
that “is not always very pleasant” (1984:434).
Toward Multiple Interpretations
As I have previously argued, we can view the walled-up wife ballad as a metaphor for mar-
ried life in all those societies in which it is sung (Dundes 1989). By entering marriage, 
the woman is 'guratively immured. She is kept behind walls—to protect her virtue and 
to keep her con'ned. !e ring-dropping ruse—which none of the earlier critics have 
addressed—would certainly support this feminist metaphorical interpretation. !e hus-
band drops the ring into the foundation and persuades the faithful wife to go in a5er it. It 
is the act of searching for a wedding ring which seals her fate literally and 'guratively. !e 
fact that a man is willing to sacri'ce his wife in order to build a bigger and better castle, 
bridge, water-tank shows the second-class status of women in such societies. In that male 
chauvinist world, women’s role is to stay protected from the outside world and to concen-
trate upon nurturing her infants (preferably sons)! !e fact that women living near Skadar 
in modern times seek the chalky liquid from the walls to mix with drinking water in order 
“to restore milk to women who cannot nurse” continues to underscore women’s nurturant 
role (Zimmerman 1979:380). !e ideal wife nurtures males—either by bringing food to 
her husband working on a construction site or by giving suck to her newborn son.
Whereas myth-ritual totally fails to explain why it must be a female victim in the ballad, 
the present hypothesis would explain why it must be a woman who is sacri'ced. Marriage is 
a trap—for women. !at is the ballad’s message. She must sacri'ce everything, her mobil-
ity—she is trans'xed—and even her life. !e only aperture—in some versions—is a tiny 
window through which she can continue to suckle her infant son.
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I believe this is a plausible metaphorical reading of the ballad of the walled-up wife, but 
is it the only possible reading? Certainly not. And this brings us to a 'nal issue in our brief 
consideration of the ballad’s signi'cance. Nineteenth-century folklorists, if they thought 
about the meaning of folklore at all, invariably proposed some monolithic hypothesis. 
While they understood perfectly well the multiple existence of folklore texts, they did not 
realize that meanings could also be multiple. As variation is a hallmark of folklore texts, so 
is it also to be found in folklore interpretations.
Ever since Propp delineated the various dramatis personae in the magic tale (Aarne-
!ompson tale types 300–749) in 1928, folklorists have had the methodological tools to 
explore the possibility of investigating the crucial matter of perspective or point of view in 
folktales or ballads. Any given folktale or ballad may give priority to one of several vantage 
points. Perhaps the most obvious distinction concerns whether the tale is told from the per-
spective of the hero or the victim, assuming they are two di8erent characters. (Propp made 
an important di8erentiation between hero-victims—who saved themselves—and hero-
seekers who saved victims [1968:36].) Although, in theory, a tale could be told from the 
villain’s point of view, this is more common in written literature than in oral tradition.
In my analysis of the folktale source of Shakespeare’s King Lear, I tried to demonstrate 
that an originally girl-centered folktale was retold by Shakespeare from a male parent’s 
point of view (1976). In the same way, A. K. Ramanujan revealed that the Indic Oedipus 
tale was told from the mother’s viewpoint rather than the son’s (1983). Similarly, Jack 
Zipes has brilliantly shown how the female-centered tale of Little Red Riding Hood was 
recast by male collectors, namely, Perrault and the Grimm brothers, so as to satisfy the 
agenda of male ideology. (In the original oral tale, the heroine saves herself through her 
own cleverness—an example of Propp’s hero-victim—whereas in the Perrault and Grimm 
“rewrites,” the heroine is either eaten up by the wolf or else saved by an intervening male 
woodsman [Zipes 1993:30–34, 375–378].) Finally, Jim Taggart in his splendid Enchanted 
Maidens (1990) proved from his own 'eld materials from Spain that there were distinct 
male and female versions of the same tale type, a di8erentiation that could frequently be 
correlated with the gender of the tale-tellers. Bengt Holbek in his magnum opus devoted 
to the European fairy tale also sought to distinguish “Masculine” and “Feminine” tales 
(1987:161, 417).
What this suggests in terms of the ballad of the walled-up wife is that there are at the 
very least two distinct possible perspectives: one would be that of the victim, the wife who 
is immured, and the second would be that of the male builder. It is obviously a matter of 
opinion as to whose story the ballad tells. Is it the tragic fate of the female? Or the tragic 
grief of the builder-widower? Just as there is no one correct “text” of an item of folklore, 
there is no one correct “interpretation” of an item of folklore. Folklorists must accustom 
themselves to accepting multiple interpretations just as they have learned to accept the 
existence of multiple versions of texts.
As mentioned above, I have proposed a feminist reading of the ballad which argues 
that the plot provides a deadly metaphor for marriage from India to the Balkans in which 
a wife is forced to give up her freedom and mobility by the demands of her husband and 
his family (e.g., in patrilocal residence). But if we look at the ballad text from the builder’s 
perspective, we may get quite a di8erent reading. All versions of the ballad involve one or 
more males involved in some kind of construction enterprise. !is is true whether the goal 
is the building of a bridge, a castle, a monastery, or a dam (to hold water). I have somewhat 
facetiously called this a male edi'ce complex (Dundes 1989:161). But the key motif is that 
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whatever is constructed during the day is deconstructed at night. Folklorists know this as 
Motif D2192, Work of day magically overthrown at night. Now it is perfectly obvious that 
we are dealing with fantasy here inasmuch as buildings do not disappear night a5er night 
a5er repeated daily attempts to put them up. !us if we consider the motif in metaphori-
cal or symbolic terms, we must ask what could it mean to have something raised during 
the day to be razed at night? If we use the verb erect instead of raise, perhaps the symbol-
ogy might be clearer. Men fear that they may not be able to sustain an erection, especially 
at night, a time for love-making. In terms of males versus females, males may try to express 
their masculinity by denying any dependence upon women. Boys become men by means 
of rites of passage (normally administered by males, not females) in which they formally 
repudiate any hint of maternal control. !e most surprising feature of such rites of passage 
as Bettelheim (1962) and others have suggested is that the men frequently imitate or emu-
late female procreative behavior. In the ballad, men force a sacri'cial woman to be enclosed 
in a man-made construction—just as men were originally enclosed in a female womb. !at 
the male symbolism is not completely successful is hinted at by those versions of the bal-
lad where the woman, though immured, is permitted to succor her male baby through an 
aperture. Still, the male message in the ballad concerns the importance of creating a perma-
nent erection, and one that, in imitation of the female, can contain a human being within 
it. !e fallacy of the “phallicy” is that the male womb results in the death of its occupant 
whereas female wombs—if all goes well—contain new life. In that sense, the ballad rep-
resents wishful thinking on the part of males, that they can create remarkable edi'ces just 
as women procreate, but the sad reality is that the male hubris brings only death to the 
female. Male death is opposed to female life, and the male insistence upon erecting his edi-
'ce complex or complex edi'ce means that his obedient, subordinate female must sacri'ce 
her life for that male enterprise.
Keep in mind that one need not choose between the female or male interpretations of 
the walled-up wife. !e ballad as sung in India more o5en re6ects the female victim’s point 
of view as opposed to the Balkans where the story is seemingly most frequently told from 
the male builder’s perspective. In any event, perhaps neither the female nor the male inter-
pretation may be deemed valid, but they are surely a welcome alternative to the simplistic, 
literal myth-ritual building sacri'ce theory that has dominated the scholarship devoted to 
this extraordinary ballad up to the present time. Both these interpretations also are, unlike 
the earlier parochial nationalistic readings of the ballad, applicable to the ballad in all of 
its versions, not to just the versions found in Serbia, or Hungary, or Romania. Moreover, 
rather than tying the ballad to an unproven myth-ritual hypothesis of human sacri'ce, 
these interpretations link the ballad to the ongoing traumatic relations prevailing in the 
battle of the sexes, which would help explain why the ballad continues to be a painful and 
poignant reminder of the di7culties of balancing a career and marriage for males, and of 
achieving freedom of movement and opportunity for females in India and in the Balkans.
!e future of the ballad’s popularity in India and the Balkans may be in question. !e 
“liberation” of women—the very word liberation refers to the basic complex of ideas which 
generated the ballad in the 'rst place, a complex that insisted that women were not free, 
not liberated—may in time make the ballad’s message obsolete. As more and more women 
become builders of bridges, castles, and dams, perhaps it will be men who will be forced to 
become the “victims” of their wives’ ambitions.
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(Postscript) Binary Opposition in Myth:
!e Propp/Lévi-Strauss Debate in Retrospect
Introduction
Dundes used structuralism to de'ne and compare folklore genres, and, methodologically, 
as the key element of an analytic step—deriving cultural meaning—in an objective science 
of folkloristics. He de'ned structuralism as the “study of the interrelationships or organi-
zation of the component parts of an item of folklore,” and was especially drawn to Russian 
folklorist Vladimir Propp’s morphology, which designated functions of dramatis personae 
within a linear plot sequence. He also was intrigued with French anthropologist Claude 
Lévi-Strauss’s non-linear idea of binary opposition as a re6ection of universal mental pro-
cesses, and used it as a basis for his re6ections on trichotomy as a primarily Western cog-
nitive pattern. Dundes interacted with the French scholar when they were colleagues in 
anthropology at Berkeley in the fall of 1984. !e kinds of questions they discussed, which 
drove the use of structural analysis, concerned thinking and learning processes revealed 
by folklore. An example is the issue of how folklore, like language, is acquired in child-
hood, and the ways in which structures are learned that allow the generation of variations. 
Dundes presented further goals for structural analysis: predicting culture change, examin-
ing cultural determination of content, and making cross-genre comparisons. As a philoso-
phy, Dundes’s version of structuralism allowed for human agency and cultural determin-
ism, o5en denied in anti-humanistic structuralism, although Dundes adhered to the struc-
turalist principle that meaning derives from causal relationships within a structure.
Dundes was introduced to Proppian theory and Russian formalism through two of his 
instructors at Indiana University, European folklorist Felix Oinas and Hungarian-born 
semiotician !omas Sebeok, and he completed his dissertation, which he refers to in this 
essay, on the morphology of American Indian folktales. Dundes made a lasting contri-
bution by revising Propp’s long and rigid sequence of thirty-one functions in the folktale 
into a body of ten functions, grouped into 've motifemic pairs. He discerned elementary 
sequences that are the basis of what people think of as “story”: assignment of task to accom-
plishment of task, and lack to lack liquidated. !e two sequences can combine to form a sin-
gle, complex one: lack, to assignment of task, to accomplishment of task, to lack liquidated. 
Comparing Native American tales to European narratives, he found cultural di8erences in 
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the way that the stories were separated by intervening pairs of lacks and liquidations of those 
lacks. He explained what he called the greater “motifemic depth” in European tales by their 
cultural context of deferred grati'cation or reward. Dundes’s use of cultural psychology 
and functional revision has been instrumental in a number of structural analyses (including 
Bar-Itzhak 2005; Azuonye 1990; Bremond 1977; Turner 1972; and Skeels 1967). He also 
applied structural analysis to tales outside of North America (1971c).
Dundes was instrumental in expanding Proppian analysis to the English-speaking world 
by introducing a translation of Propp’s Morphology of the Folktale ([1928] 1968). !ere, he 
iterated the distinction between Propp’s “syntagmatic” analysis, borrowing from the notion 
of syntax in the study of language, and Lévi-Strauss’s “paradigmatic” one, which seeks to 
describe a pattern or paradigm (usually based upon an a priori principle of binary oppo-
sition) underlying the folkloric text. Dundes praised paradigmatic work for relating the 
schematic structure to worldview and cultural context. He pointed out that Lévi-Strauss’s 
approach facilitated the modern synchronic reconceptualization of myth (and other forms 
of folklore) as models, replacing the diachronic notion of myth as a charter set back in pri-
meval time. Yet Dundes had methodological concerns, since, in contrast to syntagmatic 
approaches, paradigmatic analyses were “speculative and deductive, and they are not as easily 
replicated.” Although praising Propp for developing a syntagmatic method that was empiri-
cal and inductive, he worried that the resultant analyses considered the text alone, in isola-
tion from its social and cultural context. !is observation led him to frequently write, in 
explanations of structuralism, that “structural analysis is not an end in itself.” For Dundes, it 
was an analytical task, following identi'cation, that led to interpretation.
!e structural analytical step in Dundes’s folkloristic method, occurring between iden-
ti'cation and interpretation, typically comprised (1) discovery of a minimal unit, (2) 
investigation of the relationships between di8erent minimal units in combination, and 
(3) cross-cultural comparisons to determine the spread or particularity of the structure. 
Interpretation typically discerned psychoanalytical or symbolist meanings (in this essay 
he mentioned examples of customs, such as bull'ghts and weddings, in addition to narra-
tives and proverbs), and the determination of “worldview,” that is, general outlooks, values, 
and beliefs that drive human action and inform ethical judgments. A structural analysis of 
these interpretations need not follow only Proppian or Lévi-Straussian lines. Under the 
category of structuralism, which Dundes identi'ed as an evolving philosophy, he included 
widely known perspectives for the tripartite (syntagmatic) ordering of “rites of passage” 
introduced by French folklorist Arnold van Gennep, and British social anthropologist 
James George Frazer’s paradigmatic division of homeopathic and contagious magic in the 
early twentieth century.
In this essay, Dundes criticized the idea of the “superorganic,” which he 'nds per-
vasive both in many anthropological treatments of custom, and in literary searches for 
origins using the Finnish or “historic-geographic” method. !is idea was introduced by 
evolutionist Herbert Spencer, and articulated by Berkeley anthropologist A. L. Kroeber 
(1917). It is a structural argument about the Western binary of social and organic forces, 
expressed, Kroeber stated, in other oppositions, such as body/soul, body/mind, and physi-
cal/mental. !e superorganic idea implied that culture was above the level of the human 
organism and had a force of its own, rather than being constructed by social or individ-
ual forces. Dundes (in this essay), and others (such as his anthropological teacher David 
Bidney) railed against this idea, preferring the philosophy that culture involved human 
volition and emotion. Dundes’s structuralist goal was to 'nd minimal units of cultural 
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expression to demonstrate this individual and social agency. Dundes criticized the histor-
ic-geographic reduction of narratives to tale types as representing a superorganic assump-
tion, since they suggested that tales di8use without human agency, and, as invented units, 
existed as ontological entities. Dundes delivered his criticism directly to the brain-center 
of the historic-geographic method, since he delivered this essay in Finland in 1976, home 
to the legacy of twentieth-century folklorist Antti Aarne and the “Aarne-!ompson” sys-
tem of classi'cation (“!ompson” refers to American folklorist Stith !ompson, who was 
greatly in6uenced by Finnish folkloristics).
In his postscript published thirty-one years later, Dundes re6ected on the lasting in6u-
ence of Propp and Lévi-Strauss on the structural analysis of narrative, and attempted to 
mediate what had been seen as opposition to their structural approaches. Dundes used the 
occasion to comment on the di8erence between how folkloristics and anthropology dealt 
with myth, since he took Lévi-Strauss to task for not being folkloristically aware of folklore 
genres. Similarly, he questioned the interpretations of psychoanalysts because of their lack 
of a folkloristic di8erentiation between tale and myth (see 2005c). In contrast, folkloris-
tic analysis was privileged, because its structural assumptions were based upon a compara-
tive, wide-ranging knowledge of the genres of folklore. Dundes also made other contribu-
tions to structural analysis, using it to de'ne genres and apply cross-genre interpretation, 
such as in “!e Structure of Superstition,” “Toward a Structural De'nition of the Riddle,” 
and “On the Structure of the Proverb,” included in Analytic Essays in Folklore (1975b), and 
“On Whether Weather ‘Proverbs’ Are Proverbs” and “April Fool and April Fish: Towards 
a !eory of Ritual Pranks” in Folklore Matters (1989d).
Structural analysis is not restricted to verbal genres; it has also been applied to non-verbal 
material (see, for example, Glassie 1975 and Bronner 1992, 2006a). Comparing games to 
narratives as an example of cross-genre analysis, Dundes structurally examined play in “On 
Game Morphology” (1963a; see the next chapter of the present volume). For further discus-
sion of the structuralism of Propp and Lévi-Strauss, see Propp (1984) and Segal (1996).
By the time Dundes wrote his postscript, a “post-structuralist” movement held sway 
in folkloristics that was characterized by microanalyses of folkloric performances as dis-
tinct events. An open philosophical question is whether this big tent of post-structural-
ism runs counter to the principles established by structuralism, or if it is an outgrowth 
of it. Dundes’s explication of modern terms of analysis in his essays “Texture, Text, and 
Context” and “From Etic to Emic Units in the Structural Study of Folktales” (see chap-
ter 4) are o5en viewed in folkloristic historiographies as precursors of poststructuralist 
approaches (1980g, 1962g). Dundes’s structuralist concern for the social and cultural con-
text of lore, synchronic treatment of models (deriving from the distinction between sig-
ni'er and signi'ed), the creative generation of expressive variations, and the structure of 
native performance (which he called “emic” in contrast to previous, text-centered “etic” 
approaches) echoes through many contemporary post-structuralist analyses. Yet Dundes 
also expressed dismay at the lack of hypothesis building and symbolist generalization in 
the prevalent post-structuralist microanalysis, which implied the non-comparable unique-
ness of each performance, and restricted meaning to the consciousness of the actor in a 
performance (see Dundes 2005c; Bronner 2006c). He adhered to uncovering underlying 
cognitive structures in folkloric texts, in order to explain the acquisition and generation of 
folklore as a renewable resource across cultures. He championed the view iterated in this 
essay that in revealing “patterns of metaphors,” structuralist analysis “should provide unri-
valed insights into the worldview and behavior of peoples everywhere.”
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In the past several decades, there is no theoretical trend which has had more 
impact upon both the humanities and the social sciences than structuralism. !e schol-
arly discussions of structuralism in literature, in anthropology, and in general are part of a 
rapidly burgeoning bibliography.1 !ere are even historical studies of the development of 
structuralism from Russian formalism among other intellectual precursors.2
!e 'eld of folkloristics is no exception and in fact the growth of structuralism in folk-
lore scholarship has been so enormous competing schools or methods in carrying out 
structural analysis have emerged. !us there are followers of Lévi-Strauss as opposed to 
followers of Propp to name two of the major contributors to the structural approach to 
folklore. Lévi-Strauss brand of structural analysis has been applied with equal fervor to the 
story !e !ree Bears3 and to classical and Sumerian myths.4 Propp’s methodology has 
inspired analyses of American Indian tales,5 African tales,6 and Sicilian puppet plays.7
It is not my intention to survey all the structural studies in folklore which have been 
undertaken thus far. For one thing, the bibliography has become almost unmanageable. A 
case in point is the long list of surveys and critiques of Lévi-Strauss’s narrative analysis.8 For 
another, there are already useful, fairly comprehensive surveys of the folkloristic structural 
scholarship available in print.9 
Nor shall I be concerned here with unraveling the in6uences of one structuralist upon 
another or with identifying early anticipations of structuralism in folklore. It is neverthe-
less interesting to see the suggestion in Jason’s notes to her recent translation of Nikiforov’s 
1927 essay On the Morphological Study of Folklore that Propp may have borrowed several 
concepts central to his own morphological study from Nikiforov. Similarly, it would be 
interesting to know whether Lévi-Strauss was in6u enced directly or indirectly by. French 
philosopher-sociologist Gabriel Tarde’s am bitious attempt at the turn of the century to 
describe oppositional paradigms as one of the important organizing principles of both 
the natural world and human society. !ough Tarde lacked Lévi-Strauss’s cross-cultural 
anthropological sophistication, he does speak of such matters as the question of the revers-
ibility or irreversibility of social facts10 and he does suggest that the middle term of an oppo-
sitional pair can combine with one of the members of the pair to form a new opposition,11 
a proposal which seems strangely akin to Lévi-Strauss’s statement about myth structure: 
“We need only to assume that the two opposite terms with no intermediary always tend 
to be replaced by two equivalent terms which allow a third one as a mediator; then one of 
the polar terms and the mediator becomes replaced by a new triad and so on.”12 However, 
questions of precursors and in6uences belong to the history of structuralism and this is 
really not my topic. Rather I should like to consider brie6y some though by no means all 
of the theoretical issues of the application of structuralism to folklore.
First, it should be understood that struc turalism, the study of the interrelationships 
or organization of the component parts of an item of folklore, is not limited to narrative 
analysis. Because of Lévi-Strauss’s concern with myth and Propp’s with Märchen, struc-
tural analysis is sometimes wrongly thought to be limited to folk narrative materials. !is 
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is de'nitely not the case. Structuralism can be applied to any genre of folklore. !ere are 
already a number of structural studies of such genres as proverb, riddle, and superstition.13 
One can argue that there is a decided advantage to applying the techniques of structural 
analysis to so-called minor genres. If structural analysis works at all, then it should work as 
well with minor genres as with major genres. As a matter of fact, the minor genres are obvi-
ously much easier to investigate inas much as the texts are relatively brief. !us it would 
appear to be easier to attempt a structural analysis of curses or blessings or toasts than to 
seek to discern the structure of an epic consisting of thousands of lines.
!e problems of structural analysis are approximately the same no matter what the 
genre. !e problems include discovering or de'ning a minimal structural unit, and under-
standing how these minimal units combine into traditional patterns. Perhaps the most dif-
'cult task is the discovery of a minimal structural unit. What, if any, are the minimal units 
of proverbs or of riddles? Without a minimal unit, it is almost im possible to undertake 
structural analysis. It is true that structural analysis is more concerned with the relation-
ships or organi zational patterns of the units than with the units per se. But how can one 
discuss re lationships intelligently without speci'c re ference to the terms or units which are 
presumed to be related?
Let me give an example of a minimal structural unit from my investigations of proverbs. 
From an analysis of English proverbs, I have proposed the following tentative de'nition: 
“A proverb is a tra ditional propositional statement consisting of at least one descriptive ele-
ment, a descriptive element consisting of a topic and a comment.” !e minimal unit is the 
descriptive element, although to be sure there are two component parts: the topic and the 
comment. It might be mentioned at this point that the critical question of precisely where 
to make one’s “cuts,” that is, where to subdivide what may well be a continuum, is not easy 
to settle and the answer as o5en as not is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. In theory, one 
can always divide any proposed minimal unit into still smaller units (just as molecules yield 
atoms which yield protons, neutrons, and electrons, etc.). My suggestion of the descrip-
tive element as the basic minimal unit of proverbs14 is thus not meant as necessarily being 
any ultimate or absolute unit. On the other hand, I believe it is a heuristic unit. For it can 
help to explain why there can be proverbs in English consisting of as few as two words. 
Examples include: Time 6ies; Money talks; and Opposites attract. In “Time 6ies,” there 
is only one topic: time, and only one comment: 6ies. !is proposed unit of analysis also 
explains why there cannot be any one-word proverbs. !ere may be plenty of traditional 
single words in slang and folk speech, but such items would not be considered proverbs if 
my basic unit were accepted as a valid de'nitional criterion. And this brings us to one of 
the important purposes of structural analysis in folklore: the de'nition of genres.
Inasmuch as structural analysis is es sentially a form of rigorous descriptive eth nography, 
it is potentially of great interest to those folklorists concerned with genre theory. It is 
almost impossible to de'ne an item of folklore in terms of origin (especially since origins 
are almost always unknown despite the centuries of speculative historical reconstruction 
e8orts). It is equally unsatis factory to try to de'ne a genre in terms of function for it is not 
uncommon for di8erent genres of folklore to 'll the same functional slot. A traditional 
gesture may serve instead of a proverb, for example, in summing up a situation or recom-
mending a course of action. Functionally, the gesture would be equivalent to a proverb, but 
not all gestures function as proverbs. So function (and con text) alone are not always su7-
cient to deter mine genre. Since structural analysis is concerned with the item itself rather 
than factors external to the item (factors such as its origin or function), it is more likely to 
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be of assistance in determining the morpholo gical characteristics of that item, character-
istics which may be criteria to be used in de'ning a genre.
Once having proposed the descriptive element as the minimal structural unit of the 
proverb, I was able to see proverbs with two or more descriptive elements in a new light. 
Proverbs with two descriptive elements might have these elements in opposition (although 
there are also nonoppositional proverbs). In oppositional proverbs, either the topics can 
be in opposition, or the comments can be in opposition, or both topics and comments can 
be in opposition. Examples of the latter case would be “Here today, gone tomorrow,” “Last 
hired, 'rst 'red,” and “!e spirit is willing but the 6esh is weak.”
Without recapitulating my entire analysis of proverb structure, I hope it is never theless 
clear what the initial steps in struc tural analysis were, namely the discovery of a minimal 
unit, followed by an investigation of the relationships prevailing between di8erent mini-
mal units in combination. Note that if a given instance of structural analysis is valid, then it 
ought to be possible to replicate the analysis. !us if my analysis of English proverb struc-
ture is sound, then other researchers ought to be able to duplicate my 'ndings. If my anal-
ysis were applicable to non-English proverbs, then that too is testable. !is is surely one 
of the great advantages of structural analysis. To some extent, it is always empirically veri-
'able. A structural analysis of a game or of a riddle can always be tested against the origi-
nal data with which the analysis was made. So much of previous folklore research has been 
totally unveri'able whether it was a matter of some supposed chronological or evolution-
ary (or devolutionary) sequence or whether it was a matter of “reading in” some interpre-
tation albeit solar, historical, or psychoanalytic. It has always been di7cult to verify inter-
pretations of folklore and more o5en than not, it comes down to a matter of accepting one 
interpretation rather than another on pure faith. In marked contrast, structural analysis, at 
least in theory, o8ers the possibility of some objectivity rather than subjectivity. Of course, 
it is perfectly true that there may well be subjectivity and more than a little interpretation 
involved in the initial selection of a minimal unit (or even in the whole notion that there is 
such a thing as a minimal constituent unit). Still, no matter how speculative the units may 
be initially, they can be tested. One can take Propp’s function or what I term motifeme and 
check it against a corpus of folktales.
While on the subject of minimal units of analysis, I might mention the issue of whether 
such units truly represent the nature of the compositional structure of the folk loristic item 
under investigation or whether the units are nothing more than hypotheti cal though 
heuristic constructs created by imaginative researchers. !is theoretical issue has been 
described previously as the God’s truth position versus the hocus-pocus view. God’s truth, 
of course, implies that the units and patterning of these units actually are inherent in the 
data whereas the more skeptical hocus-pocus alternative suggests that the proposed units 
and unit patterns are only 'gments of an analyst’s fertile imagination. In other words, a 
God’s truth folklorist might argue that folktales have structure; a hocus-pocus folklorist 
might contend that the various structural schemes proposed by Bremond, Greimas, Propp, 
Lévi-Strauss, etc. have been imposed upon folk narratives. !e crucial question is then: 
does a folklorist discover/describe the existent structure of folkloristic genres or does he 
or she invent/create structural schema? Most practitioners of structural analysis assume 
that they are discovering, not inventing, the patterns they discuss. Lévi-Strauss, in refer-
ring to the code he is studying in mythology, makes an unequivocal statement: “!is code 
. . . has neither been invented nor brought in from without. It is inherent in mythology 
itself, where we simply dis cover its presence.”15 I too would agree generally with such a 
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God’s truth position, that the materials of folklore really are highly structured, but I would 
also suggest that the various structural schemes proposed by analysts are only “manmade” 
approximations of God’s truth. Although the structural schema almost invariably purport 
to be God’s truth itself, it is probably much more intellectually honest to admit that struc-
tural analysis thus far has consisted largely of hocus-pocus. Ideally, each suc ceeding genera-
tion of structural folklorists will substitute a more accurate and re'ned version of struc-
tural analysis for any given genre, with each new analysis coming ever closer to describing 
the underlying structural pattern. On the other hand, if one assumes that there is such an 
underlying pattern, one must in theory admit the possibility of discerning that pattern 
at any point in time and consequently that any one particular analysis could be accurate 
enough so as not to require further re'nement. In any event, the methodological implica-
tions are simply that each proposed hocus-pocus scheme must be tested and retested . . . 
against the empirical reality which is the subject of structural analysis. God’s truth in this 
metaphorical sense is not necessarily unknowable.
!e question of whether structure is “knowable” raises yet another important theo-
retical issue in structuralism. Structural analysts claim that they have identi'ed structural 
patterns in myth, fairy tale, or some other genre. In short, they say they “know” what the 
underlying structural patterns are and that they can articulate them. But what about the 
informants who tell the tales? Do they “know” the structural patterns which underlie the 
tales they tell? Lévi-Strauss contends that as a rule they do not: “Although the possibility 
cannot be excluded that the speakers who create and transmit myths may become aware of 
their structure and mode of operation, this cannot occur as a normal thing, but only par-
tially and intermittently. . . . In the particular example we are dealing with here, it is doubt-
ful, to say the least, whether the natives fascinated by mythological stories, have any under-
standing of the sys tems of interrelations to which we reduce them.”16 It is true that speakers 
of a language are perfectly well able to speak that language without being able to articulate 
the rules or grammatical principles which linguists have described in considerable detail. 
Propp too suggests that storytellers are constrained insofar as he claims they cannot depart 
from the overall sequence of functions in fairytale structure,17 which may imply that story-
tellers do not know the superorganic structural patterns which limit their creativity.
I wonder if it is not possible that story tellers in some sense do “know” the struc tural pat-
terns which underlie their narratives. I suspect that children do in fact extrapolate folklor-
istic patterns such that they are well able to pass judgment as to whether a given folktale or 
riddle is being properly told. Even if individuals cannot articulate the patterns—and why, 
a5er all, should the creators of hocus-pocus schemes attach any signi'cance to whether or 
not informants can articulate the analysts’ particular brands of hocus-pocus—that does 
not necessarily mean that the informants are not aware of the underlying patterns. !e 
incredible and brilliant Conversations with Ogotemmêli show pretty clearly that the blind 
hunter Ogotemmêli knew in'nitely more about the structural patterns underlying Dogon 
culture than did professional ethnographer Marcel Griaule who had been searching for 
such patterns for more than '5een years. One might here object that there is a distinction 
between native categories and analytic categories.18 !is is true. Native categories, from 
inside a culture, are always worth studying; but they may or may not constitute accurate 
empirical descriptions of data as sought by objective analysts from either inside or outside 
that culture. On the other hand, there is something unpleasantly patronizing and conde-
scending about statements which deny natives any insight into the mechanics of their folk-
lore. In this context, I might cite Lévi-Strauss’s boast in which he states: “I therefore claim 
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to show not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men’s minds without 
their being aware of the fact.”19 !is view is strikingly similar to Jung’s position as stated in 
his essay !e Psychology of the Child Archetype, where he claims that “primitive” mentality 
di8ers from the civilized in that conscious thinking has not yet developed. In his words, 
“!is shows itself in the circumstance that the primitive does not think consciously, but 
that thoughts appear. !e primitive cannot assert that he thinks; it is rather that ‘some-
thing thinks in him.’”20 With this superorganic notion of abstractions operating indepen-
dently in men’s minds, one is not sur prised to 'nd Jung claim “!e primitive mentality 
does not invent myths, it experiences them.”21 !e human in this view is merely a passive 
unthinking vehicle through which archetypal myth material is transmitted. Frankly, it is 
extremely di7cult to imagine any folklorist who had ever collected folklore in the 'eld 
arguing along these lines. Informants certainly vary with respect to sensitivity and to the 
amount of insight they may have into the nature of their folklore, but it is surely an error to 
assume that folklore is learned and passed on in a totally mechanical, unre6ective manner. 
By the same token, it is probably fair to say that, the majority of taletellers have not ever 
bothered to articu late the structural rules or epic laws govern ing the composition of their 
narratives. It is not so much that they could not do so, but more likely that they have little 
interest in doing so. It is enough to tell and enjoy a folktale without speculating at length 
about its compositional (and psychological) de vices. Finally, since structural analysts are 
themselves humans and hence members of one or more folk groups, it is clear that humans 
are capable of selfconsciously examining the structure of their folkloristic creations.
!e idea that myths and other genres of folklore can operate in men’s minds without 
humans being aware of the fact is part of a much larger unfortunate tendency in folk-
loristics. I refer to the pervasiveness of superorganic thinking in folklore theory. In essence, 
this tendency divides folklore into folk and lore with the emphasis de cidedly upon the 
lore. As a result, the folk are ignored. Folklore is studied as though it has little or noth-
ing to do with people. Such notions as automigration in which tales (rather than people) 
migrate or the law of self-correction (that tales correct them selves), or the concept of zers-
ingen according to which the very process of folklore per formance is deemed destructive 
which is thought to result in the eventual degener ation of folklore over time, are all exam-
ples of superorganic principles or laws of folk loristics which are presumed to operate inde-
pendently of human emotion and vo lition.
I am convinced that it is this unmitigated penchant for superorganic, “folkless” theory 
and methodology which has led to the great interest in structuralism in European folk-
loristic circles. With structuralism, folk lorists are free to continue to concentrate upon text 
and text alone. Just as the com parative method treated texts wrenched from contexts, so 
structuralism could be applied to these same texts. Although old fashioned comparativists 
may have initially distrusted structuralism because of its syn chronic bias (and its apparent 
cavalier disregard of diachronic factors), it soon became obvious to text-oriented folklor-
ists that structuralism was a method which could be applied to the same kinds of archive 
materials previously utilized in comparative studies. Instead of determining subtypes and 
plotting charts of tale di8usion, researchers could begin to chop up texts into their sup-
posed component parts. With struc turalism as with the comparative method, it was not 
necessary to consider the story telling process, or the relationship of tale content to the per-
sonalities of tale tellers and their audience.
If we think of the taletelling process as involving 1. a tale teller, 2. the tale text, and 
3. the audience, we can see that both the comparative method and structuralism tend to 
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disregard everything except the tale text. !is is too bad inasmuch as it is clear that folk-
lorists need to study the performance aspects of tale telling, the personal esthetics of the 
tale teller, and the nature of the under standing of the folktale by di8erent members of the 
audience. !ere has been little concrete discussion in the folkloristics literature on pre-
cisely what di8erent members of an audience understand by a given item of folk lore even 
though it is clear that the same item of folklore may mean very di8erent things to di8er-
ent listeners. In terms of a simple communications model, the scholarship has been largely 
concerned with the encoding of the message so to speak by the sender or originator (e.g., 
the oral-formulaic theory) and the message itself (e.g., all the text-oriented theories and 
methods). Relatively little research has been devoted to the process of decoding the mes-
sage, that is, the intri cacies of the listener’s perceptions and under standings of the mes-
sage. One would think that the investigation of audiences and their di8erent understand-
ings (and misunder standings) of folklore communication events is a likely area for future 
research. If Lévi-Strauss is correct when he says that myths (and by implication other folk-
lore genres) operate in men’s minds without their being aware of the fact, then it is obvious 
that the central question of what a tale-teller and his audience consciously understand when 
a tale is told could not possibly be answered by structural analysis.
A related theoretical issue in considering structuralism and folklore concerns uni-
versalism. Are there universal structures? Or are structures limited to particular culture 
areas or individual cultures? Or are there structures peculiar to one particular folklore 
item? One 'nds studies labeled structural in which there is a single text analyzed. On the 
other hand, Lévi-Strauss speaks of mythical thought in general which he claims “always 
works from the awareness of oppositions towards their progressive mediation.”22 !e 
implication is clearly that this alleged characteristic of mythic thought is as widespread 
as myth itself. Propp’s morphological description of the fairy tale is based upon Russian 
materials, but since most if not all of the tales in the corpus are international tale types, 
one may well assume that Propp’s analysis holds (with some variation) for at least all Indo-
European Märchen. Part of the di7culty here is really a question in genre theory. Are 
folklore genres universal or at least cross-cultural? Is there a riddle structure which will be 
manifest wherever riddles exist? Or are there di8erent riddle structures for di8erent riddle 
traditions in di8erent cultures?
!is brings us to the role of structuralism with respect to identifying oicotypes. Either 
there will be locally popular structural pat terns and thus structural oicotypes or the iden-
ti'cation of cross-cultural structural patterns will greatly assist researchers in concen-
trating upon local oicotypical content di8erences within a common structural frame. In 
other words, there may be types of a structural nature or oicotypes of content. !e point 
is that whether a folk lorist employs the comparative method or structuralism, he or she 
is concerned with 1. de 'ning similarities, and 2. delineating di8er ences. I should like to 
stress that it is possible to discover hypothetical oicotypes through either the comparative 
method or structural analysis. Ideally, both methods should be employed. If one under-
takes a full-6edged historic-geography study of a single tale type, one could well discover 
a subtype or form of the tale peculiar to a given cultural area. However, on the basis of 
a single local form of only one tale type, one would not really have su7cient evidence 
to support a claim of having isolated an oicotype. One would need to have historic-geo-
graphic studies of other tale types which showed the same or similar local forms of those 
tales before one could comfortably assume that an oicotype had been discovered. !e dif-
'culty is that not that many tales in the Aarne-!ompson canon have been subjected to a 
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comprehensive historic-geographic monographic treatment. !us a cautious scholar com-
mitted only to the comparative method in folktale studies might feel it was premature to 
search for potential oicotypes by making a “comparative study of com parative studies” of 
folktales. Here is where structural analysis can be of considerable assistance. If a folklor-
ist undertakes a struc tural analysis of even a single text from a given culture, and if he or 
she  is successful in articulating the structural pattern, he or she may in fact have isolated a 
pattern which is oicotypical. For a structural analysis, one does not need the thousands or 
at any rate hundreds of versions of a single tale type so essential for a historic-geographic 
study. So long as the one text were representative (and admittedly some additional texts 
of the tale would be necessary to determine this), the structural analysis might be useful. 
If a structural pattern were discerned, one would then seek to discover if the identical pat-
tern were to be found in other tale types. !is could be accomplished in a matter of days 
rather than the years it takes to complete even a single historic-geographic study. If a con-
sistent structural pattern were identi'ed in this way—as I believe I have demon strated in 
the case of the Unsuccessful Repe tition pattern in Lithuanian folktales—then an oicotype 
may have been discovered. If the delineation of a hypothetical oicotype is accurate, then 
it should be theoretically possible to predict in advance what will happen to tales which 
are borrowed by the culture in question. I have tried to show, for example, how European 
tales have been recast into American Indian structural pat terns23 and into African struc-
tural patterns.24 Comparative studies and structural studies are thus hardly mutually exclu-
sive. To the contrary, these o5en opposed methods are highly compatible and they may 
be mutually supportive. If one located a hypothetical oicotype, one might wish to see if 
the same or similar local form were found elsewhere. If it were, this would not necessarily 
destroy the value of the initially discovered oicotype. If there are other cultures with a pen-
chant for unsuccessful repetition, that would not invalidate the discovery that Lithuanians 
have such an oicotype.25 Admittedly, it is more likely that content rather than structure 
will be oicotypical. Structures appear to be cross-cultural (though not necessarily uni-
versal) whereas content seems to be more o5en than not culturally relative. 
I should like to indicate my conviction that structures are not necessarily limited to 
single folklore genres. !is is not to deny that structural analysis may be useful in de'ning 
genres. Rather it is a question of the possible arbitrariness of genre de'nitions as well as of 
the entire subject matter of folk lore itself. If structural patterns are culture-wide phenom-
ena (leaving aside the question of possible universality of such patterns for the moment), 
then it would be folly to assume that structural patterns are limited to single genres of 
folklore. In this sense, it is misleading for Olrik to claim that the “Law of !ree” (das 
Gesetz der Dreizahl) is strictly an epic law peculiar to folk liter ature.26 I have attempted to 
show that such a pattern is characteristic of American (and Indo-European) thought in 
genera1.27 !is in no way minimizes the value of under taking structural analyses of folk-
loristic materials. It is precisely because general cultural patterns are so explicit in folk-
loristic materials that makes structural analy sis of folklore so important. If we are success-
ful in isolating and describing a structural pattern present in an item or genre of folk lore, 
we may have provided a useful aid to understanding the nature of the culture at large as 
well as the cognitive categories, ideological commitments, and concrete be havior of the 
people sharing that culture. For surely one of the goals of structural analysis of folklore 
or any other variety of cultural materials (language, written liter ature, etc.) is to a8ord 
insight into worldview. It is di7cult to gain access to the worldview of another culture (or 
even to one’s own worldview). But if the identi' cation of structural patterns in folklore 
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can be of service in articulating the basic nature of one’s own worldview and the world-
views of others, then the study of folklore would be absolutely indispensable to a better 
understanding of humanity.
In evaluating the achievements of Lévi-Strauss and Propp with respect to the above 
mentioned issues, we 'nd that Lévi-Strauss is very much concerned with relating struc-
tural patterns to worldview. Propp in contrast, admittedly working at an earlier period and 
from more of a literary than an anthro pological perspective, tended to study struc tural 
patterns as ends in themselves. To be sure, Lévi-Strauss and Propp are not con cerned with 
the same types of structural patterns. Propp was primarily interested in identifying the 
sequential, continuous or syntagmatic structure of Russian fairy tales. Lévi-Strauss on the 
other hand wishes to identify oppositional patterns of discon tinuities, or the paradigmatic 
structure of myth in general. Lévi-Strauss is perfectly well aware of the sequential structure 
of myth; he just doesn’t consider it very im portant. It is the underlying “schemata” rather 
than the “sequences” of myth which interest him. In his words, “!e sequences form the 
apparent content of the myth; the chronological order in which things hap pen.”28 As soci-
ologists seek latent as opposed to manifest function and as psychoanalysts seek latent as 
opposed to manifest content, Lévi-Strauss seeks underlying paradigmatic patterns rather 
than what he considers to be the apparent, manifest sequential structure. Lévi-Strauss’s 
goal is analogous to Chomsky’s search for deep structure as opposed to super'cial surface 
structure (and perhaps also to Jung’s search for universal archetypes). In his early essay 
on “!e Structural Study of Myth,” Lévi-Strauss states (my emphasis), “!e myth will be 
treated as would be an orchestra score perversely presented as a unilinear series and every-
where our task is to re-establish the correct disposition.”29 !e “perverse” sequential or syn-
tagmatic structure, that is, the narrative structure studied by Propp is clearly not the object 
of Lévi-Strauss’s type of structural analysis.
In my opinion, Lévi-Strauss is not ana lyzing the structure of myth narrative, that is the 
compositional structure of myths as narrated, but rather he is analyzing the structure of the 
world described in myths. !is is a perfectly legitimate intellectual enterprise. It is simply a 
di8erent intellectual enterprise from Propp’s attempt to analyze the sequential structure of 
Russian fairy tales. !e di8erence is thus between the structure of myth as a narrative genre 
and the structure of the image of reality depicted in the world de'ned by the myth. Propp 
is concerned with the structure of a continuum, of continuities; Lévi-Strauss is concerned 
with the structural pattern of discontinuities. Since Lévi-Strauss is trying to identify oppo-
sitional paradigms in the world de scribed in myth, he does not choose to be limited by the 
chronological order in which elements of the paradigm occur in a given narrative. If high/
low, night/day, male/female, etc. instances occur anywhere in the narrative, Lévi-Strauss 
feels free to extra polate them and re-order them in his delineations of the paradigm. 
Moreover, since it is the world described in myth rather than any one myth itself which is 
of interest, Lévi-Strauss is not limited to the data contained in a single myth (or even of 
myths of a single culture). Any data in any myth can be used comparatively to illuminate 
di8erent exempli'cations of the oppositional paradigm. In e8ect, Lévi-Strauss’s method-
ology in Mythologiques is as much a tour de force of the comparative method (though not 
exactly the historic-geographic variety!) as it is of structuralism. In any event, whether one 
prefers Lévi-Strauss’s paradigmatic brand of structural analysis to Propp’s syntagmatic or 
not, one must applaud his attempt to relate the structural patterns he discerns to the soci-
ety (and world) at large. For instance, Lévi-Strauss o5en tries to show how the pattern he 
'nds in myth is isomorphic with kinship among other pat terns in the culture.
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For all Lévi-Strauss’s interest in demon strating the widespread nature of binary oppo-
sitional structures, he makes relatively little use of the total range of folklore genres. Here 
one must keep in mind that despite Lévi-Strauss’s extended analyses of myth, he is really 
not a folklorist. Rather, he is like so many anthropologists and phi losophers inasmuch 
as he tends to restrict his research with folkloristic materials to myth alone, or any rate 
to folk narrative since some of the items he treats are folk-tales rather than myths. It was 
Köngäs and Maranda in Structural Models in Folklore who 'rst drew attention to the pos-
sible extension of Lévi-Strauss’s analysis of myth to other genres of folklore. On the other 
hand, the notion of the centrality of oppo sition to folkloristic genres was quite clearly 
stated by Danish folklorist Axel Olrik as one of his epic laws, namely the Law of Contrast 
(das Gesetz des Gegensatzes) in the 'rst decade of the twentieth century. !e point is that 
it would appear that oppositions are just as important in the structure of riddles and prov-
erbs as in the structure of myth. Oppositions are equally prominent in other genres.
In some cases, actual oppositions in nature or at least what is perceived as an opposi-
tion may be the subject of folklore. For example, Kuusi has masterfully demonstrated the 
vast distribution of traditional descriptions of what various peoples say on those occa-
sions when sunshine and rain occur at the same time, e.g., the devil is beating his wife. 
!e simultaneous occurrence of sunshine and rain is surely understood as an instance 
of opposition. Sometimes, oppositions in nature are imagined as is commonly the case 
in locutions for never such as “When water runs uphill.”30 Consider the following auto-
graph book verse:
When roses bloom in winter,
And the snow6akes fall in June;
When the sun shines at midnight,
And the moon shines at noon;
When the waters cease their 6owing,
And two times two are ten;
When joy is sorrow and today is tomorrow,
Maybe I’ll forget you then.
!ere is surely no dearth of examples of opposition in folklore. Sometimes an oppo sition 
in nature, so to speak, is used as a model for a would-be opposition in culture. For exam-
ple, the fact that hens occasionally crow like roosters has been used by the folk in the fol-
lowing way:
A whistling maid and a crowing hen
Are neither 't for gods nor men.
In this instance, we 'nd male chauvinism making use of the opposition to recommend that 
women restrict themselves to socially de'ned women’s roles and behavior. A maid who 
whistles (like a boy) is by analogy depicted as being as unnatural as a hen which crows (like 
a rooster). I might mention parenthetically that male chauvinism in folk lore is not limited 
to denying women the right to assume male roles or practice activ ities normally associ-
ated with males. Male chauvinism also includes men usurping roles or activities normally 
associated with women. !ese oppositions are not challenged. !e most obvious exam-
ple concerns the ability to bear children. From the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib and 
Noah’s building his ark to 6oat around for approximately nine months right down to mod-
ern folklore, we 'nd countless instances of males denying female procreativity and in fact 
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appropriating such activity for themselves. Patriarchal societies evidently needed male cre-
ation narratives to bolster their sense of male superiority. Modern examples might include 
a male rotund Santa Claus who delivers packages clown the chimney, the male stork who 
explicitly delivers babies down the same chimney, and 'nally the male easter bunny who 
brings eggs—eggs being clearly associated with females. Whereas the would-be attempt of 
women to act like men (as in whistling) is singled out for scorn, there is no comparable 
conscious criticism of men’s usurpation of the female child bearing role in either narrative 
or custom (e. g., couvade).
It is easy to think of hundreds of examples of the occurrence of oppositions in folk-
lore for as Olrik observed such opposition consti tutes a major rule of epic composition.31 
Hero-villain, trickster-dupe would be ex amples of individual characters in opposition, but 
sometimes the opposition is contained in a single character. Half-man/half-animal, e.g., a 
mermaid, or similar combinations of god and man or god and animal would be examples. 
!e wise fool who commonly combines folly and wisdom and who may confuse the literal 
and the metaphorical would be another. Indeed, a wise fool of the Hodja variety is a veri-
table walking oxymoron. Perhaps the prime illustration of the centrality of opposition or 
paradox in folklore would be virgin birth.
In view of this, it is tempting to argue that all folklore, not just myth, consists of form-
ing and attempting to resolve oppo sitions. !e oppositions may concern life/ death, good/
evil, truth/falsehood, love/hate, innocence/guilt, male/female, man/god, large/small, 
child/adult, etc. If pleasure truly does depend upon the reduction of tension, then one 
of the reasons why folklore gives pleasure is because it reduces the tensions it creates by 
resolving oppositions. In folk-tales, the paradoxical tasks, e.g., carrying water in a sieve, are 
invariably solved by the hero or heroine. !e apparent contradiction in oppositional rid-
dles is always resolved by the answer to the riddle. In proverbs, the formation of the oppo-
sition may itself be an answer or response to a question posed in life, e.g., “!e longest way 
round is the shortest way found” suggests that what appears to be the longer path may 
in fact be the most direct and e7cient. !is is analogous to the modest choice motif (L 
211) in which the worst looking casket proves to be the best choice. !e same opposition 
between appearance and reality is common in proverbs, e.g., “Good things come in small 
packages” or “Never judge a book by its cover.”
A recognition of the oppositional structure of so much of folklore makes it easier to 
understand the di8erent functional contexts of folklore. Van Gennep in his classic !e 
Rites of Passage made one of the 'rst structural studies of folklore. One does not always 
think of Van Gennep as a struc turalist, but his own statement of purpose clearly identi'es 
him as such. “!e purpose of this book is altogether di8erent. Our interest lies not in the 
particular rites but in their essential signi'cance and their relative positions within cere-
monial wholes—that is, their order.” As all folklorists know, Van Gennep identi'ed a syn-
tagmatic structural pattern of separation, transition, and incorporation. In his words, “!e 
underlying arrangement is always the same. Beneath a multiplicity of forms, either con-
sciously expressed or merely implied, a typical pattern always recurs: the pattern of the rites 
of passage.”32 !is is unquestionably a structuralist perspective. I would add that changes of 
state or status imply transition between two opposed categories. !us funerals are transi-
tions from life to death; weddings are transitions from unmarried to married (and also res-
olutions of oppo sitions between two family units, one of the bride and one of the groom). 
Giving birth to a child makes one a parent. All these critical life crises are marked by folk-
lore. Folklore tends to cluster around times of anxiety be it in the individual life cycle or 
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the calendrical cycle of the entire community. (!e transition from winter to spring of 
course involves another opposition, from death to life). In view of this one might go so far 
as to argue that it is in part the oppo sitional nature of much of folklore which makes it so 
appropriate for such critical times. For example, I have suggested that one reason why rid-
dles might be told at wakes is that answering oppositional riddles might provide a micro-
cosm of the desire to resolve the opposition between the living and the dead at a funeral 
rite.33 Similarly, I have suggested that one reason why riddles are used so o5en in court-
ship rituals might be because of their oppositional structure.34 In exogamous societies, the 
bride and groom must be unrelated. !e marriage qua ritual essentially relates two individ-
uals who were previously unrelated. Riddles, structurally speaking, may provide a model 
for this event. !e descriptive elements in oppo sition make it appear that the elements are 
unrelated. !e answer to the riddle succeeds in eliminating the apparent contradiction and 
unites the elements in harmony. If this explanation is at all valid, then structural analysis 
can be seen as a useful tool for anyone who wishes to explain why a given genre or item of 
folklore is used precisely when it is. If the structure of an item of folk lore can be shown to 
be isomorphic with the structure of the speci'c context in which that item occurs, then we 
may have advanced considerably in our understanding of folk loristic phenomena and how 
such phenomena function.
!e point which is crucial is that struc tural analysis is not an end in itself. It is only a 
means to an end, that end being a better understanding of the nature of human beings, 
or at least of a particular society of humans. !e possible if not probable universality of 
binary opposition in folklore may suggest that structural analysis may not, a5er all, be very 
useful in de'ning genres or revealing cultural di8erences. !at is a legitimate criticism 
of any universal principle. It is equally true of Frazer’s laws or principles of sympathetic 
magic. If homeopathic magic is universal, then it cannot be used to di8er entiate one cul-
ture from another. However, by the same token, the existence of universal structural prin-
ciples would in no way pre clude culturally relative content analyses. !e universal princi-
ple is one thing; its concrete manifestation in one or more speci'c cultural contexts may be 
another. For example, in American wedding ritual, the bride throws a bouquet of 6owers 
to her bridesmaids. !is can be understood as a homeopathic articulation of her willing-
ness or wish to be de6owered. (!e bridesmaid who catches the bouquet is said to be the 
next to marry which would be an exempli 'cation of contagious magic.) !e issue here is 
not necessarily the validity of this inter pretation so much as the fact that it was the appli-
cation of a universal principle, that of homeopathic magic, which provided the clue for 
a symbolic explanation of why a particular item of folklore, in this case, a custom, was 
appropriate in a given context. In the same way, the slipping of a circular ring over an out-
stretched 'nger provides a homeopathic model for the sexual consummation of the mar-
riage. (!e fact that it is the groom who places the ring on the bride’s 'nger suggests that 
marriage provides sanctioned access to or control over the genitals of one’s spouse.) Some 
conservative folklorists may object to such symbolic interpretations of wedding customs, 
but whether it is throwing rice (seed, semen) to wish homeopathically (and contagiously) 
the newlyweds a fertile union or whether in Jewish weddings it is the groom’s breaking a 
glass (virginity) with his foot, the appropriateness of such ritual be havior in such a con-
text seems clear enough. Again, the correctness or incorrectness of the interpretation is 
not the issue. Rather it is the possibility of utilizing a universal organizing principle, in this 
instance, homeopathic magic, to explain a particular piece of folkloristic behavior. (In this 
con text, we can understand the outbreak of “streaking,” running naked, that is, un covered, 
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in a public place as in part a symbolic statement of social protest against the “cover-up” of 
the Watergate political scandal of the early 1970’s.)
Not all structural analysis claims univer sality. Propp’s morphology used only Russian 
materials and there is no reason to assume universality without so much as testing a given 
structural formulation against materials from a large sampling of cultures. But even if 
Propp’s morphology applies only to Russian culture (or to Indo-European cul tures as it 
most probably does), the question of the meaning of Propp’s analysis remains unanswered. 
Propp convincingly demon strated the syntagmatic structure of European Märchen, but 
he did not say very much about the meaning of the pattern he deline ated. Admittedly, 
structural analysis is ob jective or at least it is supposed to be whereas the interpretation of 
a structural pattern is subjective. Yet without interpretation, struc tural analysis can be just 
as trivial and sterile as motif and tale type identi'cation. It is not enough to identify or 
describe, though description is a necessary 'rst step. Struc tural analysis without interpre-
tation is little more than a form of academic gamesmanship in which the construction of 
some more or less abstruse model is seen as the ultimate goal. What then is the signi'cance 
of Propp’s morphology? How does the pattern he described in such exemplary detail relate 
to Russian or European culture as a whole?
If we apply Van Gennep’s structural pattern to Propp’s morphology, we can see that 
functions 1–11 constitute a sequence of separation. Function 1, One of the members of a 
family absents himself from home, to function 11, !e hero leaves home, seem to describe 
the break up or departure from one’s natal family. Function 15, !e hero is transferred, 
delivered, or led to the where abouts of an object of search, to function 31, !e hero is mar-
ried and ascends the throne, might be said to constitute a sequence of incorporation. !e 
incorporation involves the formation of a new family unit (through marriage). In terms of 
Van Gennep’s scheme of analysis, the crucial transitional sequence would be Propp’s func-
tions 12 through 14, the donor sequence. It is the donor, o5en encountered in an area 
between the hero’s homeland and the other land, who makes it possible for him to succeed 
in his quest. If the fairy tale is in part an account of a marriage quest, then the donor 'gure 
may be serving the role of a matchmaker.
!e di7culty the hero or heroine has in leaving home may re6ect the comparable 
di7culties one encounters in life in leaving home. Similarly, the even greater obstacles 
encountered in the other land from the eventual spouse’s family may also be accurate in 
terms of the problems which need to be solved whenever an individual moves in to live 
with his or her in-laws. !e transition from childhood to adulthood and its success ful 
completion through marriage may thus be one of the primary subjects of fairytales. From 
tales, children may be expected to learn that one must leave the security of one’s initial 
home to 'nd a suitable spouse. Whether one brings a spouse home or stays on to live in 
the spouse’s land would simply re6ect the di8erent possibilities of post nuptial residence, 
e.g., patrilocal or matrilocal. 
I do not wish to be misconstrued as believing that fairytales re6ect only normal every-
day ordinary life. Fairytales are fantasy, one must remember. !ey are very much analo-
gous to dreams. If being asleep and being awake are in opposition, then dreams are inter-
mediate. One is asleep, but one imagines one is awake. So in a similar manner, the fairytale 
takes place once upon a time, outside of normal time and space, but it is told as though it 
were reality, in real time and space. (To the extent that dreams are inevitably narrated, they 
o5en take on the appearance of folktales. Whereas some scholars have argued that dreams 
are the source of folktales, I see no reason for assuming that any one clement of culture is 
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necessarily logically prior to any other element of culture. It is equally possible that pat-
terns of dream narrative are in fact derived from folktales. It would be inter esting to apply 
Propp’s morphology, for example, to dreams of individuals from Indo-European cultures 
to see the extent, if any, to which dream structure resembles fairytale structure.)
My own view of fairytales is that they express child-parent con6icts and also sibling 
rivalry. Boys conquer large male rivals (giants, dragons) while girls outwit large female 
rivals (stepmothers, witches) as well as evil brothers or sisters. Ambivalence towards par-
ents is suggested by the fact that the donor 'gure and the villain may be the same sex. In 
Cinderella, the heroine may be helped by a cow or fairy godmother while she is hindered 
by a wicked stepmother. Similarly, in male centered fairytales, the donor 'gure and the 
villain may both be male, suggesting a son’s ambivalence towards his father. To the extent 
that the so-called Freudian family romance may be re6ected in fairytales, I believe it would 
be a mistake to think that fairytales were no more than 'ctionalized accounts from the 
old, natal family to the new, conjugal family. !e point is simply that Propp’s morphology 
makes it possible to speculate about the signi'cance of fairytales in new ways.
It is precisely this possibility of seeing folklore in new ways which makes structural 
analysis worthwhile. Let me give another example. In comparing the morphology of 
North American Indian tales and European tales, I drew attention to the number of 
motifemes which intervened between the members of a motifeme pair such as Lack and 
Lack Liquidated.35 Speci'cally, I sug gested that American Indian folktales had a lesser 
motifemic depth than European tales. In Propp’s morphology, there arc many functions 
which may occur between 8a and 19, Lack and Liquidation of the Lack. Cumulative 
tales36 also re6ect comparable motifemic depth insofar as the initial lack may be separated 
from 'nal liquidation by a whole series of intervening pairs of lacks and liquidations of 
those lacks. I failed to say, however, that the greater motifemic depth of European tales 
might re6ect an important principle of European culture and that is the whole notion of 
deferred grati' cation or reward. I have since analyzed the future orientation in American 
worldview in these terms and I even suggested that the popularity of the shaggy dog story 
in which an excessively long buildup to what is usually regarded as a disappointing punch 
line is essentially a metacultural parody of this worldview principle.37 !e practice of liv-
ing for the future either the immediate future or for life in the next world is made fun of in 
the shaggy dog story insofar as it is implied that the reward is never worth the long wait. 
!e shaggy dog story builds expec tations only to deny them in contrast to fairytales and 
cumulative tales in which expectations are almost always ful'lled. What is important in 
the present context is that the structure of narrative is closely related to principles or ele-
ments of world-view.
We may hope that the rewards of struc tural analysis will not be long deferred. As more 
and more structural analyses of folk lore genres and items are undertaken, we stand to gain 
more and more insight into both folklore and folk. It is not enough to collect and clas-
sify folklore. Nor is it su7cient to carry out structural analyses without interpretation. 
Structural studies, like comparative studies, should be the jumping o8 points for interpre-
tation. For example, it is not enough to analyze the structure of the game of Chinese chess 
or even to compare its traits with European chess. What folklorists should be interested in 
is establishing the existence of oicotypes and the relationships of oicotypes to such matters 
as national character, ideology, and worldview. !us in Chinese chess, it is such details as 
the lack of a queen among the chess pieces which is of particular interest. !e male bias in 
Chinese social organization (where women are expected to be servile, obedient, and to stay 
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out of men’s way) is clearly re6ected in Chinese chess. Actually, Chinese chess is almost 
certainly an older form than European chess. So the addition of the powerful queen and 
the presence of a relatively weak king in European chess should be of interest to students of 
European family structure, especially in view of the psychoanalytic interpretation of chess 
ac cording to which the object of the game is to put the opposing king (father) in jeopardy/
check so that he cannot move (impotence?), o5en by using one’s own queen (mother) 
e8ectively.38 Regardless of whether or not the term “checkmate” does derive from the 
Persian words “shah” “mat” (the king is dead), it is curious that the English words strongly 
suggest suppressing a “mate,” perhaps the mate of the opponent’s queen. !e relevance 
of checking a queen’s mate in the light of the Oedipus complex ac cording to which one 
wishes to eliminate the father in order to have one’s mother to oneself ought to be obvi-
ous enough. It is probably no accident that the addition of the queen in chess occurred at 
approximately the same time in history (eleventh or twel5h century) as the emergence of 
the Madonna complex in southern Europe.
!e interpretation of the structural features need not, of course, be psychoanalytic. !at 
is simply my own personal bias. I believe that structural analysis can facilitate all kinds of 
di8erent modes of interpretation. Again, in Chinese chess, the equivalent of pawns, that is, 
soldiers, can move to the eighth rank at the opposite end of the board. However, whereas 
pawns in European chess can be transformed into queens or other powerful pieces, the 
pawns in Chinese chess must remain pawns. !e possible implications with respect to dif-
ferences in patterns of social mobility are clear. !e analogy for folktale study is simply 
that we must go beyond the comparative listing of motifs and traits in di8erent cultural 
areas. We must not stop with structural descriptions of Russian fairytales. We must make 
attempts to interpret the meanings (and I use the plural advisedly) of folklore. It is not 
enough to say that folklore is a mirror of a culture. We must try to see what it is that folk-
lore re6ects.
I believe it is through structural analysis that we may best view the re6ection a8orded 
by folklore. First we need rigorous struc tural descriptions of the kind provided by Bouissac 
for the lion tamer’s act in the circus, but we also need interpretative studies showing how 
the structural patterns provide metaphors for the culture at large, studies such as Geertz’s 
brilliant analyses of Javanese shadow puppet plays39 and the Balinese cock'ght.40 It would 
be possible, for ex ample, to describe the structure of a Spanish or Mexican bull 'ght in a 
manner similar to Bouissac’s superb account of circus acts, but if the analysis failed to relate 
the struggle between man and bull to Spanish and Mexican norms of masculinity, it would 
be insu7cient. In the bull'ght, there is a battle to see who penetrates whom. !e matador 
tries to place his sword in the bull (a5er allowing the bull to make many passes) while the 
bull presumably is trying to gore the matador. !e loser, the one penetrated, is emasculated 
or feminized. If the matador is particularly brilliant, he may be awarded various extremi-
ties of the bull, e.g., the ears, hooves, tail, etc. which suggests the complete humiliation of 
the bull. Whether the bull is a father symbol or simply another male, the battle represents 
the matador’s attempt to demonstrate in public his masculine prowess at the expense of 
another male, a pattern which is also to be found in verbal dueling among adolescent males 
throughout the Mediterranean area.41
In sum, I would say that structural analysis is but one of the methodological techniques 
available to folklorists. In combination with the comparative method, it can be used to 
de'ne genres and identify oicotypes. A5er rigorous structural descriptions, the folk lorists 
may be better able to see how folklore contains and communicates the central metaphors 
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of a society. !e analysis and interpretation of these patterns of metaphors should provide 
unrivalled insights into the worldview and behavior of peoples every where.
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Postscript
Binary Opposition in Myth: 
!e Propp/Lévi-Strauss Debate in Retrospect
In 1928, Russian folklorist Vladimir Propp published his pathbreak-
ing Morphology of the Folktale in a limited printing of only 1600 copies (Bravo 1972:45). 
In his Morphology, Propp delineated a syntagmatic sequence of thirty-one functions 
which he claimed de'ned the Russian fairy tale (Aarne-!ompson tale types 300–
749). Unfortunately, the few Western scholars who read Russian and Propp’s important 
monograph had little impact upon the direction of folk narrative study. Only famed lin-
guist Roman Jakobson in his 1945 folkloristic commentary for the Pantheon edition of 
Afanas’ev’s Russian Fairy Tales referred to Propp’s research in a brief summary of his 'nd-
ings (1945:640–641). It was not until Professor !omas A. Sebeok of Indiana University 
arranged for an English translation of Propp’s Morphology in 1958 that Propp’s remark-
able analysis became accessible to Western folklorists (cf. Breymayer 1972; Bremond and 
Verrier 1982; and Cardigos 1996:33–36, but see Chistov 1986:9).
!ree years earlier, French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss had responded favor-
ably to an invitation issued by the same Professor Sebeok who was then the editor of 
the Journal of American Folklore to participate in a symposium on myth. (Among oth-
ers in that symposium were David Bidney, Richard M. Dorson, Reidar !. Christiansen, 
Lord Raglan, and Stith !ompson.) Lévi-Strauss’s paper, entitled “!e Structural Study 
of Myth” which initiated a veritable 6ood of “structural” enterprises, was written with-
out any knowledge of Propp’s Morphology. !e 1955 JAF issue was published as a sepa-
rate book under the title Myth: A Symposium in 1958, the same year Propp’s Morphology 
appeared in English.
In his essay, Lévi-Strauss contended “that mythical thought always works from the 
awareness of oppositions towards their progressive mediation” and further that “the 
purpose of myth is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction” 
(1955:440, 443). Lévi-Strauss has persisted in his “de'nition” of myth or mythical thought. 
In !e Naked Man, the 'nal volume of the four-volume Mythologiques, in a chapter enti-
tled “Binary Operators,” he has this to say of “mythemes,” his neologism intended to refer 
to basic units of myth: “Of course, all mythemes of whatever kind, must, generally speak-
ing, lend themselves to binary operations, since such operations are an inherent feature of 
the means invented by nature to make possible the functioning of language and thought” 
(1981:559). To be sure, Lévi-Strauss is well aware that he has been “accused” of “overusing” 
“the notion of binary opposition” (1995:185).
Like Propp, Lévi-Strauss had proposed a formula for the structure of narrative, but unlike 
Propp, his formula was totally algebraic involving “functions” and “terms” (1955:442; 
for a discussion of the formula, see Mosko 1991). Whereas Propp had extrapolated his 
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thirty-one function sequence from the linear order of events recounted in his 100 fairy 
tale corpus, Lévi-Strauss sought to discover what he felt was the underlying paradigm (of 
oppositions). Lévi-Strauss did recognize the “order” of events as presented in narrative as 
told, but he elected to ignore that “order.” In his terms, “!e myth will be treated as would 
be an orchestra score perversely presented as a unilinear series and where our task is to re-
establish the correct disposition” (1955:432, my emphasis). !e use of the descriptive label 
“perversely” seemed to suggest that the linear sequential order (utilized by Propp) was an 
obstacle to be overcome by Lévi-Strauss in his e8orts to arrive at the supposed underlying 
paradigm. As Champagne puts it, “Lévi-Strauss regards such linear, sequential forms as 
obvious and super'cial” (1995:42).
Lévi-Strauss is certainly cognizant of the di8erence between syntagmatic and paradig-
matic structure (1988:205). Moreover, throughout his four volume Mythologiques series, 
Lévi-Strauss repeatedly denigrates the sequential syntagmatic while at the same time prais-
ing the virtues of the paradigmatic. In !e Raw and the Cooked, the 'rst of the Mythologiques 
volumes, Lévi-Strauss claims that a detail of one myth which is “absurd on the syntagmatic 
level” becomes “coherent from the paradigmatic point of view” (1969:253). Again and 
again, the syntagmatic context is summarily dismissed. In speaking of another myth, Lévi-
Strauss argues, “If we consider only the syntagmatic sequence—that is, the unfolding of 
the story—it appears incoherent and very arbitrary in construction” (1969:306), and he 
proceeds to generalize, “Considered purely in itself, every syntagmatic sequence must be 
looked upon as being without meaning,” and the only solution involves “replacing a syntag-
matic sequence by a paradigmatic sequence” (1969:307). Interestingly enough, although 
Lévi-Strauss’s methodology wears the trappings of structuralism, his actual method is a 
form, an idiosyncratic form to be sure, of the comparative method. It is through compari-
son with one or more other myths (not always cognates!) that the elusive meaning of a 
myth text can be “revealed.” Lévi-Strauss is explicit on this point: “Finally, one detail in the 
Bororo myth that remained incomprehensible when viewed from the angle of syntagmati-
cal relations, becomes clear when compared to a corresponding detail in the Kayapo myth” 
(1969:210, my emphasis). In this case, it is a Kayapo text which purportedly illuminates 
a Bororo text, but the comparison can go either way: “!e Kayapo-Kubenkranken ver-
sion (M8) contains a detail that in itself is unintelligible and that can only he elucidated 
by means of the Bororo myth, M55” (1969:131). So although Lévi-Strauss is essentially 
known as a structuralist, the empirical fact is that he is much more of a comparativist than 
a structuralist.
Lévi-Strauss’s methodology is consistent and explicit: “By dividing the myth into 
sequences not always clearly indicated by the plot, and by relating each sequence to para-
digmatic sets capable of giving them a meaning, we eventually found ourselves in a posi-
tion to de'ne the fundamental characteristics of a myth . . .” (1979:199). Sometimes the 
comparative paradigm could come from within the same culture as the original myth; 
sometimes from without. “While the episode of Moon appears to be nonmotivated in the 
syntagmatic chain of the !ompson myth considered alone, it 'nds its place again in a par-
adigmatic ensemble as a permutation when related to other myths of these same Indians” 
(1955:140n) but alternatively the range of Lévi-Strauss’s comparative method can be large, 
so large that he is willing to compare a South American Indian myth with possible cog-
nates in North America to 'nd meaning. Speaking of an episode in his “Tucuna reference 
myth,” Lévi-Strauss has this to say: “!is episode which cannot be interpreted according 
to the syntagmatic sequence, and on which South American mythology as a whole fails to 
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shed any light, can only be elucidated by reference to a paradigmatic system drawn from 
North American mythology” (1979:17).
In 1959, Lévi-Strauss was appointed to the prestigious chair of Social Anthropology 
at the College de France and for his inaugural lecture, he chose a Tsimshian narrative 
reported by Franz Boas to analyze. His analysis of “La Geste d’Asdiwal” was a brilliant tour 
de force revealing four distinct levels of binary oppositions: geographic (e.g., east vs. west), 
cosmological (e.g., upper world vs. lower world), economic (land-hunting vs. sea-hunt-
ing), and sociological (e.g., patrilocal residence vs. matrilocal residence). Again, there is no 
reference to Propp in his Asdiwal essay which was published in the Annuaire, 1958–1959, 
Ecole pratique des hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses.
By 1960, Lévi-Strauss had de'nitely read Propp’s Morphology. We know this because 
in that year, he published an extensive review of it. Appearing initially in the Cahiers de 
l’institut des Sciences Economiques Appliquées as “La structure et la forme. Rélexions sur un 
ouvrage de Vladimir Propp,” it was also printed as “L’analyse morphologique des contes 
russes” in volume III of the International Journal of Slavic Linguistics and Poetics. In his 
review, Lévi-Strauss duly praised Propp for being an innovator ahead of his time, but he 
also criticized Propp’s analysis. A sample of the praise reads: “!e most striking aspect of 
Propp’s work is the power with which it anticipated further developments. !ose among 
us who 'rst approached the structural analysis of oral literature around 1950, without 
direct knowledge of Propp’s attempts a quarter of a century earlier, recognize there, to their 
amazement, formulae—sometimes even whole sentences—that they know well enough 
they have not borrowed from him. . . . [!ere] are so many intuitions, whose perspicacity 
and prophetic character arouse our admiration. !ey earn for Propp the devotion of all 
those who, unknown to themselves, were his followers” (Lévi-Strauss in Propp 1984:175). 
However, it is with one of the primary criticisms of Propp by Lévi-Strauss that we are pres-
ently concerned.
Lévi-Strauss faults Propp for analyzing wondertales. For, according to Lévi-Strauss, 
“Tales are constructed on weaker oppositions than those found in myths” (Propp 1984:176; 
cf. Cardigos 1996:34). In this context, Lévi-Strauss claims that “the tale lends itself imper-
fectly to structural analysis. . . . Should he [Propp] not rather have used myths” instead 
(1984:177)? Lévi-Strauss then goes on to give his guess as to why Propp did not use myths. 
“As he is not an ethnologist, one can suppose that he had no access to or control over myth-
ological material collected by him and among peoples known to him” (1984:177).
!e idea that a professional folklorist, a professor of folklore, did not know enough 
about myths to analyze them is, of course, preposterous, and it should come as no surprise 
to learn that Propp upon reading Lévi-Strauss’s review was insulted by the insinuation 
that he knew nothing about myth. Stung by Lévi-Strauss’s criticism, Propp wrote a strong 
rebuttal which appeared 'rst in the 1966 Italian translation of his Morphology immedi-
ately following the Lévi-Strauss review. (Propp’s Morphology has had an enormous impact 
in Italy [cf. de Meijer 1982].) Lévi-Strauss, however, was given the last word in the form 
of a brief postscript in which he expressed or perhaps feigned surprise at Propp’s anger. 
He had meant, he averred, only to o8er “a homage” to a pioneering e8ort—although it is 
noteworthy that Lévi-Strauss has continued to avoid making any mention of Propp in any 
of his many writings on myth and structure. Lévi-Strauss’s original review, Propp’s rebut-
tal, and Lévi-Strauss’s postscript are available in English translation in Propp’s !eory and 
History of Folklore, a selection of Propp’s essays published by the University of Minnesota 
Press in 1984. (It is a pity that Propp’s footnotes to his rebuttal did not appear in the 
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Minnesota Press translation, especially the one that referred to !e Morphology of North 
American Indian Folktales!)
In his rebuttal, “!e Structural and Historical Study of the Wondertale,” Propp 'rst 
thanks the Italian publisher Einaudi for inviting him to write a rejoinder to Lévi-Strauss’s 
review. He then observed that Lévi-Strauss has an important advantage inasmuch as he is 
a philosopher whereas Propp is merely an empiricist (1984:68). Propp replies that he will 
not dwell on the logic of such an argument as “since the author does not know myths, he 
studies wondertales,” but it is clear that he does not think much of it. “No scholar can be 
forbidden to do one thing and urged to do another,” he comments. !e interested reader 
should consult the full texts of the debate for all the nuances and facets of the arguments 
on both sides. Here one may note that Propp in turn critiqued Lévi-Strauss’s “re-write” of 
Propp’s thirty-one function scheme by saying, “My model corresponds to what was mod-
eled and is based on a study of data, whereas the model Lévi-Strauss proposes does not 
correspond to reality and is based on logical operations not imposed by the data . . . Lévi-
Strauss carries out his logical operations in total disregard of the material (he is not in the 
least interested in the wondertale, nor does he attempt to learn more about it) and removes 
the functions from their temporal sequence” (1984:76). As we have already noted in some 
detail, Lévi-Strauss would make no apology for “removing” functions from their tempo-
ral sequence. In part, we have the two scholars talking past one another: Propp is con-
cerned with empirically observable sequential structure whereas Lévi-Strauss is interested 
in underlying paradigms, typically binary in nature. (My own view is that Lévi-Strauss is 
not so much describing the structure of myth as he is the structure of the world described 
in myth. !at is a signi'cant distinction.)
!ere is other evidence of Lévi-Strauss’s rather Olympian posture with respect to his 
version of “structure” in myth. In the 'rst volume of his magnum opus, !e Raw and the 
Cooked, he doubts that the natives of central Brazil would have any understanding of “the 
systems of interrelations” he 'nds in their myths. Moreover, he adopts a truly superorganic 
position when he says, “I therefore claim to show not how men think in myths, but how 
myths operate in men’s minds without their being aware of the fact” (1969:12), a state-
ment strangely reminiscent of Jung’s equally mystical claim in his “!e Psychology of the 
Child Archetype” essay, “. . . the primitive cannot assert that he thinks; it is rather that 
something thinks in him! . . .” (1963:72). Lévi-Strauss appears to reject the Jungian univer-
salistic “archetypal” approach to myth (1969:56; 1995:188), and most writers comparing 
Lévi-Strauss and Jung tend to see more di8erences than similarities (cf. Chang 1984 and 
Messer 1986). However, readers can judge the possible parallelism between the two state-
ments cited above for themselves.
In any event, Lévi-Strauss never repudiated his superorganic statement. Indeed, he 
is well aware of the Anglo-American attitude towards it. In his 1977 Canadian CBC 
series of talks, published as Myth and Meaning, Lévi-Strauss begins by referring to this 
very statement: “You may remember that I have written that myths get thought in man 
unbeknownst to him. !is has been much discussed and even criticized by my English-
speaking colleagues, because their feeling is that, from an empirical point of view, it is an 
utterly meaningless sentence. But for me it describes a lived experience, because it says 
exactly how I perceive my own relationship to my work. !at is, my work gets thought 
in me unbeknown to me” (1979:3). Were one to object that Lévi-Strauss’s own thought 
should not be compared to myth, one would be obliged to recall Lévi-Strauss’s unabashed 
comment about !e Raw and the Cooked that “. . . this book on myths is itself a kind of 
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myth” (1969:6) which upon re6ection is entirely consistent with Lévi-Strauss’s contention 
that the Freudian reading or interpretation of Oedipus “should be included among the 
recorded versions of the Oedipus myth on a par with earlier or seemingly more “authen-
tic” versions” (1955:435).
But this inquiry is not intended to be a full-6edged discussion of either Lévi-Strauss’s 
or Propp’s methodologies. (For an initial entree into Lévi-Strauss’s voluminous writings 
on myths and the criticism of them, see Lapointe and Lapointe [1977]; for Propp, see 
Breyrnayer 1972, Liberman 1984, and Ziel 1995). !e aim is to consider only the issue of 
binary opposition in myth. Let us assume for the sake of argument that Lévi-Strauss is cor-
rect in his assumption that myths reveal binary oppositions more clearly than do folktales 
and that “Tales are constructed on weaker oppositions than those found in myths.”
In his 1955 essay in JAF, what narrative does Lévi-Strauss choose to demonstrate his 
version of “structural analysis?” He chooses the story of Oedipus. Now since Lévi-Strauss 
is an anthropologist and not a folklorist, he is evidently not all that familiar with the stan-
dard genre de'nitions of myth, folktale, and legend, distinctions which have been observed 
for nearly two centuries ever since the times of the brothers Grimm who devoted separate 
major works to each of these three genres. (For de'nitions, see Bascom 1965 and Bødker 
1965). Su7ce it to say that if a myth is a sacred narrative explaining how the world and 
humankind came to be in their present form,” then it is perfectly obvious that the story 
of Oedipus is NOT a myth. As folklorists very well know, it is in fact a standard folk-tale, 
namely, Aarne-!ompson tale type 931. (!e number was assigned by Aarne in his origi-
nal Verzeichnis der Märchentypen, FFC 3, published in 1910.) So it turns out that Lévi-
Strauss, like Propp, began his analysis of “myth” with a folktale! In the same essay, a5er 
discussing one actual myth, that of the Zuni emergence, he proceeds to talk about “the 
trickster of (native) American mythology” and refers to “the mythology of the Plains” cit-
ing “Star Husband” and “Lodge-Boy and !rown-Away” (1955:440). But these latter allu-
sions are all to folktales, not myths. At least Lévi-Strauss is consistent, that is, consistently 
mistaken. In !e Origin of Table Manners, the third volume in the Mythologiques series, he 
devotes no less than two chapters to the “Star Husband” myth (1979:199–272), this even 
though he had read Stith !ompson’s classic study “!e Star Husband Tale” (my empha-
sis). No serious folklorist would label the Star Husband story a myth, but then again Lévi-
Strauss is no folklorist. He refers to Stith !ompson, by the way, as “the eminent mythog-
rapher” (1979:19) (again, my emphasis). !e fact is that Stith !ompson wrote very little 
about myth, preferring instead to concentrate on his beloved folktale! One might well 
argue that if Lévi-Strauss insists upon calling folktales such as Star Husband “myths,” he is 
perfectly justi'ed in reclassifying Stith !ompson, an acknowledged specialist in the folk-
tale, as a “mythographer” or “mythologist.”
What about the subject of Lévi-Strauss’s inaugural lecture, the story of Asdiwal (which 
he cautiously labelled “geste”)? !is is not a myth either. If it were believed to be histori-
cally “true” by the Tsimshian, then it would be a legend. If not, it would be a folktale, a 
'ctional narrative not believed to be any more historical than such Western folktales as 
Cinderella or Little Red Riding Hood. In no way is the geste of Asdiwal an account of 
how the world or humankind came to be in their present form. It is not a myth by folklor-
istic standards.
And what about the texts, the hundreds of texts, analyzed in the four-volume 
Mythologiques and the two later sequels (1988, 1995)? Are they all myths? !e initial nar-
rative discussed, “!e Macaws and their Nest” is a Bororo version of the “bird-nester,” a 
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narrative which Lévi-Strauss (arbitrarily) labels M1 (key myth). But the narrative is not a 
myth at all in the technical sense of the term. It is a straightforward folktale! !is is not to 
say that Lévi-Strauss does not analyze some myths in Mythologiques. !e important point 
is that he analyzes both myths and folktales indiscriminately.
If the Oedipus, Asdiwal, and bird-nester narratives are all folktales rather than myths, 
then we might pose to Lévi-Strauss the same question he addressed to Propp: if folktales 
are constructed on weaker oppositions than those found in myths, why did Lévi-Strauss 
choose folktales rather than myths to demonstrate his theory of binary oppositions? It 
seems to me that Lévi-Strauss is hoist by his own petard! !e obvious answer is that binary 
oppositions are just as strong in folktales as they are in myth. Lévi-Strauss’s own insight-
ful analysis of Asdiwal is a perfect case in point. !e fact that Lévi-Strauss, like the major-
ity of anthropologists, doesn’t know the di8erence between a myth and a folktale should 
not be a factor. Most anthropologists use the term “myth” when the narratives they dis-
cuss are unmistakably folktales or legends. !e appalling ignorance among anthropologists 
and others concerning such standard folk narrative genre distinctions as myth and folktale 
might account for why despite a deluge of critical writing on Lévi-Strauss’s Mythologiques 
and other studies of “myth” by anthropologists and sociologists (cf. !omas et al. 1976; 
Carroll 1978, and Mandelbaum 1987), no one seems to have noticed that Lévi-Strauss was 
analyzing folktales more o5en than myths. Even those critics who have commented specif-
ically on the Propp/Lévi-Strauss debate (e.g., Bravo 1972, de Meijer 1970, Janovic 1975) 
failed to remark on this matter.
So if Lévi-Strauss has analyzed folktales rather than myths, what happens to his notion 
that “mythical thought always works from the awareness of oppositions towards their pro-
gressive mediation,” and “the purpose of myth is to provide a logical model capable of over-
coming a contradiction?” Clearly, the notion needs to be amended. But there is more.
One could well argue that binary opposition is a universal. Presumably all human soci-
eties, past and present, made some kind of distinction between “Male and Female,” “Life 
and Death,” “Day and Night” (or Light and Dark), etc. Certainly we can 'nd binary oppo-
sitions in genres of folklore other than myth and folktale. Take the proverb genre, for 
example. Some proverbs have both topics and comments in opposition: “United we stand; 
divided we fall” (united vs. divided; stand vs. fall); “Man proposes; but God disposes” 
(Man vs. God; proposes vs. disposes); “Last hired; 'rst 'red” (last vs. 'rst; hired vs. 'red) 
etc. (Dundes 1975). !e same kinds of binary opposition also occur in traditional riddles 
(Georges and Dundes 1963). Examples of oppositional riddles include:
I am rough, I am smooth
I am wet, I am dry
My station is low, my title high
My king my lawful master is,
I’m used by all, though only his. (highway)
Large as a house
Small as a mouse,
Bitter as gall,
And sweet a5er all. (pecan tree and nut)
And what about the curse genre? !ere are traditional Jewish-American curses which 
are clearly based on binary oppositions:
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You should have lockjaw and seasickness at the same time. 
May you eat like a horse and shit like a little bird.
Could we not assert on the basis of the above examples that a proverb (riddle, curse) 
can serve as “ a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction?”
If binary opposition is a universal—or even if it were con'ned to folklore genres as 
diverse as myth, folktale, proverb, riddle, and curse—the question is: how can binary oppo-
sition be used to de'ne the nature of myth? !is is not to deny that binary oppositions can 
be found in myth. !e critical point is that binary opposition is in no way peculiar to myth. 
If this is so, then what Lévi-Strauss has isolated in his analysis of “myth” tells us precious 
little about the nature of myth in particular. To be fair, since Lévi-Strauss is actually inter-
ested in the nature of human thought (rather than myth per se), perhaps it doesn’t matter 
that binary opposition as a distinctive feature is not con'ned to myth. Quite the contrary. 
If binary oppositional thought is a pan-human mental characteristic, that is well worth 
noting. But then we must not pretend that the presence of binary oppositions in a narra-
tive necessarily identi'es that narrative as a myth. Although Lévi-Strauss occasionally actu-
ally cites an Aarne-!ompson tale type number (1995:181), the truth is that for the most 
part he totally ignores the basic “myth-folktale-legend” genre categories. From a folklor-
istic vantage point, it is the height of hubris to write a four-volume (plus two sequel vol-
umes) introduction to a science of mythology without even recognizing or knowing the 
di8erence between a myth and a folktale!
Finally, we are obliged to remind the reader that the presence of binary opposition in 
folklore is hardly a new idea. One of Axel Olrik’s epic laws proposed in the 'rst decade of 
the twentieth century was Das Gesetz des Gegensatzes, the Law of Contrast. “!is very basic 
opposition is a major rule of epic composition: young and old, large and small, man and 
monster, good and evil” (Olrik 1965: 135; cf. 1992:50). Furthermore, the principle was 
beautifully illustrated by another Danish folklorist, the late Bengt Holbek in his three-di-
mensional paradigmatic model for Danish folk-tales: low vs. high, young vs. adult, and male 
vs. female (Holbek 1987:453), a conceptual model borrowed from Elli Köngäs Maranda 
(Maranda and Maranda 1971:23). !e wheel may have been re-invented but it also comes 
full circle, inasmuch as Maranda was inspired by none other than Lévi-Strauss!
To the extent that the debate between Propp and Lévi-Strauss itself constitutes a kind 
of academic binary opposition, we earnestly trust that this essay will be understood as a 
form of constructive mediation.
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On Game Morphology: 
A Study of the Structure of 
Non-Verbal Folklore
Introduction
!is essay is included as a demonstration of Dundes’s structural analysis, derived from 
methods introduced by Vladimir Propp and other Russian formalists. But its statement 
on the materials covered by folkloristic inquiry is even more signi'cant. In 1964, when 
this essay was published, most folklore studies focused on what was called “oral literature.” 
Dundes showed the domination of narrative in folkloristic thought by pointing out the 
binary of “verbal/non-verbal” dividing traditional genres. !e negation of “non-verbal” 
assumes that “verbal” (that is, speech and narrative) is the central term by which “other” 
genres are evaluated.
Dundes set out to change that de'nitive preoccupation with oral literature as part of 
his general campaign to treat folklore as a type of knowledge in social lives, rather than 
a relic textual form. !is is what he meant by an elastic “modern” concept of folklore, in 
which all cultural expressions that repeat and vary within groups constitute folklore. If 
games and dances can be shown to have comparable structures, then they are part of a 
whole called folklore, rather than divisible into central verbal and marginal non-verbal 
parts. !e organic rhetoric of morphology is signi'cant, because it refers to the holistic 
structure of an organism (such as a plant), which has observable essential parts enabling 
the organism to live. !e linear structure analyzed in morphology di8ers from the presen-
tation of non-sequential “elements” for games, such as rules governing action, and physi-
cal setting. See, for example, the ten elements in E. M. Avedon (1979). Robert A. Georges 
(1972) gave a folkloristic de'nition of games, i.e., behavioral models de'ned by competi-
tion and rules.
Dundes’s intention here was to raise epistemological questions about the rationale for 
including di8erent types of material under the rubric of folklore. His revelation that many 
forms of children’s play, coming at a formative time in human development, composed a 
narrative plot involving a departure and return to home has stimulated other studies focus-
ing on the sociopsychological meaning of this structure for children. I suggested that the 
structural function of the game narratives described by Dundes was to enact the tripar-
tite structure of rites of passage (separation, transition, incorporation) on a daily basis, at 
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a time of rapid physical and social changes, especially in American society, which is noted 
for encouraging the values of individualism and self-reliance in children (Bronner 1990). 
When children mature, they are discouraged from game playing, and the departure from 
home theme is not reinforced. An example is the interpretation of “Hide and Seek” in 
America, a game encouraging individualism because of the symbolic roles it assigns. In 
contrast to countries having games with a more authoritarian It role, in this American 
game a parental, low-power It searches for children who independently hide before return-
ing to the “safe” home base. (See the experiments with high and low power Its in Sutton-
Smith and Gump 1972). Although stating that folktales and games are “quite di8erent 
media of expression,” Brian Sutton-Smith observed that they are similar in being models 
that “represent behaviors occurring in other settings, both real and imaginary.” His cross-
cultural study of twenty-'ve societies found that those possessing games of strategy tended 
to have folktales in which the outcome is determined by strategy. He posited that games 
of strategy were associated with high obedience training in childhood, and that strate-
gic outcomes in tales were culturally provided rewards for obedience in games. In con-
trast, the game of “Hare and Hounds” (and the related chasing games of “Tag” and “Hide 
and Seek”) involved physical skills associated with achievement training (1972; also see 
Roberts, Arth, and Bush 1959).
Dundes’s subsequent work in games shi5ed to the gendered nature of structural rules. 
Following his reference to the bull'ght in the previous chapter on “Structuralism and 
Folklore,” he found a male/female binary in the competitive structure of boys’ games “Hare 
and Hounds,” in fact, is typically described as a male game). He argued that the game begins as 
male to male combat, but ends in the victory of one male, who “feminizes” the opponent (see 
the chapter on “Gallus as Phallus” in this volume, as well as other essays by Dundes [1987a, 
1997e]). Other issues of genre analysis in folkloristics that Dundes raised also remain (See 
Harris-Lopez 2003; Georges and Jones 1995a; Honko 1989; and Ben-Amos 1976).
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Are children’s games, a form of non-verbal folklore, and folktales, a form 
of verbal folklore, structurally similar? I am suggesting in the following article that they 
are and also that there are many other non-verbal analogues to verbal folk lore forms. 
Consequently, the de'nition of folklore should not be limited to verbal materials.
Although structural analysis, as an e8ective means of descrip tive ethnography, has been 
applied to a number of types of folk lore expression, it has not been employed in the study 
of chil dren’s games. Yet games, in general, and competitive games, in particular, are obvi-
ously patterned. In competitive games, the participants are aware that play is governed by 
de'nite limiting rules. !e application and the interrelationship of these rules result in an 
ordered sequence of actions by the players, and these action sequences constitute the essen-
tial structure of any particular game.
In order to delineate the structure of a game, or any other form of folklore, one must 
have a minimum structural unit. Only with such a unit can there be any precise segmen-
tation of the con tinuum of game action. As a trial unit, I propose to use the moti feme, a 
unit of action which has been used in structural studies of folktales.1 One obvious advan-
tage of employing the motifeme is that if game action can, in fact, be broken down into 
motifemes, then it would be relatively easy to compare the structure of games with the 
structure of folktales.2 Before examining the pronounced similarities in game and folktale 
structure, it is necessary to emphasize one important di8 erence between the two forms. 
!e di8erence is dimensionality. !e folktale is concerned with con6ict between protago-
nist and antagonist, but the sequence of plot actions is unidimensional. Either the hero’s 
actions or the villain’s actions are discussed at any one moment in time at any one point in 
the tale. Vladimir Propp, a Russian folklorist, made, in 1928, a thought-provoking exami-
nation of fairy tales and devised a distribution of functions (motifemes) among the dra-
matis personae of the tales.3 He noted, for example, that functions VIII (villainy), XVI 
(struggle), and XXI (pursuit) belong to the villain’s sphere of action. Certainly, functions 
IV (reconnaissance) and V (delivery) in Propp’s analysis are villain and not hero actions. In 
games, however, one 'nds a contrast: there are at least two sequences of actions going on 
simultaneously. When A is playing against B, both A and B are operating at the same time, 
all the time. !is is theoretically true in folktales, but only one side’s activities (usually the 
hero’s) are described at a given point in the tale. A folktale is, therefore, a two-dimensional 
series of actions displayed on a one-dimensional track, or, conversely, a game is, structurally 
speaking, a two-di mensional folktale.
In his notable discussion of folktale morphology, Propp drew particular attention to 
function VIII, villainy. In this function, a villain causes harm or injury to one member of a 
family by abducting a person or stealing an object, etc., thus creating the actual movement 
of the folktale.4 At the same time, he astutely observed that a folktale could begin with 
the desire to have some thing or a de'ciency or lack as a given ground-rule. In the analy sis, 
Propp considered lack (function VIIIa) as morphologically equivalent to villainy (function 
VIII). If a folktale did not begin with a state of lack, then a state of lack could be created by 
an act of villainy. !is same distinction can also be applied to the structure of many games. 
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A game can begin with an object which is missing, or the object may be hidden before 
play begins. In some games nothing is missing, but the initial portion of game ac tion (cor-
responding to Propp’s “initial” or “preparatory” section of the folktale, functions I–VII) 
brings about the requisite state of lack or insu7ciency. In games of the 'rst type, an indi-
vidual may hide from the group (as in “Hare and Hounds”) or the group may hide from an 
individual (“Hide and Seek”). In games of the second type, an individual or object may be 
abducted or captured, which also results in a lack. !is happens, for example, in the child-
stealing game of “!e Witch.” Other characteristics shared by both folktales and games 
will become apparent in the follow ing discussion of several speci'c games.
In “Hare and Hounds,”5 the boy chosen as the Hare (the choosing by counting out 
rhymes or other means may be con strued as pre-game activity) runs away to hide. Usually a 
'xed time span, a speci'c number of minutes, or counting to some arbitrary number, marks 
the formal beginning of the chase, much as the iteration of an opening formula marks the 
passage from reality to fantasy in the beginning of a folktale. In fact, some games actually 
have opening formulas such as “Ready or not, here I come.” !e game, then, begins with a 
lack, the missing Hare. !e quest, so popular in folktales, is equally popular in games. !e 
Hounds attempt to 'nd and catch the Hare, just as the hero in folktale seeks to liquidate 
the initial lack (function XIX).
Note, however that two sets of actions, or motifeme sequences, are involved in the game. 
One action is from the point of view of the Hounds, the other from the perspective of 
the Hare. !e se quences include the following motifemes: lack, interdiction, viola tion, and 
consequence.6 In one motifemic sequence, the Hounds want to catch the Hare (lack). !ey 
are required to catch him before he returns “home,” a place agreed upon previously (inter-
diction). If the Hounds fail to do so (violation), they lose the game (consequence). In the 
second motifemic sequence taking place simultaneously with the 'rst, the Hare wants to go 
“home” (lack), but he is required to arrive there without being caught by the Hounds (inter-
diction). If he fails to do so (violation), he loses the game (consequence). It is possible to win 
the game, by liqui dating the lack, by either of two actions: catching the Hare or re turning 
“home” safely. But it is impossible for both Hare and Hounds to win and also impossible 
for both Hare and Hounds to lose. Here is another point of contrast with folktales. In folk-
tales, the hero always wins and the villain always loses. In games, how ever the outcome is 
not so regular or predictable: sometimes the Hare wins, and sometimes the Hounds win. 
As Caillois has pointed out, one characteristic of competitive games is that the opponents 
are equal and, in theory, each opponent stands the same chance of winning.7
!e game of “Hare and Hounds” might be structured as follows:
Lack Interdiction Violation Consequence
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!e double structure is also illuminated by comparison with analogous folktale structure. 
From the Hare’s point of view, one could say there was a hero pursued (function XXI) and 
that the hero is rescued from pursuit (function XXII), assuming the Hare wins. !e game-
folktale analogy is even closer in those versions in which the Hare is required to leave signs, 
such as strips of paper, to mark his trail. In folktales, when the hero runs from his pur suer, 
he o5en places obstacles in the latter’s path. !ese objects mark the trail, but also serve to 
delay the pursuer. From the point of view of the Hounds, i.e., with the Hounds as heroes, 
the Hare appears to serve as a donor 'gure, inasmuch as the dropped slips of paper are 
“magical agents” (identi'ed as function XIV) which aid the hero-Hounds in liquidating 
the initial lack.8 !e donor sequence, then, is another point of similarity between games 
and folktales.
In a popular American children’s game which Brewster calls “Steps,”9 the leader, or “it,” 
aids the others in reaching him (to tag him) by permitting various steps, such as baby steps, 
giant steps or umbrella steps. In this game, the donor 'gure grants the privilege of using 
certain “magical” steps. !e fact that the magi cal aid is not granted until the hero is tested 
by the donor is also a striking parallel to folktale morphology. A5er the donor (“it”) per-
mits the number and type of steps, (e.g., four baby steps), the recipient (“hero”) is required 
to say “May I?” If the latter passes the politeness test, he is permitted to take the steps 
which bring him closer to his goal. However, should he neglect to express the etiquette 
formula, the donor will penalize him by ordering him to step backwards, thus moving him 
away from the goal. More o5en than not in folktales, civility or politeness to the donor 
will pro vide the needed magical agents while discourtesy deprives the would-be hero of 
these same agents.
In some games, the presence of a donor sequence appears to be optional rather than 
obligatory, as is also true in folktales. In “!imble in Sight”10 an object, such as a thimble, 
is hidden. Actually, the object is supposed to be visible but not obvious. !e children seek 
to discover or notice the object (lack). As each child does so (lack liquidated), he indi-
cates his success by exclaiming a verbal formula such as “rorum torum corum,” much as 
the suc cessful player in “Hide and Seek” announces his return “home” with the phrase 
“Home free.” (!ese verbal formulas would ap pear to be analogous to closing formulas in 
folktales.) In this form of “!imble in Sight” there is no donor sequence but in some ver-
sions, the hider aids the thimble-seekers by giving helpful clues such as “You’re freezing” 
or “You’re cold,” when the seeker is far away from the quest-object, and “You’re warm” 
or “You’re burn ing,” when the seeker is close to the object. In such versions, the seeker 
could presumably request assistance from the donor by ask ing, “Am I getting warm?” 
Nevertheless, since the game can be played without the donor sequence, it is clear that the 
sequence is structurally not obligatory.
!e frequency of the donor sequence in games and folktales also demands atten-
tion. One would suspect, for example, that since the donor sequence is comparatively 
rare in American Indian folktales, as compared with Indo-European folktales, the donor 
sequence would be infrequent in American Indian games. !e presence or absence of such 
a sequence might even be correlated with magic and religion. If a person can make magic 
or seek a religious vision as an individual, then the need for a donor might be less than in 
those cultures in which experts or intermediaries supply magic or religion.
So far, mention has been made of a number of games in which the initial lack is part of 
the given. !e game’s action does not begin until an object or person is removed or secreted. 
“It” may absent himself or herself in order to produce the initial lack situation. However, in 
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“!e Witch” the lack is the result of “its” abduct ing someone.11 In this game, the parallel to 
folktale structure is also apparent. A mother leaves her seven children, named a5er the days 
of the week (Propp’s function I, “One of the members of a family is absent from home”—
still bearing in mind that Propp’s morphological analysis was made of folktales and not 
games). Before leaving, the mother tells her children, “Take care the Old Witch does not 
catch you” (function II, “An interdiction is addressed to the hero”). !e witch enters and 
the children do not take heed (function III, “!e interdiction is violated”). !e witch pre-
tends that the children’s mother has sent her to fetch a bonnet (function VI, “!e villain 
attempts to deceive his victim in order to take possession of him or of his belongings”). !e 
child goes to get the bonnet (function VII, “!e victim submits to de ception and thereby 
unwittingly helps his enemy”). !e witch abducts one of the children (function VIII, “!e 
villain causes harm or injury to one member of a family”). !e mother returns, names 
her seven children, and thus discovers that one of her chil dren is missing. !e remain-
ing children cry, “!e Old Witch has got her” (function IX, “Misfortune or shortage is 
made known”). !e sequence of motifemes is repeated until the witch has abducted all the 
children. !is action is analogous to the repe tition of entire moves in folktales, e.g., elder 
brothers setting out successively on identical quests.
!e mother then goes out to 'nd the children (function X, “!e seeker agrees to or 
decides upon counteraction,” and func tion XI, “!e hero leaves home”). !e mother 
encounters the witch and asks her for information about the whereabouts of her children. 
In the standard ritual dialogue, one 'nds possible traces of the standard donor sequence, 
as identi'ed by functions XII– XIV. In this game, the witch functions as donor. !e 
mother 'nally arrives at the place where her children are being held captive (function XV, 
“!e hero is transferred, reaches, or is led to the whereabouts of an object of search”). !is 
function or motifeme is of great signi'cance to the structural analysis of both games and 
folktales. Propp remarks (page 46), “Generally the object of search is located in another 
or di8erent kingdom.” Anyone familiar with children’s games will recall that many make 
man datory the penetration of the opponent’s territory. In “Capture the Flag” (Brewster, 
pages 69–70), the object of the search is the opponent’s 6ag, clearly located in the “ene-
my’s kingdom.”
Now the mother discovers her lost children (function XIX, “!e initial misfortune or 
lack is liquidated”), and mother and children pursue the witch. !e one who catches the 
witch becomes the witch in the next playing of the game. In folktales, a pursuit o5en fol-
lows the liquidation of the initial lack, but more com monly the villain pursues the hero 
(function XXI, “!e hero is pursued”). !e hero inevitably escapes (function XXII, “!e 
hero is rescued from pursuit”). Propp remarks that “a great many folktales end on the note 
of rescue from pursuit.” !e same might be said of games. In many games, “it,” or the vil-
lain, is the one who pursues the “hero”-seekers a5er the latter have obtained the quest-ob-
ject, such as the 6ag in “Capture the Flag.” Of course, one reason why the game of “!e 
Witch” is similar to folktales is the 'xed nature of the outcome! !e witch never wins, just 
as the vil lain in folk tales never wins.
Critics have been sceptical of Propp’s morphological analysis on the grounds that he 
limited his material to Russian fairy tales. Competent students of the folktale, however, are 
aware that most, if not all, of the tales Propp analyzed can, in fact, be classi'ed according 
to the Aarne-!ompson system as tale types. Others complain that Propp was too general 
and that his functions apply to literary as well as to folk materials. It is true that Propp’s 
concept can be correlated to the plot structure of Beowulf and to most of the Odyssey 
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(Cf. his functions XXI to XXXI with the end of the Odyssey). Clearly, the game of “Old 
Witch” contains a number of Propp’s functions and, in one sense, the game appears to be 
a dramatized folktale. Moreover the “Old Witch” game bears a super'cial resemblance to 
the Aarne-!ompson tale type 123, “!e Wolf and the Kids.” But what is important here is 
that the morphological analysis of folktales appears to apply equally well to another genre 
of folklore—traditional games, thereby providing further con'rmation of the validity of 
Propp’s analysis.
When one perceives the similarity between the structure of games and folktales it is 
also possible to see parallels among special forms of the two genres. For example, one type 
of folktale is the cumulative take. In these tales (Aarne-!ompson types 2000–2199), one 
'nds chains of actions or objects. Usually, there is repetition with continual additions. In 
ballads this stylistic feature is termed “incremental repetition.” Stith !ompson, in his dis-
cussion of tales of this type, noted, but without further com ment, that they had “something 
of the nature of a game.”12 !is game-tale analogy is obvious in “Link Tag” in which “it” tags 
someone. !e tagged person must take hold of the tagger’s hand and help him or her tag 
others; the next one tagged joins the 'rst two and so on.13 (!e same structure is obviously 
found in those folk dances in which couples or individuals form ever-lengthening chains.)
Another sub-genre analogy might be trickster tales (or jokes) and pranks. In trickster 
tales and in most pranks or practical jokes, the primary motifemes are fraud and deception 
(Propp functions VI and VII) so there can even be an exact identity of content as well as 
form in folktales and games.14 For example, in some ver sions of tale type 1530, “Holding 
up the Rock,” a dupe is gulled into believing that he is holding up a wall. But “Hold up the 
wall” is a hazing stunt at Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College, in which, according to 
one report, a student is required to squat with his back against a wall as if supporting it.15 A 
more surprising example is the prank analogue of tale type 1528, “Holding Down the Hat,” 
in which victims were fooled into grab bing feces concealed under a hat.16 Perhaps the great-
est similarity in trickster tale and prank morphology is their common parodying of stan-
dard folktale and game structure. Instead of liquidating an actual lack, a false lack is feigned. 
!us the unsuspecting initiate is sent snipe-hunting, armed with a sack and a 6ashlight, or 
an apprentice is persuaded to seek some quest-object which, according to the occupation 
group, may be striped paint, a board-shortener, or a le5-handed monkey wrench.
!e morphological similarity between game and folktale sug gests an important princi-
ple which may be applied to other forms of folklore. Basically, these di8erent forms derive 
from the distinc tion between words and acts. !us, there is verbal folklore and non-verbal 
folklore. !e distinction is made most frequently with respect to myth and ritual. Myth is 
verbal folklore or, in Bascom’s terms, verbal “art.”17 Ritual, in contrast, is non-verbal folk-
lore or non-verbal art. Myth and ritual are both sacred; folktale and game are both secu-
lar. (Whether all games evolved from ritual is no more or less likely than the evolution, 
or rather devolution, of folktales from myths.) Whereas folklorists have, for some time, 
known of the similarities between myth and ritual, they have not recognized the equally 
common characteristics of folktale and game. Moreover, they have failed to see that the 
verbal/non-verbal dichotomy applies to most, if not all, of the standard genres of folk-
lore. !e proverb, clearly an example of verbal folklore, has for its non-verbal counterpart 
the gesture. !ey are functionally equivalent as both forms may sum up a situation or pass 
judg ment on a situation. Riddles are structurally similar to proverbs in that both are based 
upon topic/comment constructions, but they are distinct from proverbs in that there is 
always a referent to be guessed.18 Non-verbal equivalents include a variety of di7cult tasks 
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and puzzles. !e distinction between proverbs and riddles applies equally to gestures and 
non-oral riddles. !e referent of the gesture is known to both the employer of the gesture 
and his audience before the gesture is made; the referent of the non-oral riddles is presum-
ably known initially only by the poser.19
Superstitions are also illuminated by this verbal/non-verbal distinction. Folklorists 
have long used terms such as “belief ” and “custom” or “practice” in discussions of supersti-
tions. In this analysis, practices or customs would be examples of non-verbal folklore since 
actual physical activity is involved. !e distinction may even apply to folk music. If folk 
narrative, for example, is set to music, it would then be termed folksong; if a game were set 
to music, it would then be termed folk dance. (Note that the etymology of the term “bal-
lad” supports this distinction.) I am not implying that folksong derives from folk narrative 
or that folk dance derives from game but only suggesting that these supposedly disparate 
genres have much in common. For example, the basic sequence of lack and lack liquidated 
found in folktales and games is also found in folk dance. In many dances, a couple is sepa-
rated, or from the man’s point of view, he has lost his partner (lack). !e remainder of the 
dance consists of reuniting the separated partners (liquidating the lack).20 Moreover, the 
leaving of home and return ing home occurs in folktales, games, folk dances and folk music. 
Structurally speaking, it does not matter whether “home” is a house, a tree, a position on 
a dance 6oor or a note.
!e techniques of structural analysis should be applied to genres of folklore other than 
games and folktales. !ese forms, from the design of quilt patterns to tongue-twisters, can 
be de 'ned structurally. One would guess that such analyses will reveal a relatively small 
number of similar structural patterns underlying these apparently diverse forms.
Speci'cally, I have tried to demonstrate that at least one non verbal form of folklore, 
children’s games, is structurally similar to a verbal form, the folktale. If, then, there are non-
verbal analogues (e.g., games) for verbal folklore forms (e.g., folktales), then folk lore as a 
discipline cannot possibly be limited to the study of just verbal art, oral literature, or folk 
literature, or whatever smiliar term is employed. Kenneth Pike has observed that “Verbal 
and non-verbal activity is a uni'ed whole, and theory and methodology should be orga-
nized or created to treat it as such.”21 It is time for folklorists to devote some of the energies 
given over to the study of verbal folklore to the study of folklore in its non-verbal forms. 
Compared to folk narrative and folksong, such forms as folk dance, games, and gestures 
have been grossly neglected.22 Admittedly there are complex problems of transcription but 
surely they are not insuperable. 
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The Devolutionary Premise in 
Folklore Theory
Introduction
To encourage the “modern” or American break of folkloristics from its intellectual parent, 
nineteenth-century European folklore studies, thirty-three-year-old Dundes criticized his 
elders for holding a deep bias against progress. It was an extension of another historio-
graphical argument in his earlier essay “From Etic to Emic Units in the Structural Study 
of Folktales” (1962g, and chapter 4 in this volume)—namely, that modern structural and 
contextual theories were refreshingly synchronic, while previous approaches were dia-
chronic, mired in problematic historical-geographic searches for origin. Dundes sought to 
disrupt the binary underlying prevalent theories in the 'eld—including survival, myth-rit-
ual, and historic-geographic perspectives. He saw this binary as setting a superior elite civi-
lization against a primitivized folk culture. !is led to other oppositions, with one pole, 
assumed to be the later development, dominating or displacing the other, associated with 
the distant past or “folk”: urban/rural, rhymes/myth, science/spirituality. Dundes wanted 
to underscore his social de'nition of folk as any group with a linking factor, and lore as a 
necessary element of life, past and present. !us, he declared these as timeless criteria in 
stating that “there has always been folklore and in all likelihood there will always be folk-
lore.” Instead of viewing change to lore as bad or necessarily degenerative, he argued for 
a model in which folklore “actually improved or rather evolved in time.” Folklore and its 
study then stood for something growing—in scope and importance. Only then, he con-
cluded, can folkloristics make progress.
Dundes 'rst presented this paper to professional folklorists at the American Folklore 
Society meeting in 1967, as part of a special session on the history of folklore scholarship. 
As with his studies of folklore, in his historiography Dundes sought to uncover structural 
patterns that revealed driving ideas, o5en outside the awareness of participants in a cul-
ture or discipline. Folklorist Elliott Oring recalled that when he gave the paper, Dundes 
ignited “a rather animated debate” about whether folklore in reality was indeed vanishing, 
rather than about whether folklorists unconsciously followed what Dundes called “the 
vise of devolutionary thought.” Responding to the comment by famed songhunter Alan 
Lomax, that true folk songs were in danger of extinction, Dundes asserted if Lomax would 
consider the ever popular but o5en neglected genre of jokes, he would realize that folklore 
was growing and emerging. But the obsession with folk songs as a vanishing expression of 
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a golden age was, Dundes observed, indicative of the devolutionary mindset. As the title 
of Oring’s reminisce, “!e Devolutionary Premise: A De'nitional Delusion?” (1975a), 
suggests, Dundes preferred to turn the debate toward the question of whether there was, 
as Oring put it, “some unconscious sado-masochistic compulsion of folklorists to devolve 
the lore that they love.” Readers can consider his criticism that Dundes sees a devolution-
ary bias because he (Dundes) worked with a di8erent de'nition of folklore from those 
theorists he analyzed. Oring pointed out, for instance, that jokes were known in the nine-
teenth century, but they “weren’t considered folklore.” !erefore, Dundes has a presentist 
argument, including the criteria used for judging “progress,” in discovering devolutionary 
premises in studies that do not have them. As Oring stated, “to impute a devolutionary 
premise to survivalist theory is to criticize antiquarians for studying antiques, or to suggest 
that antiques may be very new rather than very old.” !at is not to deny devolutionary ten-
dencies in some folklore theories, but, rather, to question whether a binary exists between 
past and present theories of folklore, or, for that matter, between folklore studies as a prac-
tice and other disciplines considered more evolutionary.
Without diving into the debate of whether devolutionary belief as a cognitive pattern is 
an illusion or not, William A. Wilson has written that Dundes demonized the historic-geo-
graphic method as devolutionary, although some of its practitioners did in fact construct 
“a model in which folklore actually improved or rather evolved in time.” Wilson pointed 
to Julius Krohn, a prominent 'gure associated with the “Finnish School” of historic-geo-
graphic folklore studies, who in the 1880s propounded a view that Kalevala poems were 
not fragmented survivals from a golden age of the past, but, because they had been imbued 
with a Finnish national spirit through centuries of oral transmission, were constantly re-
created and improved (1976). !is point of information raised a more general question, 
sparked by Dundes, about the varied concepts and categorizations of past (e.g., “golden 
age,” “primitive,” “ancient,” “pre-industrial”) and present (“industrial,” “urban,” “modern,” 
“post-modern”), as well as their interrelationships (e.g., in the idea of folk practices, such as 
hunting, as an “escape” from modernity as well as an integral part of it; in slang and legend; 
and indeed in jokes). (See, for instance, De Caro 1976; Bronner 1998; and Bauman and 
Briggs 2003.) One suggestion that Oring made was to di8erentiate among the approaches 
to speci'c genres, so that Freud’s jokes invited evolutionary consideration, while Lomax’s 
ballads impelled devolutionary analysis.
Writing in the twenty-'rst century, Dundes doubted that folklorists had been able to 
undo devolutionary thinking. In a jeremiad-sounding address to the American Folklore 
Society, he cited references, a5er he published his “Devolutionary Premise” essay (1975c), 
to folkloristics as “predicated on a vanishing subject” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1996) and 
to “the disappearance of its subject matter” (Ben-Amos 1972). His answer, one applauded 
by many folklorists, was that “folklore continues to be alive and well in the modern world, 
due in part to increased transmission via e-mail and the Internet.” Adapting the famous 
epigrammatic phrase attributed to Mark Twain (a charter member of the American 
Folklore Society), Dundes quipped, “Reports of folkloristics’ death have been greatly 
exaggerated” (2005c).
Annotations of two terms in this essay may be helpful to readers. “Ur-form” (also 
referred to as Grundform in German) refers to the original or archetypal form from which 
many variants emerged. Two of the scholars mentioned by Dundes are usually credited 
with spreading its use: Antti Aarne (1867–1925) from Finland, who developed the 
tale-type index, a standard international reference for folktales; and Walter Anderson 
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(1885–1962), who taught in Germany (born in Belarus and raised in Estonia). !e use of 
Ur has a biblical reference to the Book of Genesis; it was the birthplace of the 'rst patri-
arch Abraham (translated as “father of a multitude” or “leader of many”). Ur exempli'es 
the “many from one” philosophy in a holy scripture. !e metaphor is meant to show the 
multiple trajectories of narrative o8spring, since Abraham is viewed as the patriarch for 
Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, and, even within those, for a number of variations, such 
as the twelve tribes of Israel.
Gesunkenes Kulturgut is a German phrase, literally meaning sunken cultural materi-
als. It was coined as a folkloristic term in 1902 by German folklorist and philologist Hans 
Naumann (1886–1951). He used it to describe the process by which expressions origi-
nating in the upper stratum of society “sink” to, or are adapted by, the lower stratum. It 
assumed a rigid class structure, arranged hierarchically by wealth and occupation, since 
it suggested interchange between an aristocracy and peasantry at the top and bottom, 
respectively. As the reference work General Ethnological Concepts by Åke Hultkrantz out-
lined, and Dundes averred, the concept is much older. Hultkrantz gave examples from the 
mid-nineteenth century, and claimed that among European scholars, it “has been widely 
accepted” (1960). Still, Hultkrantz recognized alternative theories of transmission; one 
suggested a reverse vertical direction from the bottom to the top, but nonetheless main-
tained the binary of simple folk and sophisticated aristocracy to which Dundes objected. 
Several ethnologists cited by Hultkrantz viewed culture as both an up and down 6ow, 
while others, such as Berkeley anthropologist George Foster (1914–2006) suggested a 
“circular relationship” in which folk culture “draws on and is continually replenished by 
contact with the products of intellectual and scienti'c social strata, but in which folk cul-
ture continually, though perhaps in a lesser degree, contributes to these non-folk societies” 
(1953). In one of Dundes’s last publications, he was still complaining of the prevalence of 
gesunkenes Kulturgut theory in historical scholarship. Taking up the proverbs represented 
in the famous painting Netherlandish Proverbs by Pieter Bruegel, he found that the dev-
olutionary thinking evident in gesunkenes Kulturgut had been prominent in preventing 
credit being given to the cultural creativity of ignorant, illiterate peasants in the painting. 
Rather than relying on “educated aristocratic individuals,” Dundes proclaimed, Bruegel 
“favored folk material rather than elitist classical or biblical versions” of proverbs. Other 
examples he gave were that Polyphemus (AT 1137) began with Homer’s Odyssey, and that 
the “Taming of the Shrew” (AT 901) originated with Shakespeare’s play, although it was 
clear to Dundes that both authors borrowed the plots from oral tradition. “!e point is,” 
Dundes concluded, that “it is folklore which is the source of high culture, not the other 
way around” (2004b, 18).
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There has been far too little progress observed in the development of folklor-
istics. But this lack of “progress” is not so surprising in view of the unmistakable and con-
sistent bias against progress inherent in the majority of folklore theories. Even a cursory 
examination of the intellectual history of folklore scholarship reveals a de'nite unques-
tioned basic premise that the golden age of folklore occurred in the past, in most cases 
speci'cally the far distant past. As a result of the past-oriented Weltanschauung of most 
folklorists—and it is really with the worldview of folklorists that this essay is concerned 
—it has always appeared to be logically necessary and highly desirable to engage in histori-
cally reconstructing the golden age of folklore. !e endless quest for the land of “ur” as in 
“ur-form,” or “archetype” in Finnish Method parlance, continues unabated in conservative 
folkloristic circles. Inasmuch as the means and direction of folklore methodology are prob-
ably inescapably controlled by the nature of the theoretical premises, hitherto largely unex-
amined, held by professional folklorists, it is absolutely essential that these crucial underly-
ing premises be held up to the light of reason if there is ever to be any appreciably signi'-
cant change in methods of folklore analysis.
!e bias against “progress” in folklore theory may be easily demonstrated by brie6y con-
sidering some of the numerous examples of degeneration, decay, or devolution—the particu-
lar term is not the issue—which abound in so much of traditional folklore theory. Perhaps 
the most obvious instances are those underlying the various folklore transmission theories. 
Typically, surveys of such theories begin with a detailed consideration of degeneration, per-
haps signaling its hallowed position.1 !e most common devolutionary notion is that folklore 
decays through time. Another notion is that folklore “runs down” by moving from “higher” to 
“lower” strata of society. !ese two notions are by no means mutually exclusive and in fact one 
can without di7culty imagine that if folklore really moved from “higher” to “lower” strata, it 
could easily undergo textual deterioration at the same time. Classic examples of these notions 
include Max Müller’s “disease of language” according to which theory of semantic devolution 
the original names of Vedic and other gods became confused or forgotten as time passed, as 
well as Hans Naumann’s “gesunkenes Kulturgut”2 which held that cultural items originating in 
the upper stratum of society 'ltered down to the lower stratum which was wrongly thought 
to be synonymous with the “folk.” A logical consequence of this “aristocratic” origin of folk-
lore theory was that folklore consisted largely of reworked remnants which had managed 
somehow to survive the presumed downward transmission of culture.
It should be remarked that the gesunkenes Kulturgut notion is still very much with us. 
Folklorist Walter Anderson believed that folktales usually moved from “culturally higher” 
to “culturally lower” peoples, according to Stith !ompson,3 who echoes the idea, point-
ing out that American Indians have borrowed European tale types whereas Europeans have 
not borrowed American Indian tales. !ompson even goes so far as to say that “If the prin-
ciple is really valid we may ask whether tales must keep running down hill culturally until 
they are found only in the lower ranges,” although he concedes this would be an overstate-
ment of Anderson’s position. Nevertheless, !ompson’s own devolutionary bias may well 
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have led him to misinterpret the available data regarding a hypothetical archetype for the 
“Star Husband” tale which he studied using the Finnish method. Like all devolutionary folk-
lorists, he assumes that the original form of the tale must have been the fullest and most 
complete version. Later, shorter versions are thus assumed to be fragments. !e devolution-
ist normally postulates a movement from complex to simple whereas an evolutionist might 
argue that the development from simple to complex is equally likely. In any case, !ompson 
is forced to label some of the shorter versions of Star Husband as confused or fragmentary 
despite the fact that his “fragmentary” versions demonstrate a common uniform pattern.4
!ere are many other striking illustrations of the devolutionary premise in folklore trans-
mission theories. !e Grimms argued that folktales were the detritus of myths5 and just as 
folktales were assumed to be broken down myths, so it was held that ballads were the detri-
tus of epics or romances.6 But perhaps no more overt statement of the premise can be found 
than in the conception of “zersingen” in folksong theory. “Zersingen” refers to the “altera-
tions of a destructive nature”7 which occur as songs are sung. !e very act of singing a folk-
song is thus construed to be a potentially destructive act endangering the continued stability 
of the song sung.8 Moreover, just as singing songs is presumed to destroy them, so the tell-
ing of folktales is thought to run the risk of ruining them. Retelling a tale allows the forget-
fulness of the raconteur to become a factor.9 !is is implicit in Walter Anderson’s famous 
superorganic “law of self-correction” (Gesetz der Selbstberichtigung).10 Anderson’s idea was 
that folktale stability was not attributable to the remarkable memories of raconteurs, but was 
rather the result of an individual’s hearing a given tale on many di8erent occasions, perhaps 
from many di8erent sources. Narratives essentially corrected themselves, argued Anderson, 
but the very term used indicates the devolutionary bias. Why is it assumed that folktales 
need to be corrected? Only the unquestioned assumption that folktales become “incorrect” 
through time can possibly justify the notion that folktales need to “correct themselves”—
granting for the sake of argument that tales rather than people do the “correcting.”
A critical correlative of the devolutionary premise is the assumption that the oldest, 
original version of an item of folklore was the best, fullest, or most complete one. A change 
of any kind automatically moved the item from perfection toward imperfection. Partly for 
this reason, one 'nds a deep resentment of change and an equally deep-seated resistance 
to the study of change in folklore. A similar situation prevailed until relatively recently 
in anthropology where even up to the 'rst several decades of the twentieth century pio-
neer ethnographers sought to obtain “pure” precontact cultural data. Students of the 
American Indian, for example, would o5en write up their 'eld data as if the Indians had 
never been exposed to or a8ected by acculturative European in6uences. Mooney, in col-
lecting Cherokee tales, speci'cally commented that he did not bother to record what were 
obviously European borrowings. !is made perfect sense in the light of a past-oriented 
Weltanschauung. If the forms of the past were more valuable, then it logically followed 
that changes of any kind were by de'nition potentially destructive in nature. Although 
anthropologists have learned to accept and study culture change, folklorists generally have 
tended to continue to look askance at change.
!e Hungarian folklorist Ortutay, in probably the most detailed critique of folklore 
transmission theories, notes that, “Retelling nearly always involves a change” and although 
there may be an element of creativity involved in making any change, “in its later, 'nal 
stages . . . oral transmission comes to be equivalent to deterioration, to a process of stut-
tering forgetfulness.”11 !e same attitude towards change is expressed by Stith !ompson 
when in summarizing Walter Anderson’s views he says, “!e 'rst time a change of detail 
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is made in a story it is undoubtedly a mistake, an error of memory.” 12 Deleterious changes 
could be caused by weakness of memory, unwelcome interpolations, or from contamina-
tions of themes. Note the obvious pejorative connotation of the term “contaminated text,” 
a term which once again re6ects the ever present devolutionary premise.13
!e generally negative attitude towards change has been clearly re6ected in folklore 
methodology. Just as ethnographers carefully si5ed through unavoidable details obvi-
ously only recently added through acculturative contact in an attempt to discover the pure 
unadulterated original native culture, so practitioners of the Finnish historic-geographic 
method sought to work backwards through the unfortunate changes (or, in !ompson’s 
terms, the mistakes and errors) in order to 'nd the pure unadulterated original ur-form. 
!e di7culties of searching for the ur-form, too o5en presumed to be hopelessly hidden by 
the destructive, deteriorative e8ects of oral transmission were considerable, but not always 
insurmountable. Possibly one of the most ambitious and optimistic e8orts was made by 
students of the Bible engaged in Form Criticism.
Form Criticism, according to Redlich,14 is a method of study and investigation which 
deals with the preliterary stage of the Gospel tradition, when the material was handed 
down orally. It was assumed that Biblical materials before being set down in written tradi-
tion “were subject to the usual inevitable fate of oral tradition, such as adaptation, altera-
tion, and addition.” However, it was also assumed that there were de'nite, discernible laws 
governing the oral transmission process, laws which once discovered might be applied (in 
reverse) to the written Gospels. By thus working backwards, Form Critics hoped to be able 
to reconstruct “the narratives as they actually happened and the sayings as they were actu-
ally uttered by our Lord.”15
A few folklorists have commented upon the consequences of the devolutionary prem-
ise. Von Sydow, for instance, challenged the hypothesis that the original form of a folktale 
was necessarily the most complete, most logical version,16 although he confessed this had 
been his own view when he began his folktale research. Similarly, Gerould in !e Ballad of 
Tradition deplores the “unfortunate tendency on the part of scholars to take it for granted 
that earlier ballads are likely to be better than later ones. . . .”17 Yet Gerould argues that 
the process of deterioration is inevitable: “Degeneration of noble themes and captivat-
ing tunes must have gone on ever since ballads became current. . . .”18 !e implicit nature 
of the devolutionary premise is also revealed in the wording of Gerould’s consideration 
of the American “Old Bangum” versions of “Sir Lionel” (Child #18) when he observes, 
“!e interesting point about all these versions, it seems to me, is the evidence they give 
that changes and even abbreviations do not necessarily imply any structural degeneracy.”19 
More recently, Ortutay has suggested that short elementary forms such as proverbs or jests 
are “most capable of resisting the corroding e8ect of degressive processes.”20
Despite a few critical comments by folklorists, there does not appear to be much aware-
ness of the enormous impact of devolutionary ideas upon folklore theory and method-
ology. At best, folklorists seem to accept the idea that the universe of folklore is running 
down. Even Olrik’s so-called epic laws of folklore were presumed to weaken in time. Olrik 
suggested, for example, that the law of the number three “gradually succumbs to intellec-
tual demands for greater realism.” 21 One possible reason for the lack of awareness may be 
that folklore has o5en been associated with evolution rather than devolution. And the 
interesting question does arise, how folklorists could remain so utterly committed to a 
devolutionary worldview at a time when ideas of evolution and of progress were so much 
at the fore of European intellectual thought.
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!e intellectual history of the idea of progress is reasonably well documented22 and 
there can be no doubt that this idea came into prominence at about the same time that 
the discipline of folklore began to emerge. Progress meant more than that the “moderns” 
were just as good as the “ancients” as had been argued in the late seventeenth century. 
Progress meant that the golden age was not behind us but ahead of us.23 !e positivistic 
ethic of the ultimate perfectibility of man and society had considerable in6uence upon 
the course of most academic disciplines. However, as we shall see, the e8ect of the evolu-
tionary idea of progress on the treatment of folklore materials was largely a negative rather 
than a positive one.
To be sure, there were some attempts to borrow evolutionary ideas in folklore theory. 
One of the most striking instances is Hartland’s suggestion that narratives all over the world 
followed a basic evolutionary general law.24 Folktales, and speci'cally incidents in tales, 
changed with di8erent stages of civilization in accordance with this law. Speaking of an 
incident in the Forbidden Chamber cycle of tales, Hartland observed, “!e incident in this 
shape is specially characteristic of savage life. As with advancing civilization the reasoning 
which has moulded it thus becomes obsolete we may expect that the incident itself will 
undergo change into a form more appropriate to the higher stages of culture. . . .”25 An item 
of folklore had to become 't in order to survive. Hartland spoke of the popular mind and 
how it “rendered by a process analogous with that of natural selection, which we may call tra-
ditional selection, the version that has reached us predominantly over all others.”26 Hartland 
even suggested that it was traditional selection which tended to “eliminate the ruder and 
coarser, preserving and re'ning, not necessarily the more credible, but the more artistic.” 
!e idea that traditional selection operated in such a way as to ensure esthetically superior 
products was of course entirely in keeping with the concept of evolution as progress.
In spite of this isolated example of a positive application of evolutionary “progress” ori-
ented theory to folklore—and there are several others—it is quite evident that the concept 
of progress per se had a devastatingly negative e8ect upon folklore theory. !e associa-
tion of folklore with the past, glorious or not, continued. Progress meant leaving the past 
behind. From this perspective, the noble savage and the equally noble peasant—folkloris-
tically speaking—were destined to lose their folklore as they marched ineluctably towards 
civilization. !us it was not a matter of the evolution of folklore; it was more a matter of 
the evolution out of folklore. !is may best be seen in the work of Tylor who in adamantly 
opposing rigid degenerative theories de'nitely championed unilinear cultural evolution. 
At the same time, he forcefully argued the devolution of folklore. !ere was no inconsis-
tency in this. On the one hand, Tylor states that “notwithstanding the continual interfer-
ence of degeneration, the main tendency of culture from primaeval up to modern times 
has been from savagery towards civilization.”27 On the other, Tylor conceived folklore, that 
is, “survivals,” to be “transformed, shi5ed or mutilated” fragments of culture.28 To put it 
succinctly, as humans evolved, so folklore devolved. Tylor’s view of folklore is clear. For 
example, he suggested that it might be possible to trace the origins of games of chance 
from ancient divination rituals insofar as such games were “survivals from a branch of sav-
age philosophy, once of high rank though now fallen into merited decay.”29 In an unequiv-
ocal statement, Tylor remarks, “!e history of survival in cases like those of the folk-lore 
and occult arts which we have been considering, has for the most part been a history of 
dwindling and decay. As men’s minds change in progressing culture, old customs and opin-
ions fade gradually . . .,” although Tylor does admit that there are in fact occasional excep-
tions to this “law.”30 If survivals or folklore were truly dying or dead, then it made a good 
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deal of sense for Tylor to argue that the folklorist’s or ethnographer’s course should be like 
that of the anatomist who carried on his studies if possible on dead rather than on living 
subjects.31 Here we have the ultimate logical consequence of devolution: death. And this 
is why devolutionary-minded folklorists have devoted themselves by de'nition to dead 
materials. !e view, still widely held, is that as all the peoples of the world achieve civilized 
status, there will be less and less folklore le5 until one day it will disappear altogether. !us 
Ruth Benedict could write authoritatively in the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences in 1931 
that “in a strict sense folklore is a dead trait in the modern world.”32 Are folklorists doomed 
to study only the disappearing, the dying, and the dead?
Of course, the gloomy reports of the death of folklore are in part a result of the mis-
guided and narrow concept of the folk as the illiterate in a literate society, that is, the folk 
as peasant, as vulgus in populo, as isolated rural community.33 Since the majority of folk-
lorists in Europe and Asia continue to restrict the concept of folk in this way, citing as a 
matter of fact the de'nitions of folk society o8ered by American anthropologists Red'eld 
and Foster for authority,34 it is easy for them to believe that gradually the folk are dying 
out. With the devolutionary demise of folk or peasant culture, the deterioration of folk-
lore was a matter of course. Ortutay puts it in these terms: “We suggest that, as long as 
the oral tradition of the peasantry continued to exist as a uniform system . . . degressive 
and deteriorative processes played a secondary role in the dialectics of oral transmission.”35 
Since unquestionably one of the reasons for the break-up of peasant culture is the advent 
of industrialization, Communist folklorist Ortutay is able to point the accusing 'nger of 
blame at capitalism for destroying peasant (= folk) culture and consequently for destroy-
ing folklore.36 Of course, if folklorists were able to free themselves from so narrow and 
obsolescent a concept of folk, they could see that there are still numerous active function-
ing folk groups (e.g., ethnic, religious, occupational, etc.) and that the peasant community 
is just one of many di8erent types of “folk.” In fact, even as this one type of formerly rural 
homogeneous folk group becomes transformed into urban, heterogeneous, part-time folk 
groups, new types of folklore are emerging, some of which are actually caused by capital-
ism as in the creation of folklore from commercial advertisements.37
Yet even attempts to repudiate the idea that folklore is dying cannot fully escape the 
traditional devolutionary bias. Richard Dorson ends his book American Folklore with the 
statement that “!e idea that folklore is dying out is itself a kind of folklore.”38 On the one 
hand, Dorson is indicating that this idea is a traditional one, but, in addition, since he obvi-
ously doesn’t believe that folklore is dying out, the second use of the term folklore has a hint 
of the idea of folklore as falsehood or fallacy. In any event, the meaning of “folklore” in the 
phrase “!at’s folklore” in popular parlance refers to an error. !is continued pejorative 
connotation of the word folklore39 has a close connection with the devolutionary premise.
If folklore is conceived to be synonymous with ignorance, then it follows that it is a 
good thing for folklore to be eradicated. With this reasoning, educators and social reform-
ers seek to stamp out superstitions encouraging folk medical practices on the grounds that 
such practices are either harmful in and of themselves or harmful to the extent that they 
delay or discourage consultation with practitioners of scienti'c medicine. In this light, 
it is not just that folklore is dying out, but rather it is a good thing that folklore is dying 
out. Moreover since it is regrettable that folklore isn’t dying out at an even faster pace, the 
implication is that people should give the devolutionary process a helping hand.
!e education versus folklore (or to put it in other terms: truth versus error) dichot-
omy is intimately related to the devolutionary premise. In essence, the idea is that the more 
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education, especially the more literacy, the less the illiteracy and thus the less the number of 
folk and the less the folklore. It is wrongly assumed that literate people have no folklore.
!is is really the evolutionary progress idea restated. As nonliterate and illiterate peo-
ple become literate, they will tend to lose their folklore. Typical is Gerould’s remark: “Not 
until the spread of primary education and the conversion of the general public from oral 
to visual habits, which took place in the nineteenth century, was folk-song marked for 
destruction.”40 Much sounder, of course, is Albert Lord’s position: “While the presence 
of writing in a society can have an e8ect on oral tradition, it does not necessarily have an 
e8ect at all.”41 It is certainly doubtful whether increased literacy and education have seri-
ously a8ected the quality and quantity of folk speech or jokes, at least in American culture. 
Moreover, if there is any validity to what has been termed the concept of “postliterate man” 
(as opposed to preliterate or nonliterate man), referring to the idea that the information 
communicated by such mass media as radio, television, and movies depends upon the oral-
aural circuit rather than upon writing or print, then it becomes even more obvious that 
oral tradition in so-called civilized societies has not been snu8ed out by literacy.
!e di8erence between a future oriented worldview involving progressive evolution 
out of folklore and a past oriented worldview reveling romantically in the glorious folklor-
istic materials of nationalistic patrimonies seems to be clear cut. However, it is important 
to realize that not everyone shares the future oriented evolutionistic postulate. !ere are a 
number of devolutionary based philosophies of life, philosophies which decry the inroads 
made by civilization. In such philosophies of cultural primitivism42 the golden age remains 
safely embedded in the past while the evils of civilization do their deadly work, destroying 
all that is deemed good and worthwhile. From this perspective, folklore and civilization are 
still antithetical—just as they were in Tylorian times, but the critical di8erence is that folk-
lore is good and civilization is bad, rather than the other way around. !e distinction can 
also be expressed in terms of utility. !e nineteenth century doctrine of progress included 
a bias towards utilitarianism. Evolution and progress meant an increase of useful cultural 
items. In this light, folklore as a vestigial remain or relic was de'ned as essentially useless.43 
With the substitution of devolution for evolution in general worldview, there comes the 
possibility of transvaluing folklore into something useful rather than useless. An example 
of this may be found in some of the psychological approaches to folklore.
Freud summarized the devolutionary philosophy of life in Civilization and Its 
Discontents—the title itself indicates the bias—when he stated that “our so-called civili-
zation itself is to blame for a great part of our misery, and we should be much happier if 
we were to give it up and go back to primitive conditions.”44 Note also that the Freudian 
method consisted of clarifying or removing present neuroses by treating them as surviv-
als from a fuller, more complete event in the individual’s past. !e historical reconstruc-
tion of the traumatic ur-form to explain apparently irrational and fragmentary phenom-
ena is cut from the same methodological cloth as the majority of folklore reconstruction 
techniques, More revealing perhaps for folkloristics are the actual approaches to folklore 
found in the anthroposophical tradition of Rudolf Steiner and his followers as well as in 
the applications of analytical psychology by Carl Jung and his followers. For both Steiner 
and Jung, folklore represented an important vehicle by means of which individuals could 
travel backwards through time to gain vital spiritual bene't. In other words, one of the 
ways of getting back to nature, ideal human nature that is, and away from forward march-
ing destructive civilization, was by regaining contact with folklore. Rudolf Steiner’s in6u-
ential lecture “!e Interpretation of Fairy Tales,” given on December 26, 1908, in Berlin, 
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clearly illustrates the devolutionary nature of civilization as opposed to folklore. Fairy 
tales, according to Steiner, belong to time immemorial when people still had clairvoy-
ant powers and when they had access to spiritual reality. In modern times, people have 
wrongly engaged in intellectual pursuits and have gotten out of touch with spiritual real-
ity. Fortunately, by reading and understanding (anthroposophically, of course) fairy tales, 
moderns can attempt to rediscover their long lost spiritual heritage. In like fashion with 
only slightly less mystical language does Jung argue that myths and their archetypes “hark 
back to a prehistoric world with its own spiritual preconceptions.”45 Like Steiner, Jung 
assumes that the primeval spiritual reality is fundamentally a Christian one, and, like 
Steiner, he is unalterably opposed to intellectual and rational attempts to explain the con-
tent of myth. Perhaps the overt Christian cast of Steiner and Jung’s approach to folklore 
accounts for the placement of the golden age in the past. Fallen from grace and tainted by 
civilization, people need to 'nd balm for their injured souls by immersing themselves in 
myths and tales which are presumed to o8er the possibility of at least partial spiritual sal-
vation. In this view, it is not folklore but the spiritual person which is running the risk of 
dying out. It is curious how little notice the Steiner and Jung positions have obtained from 
folklorists, for in truth they are pioneers in the uncharted area of applied folklore. Folklore 
in their conceptual framework provides a unique source of therapy for the troubled if not 
sick mind of the modern person.
Having delineated the nature of the devolutionary premise, one can see the history of 
folklore scholarship in a new light. It would appear that each successive methodological 
innovation has consisted largely of a slightly di8erent application of devolutionary the-
ory. If it is accurate to say that Max Müller’s solar mythology yielded to Andrew Lang and 
company’s “anthropological folklore” approach, then one can see that the crucial notion 
of the “disease of language” was replaced by a notion that fully formed “rational” savage 
ideas devolved through time to become fragmentary, irrational mental survivals in civiliza-
tion. Moreover, one might consider that one o8shoot of the survival theory was the more 
speci'c myth-ritual approach in which games, folkdances, and popular rhymes were pre-
sumed to be degenerate derivatives of original myths or even earlier rituals. One thinks, for 
example, of Lewis Spence’s contention that folk rhymes including some nursery rhymes 
are frequently survivals of myth and ritual, “that is, they represent in a broken-down or cor-
rupted form, the spoken or verbal description of rite.”46 In addition, if it is accurate to say 
that the late nineteenth century unilinear cultural evolutionary based doctrine of surviv-
als in turn lost its sway in folklore circles to make way for the Finnish version of the older 
comparative method, then one can similarly see that the degeneration oriented concept of 
mutilated, vestigial survivals has been succeeded by a technique whereby multitudinous 
versions of an item of folklore—versions which are said to su8er from the alleged ravages 
of performance—are amassed with the hope of reconstructing the perfect, albeit hypo-
thetical, basic form from which these numerous partial realizations must have sprung. !e 
question is thus not whether there is a devolutionary bias or premise in folklore theory and 
method. !ere can be no doubt that there is. !e question is merely which devolutionary 
scheme is in vogue at any given point in time.47
In evaluating the signi'cance of identifying a devolutionary premise in folklore theory, 
there are several possibilities. One of these is that folklore is in fact devolving and that the 
various expressions of the devolutionary premise simply attest to this. Another possibility, 
however, is that the devolutionary premise is a culture bound product of a larger nineteenth 
century European worldview, a worldview which favored romanticism and primitivism, 
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and which encouraged scholars in many disciplines to look and work backwards, that is, 
toward the presumed perfect past. If this were the case, then it might be useful to suggest 
alternative a priori premises so that modern folklorists might be enabled to escape the vise 
of devolutionary thought. One could, for example, propose a cyclic scheme48 in which it 
was assumed that folklore materials could rise phoenix-wise a5er a period of degeneration. 
Or one could construct a model in which folklore actually improved or rather evolved in 
time. Why must we assume, for example, that jokes told in any one age are necessarily infe-
rior in any way to those told in ages past? Is it not within the realm of human possibility 
that a new version of an old joke might be a 'ner example of oral style and humor than its 
precursors? !ere should be recognition of the fact that change per se is not necessarily neg-
ative. Change is neutral; it is neither good nor bad. It may be either; it may be both. In this 
light, the unity, as Ortutay referred to it, of “one creation—innumerable variants”49 need 
not depend upon the idea that the initial one creation is perfect and the innumerable vari-
ants which follow merely imperfect derivatives. !e whole idea of one creation giving rise 
to multiple variants is very likely a manifestation of what the intellectual historian Lovejoy 
described under the framework of the great chain of being, a dominant intellectual con-
cept in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe.50 !e many deriving from the one may 
certainly be conceived as belonging not to a set in which perfection is necessarily assumed 
to be logically prior to imperfection, but rather to a set in which members may be ranked 
genealogically or hierarchically (e.g., in esthetic terms) or even as existential equals.
With a more eclectic theoretical framework, one might say that folklore in general is 
NOT devolving or dying out, but only that some genres or some examples of some genres 
are decreasing in popularity or usage, e.g., the true riddle or ballad in American urban soci-
ety. By the same token, one might say that folklore in general is NOT evolving or being 
born, but only that some genres or some examples of some genres are increasing in popular-
ity or usage and that occasionally new folklore forms are created. One need not, in other 
words, place the golden age either in the far distant past or in the far distant future. One 
may merely indicate that folklore is a universal: there has always been folklore and in all 
likelihood there will always be folklore. As long as humans interact and in the course of so 
doing employ traditional forms of communication, folklorists will continue to have golden 
opportunities to study folklore.
Notes
1. Gyula Ortutay, “Principles of Oral Transmission in Folk Culture,” Acta Ethnographica, 
VIII(1959), 175–221, provides such a survey. See especially pp. 200–207. See also Douglas J. 
McMillan, “A Survey of !eories Concerning the Oral Transmission of the Traditional Ballad,” 
Southern Folklore Quarterly, XXVIII (1964), 299–309.
2.  For a convenient summary of Naumann’s theory, see Adolf Bach, Deutsche Volkskunde 
(Heidelberg, 1960), pp. 64–69, 435–440; or Åke Hultkrantz, General Ethnological Concepts 
(= International Dictionary of Regional European Ethnology and Folklore, Vol. I) (Copenhagen, 
1950), pp. 158–159.
3.  Stith !ompson, !e Folktale (New York, 1951), p. 438.
4.  For some critical details which suggest that a devolutionary premise can bias hypotheses in his-
toric-geographic studies, see Alan Dundes, ed., !e Study of Folklore (Englewood Cli8s, N.J., 
1965), pp. 449–450, n. 9.
5.  !ompson, op. cit., p. 370.
6.  Cf. Ortutay, op. cit., p. 202; D. K. Wilgus, Anglo-American Folksong Scholarship Since 1898 
(New Brunswick, N.J., 1959), p. 43.
!e Devolutionary Premise in Folklore !eory 175
7.  !e de'nition is from Laurits Bødker, Folk Literature (Germanic) (= International Dictionary 
of Regional European Ethnology and Folklore, Vol. II) (Copenhagen, 1965), p. 330. !e empha-
sis is added.
8.  For extended discussions of “zersingen,” see Renata Dessauer, Das Zersingen. Ein Beitrag zur 
Psychologie des deutschen Volkliedes (=  Germanische Studien, No. 61) (Berlin, 1928);Hermann 
Goja, “Das Zersingen der Volkslieder. Ein Beitrag zur Psychologie der Volksdichtung,” Imago, 
VI (1920), 132–242, an abridged form of which appeared in translation as “!e Alteration 
of Folksongs by Frequent Singing: A Contribution to the Psychology of Folk Poetry,” !e 
Psychoanalytic Study of Society, ed. Sidney Axelrad and Warner Muensterberger (New York, 
1964), III, 111–170. “Zersingen” and related phenomena are also discussed by Bach, op. cit., 
pp. 509–510. Note that if folklorists truly believed in the reality of “zersingen,” they might well 
exert an all out e8ort to prevent any further performances of folklore inasmuch as they have 
assumed that deterioration is an inevitable concomitant or result of performance. One can just 
imagine folklorists running around begging the folk not to sing folksongs, kindly explaining 
to them that singing them in time destroys them. !is is perhaps analogous to librarians who 
are so concerned about injuries to and losses of books that they would almost prefer to keep all 
books safely locked up, away from all potential readers. !e di8erence, of course, is that folklor-
ists could not possibly stop the folk from using folklore—even if they wanted to. Nevertheless, 
in a way a modi'ed version of “zersingen” philosophy does appear to prevail among those folk-
lorists who express great anxiety about quickly collecting folklore before it disappears, dies out, 
or su8ers further “loss” of meaning.
9. Kaarle Krohn, Die Folkloristische Arbeitsmethode (= Instituttet for Sammenlignende 
Kulturforskning, Series B, No. 5) (Oslo, 1926), pp. 59–65; !ompson, op. cit., p. 436.
10.  Cf. Dieter Glade, “Zum Anderson’schen Gesetz der Selbstberichtingung,” Fabula, VIII (1966), 
224–236.
11.  Ortutay, op. cit., p. 180.
12.  !ompson, op. cit., p. 437. !e emphasis is added.
13.  Cf. Krohn, op. cit., pp. 84–85; !ompson, op. cit., p. 437; Ortutay, op. cit., p. 203; and Bach, 
op. cit., p. 519.
14.  E. Basil Redlich, Form Criticism: Its Value and Limitations (London, 1939), p. 9.
15.  Ibid., p. 11.
16.  Dundes, op. cit., p. 233.
17.  Gordon Hall Gerould, !e Ballad of Tradition (New York, 1957), p. 214.
18.  Ibid., p. 185.
19.  Ibid., p. 174. !e emphasis is added.
20.  Ortutay, op. cit., p. 207.
21.  Dundes, op. cit., p. 134.
22.  Some of the standard sources include John Baillie, !e Belief in Progress (London, 1950); J. B. 
Bury, !e Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth (New York, 1955);Morris 
Ginsberg, !e Idea of Progress: A Revaluation (London, 1963); and Charles van Doren, !e 
Idea of Progress (New York, 1967).
23.  Harry Elmer Barnes, An Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World, 3rd rev. ed.(New 
York, 1965), II, p. 840.
24.  Edwin Sidney Hartland, !e Science of Fairy Tales (London, 1890), p. 350.
25.  Edwin Sidney Hartland, “!e Forbidden Chamber,” Folk-Lore Journal, III (1885), p. 239. For 
a similar borrowing from evolutionary theory in folksong, see D. K. Wilgus, op. cit., p. 61.
26.  Edwin Sidney Hartland, !e Legend of Perseus (London, 1896), III, p. 156.
27.  Edward B. Tylor, !e Origins of Culture(= Primitive Culture, Part I) (New York, 1958), p. 21.
28.  Ibid., p. 17. !e emphasis is added.
29.  Ibid., p. 78.
30.  Ibid., p. 136.
31.  Ibid., p. 158.
176  !e Meaning of Folklore
32.  See Alan Dundes, “!e American Concept of Folklore,” Journal of the Folklore Institute, III 
(1966), p. 235.
33. For a useful survey of the various conceptualizations of “folk,” see Hultkrantz, op. cit., 
pp.26–129. 
34.  !e point is that there is really no connection between the restricted “folk” of folk society in 
which “folk” is used simply as a synonym for peasant and the “folk” of folklore. A folk or peas-
ant society is but one example of a “folk” in the folkloristic sense. Any group of people sharing 
a common linking factor, e.g., an urban group such as a labor union, can and does have folklore. 
“Folk” is a 6exible concept which can refer to a nation as in American folklore or to a single 
family. !e critical issue in de'ning “folk” is: what groups in fact have traditions?
35.  Ortutay, op. cit., p. 201.
36.  Ibid., pp. 201, 206.
37. Alan Dundes, “Advertising and Folklore,” New York Folklore Quarterly, XIX (1963), pp. 
143–151.
38.  Richard M. Dorson, American Folklore (Chicago, 1959), p. 278.
39.  !e negative connotation of “folklore” is by no means limited to the English-speaking world. 
See, for example, the 'nal comments in Elisée Legros’ valuable Sur les noms et les tendances du 
folklore (= Collection d’études publiée par le Musée de la vie wallonne, No.1) (Liege, 1962), p. 47.
40.  Gerould, op. cit., p. 244.
41.  Albert Lord, !e Singer of Tales (New York, 1965), pp. 134–135.
42.  For an extended discussion of this concept, see Arthur O. Lovejoy and George Boas, Primitivism 
and Related Ideas in Antiquity (Baltimore, 1935), p. 7. Also relevant are: Lois Whitney, “English 
Primitivistic !eories of Epic Origins,” Modern Philology, XXI (1924), pp. 337–378; and John 
D. ScheIer, “!e Idea of Decline in Literature and the Fine Arts in Eighteenth-Century 
England,” Modern Philology, XXXIV (1936), pp. 155–78.
43.  One of the best treatments of “survivals” is Margaret T. Hodgen, !e Doctrine of Survivals: A 
Chapter in the History of Scienti%c Method in the Study of Man (London, 1936). See also Fred 
W. Voget, “Progress, Science, History and Evolution in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century 
Anthropology,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, III (1967), pp. 132–155.
44. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, translated from the German by Joan Riviere 
(Garden City, 1958), p. 29.
45.  Carl G. Jung and Carl Kerenyi, Essays on a Science of Mythology (New York, 1963), p. 72. Judging 
from Carlos C. Drake’s survey, “Jung and His Critics,” Journal of American Folklore, LXXX (1967), 
pp. 321–333, there appears to have been little notice taken of Jung’s pro-Christian and antira-
tional approach to myth. Jung claims that Christ exempli'es the archetype of the self and that 
in general pure intellectual insight as opposed to “experience” is not enough, although he admits 
that he cannot pass on his experience to his public. See Psyche & Symbol, ed. Violet S. de Laszlo 
(Garden City, 1958), pp. 32–36. In any case, when Jung speaks of the “de-Christianization of our 
world”and “the Luciferian development of science and technology” (p. 35), it is an expression of 
devolutionary worldview. For Steiner’s approach to folklore, see his !e Interpretation of Fairy 
Tales (New York, 1929), or any of the works cited in Alan Dundes’ review of Julius E. Heuscher, A 
Psychiatric Study of Fairy Tales, in Journal of American Folklore, LXXVIII (1965), pp. 370–371.
46.  Lewis Spence, Myth and Ritual in Dance, Game, and Rhyme (London, 1947), p. 2. !e empha-
sis is added.
47.  Once the devolutionary premise has been pointed out, it is easy to 'nd examples of it. For 
example, there is André Varagnac’s “Les causes de la décadence du folklore dans les pays indus-
triels,” in IV International Congress for Folk-Narrative Research in Athens: Lectures and Reports, 
ed. Georgios A. Megas (Athens, 1965), pp. 600–605.
48.  Some of the various cyclic schemes are summarized in Lovejoy and Boas, op. cit., pp. 1–7; see 
also van Doren, op. cit., pp. 117–121, 159–193.
49.  Ortutay, op. cit., p. 182.






Folk Ideas as Units of Worldview
(Postscript) Worldview in Folk Narrative
Introduction
!e opening essay of this section is signi'cant for its groundbreaking interpretation of 
worldview in folkloristic terms. Dundes was not the 'rst to point to the interpretation 
of worldview as a valuable goal of cultural study, but he made a tremendous contribution 
by proposing that worldview—a concept o5en noted for its di8useness and vagueness—
could be clari'ed with reference to the fundamental units of analysis he called “folk ideas.” 
Dundes thought of worldview generally as “the way a people perceive the world and its 
place in it,” and sought to objectify this perception with the use of folklore as source mate-
rial. An important distinction he made between folk ideas and expressive genres (such as 
beliefs or proverbs) was that the folk idea was not a genre, but rather was evident across 
genres. Folk ideas underlaid the thought and action of a given group of people, and, there-
fore, were markers of their identity. Yet, in Dundes’s words, “they are not likely to appear 
consistently in any 'xed-phrase form.” !ey were not “myths,” which folklorists thought of 
as a narrative form, and they could be popularly used to connote fallacy. !e issue was not 
the veracity of these ideas, but rather that they were “underlying assumptions” a8ecting 
outlooks as well as expressions. Dundes also referred to folk ideas as “unstated premises,” 
“existential postulates,” “notions,” “conceptions,” or “cultural axioms” that could be dis-
cerned not only in folk culture, but also in popular movies and television, objects, adver-
tising, and other commercial items. He thus called upon folklorists to broadly commit to 
the study of human thought, rather than follow a natural history model of the collection 
and classi'cation of items somehow divorced from contemporary life.
Dundes applied a linguistic model, by likening folk ideas to generative principles of 
grammar that were di7cult for natives to articulate. He argued that just as languages were 
governed by inducible principles, worldviews were equally highly patterned. !e whole 
could be discerned from cultural expressions, “particles,” as Dundes called them. !us, 
folklore became especially signi'cant as a comparable, empirical source that acted as a met-
aphor for the cultures in which it was found. Methodological problems still had to be 
addressed, such as whether the compared material, especially in di8erent contexts, was in 
fact comparable; whether the texts were truly representative; and whether the quantity 
and variety of texts were su7cient. Still, Dundes emphasized that the pursuit of worldview 
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was crucial to the overall objective of identifying cultural patterning in microcosms. !ese 
microcosms, he hypothesized, “may be isomorphically parallel to macrocosms,” that is, 
they were minute expressions of overarching, culturally shared cognition and values.
Since Dundes had contributed to, and called for, the de'nition of genres, particularly 
with structural criteria, his criticisms of genre work in the “folk ideas” essay may seem 
surprising. He did not abandon the de'nitional project, but his concern was that collec-
tion and classi'cation had become ends in themselves rather than steps in identi'cation, 
leading toward interpretation. !e renowned archives he amassed at Berkeley, arranged in 
fact by genre, are testimony to the utility of collection and classi'cation in the folkloristic 
enterprise. He implied, though, that the obsession for ordering aggregate data was a disci-
plinary “folk idea,” or at least a “habit of thinking” that “arti'cially” limited research; see 
his suggestion (in the essay on the psychology of collecting, later in this volume) for theo-
rizing that collecting and classi'cation were forms of anal retention by which material was 
held in, and therefore not worked with into expansive interpretations. A keystone of his 
comparative approach was to 'nd symbolically equivalent images and texts across genres, 
cultures, and even transmitting media. In his scholarly jeremiad, he insisted that the goal 
of the folkloristic enterprise should not be the assignment of collected items to one genre 
or another, but, instead, the interpretation of their meaning.
Dundes was not alone in his plea and plaint. His “folk ideas” essay originally appeared 
as part of a paradigm-changing symposium called Toward New Perspectives in Folklore. 
Richard Bauman, in his introduction to this book, characterized Dundes as taking “a char-
acteristic role [in the group], that of extender and rearranger of the conceptual boundar-
ies of the 'eld,” and sharing with others a questioning of “the received canon” of folklore 
genres and diachronic methods. Unlike others in his cohort, who were oriented toward 
contextual and performance perspectives, and who, in the words of editor Paredes, were 
“less interested in de'ning a general concept of folklore than in delimiting folklore in spe-
ci'c situations” (1972), Dundes called for cutting an even wider conceptual swath with 
folklore. His objectives were more cognitive than behavioral, more global than situational, 
more macro than micro.
Subsequently, a number of studies picked up on Dundes’s concept of folk ideas. For 
example, Patrick Mullen extended the comparison of Mexican and American worldviews. 
From 'eldwork with the borderlands 'shing community on the Texas Gulf Coast, he 
reported di8erent patterns in the conclusion of buried treasure stories among Mexicans 
and Americans. With the former, tellers report 'nding treasure, while with the latter, trea-
sure is not retrieved or the seeker is fatally cursed. Mullen concluded that the narrative 
evidence con'rmed Dundes’s contrast of limited good in Mexican society (as described 
by George Foster) and unlimited good in American society (1978). In the Mexican view, 
since wealth was limited and a rigid class system prevented mobility, the explanation given 
of a person’s success was that he or she must have landed treasure. With “good” or wealth 
perceived as unlimited, and mobility accessible in the American worldview, the legends 
discouraged 'nding the treasure because work would be rewarded. America, according to 
Dundes, “remains a land of opportunity, that boundless wealth is still readily available to 
anyone with the energy and the initiative to dig for it.”
Dundes pointed out that folk ideas were not only narrated, but also materialized. To 
demonstrate, he extended the analysis of how national societies perceive “good” via his 
study of folk toys that featured pecking chickens placed on a paddle. !e beaks are attached 
to a weighted string, and when the paddle is moved, the beaks peck at the wooden surface 
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on the paddle. He found that the American versions of the toy are the only ones to use edi-
ble food; each chicken has an individual portion of corn kernels, leading him to the con-
clusion that “only a country with an abundant food supply could waste food to construct 
or decorate a toy” (1989). Other countries vary in the space provided for pecking and in 
the extent of food depicted, which suggested to Dundes that makers constructed toys in 
accordance with the “unstated premises” of their society. He showed objects produced 
in India that “hint at a basic overpopulation problem,” while Swedish versions have “an 
unbounded and near in'nite amount of food.” For an alternative interpretation of the toy 
in a situated event using a psychoanalytical perspective, see Bronner 2005d.
Dundes’s concept of the folk idea did not go unchallenged. Stephen Stern and Simon 
J. Bronner criticized the ahistorical tendencies of worldview analysis, which o5en led to 
the false conclusion that the perception of limits remained constant through time, and 
extends uniformly to the whole society (1980). Methodologically, there was the tempta-
tion to be selective with the evidence, ignoring contradictory sources that did not 't the 
theme, either to give the appearance of an unequivocal pattern, or to begin with one’s con-
clusion and 'nd data to 't the theme. Aware of the methodological pitfalls, Dundes him-
self warned that “it is dangerous to speculate on the basis of too few texts or exemplars.”
Another critical concern is the extension of identity to generalizations of national char-
acter. Dundes raised this worry in this essay, when he attempted to di8erentiate between 
stereotypes as false generalizations (“folk fallacies,” he called them) and folk ideas. Seeking 
to show American folklore as a re6ection of an American type or theme, folklorist 
Richard M. Dorson—coming out of an American Studies background—fused the con-
cept of folk ideas to the approach of “image, symbol, and myth” (which he credited to the 
work of Henry Nash Smith; see Smith 1950). In this approach, distinctive expressions of 
Americanness, arising historically from unique American conditions, were held up as signs 
of national identity. See, for example, the “American Cultural Myths” (“!e Noble and 
Ignoble Savage,” “Rags to Riches,” “Fables of Innocence,” and “American Adam”) described 
in the Handbook of American Folklore, which Dorson edited (1983), or his narrative study, 
America in Legend (1973). Methodologically, one examined the expressions of values (vis-
ible images and texts in art, literature, and folklore), evaluated them for their symbolism, 
and connected them to overarching non-narrative “myths” or ideas. !e signi'cance of 
this model was that it suggested that ideas drive action, thus setting up a causal connec-
tion between culture and historical events. But critics have also noted the reductionist ten-
dency to equate societies to singular “characters” that stress exceptional traits or values; 
they bristle at the implications of a collective American mind or “group think.” Dundes, 
for his part, acknowledged that sometimes prevalent ideas in a society can be oppositional, 
suggesting cultural tensions and paradoxes (for an American Studies demonstration of this 
notion, see Kammen 1972).
Dundes de'ned “national character” as a “cluster of speci'c personality traits which 
can be empirically identi'ed” (1986). He added that as a folklorist, he examined these 
traits as expressed in folklore, and encouraged the comparative study of national charac-
ter. Following from the folklorist’s concern for how traditions di8use, he hypothesized 
that people take their national character with them when they migrate. “Individuals may 
behave di8erently in a foreign setting,” he wrote, “but it is not so easy to shed one’s national 
character.” He distinguished between national stereotypes and character as the di8erence 
between what people perceive they (or others) are like in the former, and what people actu-
ally are in the latter. Acknowledging regional, ethnic, and class di8erences with a nation’s 
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boundaries, he nonetheless advocated for an empirical approach to national character that 
shed its past associations with romantic nationalism and national socialism, and dealt with 
cultural patterning (and shared “folk ideas”) in a society. Here is the source of the com-
ment, cited above, which he o8ered to colloquy speakers in the Netherlands who were 
critical of national character. “!ere is a di8erence between New Englanders in the United 
States and residents of the so-called “Deep South,” but there are also commonalities which 
all Americans share regardless of regionalism, class a7liation, or ethnic identity. For exam-
ple, the delight in exaggeration (as opposed to the understatement of Englishmen) seems 
to be a general facet of American national character, a delight incidentally which probably 
masks a basic feeling of insecurity and inferiority vis-à-vis Europeans. Boasting and brag-
ging (about being the biggest and best) is a sure sign of such feelings of cultural inferior-
ity. In the same way, Prussians may be di8erent from Bavarians, but both north and south 
Germans share a penchant for matters scatological.” His last statement referred to his study 
of German national character (1984a). (He told the group that his publisher insisted on 
replacing his use of “national character” in the original title with “culture.”) Regarding 
Dundes’s thesis of migrating traits, see the use of his concept in Bronner 2007. For other 
statements on national character, see Dundes 1975h, 1969b.
Eminent folklorist Linda Dégh iterated the concept that worldview motivates any 
human action. She de'ned it as the “sum total of subjective interpretations of perceived 
and experienced reality of individuals,” and noted that narratives, in particular, are “loaded 
with worldview expressions.” Reviewing Dundes’s call for worldview study, she argued that 
folklorists had an advantage in using the “speci'c” source material of folklore, rather than 
the “inconcrete” materials of other 'elds (1994). A year later, in the same journal, Dundes 
took her cue, and both encouraged renewed attention to the concept and elaborated on 
his use of worldview—more than twenty years a5er his initial publication. In his post-
script, he constructed a binary between an “old” and “modern” notion of worldview. In 
his model, the old approach was synonymous with cosmology, the view of one’s place in 
the world or cosmos. In contrast, the modern notion was more cognitive and structural. 
In his words, “it refers to the way in which people perceive the world through native cat-
egories and unstated premises or axioms.” One di8erence between the two notions, he 
pointed out, was the level of conscious awareness. Cosmology was conscious, while the 
second kind of worldview was not. He mused that the modern concept was not a Freudian 
or Jungian unconscious, but a linguistic one in the sense that “speakers of a language are 
not ‘conscious’ of the grammatical laws governing their speech.” Looking to the future, he 
urged folklorists to delineate the unconscious worldview postulates, which, he wrote, “are 
so artfully articulated in folk narrative and other forms of folklore.”
For further discussion of worldview in cultural study, see Kearney 1972, 1984; Hill and 
Mannheim 1992; Naugle 2002; and Sire 2004.
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Folk Ideas as Units of Worldview
For some time now, folklorists have become increasingly annoyed at what 
they regard as a nonprofessional and indiscriminately extended use of the term “myth” to 
apply to a wide variety of materials. Accordingly, folklorists are wont to shudder when they 
read discussions about the “myth” of capitalism or the “myth” of race by di8erent social sci-
entists, who o5en use “myth” simply as a synonym for “error” or “fallacy.” !ese de'nitely 
are not what the folklorist means by the term “myth,” folklorists carefully explain to ques-
tioning students. To the folklorist, a myth is 'rst of all a narrative and that alone rules out 
most of what modern social scientists refer to under the rubric of myth. Generally speak-
ing, social scientists’ use of the term “myth” has little or nothing to do with traditional nar-
rative forms. Rather it has to do with a belief or a belief system. Moreover, their use of the 
term “myth” nearly always carries an explicit negative connotation as in Ashley Montagu’s 
book in which race or racism is referred to as man’s most dangerous myth.1
If folklorists wish to guard their own narrow de'nition of myth in the sense of a sacred 
oral narrative, explaining how the earth or man came to be in their present form, then they 
ought to o8er some constructive terminological alternative to refer to those cultural phe-
nomena that nonfolklorists persist in calling myths. !e mere insistence by folklorists that 
such phenomena as political “myths” are not really true myths doesn’t solve the problem. 
If these materials are not myths, then what are they? And should they, whatever they are, 
be studied by folklorists or not?
I believe that there are traditional notions or conceptions that properly belong in 
the province of the professional folklorist but which have never been fully recognized 
as being part of folklore because of the folklorist’s obstinate tendency to be bound by 
traditional genres. !ere can be no question that genre theory has been instrumental in 
shaping the discipline of folkloristics. Once any corpus of folklore has been collected, it 
is to matters of genre classi'cation that folklorists invariably turn. Obviously the exigen-
cies of archiving have forced the folklorist to think in terms of classi'cation and genres. 
“What do I call this?” and “Where do I 'le it?” are common questions in folklore archives 
around the world. Within conventional genres, for example, myth, folktales, and games, 
there are, of course, elaborate re'nements of subclassi'cation schemes created in order 
to facilitate “information retrieval.” But despite the practical necessity of de'ning and 
re'ning genre categories, the fact remains that the folklorist’s habit of thinking of his or 
her 'eld almost exclusively in terms of traditional genres tends to be a limiting one. It is 
a habit which leads him or her to emphasize certain kinds of folkloristic materials and to 
totally ignore others.
!e genre divisions o5en arti'cially limit research. For example, a scholar may write about 
themes in mythology or even in a single myth and pay no attention to the occurrence of the 
identical themes in other genres. Even course o8erings in folklore, and occasionally whole 
research institutes, are organized by genre. Yet surveys or even partial surveys of various sup-
posedly established genres reveal that there is frequently little agreement among folklor-
ists as to precisely what a given genre is.2 Are genres cross-cultural or not? Is what American 
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folklorists consider under the genre label “proverb” the same as what a German folklorist calls 
a Sprichwort or what a Japanese folklorist calls kotowaza? We are aware of the fact that in any 
one culture there may be a di8erence between folk or native categories on the one hand and 
analytic categories on the other. What the folk in the United States might term “old sayings,” 
the American folklorist might group under “superstition,” “proverb,” etc. But what are the cri-
teria for the establishment of these various analytic categories? And to what extent are these 
criteria applicable to folkloristic materials from other cultures?
Let me illustrate some of the di7culty by citing a concrete example. Most American 
folklorists would probably agree that “Lightning never strikes twice in the same place” is a 
bona 'de item of folklore. But to what genre does it belong? I believe that depending upon 
the speci'c context and use of this item in a particular situation, the item may be either a 
superstition or a proverb in terms of conventional genre distinctions. If the item is believed 
literally to be a fact of nature—an individual in the midst of a thunderstorm consciously 
standing on a place where lightning has previously struck to avoid being hit—then the 
item would normally be classi'ed as a folk belief or superstition. If, on the other hand, it is 
taken metaphorically to mean simply that history is nonrepetitive and that an individual 
who has su8ered one misfortune is unlikely to su8er an identical one, then the item would 
most probably be labelled as a proverb. Incidentally, this example demonstrates the fallacy 
of simply collecting folklore text items without regard to context and publishing long lists 
of raw data without accompanying full explanations.
!ere are many other perplexing problems having to do with genre assignment. To 
what genre does “All signs fail in dry weather” belong? I would be tempted to classify it 
as a metafolkloristic proverb commenting upon the lack of reliability of sign superstitions 
having to do with predicting rainfall. How would American folklorists classify the idea 
that when it thunders, God is moving his furniture, or that potato carts are rolling across 
the sky, or that two clouds are bumping their heads together, or that angels are rolling 
stones downhill? !e variant which ascribes thunder to gnomes’ bowling up in the sky is 
probably related to Washington Irving’s story of Rip Van Winkle.3 To say that such items 
are used to allay the fears of small children when they hear thunder is not to say to what 
genre of folklore they belong. Other weather phenomena are similarly described: “!e old 
woman is picking her geese” means it’s snowing, with the falling snow presumably being 
the plucked goose feathers, and the rain is “Angels crying.” !ese are not proverbs and they 
are not superstitions. !ey are rarely if ever believed to be true and they are hardly tradi-
tional causal statements of the form “If A then B, unless C.” Kuusi in his excellent study of 
“!e Devil is Beating His Wife,” said when rain falls but the sun continues to shine, uses 
the term circumlocution.4 Of course, one might argue that it doesn’t really matter to what 
genres such items belong. It is su7cient to collect and analyze the items without worry-
ing about how to classify them. !e practical question of where to 'le them in folklore 
archives still remains, however.
One could imagine that in time folklorists might agree as to the generic nature of 'c-
tive weather descriptions, but what about a notion found in American culture that every-
thing or every person has its or his price? !ere are numerous traditional expressions 
concerning the measure of money, for example, “Money isn’t everything but it helps,” 
“Money talks,” “What does it mean in dollars and cents?” In fact, Americans are suspi-
cious of items priced too low. Bargains are desirable, but “something for nothing” may be 
of poor quality. !e rule of thumb seems to be “You get what you pay for.” !is idea that 
any object can be measured in monetary terms seems to be a traditional one in American 
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culture; but it is not always stated in 'xed-phrase form, and therefore it is probably inap-
propriate to call it a proverb. Moreover, if it is not a traditional statement of cause and 
e8ect we folklorists would probably not feel comfortable in classifying it as a supersti-
tion—though possibly we might attempt to label it as a folk belief. In any event, I sug-
gest that the idea that any thing or any person can be “bought”—whether or not it is 
ultimately true—is a part of American worldview. Furthermore, it is an important part 
of American worldview inasmuch as Americans may deal with peoples from other cul-
tures who do not share such a materialistic, capitalistic view of the world. To the extent 
that such premises or ideas are traditional, I believe they are part of folklore and that they 
should be studied by folklorists. As a concession to our nominalizing penchant, I propose 
we term such notions “folk ideas.”
By “folk ideas,” I mean traditional notions that a group of people have about the nature 
of humanity, of the world, and of life in the world. Folk ideas would not constitute a genre 
of folklore but rather would be expressed in a great variety of di8erent genres. Proverbs 
would almost certainly represent the expression of one or more folk ideas, but the same 
folk ideas might also appear in folktales, folksongs, and in fact almost every conventional 
genre of folklore, not to mention nonfolkloristic materials. However, insofar as folk ideas 
are the unstated premises which underlie the thought and action of a given group of peo-
ple, they are not likely to appear consistently in any 'xed-phrase form.
!ere may well be other terms that might be considered more appropriate than “folk 
ideas,” for instance, “basic premises,” “cultural axioms,” or “existential postulates.”6  !e par-
ticular term is really not the point. What is important is the task of identifying the vari-
ous underlying assumptions held by members of a given culture. All cultures have underly-
ing assumptions and it is these assumptions or folk ideas which are the building blocks of 
worldview. Any one worldview will be based upon many individual folk ideas and if one is 
seriously interested in studying worldview, one will need 'rst to describe some of the folk 
ideas which contribute to the formation of that worldview. Sometimes, folk ideas may be 
articulated in a particular proverb or exemplum, but if folk ideas are normally expressed 
not in one but rather in a variety of genres, then it is imperative that the folklorist make 
the attempt to extrapolate such ideas from the folklore as a whole. To do this, the folklor-
ist must of necessity escape the self-imposed bind of genres and categories. Once one has 
identi'ed a number of folk ideas present in a culture, one may begin to perceive what the 
pattern, if any, of these ideas is and how each of the ideas is related to the total worldview 
of that culture.
It would be folly at this point even to speculate about the possible number of folk ideas 
in American culture, but it might be useful to discuss several tentative folk ideas as a means 
of illustrating the nature of such ideas and how they are manifested in folklore. Let us 
assume for the sake of argument that one American folk idea is that there is no real limit 
as to how much of any one commodity can be produced. !e traditional phrase “!ere’s 
(plenty) more where that came from” could refer to an invitation to eat heartily as there 
is an abundant supply in the kitchen or it could refer to a warning to a bully that there is 
more punishment in store for him if he doesn’t keep his distance. If we wished to label this 
particular tentative folk idea, we might term it “the principle of unlimited good.” One 
advantage of this label is the contrast it a8ords with the “principle of limited good” which 
anthropologist George Foster has suggested as a characteristic notion in Mexican (and 
other) peasant cultures.6 !is also raises the interesting question of how folk ideas as units 
of worldview of the “scienti'c” observer might in6uence what “folk ideas” the folklorist 
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might discover in the other cultures he studies. !e notion of “limited good” is obviously 
particularly striking to members of a culture who share a notion of unlimited good.
!ere seem to be numerous expressions of the folk idea of unlimited good in American 
society. “!e sky’s the limit” would be one expression while “shooting the moon” in the 
card game of hearts or “going for broke” might be others. !e idea that “Any man can 
be President” (despite that fact that no woman and no African American has ever been 
President) suggests the lack of limit to opportunity. Politicians who promise “a car in every 
garage and a chicken in every pot” could only be convincing in a culture where there were 
a virtually limitless number of cars and chickens possible.
Another illustration of the principle of unlimited good is perhaps provided by American 
buried treasure legends. In this context, it may be signi'cant that most accounts end with 
the treasure still not recovered. !is suggests that Americans think that America remains 
a land of opportunity, that boundless wealth is still readily available to anyone with the 
energy and initiative to go dig for it. !e fact that the legends are open ended—they do 
not end as some legends do—may indicate that they are standing invitations to Americans 
to dig and provide their own happy ending to the story. !is may have to do with other 
American folk ideas such as: “Hard work will pay o8,” “Where there’s a will, there’s a way,” 
and more precisely with the proviso that the “pay o8 ” and “way” will consist of material 
reward, for instance, treasure or money. American buried treasure legends a8ord an inter-
esting comparison with Mexican treasure tales insofar as the latter traditions include the 
'nding of the treasure. In fact, as Foster observes, it is the 'nding of buried treasure that is 
used to explain the appearance of sudden wealth in a Mexican peasant community where 
the principle of limited good prevails.7 Normally, with such a view, one could only obtain 
wealth at someone else’s expense. !e discovery of buried treasure may represent a form of 
supernatural aid for fortunate individuals. In contrast, in American worldview, the good 
fortune of one individual does not necessarily mean misfortune for another. With a notion 
of unlimited good, there can be good fortune for all.
!e contrast between limited good and unlimited good is one which could be extended 
way beyond discussions of buried treasure legends. For instance, a comparison of Mexican 
(and for that matter, European) universities with American universities in the area of pro-
fessorial appointments reveals the same contrast. In the hierarchical European system, 
there is usually only one professor in a subject at a particular university or at any rate only 
a few professors. !ere is thus “limited good” and one cannot obtain a “chair” unless it is 
vacated, for example, by the death of an incumbent. !is is why young academicians are 
forced to wait expectantly—almost vulture-like—for an opening to occur. !ey must then 
'ght each other for the post. In the American system, there are many professors in a sub-
ject at a university. In theory, there is room for all to be advanced and one need not wait or 
hope for a colleague’s misfortune in order to be promoted.
Assuming that there is a folk idea in American culture having to do with the notion of 
unlimited good, we can see that it may be manifested in materials as diverse as proverbs 
and legends. But are there folk ideas which are without expression in traditional folklore 
genres? If so, then this would present special methodological problems for the folklorist 
who was anxious to identify folk ideas. Let us consider as a possible American folk idea the 
notion that if something is good for you, it must taste bad. If it doesn’t have a bad taste, 
then it probably won’t help you. !is notion could apply to food; for example, to vegeta-
bles which children are asked to consume in the name of good health, or to bitter medi-
cines. (One popular brand of mouthwash even features the bad taste of the product in its 
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1970 advertising as though its awful taste were somehow conclusive proof of its e8ective-
ness.) !is possible folk idea may or may not be related ultimately to the Puritan attitudes 
towards pleasure and pain to the e8ect that pleasure is sinful and that one must experience 
pain and the denial of pleasure to achieve salvation. (!is association with the Puritan 
ethic is also suggested by the corollary idea that if something tastes good—like candy—it 
must be bad for your health. ) In any case, the point here is simply that the folk idea of bad-
tasting things being more likely to be good for one than good-tasting things is, in my opin-
ion, a part of traditional American thought that is likely to be overlooked by folklorists 
whose powers of observation are limited by conventional genre categories.
Both ideas, that of unlimited good and that of salvation through su8ering, share a com-
mitment to progress. Tomorrow will be better than today, and today in turn is better than 
yesterday. !e future orientation in American worldview is tied to a “bigger and better” 
principle!8 However, it is “achieving” rather than “achievement” that counts and the folk 
ideas lead ultimately to frustration. !is may be seen by considering some of the many 
forms and symbols of success in American culture, for example, position in a rank-order 
scheme, as in football teams or automobile rental agencies vying to be “number one,” the 
acquisition of sizable 'nancial resources—the size o5en indicated by the number of 'gures 
in one’s annual salary, the number of acres of one’s estate, the number of rooms (especially 
bathrooms!) in one’s home, and the number of cars that one owns. But it is not success per 
se that is worshipped. Rather it is the process of becoming a success that is admired. Once 
one has achieved success, one is established and it is time to look for a new achiever. !ere 
must always be new losers or underdogs to root for. Americans love upsets; they love to see 
favorites and front-runners get beaten. “Records were made to be broken.”
!ese folk ideas produce frustration. On the one hand, there is a drive towards success, 
but on the other hand, attainment of success can, by de'nition, be but a temporary one in 
the context of a progressive continuum of change. Whatever the success is, it is bound to be 
surpassed by a new success, probably by someone else. !is is noncyclic worldview. It is lin-
ear and it builds from successful climax to successful climax. !is means that with an open 
system, one can never achieve the ultimate climax, one can never achieve perfection. With 
the principle of unlimited good, there are always more mountains to be scaled, problems 
to be solved, money to be made. !is suggests a worldview which allows satisfactions, but 
only limited ones. In other words, the principle of unlimited good in and of itself implies 
frustration since one can in theory never acquire all the good however good is measured.
!e linearity of American life so beautifully described by Dorothy Lee9 and so evident 
in the American de'nitions of success and progress should not blind us to the possibility 
that two or more folk ideas in a single worldview system may be in opposition. One need 
not assume that all the folk ideas of a given culture are necessarily mutually reconcilable 
within a uniform, harmonious worldview matrix. For example, the line is one model of 
American thought. One respects directness and “straight” talk. One dislikes people who 
are “crooked” and one hopes they will eventually go “straight” and get “squared” away (for 
example, ex-con Square Johns) . People who get “out of line” need to be “straightened out.” 
In business, one tries to get a “line” on something, a “line” of goods perhaps. One must be 
“sharp” and look for “angles.” In general, the line is opposed to the circle. Circular reason-
ing is despised, as are most roundabout ways of speaking. “Going around in circles” is a 
traditional metaphor for ine8ectiveness and futility. It is believed that people who are lost 
go in circles. One of the traditional goals of mathematicians is to “square the circle,” a neat 
encapsulation of the “line conquering the circle.”
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Recently, the line versus the circle opposition has taken a new turn. It has been restated 
in terms of straight versus groovy. Curves mean “curvaceous” and sex; lines mean “straight” 
or “square” and the denial of sex. !ere is a movement away from the “straight and narrow” 
towards the “groovy and broad.” It is possible that part of the shi5 has come from African 
American subculture. For decades, African Americans accepted the straight world of the 
dominant white culture, even to the extent of trying to “straighten” kinky, curly hair. But 
'nally, African American culture has begun to stop denying cyclicity and circularity. In 
fact, middle class whites have even begun to imitate African American culture. !is may 
be seen in folk and popular dance. !e “square” dance and the standard popular dance step 
known as the “box step” have yielded to twisting, rotating round dance movements as the 
American white body has sought release from the restricting con'nes of Puritan strait-jack-
ets. Professor Roger Abrahams has suggested to me that the circular worldview may stem 
from the cyclic nature of rural country life with its calendrical cycle as model. Following 
this reasoning, one is tempted to see urban life as insisting upon the more e7cient line as in 
square city blocks and actual e8orts to eliminate curves in well-travelled roads.
!ere are other examples of folk ideas in opposition. For instance, in American culture 
there is the folk idea that all individuals are or should he equal in terms of opportunity. 
We have already mentioned the “Any man can be President” philosophy. !rough rugged 
individualism, any person can in theory move “from rags to riches” in a Horatio Alger-like 
pattern. !is folk idea is supported by the Puritan ethic and capitalism. At the same time, 
there is the folk idea, intimately related to the notion of democracy, that political decisions 
should be made not on the basis of individual wishes, but on the basis of what is deemed 
best by and for the majority. !us if social security and a welfare state are adjudged best 
for the majority, then individuals must turn over the fruits of free enterprise to the state 
for redistribution to the less fortunate. It is not easy to reconcile pure capitalism and pure 
socialism. It is just as di7cult to reconcile pure rugged individualism with the idea that the 
individual must deny individualism in favor of what is best for the group. Both principles 
are taught to American children and the fundamental opposition is le5 unresolved. (In 
some sense, of course, all human societies have to wrestle with the problem of the rights of 
the individual versus the rights of the group to which that individual belongs.) !is is why 
American children may become confused when they learn on the one hand that leader-
ship is a good and necessary thing but then, on the other hand, that in an ideal democracy, 
everyone is equal and leaders are resented.
One solution to the leadership-democracy paradox is suggested by a children’s game. 
It is variously titled “Patterns” or “Find the Leader.” A group of children gather in a circle 
and send an individual who has been chosen “It” out of the room or away from the playing 
area. One child in the circle is then selected as “leader” and all the others have to imitate his 
or her actions, such as handclapping, jumping up and down, and whirling around in place. 
!e leader changes the motions at intervals of his choice. “It” is summoned and given three 
guesses to identify who in the circle is the leader, that is, who is responsible for causing the 
various changes in the group’s movements. Obviously, a successful leader is one who can 
artfully conceal the fact that it is he who is the 'rst to start a new body movement. By the 
same token, the other members of the circle must be able to follow without revealing to 
“It” that they are following rather than leading. !is children’s game may thus be provid-
ing a model for an ideal leadership role in American society, namely, that one should lead 
without making it obvious that he is leading. Americans in positions of authority may be 
forced to give orders in a nonauthoritarian way in contrast to leaders in societies who do 
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not share the folk idea of egalitarianism (“anybody is as good as anybody else”) and who are 
free to lead in autocratic, authoritarian fashion. !is may be why in American culture one 
may ask rather than order a subordinate to perform a certain task. Moreover, subordinate 
employees may be given some of the accouterments of higher status positions, for example, 
enlisted men wearing o7cer-style caps or janitors being rechristened custodians.
!ere are many other folk ideas in American culture which could be mentioned; an 
important one is the idea that science and technology can eventually solve any problem. 
Any problem which has not yet been solved could in theory be solved if enough money 
could be poured into appropriate research e8orts. Here we see a combination of the folk 
idea concerning the infallibility of science and technology and the idea of the “everything 
having its price.” (Also implied is the folk idea that humans can control their environ-
ment—rather than the environment controlling them.) However, the purpose of this essay 
is not to attempt even a partial itemization of American folk ideas but only to call atten-
tion to the possibility of the existence of folk ideas.
One problem arising from the discussion of folk ideas has to do with traditional ste-
reotypes. !e question is: are traditional stereotypes folk ideas or not? By traditional ste-
reotypes, I refer to such notions as “!e French are great lovers,” “Blacks have a natural 
sense of rhythm,” or “Jews have big noses.” !ese might well be examples of what politi-
cal scientists or sociologists would call “myths”; but folklorists would surely not call these 
myths. But just what would they call them? Are they folk beliefs? I am tempted to term 
such traditional statements “folk fallacies” rather than folk ideas. !ey would be folk fal-
lacies because they are demonstrably false. Of course, there is always the matter of “prov-
ing” to everyone’s (including bigots’) satisfaction that folk fallacies are in fact fallacious. 
No doubt, if the distinction between folk fallacies and folk ideas were to be accepted, there 
might well be disputes about where individual items should be appropriately placed and in 
this way should be plunged once more into the hopeless quagmire of genre-type classi'ca-
tory arguments. Yet I do think there is value in making a distinction between folk fallacies 
and folk ideas. One di8erence is that the folk are normally consciously aware of folk falla-
cies (though not necessarily that they are fallacies) and can articulate them without di7-
culty. Folk fallacies are part of the stated premises of a culture. In contrast, individuals may 
or may not be consciously aware of folk ideas and they may not be able to articulate them 
at all. In this sense, folk fallacies tend to be “native” or folk statements as opposed to “ana-
lytic” statements which are descriptions of reality made as a result of and only a5er ana-
lytic study. Folk ideas would be more a matter of basic unquestioned premises concerning 
the nature of man, of society, and of the world, and these premises although manifested in 
folklore proper might not be at all obvious to the folk in whose thinking they were cen-
tral. Folk fallacies such as stereotypes would therefore be part of the conscious or self-con-
scious culture of a people whereas folk ideas would be part of the unconscious or unself-
conscious culture of a people.
!e distinction between conscious and unconscious culture is not always easy to draw. 
By unconscious culture, I do not mean repressed culture in any Freudian sense. Rather I 
refer to the fact that individual members of a culture are not able to consciously articu-
late all aspects of their culture. Fortunately, people with virtually no conscious idea of the 
nature of the grammar of their language are able to speak perfectly well and be understood 
by other members of their culture who likewise have no conscious awareness of the gram-
matical nature of their language. !ere have been many metaphors for this lack of con-
sciousness (for example, a 'sh is not aware it is in water since it knows no other medium), 
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but one of the most apt was used by Ruth Benedict when she remarked that “we do not see 
the lens through which we look.”11
One of the essential tasks of anthropologists and folklorists is to make people aware, 
consciously aware, of their cultures. However, if people become conscious of what was for-
merly unconscious, will the cultural patterning change? In the present context, the ques-
tion would be: if unstated folk ideas become stated folk ideas, will this have any e8ect 
upon the in6uence of these ideas? It is a moot point. On the one hand, one could argue 
that if more Americans were consciously aware of the folk idea that everything has its 
price, it would not necessarily alter this mode of perceiving reality in the slightest. On the 
other hand, if one wished to o8er alternative measurement schemes, it would obviously be 
extremely helpful to know what measurement criteria were already being employed. !us 
making the cultural unconscious conscious is the 'rst step toward change—if that is what 
is desired—much as psychoanalytic therapy aims to help individuals by 'rst making their 
unconscious conscious.
A 'nal point should be made with respect to the relationship between folk ideas and 
folk values. In discussions of worldview, there is commonly a distinction made between 
worldview and ethos. Worldview refers to the cognitive, existential aspects of the way the 
world is structured. Ethos refers to the normative and evaluative (including esthetic and 
moral judgments) aspects of culture.” Hoebel’s terms are “existential postulates” as opposed 
to “normative postulates” or values, though he seems to include both types of postulates 
in the all encompassing term worldview.” In my opinion, it is possible if not probable that 
there may be value judgments surrounding a folk idea, but the folk idea in one sense can be 
considered independent of such value judgments. Assuming there is an American folk idea 
that there is an unlimited amount of good, one can imagine that some individuals might 
feel that this situation was a desirable one while others might feel that it was undesirable. 
!e folk idea per se would simply be an empirical description of the nature of reality (or 
at least a segment of reality as perceived in one particular culture). Folk ideas, then, are no 
more than descriptive constructs and as such they are neither good nor bad. !e idea that 
everything has its price could be either good or bad or neither. In contrast, the proverb 
“Money is the root of all evil” takes a de'nite moral position.
Folklorists in deciding whether or not they wish to make use of a concept such as folk 
ideas should probably consider a number of factors. First of all, there is the question of the 
traditionality of unstated premises. It is one thing to call a tale type traditional and quite 
another to call the one or more folk ideas expressed in that tale type traditional. Moreover, 
if folk ideas are articulated only a5er analysis, isn’t there a considerable risk in calling such 
ideas traditional? Might not one be in danger of labelling a particular analyst’s idiosyn-
cratic formulations as “traditional?” Although an analyst might claim that his formula-
tions of “folk ideas” were extrapolated directly from folklore, they might perhaps be little 
more than 'gments of his fertile imagination.
Secondly, doesn’t the proposed emphasis to be placed upon the search for folk ideas 
constitute a serious threat to the continued research on individual genres? Aren’t folk ideas 
in fact a kind of glori'ed super-genre supposedly underlying all other folklore genres?
!ere is also the question of methodology. How precisely does a folklorist determine 
what the folk ideas of a given folk group are? How can one work inductively from folklor-
istic data to arrive at a delineation of one or more folk ideas?
!ere are certainly legitimate questions to be raised about the conceptualization of 
folk ideas and their utility and practicality for folklore research. Nevertheless, I believe the 
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fundamental issue is the nature of the discipline of folkloristics. If folklorists are interested 
only in collecting and preserving the heirlooms of the past so as to produce a permanent, 
antiquarian “museum of the mind,” then they need not concern themselves with the pos-
sibility of studying folk ideas. However, if folklorists view folklore as raw material for the 
study of human thought, then they might wish to seriously consider adopting this concept 
or an improved analogous one. Folk ideas are not limited to folklore and they can surely 
be found in movies, television, and the mass media generally. (In theory, a given folk idea 
might pervade nearly every aspect of a culture.) Anyone therefore truly interested in folk 
ideas—as opposed to being interested only in proverbs or in jokes—will have to cast his 
net widely enough to include popular or literary culture as well.
If one is intrigued by the possibilities of examining folklore as source material for the 
study of worldview, he or she might welcome a smaller unit of analysis. !e concept of 
worldview is too vague and di8use to be of obvious use to folklorists. However, folk ideas 
as units of worldview are much more manageable. Moreover, those writers who have long 
been accustomed to using the term “myth” in a loose sense might be encouraged to use 
“error” or “folk fallacy” where such is their meaning (as in the “myth” that blacks have 
a natural sense of rhythm) and to use “folk idea” where that is appropriate, such as, the 
“myth” of the frontier in American thought is clearly related to the folk idea of unlimited 
good (with good expressed in space and opportunity), among others.
Finally there is the matter of the relevance of folk ideas to comparative studies and 
applied folklore. It is perfectly conceivable that the identi'cation of sets of folk ideas from 
di8erent cultures will facilitate valuable comparative analyses. No doubt when two cul-
tures come into contact, it is the con6ict of folk ideas which causes the most di7culty. Yet 
inasmuch as these folk ideas are unconscious, unstated premises, it is almost impossible to 
place one’s 'nger on the speci'c details of the con6ict. If folklorists can aid in the task of 
identifying folk ideas, they may be able to assume a key role in improving communications 
between peoples (and subcultures) and reducing the number of misunderstandings which 
might otherwise arise. !is would permit the study of folklore to take its proper place 
among the “applied” social sciences.
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Postscript
Worldview in Folk Narrative
Linda Dégh’s eloquent advocacy of an approach to the study of folk 
narrative which concentrates upon the extrapolation of worldview (1994) is most wel-
come. Dégh rightfully critiques the post-modern muddle which seems to result in either 
re-inventing the wheel or simply spinning wheels already in place (1994:246). As a folk-
lorist who has long been concerned with analyzing worldview (Dundes 1969) utilizing 
folklore ranging from festivals (Dundes and Falassi 1975:185–240) to folk toys (Dundes 
1986), I would like to echo and amplify Dégh’s plea for more attention to worldview in 
folk narrative studies.
First of all, there is an abundant literature devoted to the concept of worldview includ-
ing essays by anthropologists Red'eld (1953), Geertz (1957), and Foster (1966). For rep-
resentative surveys, see Kearney (1972, 1984). As for the more limited area of worldview as 
re6ected in folk narrative, one might mention Melville Jacobs’ all too brief chapter, “World 
View,” in his now classic !e Content and Style of an Oral Literature (1959:195–199), 
Blackburn’s attempt to isolate worldview principles from Chumash oral narratives (1975), 
and Sparing’s e8ort to identify worldview themes in Schleswig-Holstein folktales (1984). 
Perhaps the most inspirational in-depth treatments of the worldview of individual cul-
tures involving some attention to folk narrative would be Marcel Griaule’s Conversations 
with Ogotemmêli (1965) which should be required reading for every serious folklorist, and 
Gerardo Reichel-Dolmato8 ’s Amazonian Cosmos (1971).
Sometimes the folkloristic treatment of worldview is quite limited, if not completely 
idiosyncratic. Italian folklorist Cirese, for example, uses “world-view” to refer exclusively 
to the Marxist-Gramscian notion of the hegemony of the oppressors over the “subaltern” 
(1974). It is true that Gramsci’s famous seven page “Osservationi sul folclore” (1971) did 
utilize the concept of worldview (cf. Byrne 1982), but only in the highly restricted Marxist 
class-conscious sense.
If I were asked to select the best single essay on worldview in folk narrative, it would be 
an easy choice to make. It is Sandor Erdész’s remarkable essay, “!e World Conception of 
Lajos Ami, Storyteller,” which appeared in Acta Ethnographica in 1961. In this essay, we 
learn that an illiterate storyteller’s worldview came largely from details contained in the 
vast repertoire of folktales that he told. Particular worldview premises are documented by 
Erdész when he cites parallels to Ami’s interview responses, parallels from the actual folk-
tales told by Ami. I shall not summarize this fascinating article further but rather urge folk-
lore students to read it in its entirety.
However, the essay does a8ord an excellent opportunity to distinguish two di8er-
ent notions of worldview, both of which are discernible in folk narrative. I should like to 
brie6y distinguish the two notions as a means of encouraging further research in world-
view through folk narrative.
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!e older notion of worldview tended to consider the term synonymous with cosmol-
ogy. Worldview in that sense meant people’s view of their place in the world, in the cosmos. 
!is is the sense employed by Erdész, who notes that Ami sees Budapest as the “center of 
the world,” and that since Adam and Eve fell from the Garden of Eden to land “someplace 
between Vienna and Buda,” the door or gate to Eden is located above that area. As there is 
an upper world, so there is also a lower world which one enters through the “Hole of the 
World” which Ami claimed was to be found somewhere in Russia.
A more modern notion of worldview tends to be more cognitive and structural. It refers 
to the way in which people perceive the world through native categories and unstated 
premises or axioms. !us the cosmology itself (the older sort of worldview) could provide 
data from which one could extrapolate principles of the newer kind of worldview. Let me 
illustrate with a few details from the Erdész essay.
According to Ami, there is a 'rmament so thick that “no human being could cut through 
it.” Even the famed mythical Sky-High tree was forced to curve “thirteen times under the 
'rmament” because it could not break through to achieve its full height. Similarly, it is 
deemed impossible to reach the “edge of the world.” People who tried to cross the North 
Pole with an airplane “got so frozen that they couldn’t break through it.” Where the 'r-
mament touched the earth, it was so low “that the swallow has to drink water kneeling on 
the black cottonweed.” Moreover, the reason why the cottonweed is black is “because the 
sun couldn’t shine under the angle of the sky” and therefore the cottonweed there “cannot 
become green.”
!ese striking images (most of which are derived directly from the folktales told by 
Ami) clearly convey messages of limitation, of stunted growth and development. !e Sky-
High tree was forced to curve thirteen times since it was unable to break through the 
'rmament; a swallow was forced to kneel—a physical impossibility since birds have no 
knees—in order to drink where the 'rmament touched the earth; cottonweed in such an 
enclosure must be black because even the powerful sun cannot reach it. !e worldview 
principles here articulate the fatalistic acceptance of the impossibility of unlimited mobil-
ity. Even the sun is obliged to remain in its own orbit, Ami explains. A peasant must know 
his or her place in the world and remain in it. !ere are impenetrable walls everywhere—
above with the 'rmament and also at the edge of the world. Even with modern technol-
ogy, such as an airplane, one cannot break through the surrounding barriers. (Whether the 
plight of the Hungarian peasant with respect to social or spacial mobility is to be attrib-
uted to the bourgeois class system or to the socialist regime then in place is debatable. 
What is not debatable is the consistent worldview articulated by Ami.)
One important di8erence between the two kinds of worldview discussed above has to 
do with conscious awareness. !e account of worldview as cosmology is clearly conscious. 
Most individuals in the West, for example, presumably could con'rm the folk belief that 
“heaven” is located “above” the earth whereas “hell” is located “below” (despite the fact 
that what is “below” on one side of the earth is the same direction as “above” on the oppo-
site side!) In contrast, it is by no means obvious that either Ami or the folklore-collector 
Erdész, for that matter, were fully aware of the many metaphors of stricture and bounded-
ness. More than likely this second kind of worldview is not in consciousness. It is not like a 
Freudian or Jungian unconscious, but rather unconscious in the same way that speakers of 
a language are not “conscious” of the grammatical laws governing their speech.
It is my hope that future folklorists will seek to delineate the “unconscious” worldview 
postulates which are so artfully articulated in folk narrative and other forms of folklore.
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As the Crow Flies: 
A Straightforward Study of Lineal 
Worldview in American Folk Speech
Introduction
Dundes cited Dorothy Lee’s “Codi'cations of Reality: Lineal and Nonlineal” ([1950] 
1968) as the inspiration for his rhetorical analysis of American speech, in which he sought 
evidence of a lineal worldview. Introducing Lee’s essay in his anthology Every Man His 
Way, Dundes praised it as a work in “comparative cognition,” pointing out that “the per-
ception and classi'cation of ‘objective reality’ is not culture-free, no matter how ardently 
a scientist wishes it were. However, by studying the nature of individual cultural cognitive 
systems, we may be able to see the arbitrariness and the normally unperceived biases of 
such systems, including our own” (1968a).
Writing in 2004 to honor his close friend and colleague Wolfgang Mieder, a world-re-
nowned specialist in proverb scholarship, Dundes expanded on his thesis of the “linear-
ity of American life,” outlined in two paragraphs of “Folk Ideas as Units of Worldview” 
(1971a, and reprinted in this volume). A5er Dundes’s death, Mieder speculated on 
Dundes’s reason for writing on linearity: “I do recall both of us as basically non-religious 
individuals speaking on occasion about life having a beginning and an end, progressing 
along with steps and mutations along the way. We both felt that as two ‘odd birds’ we could 
do no more than to move along with our scholarly work and teaching in a lineal fashion 
‘as the crow 6ies’ before our short life span would straightforwardly come to its end for-
ever” (2006b, 239).
In his focus on lineality, published a year before his death, Dundes especially brought 
out examples of folk speech to demonstrate the analytical method of extrapolating, from 
the rhetoric of folkloric examples, a common theme as an expression of an individual cul-
tural cognitive system. It is important to remember his point, though, that such analy-
ses should not be limited by conventional genre categories, because the theme cuts across 
genres; in Dundes’s own rhetoric, it “underlies” expressions as “unstated postulates” or “cul-
tural axioms.” !e resulting huge stack of examples of lineal references in American culture 
led him to question how distinctive the lineal cognitive system was in the world, and from 
where it may have arisen historically, socially, and psychologically. What set his analysis of 
linearity apart from other worldview principles—such as future-orientation (evident as a 
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faith in success and progress), abundance (also stated as “unlimited good”), and the infal-
libility of science—is the oppositional rhetorical position of linearity against circularity 
within the same society.
As with other cognitive binaries expressed rhetorically, Dundes found that one pole 
tended to dominate over the other, and argued that the American experience, especially, 
had a legacy of linearity. !ere were confrontational moments that drew attention to the 
tension of the binary. In 1971, he found signi'cance in a countercultural protest of “groovy 
and broad” against a “straight” and “square” establishment. In the midst of the Civil Rights 
movement, he also pointed to racial implications of cognitive dissonance between “the 
straight world of the dominant white culture” and the cyclicity and angularity (a term 
used by black folklorist-writer Zora Neale Hurston) of African-American culture in dance, 
music, cra5, and dress (hair). See, for example, the readings on African-American aesthetic 
forms in Mother Wit 'om the Laughing Barrel: Readings in the Interpretation of A'o-
American Folklore, which he edited ( [1973] 1990). Citing his friend and folklorist col-
league Roger Abrahams, he also viewed the binary of city and country as representative of 
linear and circular worldviews, respectively. He commented on the domination of the city 
in the binary: “One is tempted to see urban life as insisting upon the more e7cient line as 
in square city blocks and actual e8orts to eliminate curves in well-travelled roads.”
More balanced, in Dundes’s view, was the unresolved tension between individualism 
(expressed as a single line) and groupness (o5en represented as a circle), which led to an 
especially American vacillation between wanting strong leadership and egalitarian democ-
racy. Perhaps Dundes’s view showed his folkloristic grounding in the social group as the 
basis of identity, since much of American Studies scholarship, based on popular sources, 
tends to emphasize American individualism as a dominant worldview. A folkloristic argu-
ment for a European-American “individual orientation” was made, however, by Barre 
Toelken (1996, 266–72). Another active binary, according to Dundes, was between a sight-
oriented world, popularly associated with literacy and modernity, and the oral/aural chan-
nels of folk society. Using the visual worldview principle underlying sayings on the theme 
of “Seeing in Believing,” emblematic of a “deep seated penchant for the visual sense” among 
Americans (in a title with the saying in Interpreting Folklore [1980b]), Dundes nonethe-
less wondered if electronic media created a postliterate society, which was once more pri-
marily oral/aural because Americans heard their news more than they read it. !is was one 
reason why the media had not displaced folklore, he mused, because the media enabled 
narrative communication. Reliance on “reading, ’riting, and ’rithmetic” was a sign of lineal 
thinking, because it privileged the plot line, signature line, and bottom line, respectively, in 
'xed, and therefore permanently certain, forms. Dundes insightfully remarked, “Americans 
still prefer to get agreements in writing rather than to trust a gentleman’s handshake (a tac-
tile sign) or take someone’s word or say-so (oral sign) for a contract. Once an agreement is 
down in black and white, Americans watch out for, and read, the small print, with an ‘eye’ 
toward avoiding an unfavorable set of conditions” (1980h, 90).
In the present essay, more than in earlier essays, Dundes emphasized the gendered nature 
of line and circle as male and female representations, respectively. It is telling that of the 
many examples he gave in the essay, he chose “As the Crow Flies” for its title. Perhaps this 
was a self-reference to his argument for the prevalence of male chauvinism in American 
folklore, in an essay entitled “!e Crowing Hen and the Easter Bunny” (1980a). !is latter 
essay alluded to variations of the rhyme “Whistling maids and crowing hens, Never come 
to no good ends,” in which crowing was rhetorically connected to male behavior. Besides 
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the idea that a woman who whistled was acting like a man (i.e., the suggestion that whis-
tling was intrusive, even an omen of storms, therefore going against the “expected passive, 
docile, sex-stereotyped behavior norm,” according to Dundes), it was a rooster that was 
supposed to crow (see “Gallus as Phallus” in this volume for further symbolic associations 
of the rooster to hypermasculine display), and a crow that 6ew (6ying being especially 
direct and pointed). 
Dundes o8ered a sobering implication for worldview theory in the cognition of “nat-
ural association,” whereby violent actions were taken to remove a disruption of natural 
order. Reading the rhetoric of the English verse, “I know not which live more unnatu-
ral lives, Obeying husbands or commanding wives,” he warned of the resulting attitude: 
“By implication, a woman who acts like a man is unnatural and should be eliminated.” 
Noting evidence of lore that Dundes neglected (from women particularly) which stig-
matizes men, especially in the context of what historians have called the feminization or 
domestication of American culture, some folklorists countered that Dundes overstated 
his case, and should have analyzed more of the dialogic practices of everyday life in which 
male and female control are negotiated through expressive exchanges in mixed, as well as 
all-male, contexts. In some cases, such as adolescent male recitations and initiations, manly 
bravado may convey insecurity and stigmatization more than dominance and chauvinism. 
See, for example, various essays in Simon J. Bronner’s Manly Traditions, with an a5erword 
by Dundes (2005a).
Another gendered example related to linearity, according to Dundes, was the use of 
“end” in male games, based on crossing and penetrating lines. In “Into the Endzone for 
a Touchdown: A Psychoanalytic Consideration of American Football,” Dundes stated: 
“Evidently there is a kind of structural isomorphism between the line (as opposed to the 
back'eld) and the layout of the 'eld of play. Each line has two ends (le5 end and right 
end) with a “center” in the middle. Similarly, each playing 'eld has two ends (endzones) 
with a mid'eld line (the '5y-yard line). . . . !e object of the game, simply stated, is to 
get into the opponent’s endzone while preventing the opponent from getting into one’s 
own endzone” (1979b; also in Interpreting Folklore [1980b]). He argued that manliness 
was demonstrated or “proven” in the frame of play by a linear (i.e., phallic) attack on a 
male opponent, who was feminized by being penetrated in the rear (see “Gallus as Phallus” 
[1994] for an extension of this argument). In light of Dundes’s argument (and his naval ref-
erences in “As the Crow Flies”), Bronner explored the importance of line crossing as a male 
transformative ritual (2006a).
Dundes used less cross-cultural analysis in this essay than in others, referring loosely to 
lineality as an American or Western worldview, although he intimated that it was becom-
ing dominant globally as a “modern” mode of thought. Lee, in her classic essay, referred to 
the non-lineal thinking of Trobiand Islanders ([1950] 1968); in Dundes’s essay, he gave a 
Native American tribe as an example of a group with circular-based cognition. Folklorist 
Barre Toelken, especially, developed the concept of a circular worldview among the Navajo, 
as a contrast to non-Native linearity, in his widely circulating textbook !e Dynamics of 
Folklore. With regard to Dundes’s attention, in the present essay, to architecture as a sym-
bol of worldview, Toelken observed that “the [Navajo] hogan, not surprisingly, is made 
of a combination of plants (trees and branches used for the internal structure), animal 
substances (like rawhide) used in the lashing of materials together, dirt from the earth 
covering the outside, corn pollen rubbed along the main beams inside when the hogan is 
blessed, and the whole combination created for, and lived by, people whose concept of their 
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position in the world is expressed in terms of circles and interaction with those various aspects 
of nature” (1996, 289; emphasis added).
Dundes’s example of the American perception of the life course as linear, proceeding 
from birth to death, rather than being viewed cyclically, with a process of reincarnation, 
invited comparison to Eastern religious systems and group orientations, which suggest cir-
cularity. Hajime Nakamura’s seminal text, Ways of !inking of Eastern Peoples (1964), did 
not describe Eastern thinking as monolithic. Yet it did identify associations of nature with 
the divine, and the importance of a social nexus in a harmonious group, which was o5en 
represented by circular cosmological icons in China, Tibet, Korea, and Japan (e.g., the 
forces of Ying and Yang incorporated into the circular design of the traditional symbol 
taijitu, or the Poem of Reality in Zen Buddhism, consisting of twenty characters arranged 
in a circle).
If the distinctiveness of linearity as an American worldview within “Western thinking” 
was le5 culturally vague in Dundes’s essay, other studies have been more forceful in his-
torically viewing an American embrace of linearity as a sign of material expansion, tech-
nological progress, and intellectual novelty, characteristic of “modern” American experi-
ence. Historian John Demos traced the American evolution from a traditional, colonial 
world of natural cycles to the Revolutionary environment of architecture and writing, 
which made a “liberating” break with the past by having a “forward, future-directed out-
look . . . [and] the self 'rmly situated at its center” (2004). Simon J. Bronner observed a 
dynamic between the intimate, touch orientation of the community circle, which o8ered 
Americans a sense of belonging, and the rising, sight-oriented, expansive horizon of urban 
technological linearity, which gained prominence since the nineteenth century (1986b). 
Both works avowed Dundes’s line of thought.
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As the Crow Flies: A Straightforward Study of Lineal 
Worldview in American Folk Speech
“We do not see the lens through which we look.” So wrote anthropologist Ruth 
Benedict (1887–1948) in an essay entitled “!e Science of Custom” that appeared in !e 
Century Magazine in 1929. Although this essay was later expanded to become the 'rst 
chapter of her classic Patterns of Culture, published in 1934, for some reason, this succinct 
articulation of the di7culty of perceiving one’s own culturally relative cognitive categories 
was omitted. From a folklore perspective, it suggests that one of the important potential 
contributions of folklore with respect to identifying the characteristics of that critical lens 
may be that native categories of perception are clearly delineated in various genres, includ-
ing those subsumed under the rubric of folk speech.
In 1950, another outstanding anthropologist, Dorothy Demetracopoulou Lee 
(1905–75) published her insightful paper “Codi'cations of Reality: Lineal and Non-
Lineal” in Psychosomatic Medicine. Her main point was to demonstrate that fellow anthro-
pologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) had misread some of his famous Trobriand 
Island ethnographic data by seeing lines where the Trobrianders did not. In other words, 
Malinowski was guilty of imposing Western lineality upon nonlineal phenomena. While 
she did speak of anthropologists referring to “unilinear” or “multilinear” courses of devel-
opment and more generally of Westerners following a “line of thought,” she was not partic-
ularly concerned with documenting Western lineal worldview. !e bulk of her discussion 
provided instances of Malinowski’s misinterpreting Trobriand culture. She did conclude, 
however, that “much of our present-day thinking, and much of our evaluation are based on 
the premise of the line and of the line as good” (Lee 1950, 96).
Lee’s brilliant essay did not receive all the credit it deserved (see Graves 1957). It is my 
contention that Dorothy Lee was on the right track and American folk speech amply con-
'rms her assertion that the line is absolutely central, if not sacred, in American worldview. 
But she did not distinguish between drawing parallel lines and concentric circles as a lec-
turer’s means of making a point. In contrast, I argue it is “straight lines” that are crucial, 
not curved ones. Moreover, the straight lines are o5en displayed in the form of a square or 
box. It is precisely the combination of “line,” “straight,” and “square,” I suggest, that shapes 
the lens through which Americans (and other Westerners) look. !ese constituent fea-
tures that so signi'cantly a8ect our perception are found repeatedly in dozens of examples 
from familiar folk speech.
!e word “line” or the plural “lines” occurs alone, in combination in various com-
pounds, and o5en as an a7x, e.g., guidelines, deadlines, outlines, bloodlines, hemlines, 
necklines, hairlines, headlines, bylines, baselines, goal lines, property lines, airlines, ship 
lines, railroad lines, bus lines, trolley or streetcar lines, chorus lines, battle lines, pipelines, 
assembly lines, picket lines, time lines, datelines, telephone lines, 'shing lines, waterlines, 
coastlines, shorelines, skylines, and lifelines, among many others.
!e line functions as a kind of limit. One must “toe the line,” not “cross the line,” “lay 
it on the line,” or have one’s fate be “on the line.” One may be asked to “hold the line,” 
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meaning to maintain the status quo at any cost to prevent any unfavorable incursion or 
development. One can think or be “in line” (with the prevailing code or trend) and by the 
same token, if an individual’s behavior or suggestion is inappropriate, he may be admon-
ished that he is “(way) out of line.” One may seek to keep a rebellious child “in line,” that is, 
insist that he or she conform to existing social conventions. !e son or daughter of a king 
is said to be “in line” to occupy the throne. Presumably the heir must belong to the appro-
priate “lineage.” To reach the Internet or use e-mail, one must go “online.” Runners begin a 
race at the “starting line” and end at the “'nish line.”
A line can be an occupation or profession. Upon an initial meeting, one person may ask 
another, “What’s your line?” meaning “What do you do for a living?” If one’s vocation is 
the same as one’s father/mother and grandfather/grandmother, one may boast that he or 
she comes from “a long line” of doctors, lawyers, educators, etc. If a line can re6ect the past, 
it can also represent a trajectory pointing toward the future. One can look forward to suc-
cess “down the line.” In business, one speaks of a line of products with the “top of the line” 
being the best. !e “bottom line” refers to the grand total or 'nal 'gure on a 'nancial bal-
ance sheet but more metaphorically, to the 'nal upshot of a contract or deal. If one seeks 
information about a product or a person, he is said to be trying to “get a line on” it. 
A line is also an insincere formulaic ploy (o5en a well-rehearsed sales pitch) or tactic 
intended to sway or seduce an addressee, as in trying to persuade a member of the oppo-
site sex to accept an invitation for a date. !ese are o5en termed “pickup lines.” Such usage 
almost certainly relates to the notion of a “line of argument” or “line of reasoning.” Political 
organizations o5en have speci'c agendas or platforms which may be referred to as “party 
lines.” It may simply be the in6uence of print, but one tends to refer to poetry, even purely 
oral poetry, in terms of lines, and the same goes for “learning one’s lines” or “forgetting 
one’s lines” in a stage play. Clothing has “lining,” and a metaphor speaks of “lining one’s 
own pockets” (with illegal funds). Even clouds have a “lining,” as in the proverb, “Every 
cloud has a silver lining,” which in the best tradition of American optimism urges citizens 
to “always look for the silver lining.”
A line is still a line even if it’s narrow. One speaks of a “'ne line” or a “thin line” when 
making a subtle distinction between two di8erent things. A line is no less a feature for its 
being intermittent, as in a “dotted line” upon which to sign one’s name, say, to open a “line 
of credit” at a bank. With telephones, in former times, one could have a “party line” or 
indulge in a “private line.” A di7cult superior may take a “hard line” in dealing with a sub-
ordinate, especially if his performance is adjudged “borderline,” and consequently “draw 
the line” in demanding future improvement. A 'red employee, without adequate salary 
or bene'ts, may well fall below the “poverty line.” One can also draw a “line in the sand” 
to indicate that an opponent can approach no farther. !e names of famous borders also 
include the word line, such as the Mason-Dixon Line or the Maginot Line. Banks and 
insurance companies o5en “redline” impoverished urban areas where credit is denied resi-
dents. !e red line in this instance serves as an uno7cial and o5en illegal demarcation of 
areas that loan o7cers use to evaluate requests for funds.
It is not just that one is forced to stay “in line” and not “jump the line” by disregarding 
the folk principle of “'rst come, 'rst served” in a “checkout line” at a grocery store, but 
there is an implicit and sometimes explicit understanding that the line must be straight. 
Lines, of course, can be either straight or curved, but the straight line provides the norm. 
“As the crow 6ies” is a traditional response to an inquiry as to how far away a given objec-
tive is. “As the crow 6ies” means the minimum distance from the present point to the 
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objective as measured in a straight line. !ere is also the proverb: “!e shortest distance 
between two points is a straight line.” O5en, however, it is not possible to go directly from 
point A to point B. Only crows (and other birds) can do so, 6ying over obstacles that 
impede the progress of land-bound creatures.
Straight means direct, honest, and right, among other things. One tries to “get one’s 
facts straight,” that is, correct. “Be straight with me” is a request for honesty. “Setting 
the record straight” is an attempt to eliminate previous errors. “Straight from the horse’s 
mouth” refers to an unimpeachable source of information, presumably deriving from 
the practice of actually examining a horse’s teeth (to determine its age and condition) as 
opposed to simply taking the word of a horse trader. To speak “straight from the shoulder,” 
a phrase apparently derived from boxing (referring to a direct punch), means being frank 
and to the point, without exaggeration or embellishment. !e “straight dope” is slang for 
true information. To be a “straight shooter” or a “straight arrow” implies that the individ-
ual in question is completely honest and trustworthy. Someone who is not so dependable 
may be urged to “straighten up and 6y right.” “Straight talk” is sincere, honest talk. To “see 
straight” means to discern reality clearly. “To go straight” implies that one may have had 
a shady past but has now decided to lead a righteous, law-abiding life. If a person “plays it 
straight,” he or she is being totally above board, completely honest. 
If a person is successful in a job, he or she may be promoted. !e promotion may be 
gradual, or it may be dramatic so that he goes “straight to the top.” In stage comedy, the 
“straight man” has to keep a “straight face” when he or she delivers a “straight line” to set up 
the joke’s “punch line” uttered by the principal comedian. Straight can also mean unadul-
terated, as in taking one’s whiskey “straight” or “straight up,” that is, without any diluting 
mixer or ice cubes. To do something “straightaway” means doing it right away. A parent 
may tell a child to “come straight home” a5er school, meaning to come directly home with-
out meandering or taking any wrong turn or detour. Ideally, one’s destination lies “straight 
ahead.” To win seven “straight” games (seven in a row) signi'es that one has won an unbro-
ken series or sequence. Straight also designates conventional norms in sexuality. Hence, a 
“straight” is a heterosexual as opposed to a homosexual, at least in gay slang.
If straight conveys honesty, frankness, forthrightness, then it may be contrasted 
with “crooked” (cf. the abridged form “crook” for a criminal) or “bent,” as in “bent out 
of shape,” or someone who “bends the law” or terms involving circles or the adjective 
“round.” One must not get “out of line” and certainly, as already mentioned, not “cross 
the line.” Incidentally, “cross” implies departing from “straight.” An individual may 
betray another by “crossing up” that person. An even worse betrayal is called a “double 
cross.” In any event, one makes a “beeline” for an objective and does so by going “straight 
ahead” toward one’s goal.
!is is very di8erent from taking a “roundabout” way. Someone who “beats around 
the bush” is not being direct. Someone who gets the “run around” is not being treated in 
an honest, truthful manner. To “mess (kid, horse) around” is to waste time and not stay 
on course. Someone who is driven crazy may be said to be “(a)round the bend.” !ere 
is an old American folk metaphor, “to go ‘round Robin Hood’s barn,” meaning to fol-
low a winding road or be long-winded. “Round Robin Hood’s barn makes a tedious yarn” 
(Whiting 1977, 365; Mieder 1992, 38). !e word “around” may also signify inexactness 
or at best a vague approximation. A friend tells another they should meet “around 've 
o’clock.” !at is certainly not the same as specifying “'ve on the dot” (the dot presumably 
being a point on the line?). Even the use of the Latin “circa” with respect to dates re6ects 
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the same indulgence with approximation. A certain person may be said to have been born 
circa 1900, circa being, of course, cognate with the English word “circle.” A similar nuance 
of around is found in the common leave-taking formula, “See you around,” meaning in no 
particular place at no particular time. To “round o8 ” a number, say an amount of money 
owed, is a self-conscious admission that one is willing to be inexact just for the sake of 
keeping things simple.
!e negative associations of round and roundness in contrast to straight are occasion-
ally reversed in American proverbs. We know that proverbs are famous for presenting two 
completely opposite points of view. “He who hesitates is lost” urges immediate action to 
ensure success while “Look before you leap” recommends caution. !ere is even a proverb 
covering this characteristic of the genre: “!e devil can quote scripture,” meaning that one 
can always 'nd a proverb to justify one’s position. So in contrast to “!e shortest distance 
between two points is a straight line,” we have “!e longest way round is the shortest way 
found.” But by the same token, we also have “Don’t go round the world for a short cut.” So 
the upshot is, “You pays your money, and you takes your choice.” Still the general mistrust 
of round prevails: “Money is round and rolls away” (Mieder 1992, 416).
!e epitome of roundness is, of course, the circle (LoeIer-Delachaux 1947; de Alvarez 
de Toledo 1951). “Circular reasoning” is clearly in opposition to “thinking straight.” In 
terms of logic, if one uses a proposition to lead to a conclusion and then purports to prove 
the proposition by means of the conclusion, one is guilty of “circular reasoning,” the idea 
being that one has completed a circle so there is no starting point. One has argued or rea-
soned in a circle (see Walton 1991; Rips 2002). A folk belief also states that when one 
becomes lost, say in a forest, in the course of trying to 'nd one’s path to safety, one will 
wind up “going around in circles.” A bit of military doggerel, which is, however, known 
generally, con'rms the association of being frustrated or lost with going in circles: “When 
in danger, when in doubt; Run in circles, scream and shout.” Perhaps analogous to going 
in circles as a metaphor for working to no purpose may be the expression “spinning your 
wheels” that signi'es “going nowhere fast.” A wheel is, conceptually speaking, a kind of 
circle (LoeIer-Delachaux 1947, 69), and a “wheeler-dealer” or someone who “wheels and 
deals” is typically a person who is deceptive or even ruthlessly dishonest. Finally, one of the 
most striking pieces of evidence revealing the folk perception of circles is that a repeated 
series of actions that lead to an increasingly negative situation may be termed a “vicious 
circle.” !e adjective is surely telling!
If the circle (and roundness) connotes an undesirable state of confusion, the square 
does the opposite. !e square is obviously an expanded form of straight lines. “To square” 
accounts is to settle matters equitably. One tries to treat others “fair and square,” for exam-
ple, by giving them a “square deal.” Meals that are substantial and satisfactory are called 
“square meals.” One tries to get “squared away,” meaning to get things in order, to be pre-
pared for whatever the future may hold. A “square shooter” is synonymous with “straight 
shooter,” referring to someone who is scrupulously honest. To face an issue “squarely” 
means to confront it head-on and directly. To stand behind someone or something “four-
square” implies being steady, unswerving, and without equivocation. Two opponents will 
“square o8 ” or “square up,” that is, face one another directly, for a 'ght. 
!e literal centrality of square in American (and very likely Western) thought is also 
present in dwellings and city planning. It is no coincidence that major cities typically 
express their identities in open areas commonly called “squares.” !is is so even if the shape 
of the area is not actually a square. Such is the case, for example, with Times Square in New 
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York City. Some city squares are in that quadrangular shape, but many are not. Other ven-
ues such as arenas may re6ect the penchant for squares, e.g., Madison Square Garden, also 
in New York City.
Since the area of a geometric square is the length of one side multiplied by itself—if a 
side is represented by s, then the area of that square is said to be s “squared”—this principle 
has been extended so that any number n multiplied by itself is said to be n squared. !is 
leads further to the term “square root.” !e square root of nine is therefore three. But there is 
nothing literally square about either the number nine or threes. Mathematics has other con-
nections with lines and squares. For centuries, mathematicians interested in number theory 
have been fascinated by what is called the “magic square.” !is consists of an arrangement 
of numbers in the form of a square so that every column, every row, and each of the two 
diagonals adds up to the same sum, this total being called the “constant” (Meister 1952). A 
branch of geometry is called “lineal geometry,” and there are “linear algebras.” In addition, 
there are “linear equations,” and in physics there are “lines of force,” not to mention the “lin-
ear accelerator” by means of which particles are propelled in straight paths.
!e contrast between the square and the circle is not just a matter of there not being 
any vicious squares. !e fundamental opposition between these two basic metaphors is 
signaled by the expression about attempting to “put a square peg in a round hole” or the 
equally apt but perhaps less well known variant “to put a round peg in a square hole.” !e 
phrase may be used to label a mis't, someone deemed not quali'ed or 't to carry out a 
particular task. In the present context, the expression states that squareness and circular-
ity are incompatible; they are mutually exclusive. Another traditional articulation of this 
incompatibility is the mathematical fool’s errand of trying to “square the circle.” !e idea 
of trying to 'nd a circle and square with equal areas is allegedly an insoluble problem, a 
mathematical impossibility (Hobson 1913; Jesseph 1999; but see Ruthen 1989). Hence, 
the idiom is a way of suggesting the futility of a given action. Speaking of futility, when 
some project comes to naught, one may well exclaim that it is “back to square one,” that 
is, one must return to the very beginning of the enterprise to start all over again (possibly 
an allusion to a game such as hopscotch). A wastepaper basket may be referred to as “the 
circular 'le,” that is, the place to deposit unneeded correspondence. It may be worth not-
ing that both of the binary oppositions straight/crooked and square/round are reported 
in a single catchphrase once popular in England. Evidently, a humorous hyperbolic way of 
“setting a man on his word” was to say, “Straight down the crooked lane and all round the 
square” (Partridge 1961, 818).
Because square signals fairness and honesty, one should not be surprised to see just how 
much squareness permeates society. Perhaps the most popular traditional folk dance in 
American culture is called the “Square Dance.” !is may be contrasted with round dances 
such as the waltz, where dancers move or whirl in circular fashion. But for that matter, in 
social dancing, beginners are frequently taught to do the “box step.” Boxes, like squares, are 
linear in nature. One is obliged to remain in a box in the same sense as toeing the line and 
not crossing it.
In baseball, for example, the batter steps into the “batter’s box,” where a pitcher from 
the opposing team throws the ball into what is called the “strike zone,” an imaginary rect-
angular area above home plate through which a pitch must pass for the umpire behind 
the plate to call it a strike. If he misses the strike zone (and the batter doesn’t swing), the 
pitch is labeled a ball, much as a ball hit outside the le5- or right-'eld lines (also called 
“foul lines”) is called a foul (as opposed to fair) ball. !e place where the pitcher stands is 
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sometimes called the “pitcher’s box,” and if too many batters are successful, thus forcing 
him to leave (to be replaced by another pitcher), it is said he has been “knocked out of the 
box.” !e 'nal results of a baseball game, o5en appearing in newspapers and giving the sta-
tistics (e.g., runs, hits, errors, etc.), are called the “box score.” 
Baseball, America’s national pastime, is just one instance of the way boxes and lines per-
meate the culture. A “line drive” or “liner” is a sharply hit ball with little or no arc. One 
of a pitcher’s most e8ective pitches is a “curve” or “curveball,” that is, a ball that does not 
go in a straight line toward home plate but rather bends or curves in its 6ight, the aim 
being to fool the batter so he fails to hit it. In American slang, to “throw someone a curve,” 
taken from baseball, means to ask an unfair question or make an unreasonable demand. 
Again, “curve” like circle and round implies a departure from the “straight and narrow,” 
from directness and honesty.
Many sports and games have lines. For example, in basketball, one shoots foul shots 
from a position immediately behind “the foul line” aka “the free-throw line.” In football, 
there is an “o8ensive line,” consisting of players who protect their quarterback when the 
team is on o8ense, or a “defensive line,” consisting of players who attack the opposing quar-
terback. When a team is on defense, there may be several of eleven players who are posi-
tioned slightly behind the defensive line to shore up the defense, e.g., protect against a 
short pass by the opposing o8ense. !ese players are called “linebackers.” In football, the 
playing 'eld is divided into ten ten-yard strips. Position on the 'eld is accordingly mea-
sured by “yard lines.”
No one likes to “boxed in,” but the fact is that Americans are always “behind enemy 
lines,” so to speak. Lines are everywhere, it seems, and when they meet, they frequently 
form rectangles and squares. (One need look no further than to the shape of most windows 
and window panes, bricks and boards, picture frames, postage stamps, rugs, and hundreds 
of other mundane objects.) !ough businessmen may look for an “angle,” there is always a 
danger of being “cornered.” It is one thing to be boxed in but even worse to be forced into 
a small corner of a quadrilateral enclosure. At sporting events or theaters, would-be specta-
tors go to the “box o7ce” to purchase tickets. Typically, the best seats in the house are the 
“box seats.” At sporting events, spectators are not allowed to enter the actual playing area, 
e.g., the “boxing ring” (despite its name, a square) or the baseball or football 'eld. !ey 
are obliged to remain on the “sidelines.” An injured player may have to be “sidelined” for a 
period of time. In ice hockey, a player who commits an infraction is punished by being sent 
to a particular area on the sidelines termed the “penalty box.”
Houses and rooms therein may resemble boxes, and in the bedroom, one sleeps on a 
rectangular mattress that sits squarely on a “box spring.” O7ce workers may be forced to 
occupy small spaces called “cubicles.” (Why are pieces of ice used to chill drinks in the shape 
of cubes? Round bits of ice surely function equally well.) Early on, children are socialized by 
such rhymes as “Step on a line, break your father’s (mother’s) spine.” !e variant uses terms 
other than line, but the message is the same: “Step on a crack, break your father’s (moth-
er’s) back.” A line is a limit that must be respected, that is, not stepped on. In tick-tack-toe, 
the winner is the person who can draw a straight line through either three x’s or three o’s. In 
hopscotch, one must step carefully so as not to go outside any of the series of boxes. 
Whether it’s the military or show business, individuals are constantly asked to “line up.” 
Suspected criminals are frequently asked to participate in a “lineup” (to see if eyewitnesses 
can identify them as perpetrators of a crime). One also speaks of an outstanding “lineup” of 
talent, either on a sports team or a theatrical stage. Drunk drivers, when stopped by police 
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o7cers, may be asked to “walk a straight line” (as a sobriety test to prove that they are suf-
'ciently sober to be permitted to continue driving their vehicles).
It should be noted that despite the ubiquity of lines and squares in American worldview, 
the semantic associations are not always positive. A square in slang terms is a “strait-laced” 
person, someone who is excessively conventional and law abiding. !ere have even been a 
few proverbial attempts to denigrate squareness, for example, “Be there or be square.” In 
other words, show up for the event in question unless you are too inhibited or fearful to 
do so. Other traditional verbal e8orts to escape the vise of linearity include the notion of 
“reading between the lines” and the exhortation to “think outside the box.” But it can be 
said that these very attempts to escape the boundaries imposed by lines and boxes con'rm 
the existence of such cultural restraints.
If a person is terminally ill in the hospital and the EEG monitor suddenly shows that he 
or she has “6atlined,” one can safely say that person has reached “the end of the line” and, 
unless cremated, is very likely to be shortly therea5er buried in a box (co7n).
What can we conclude from this brief demonstration of the apparent American pen-
chant for straight lines and squares as well as a complementary mistrust of round curves and 
circles? Do we, in fact, have a window on a facet of American worldview? Anthropologist 
Aidan Southall suggests in a provocative, if admittedly speculative, essay devoted to an evo-
lutionary approach to architecture that original “circularity” has given way to “rectangular-
ity” (1993, 378). Citing the discovery of a dome-shaped construction of arched branches, 
unearthed in the Ukraine and said to be '5een thousand years old, perhaps one of the old-
est-known examples of human architecture, Southall wonders if this structure in any way 
symbolized the “dome of heaven.” He might well have also considered such examples as the 
shape of the Eskimo igloo or the curious beehive-shaped trulli in the village of Alberobello in 
southern Italy. In any event, he remarks that whereas “sticks and stones are naturally round,” 
they tend to be replaced as building materials by the cultural invention or borrowing of “rect-
angular bricks and square stones.” He notes further, “Round stools precede square thrones 
and chairs” and that “humankind as a whole has clearly moved from the universal occupa-
tion of the round to an almost universal occupation of the rectangular” (1993, 379).
Here is Southall’s thesis in his own words:
It is more natural (though I use this adjective with great caution), to live in the 
round than in the square, whether it is a question of dwelling or village, settle-
ment or city. For virtually nothing in nature appears in rectangular form, whereas 
round, spherical and curved phenomena, both stationary and in motion are both 
ubiquitous and so impressive as to imprint themselves on the human imagination 
and consciousness. Is the rectangular city, then, a symbolic statement of human 
culture triumphing over nature by making an opposite statement? Surprisingly, 
in all the literature on nature and culture I have not noticed the question raised. 
With the other pair lurking behind, it becomes a question of whether the rectan-
gular city is a male statement as well.” (1993, 380)
Southall is not the 'rst to suggest an evolutionary sequence from circular to rectangu-
lar structures. Robbins, for instance, suggested that dwelling shapes and settlement pat-
terns were related to whether people were nomadic or sedentary: “Considerable archaeo-
logical data also indicate that as cultures have moved from shi5ing to more settled subsis-
tence patterns temporally, there has been a corresponding trend from circular to predomi-
nantly rectangular dwellings,” and he hypothesized “that circular ground plans will tend 
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to be associated with relatively impermanent or mobile settlement patterns, and that rect-
angular house ground plans will tend to be associated with more permanent or sedentary 
community settlement patterns” (1966, 7; see also Flannery 1972, 29–30). 
One emerging controversial issue is not so much whether there are round or square 
dwellings, but rather whether or not speci'c social organizational constellations are asso-
ciated with either one (see Saidel 1993 and Flannery’s response). Of interest in the pres-
ent context is the possibility there may be a common observable pattern in both house 
type and the con'guration or grouping of multiple dwellings. Whiting and Ayres claim 
(1968, 126) that societies that build rectangular houses tend to arrange them in a line or 
square. If this is the case, it indicates that the pattern of circularity or squareness may apply 
equally to house or dwelling shape and the overall settlement plan. Moreover, the charter, 
so to speak, for such a pattern may well extend to the cosmos. One explanation for the pri-
ority of the circle is that the sun (and moon) are perceived as celestial circles (Peet 1888; 
LoeIer-Delachaux 1947; Lurker 1966, 523), not to mention the perception of the hori-
zon. Hence, architectural plans might have been intended to mirror the celestial model. 
One thinks of the circular form of Stonehenge, for example, as a prime example of a likely 
sacred construction connected with sun worship.
Lest the reader think that the idea that circularity may be manifested in dwelling con-
struction or other social forms is just pure speculation on the part of academics, one should 
ponder the following testimony given by a talented professional Oglala Sioux storyteller in 
the early twentieth century:
!e Oglala believe the circle to be sacred because the Great Spirit caused every-
thing in nature to be round except stone. . . . !e sun and the sky, the earth and 
the moon are round like a shield. . . . Everything that breathes is round like the 
body of a man. Everything that grows from the ground is round like the stem of 
a tree. Since the Great Spirit has caused everything to be round, mankind should 
look upon the circle as sacred for it is the symbol of all things in nature except 
stone. It is also the symbol of the circle that marks the edge of the world. . . . !e 
day, the night, and the moon go in a circle above the sky. . . . For these reasons the 
Oglala make their tipis circular, their camp circle circular and sit in a circle for all 
ceremonies. !e circle is also the symbol of the tipi and of the shelter.” (Walker 
1917, 160; italics added)
It may well be that the distinction between nature and culture is not so much matched 
by one between the circle and the square as by the presence or absence of the line. Nature 
does not necessarily come in lines. Rather, humans attempt to impose order by perceiving 
or drawing lines. In terms of folk speech, there is a desire to “connect the dots,” but the con-
nected dots may form circles as well as squares. Lines of latitude and longitude follow the 
shape of the earth. Still, Southall may be correct in identifying a preference for rectangles, 
though I suggest that it would be more accurate to say a preference for straight as opposed 
to curved lines. It is a desideratum to “get all one’s ducks in a row,” and it is surely no coinci-
dence that one tends to plant crops in straight rows, or that the military obliges soldiers to 
march in precise line formations, or that seniority and rank are indicated by the number of 
stripes, which are essentially glori'ed lines. In the navy, there is a distinction between “line 
o7cers” as opposed to sta8 or supply o7cers, referring to an old label assigned to warships 
or “ships of the line.” All military units, not just the navy, insist on performing prescribed 
tasks “in the line of duty.”
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While the evidence adduced from American folk speech cannot necessarily support 
the evolutionary aspects of Southall’s argument, it seems to corroborate his “delineation” 
of a critical distinction between the circle and the square. If one accepts and expands upon 
his suggestion that the “rectangular city” is male—and one can easily cite numerous exam-
ples of penile architecture, for example, the Washington Monument or the Empire State 
Building—then one may go on to propose that roundness and circles belong to the realm 
of the feminine. In evolutionary terms, the (linear?) progression from circle to square 
then corresponds to the alleged schema whereby original matriarchy was in time replaced 
by patriarchy. Certainly in American folk speech, “curvaceous” refers to a woman’s well-
shaped 'gure, signifying voluptuousness. It would not be used to refer to a man’s physique. 
Moreover, it is women, according to American male stereotypes, who are accused of not 
being able to think logically, that is, lineally.
In Shakespeare’s day, we have indisputable evidence that circle referred to the female 
pudendum. In Romeo and Juliet (2.1.23–26), we 'nd Mercutio’s bawdy remark: “‘Twould 
anger him to raise a spirit in his mistress’ circle of some strange nature, letting it there 
stand till she had laid it, and conjured it down.” In more recent times, women of easy vir-
tue were called “round heels,” presumably because they spent so much time on their backs 
that their heels became increasingly rounded. (!e term is also applied to inferior box-
ers, who were so frequently knocked out that they consequently su8ered a similar fate.) 
So perhaps one can make a justi'able case that women are round while men are square. It 
is, a5er all, women who by nature have menstrual “cycles”; men do not. !e stereotypical 
association of women with roundness and men with squareness (and hence women with 
vagueness, dissemblance, and dishonesty, as opposed to men with precision, directness, 
and candor) can easily be construed as part of the larger paradigm that “aligns” women 
with nature and men with culture (Ortner 1974). For that matter, the proposal that “recti-
linear represents the male body image and curvilinear the female” is not new (see Whiting 
and Ayres 1968, 128).
However, I would argue that both men and women in American culture think in lineal 
terms. !is may be why there is resistance to the notion of reincarnation. Reincarnation 
implies that a person’s being or soul, a5er death, is recycled. A person is reborn and begins 
life anew. In some religions, the recycling is repeated ad in'nitum. In American worldview, 
in contrast, the progression from birth through life to death is an irreversible path or line. 
One may choose to believe (in a culturally sanctioned denial of human mortality) that 
one continues to live on in heaven, but that belief does not include the possibility of being 
reborn on earth as a new baby. Americans do observe a certain cyclicity of seasons: spring, 
summer, fall, winter, a sequence from birth to death and then rebirth, as well as the recur-
rent series of the days of the week and months of the year, and Eliade credits the phases 
of the moon: “appearance, increase, wane, disappearance, followed by reappearance a5er 
three nights of darkness” as contributing signi'cantly to the belief in cyclical concepts of 
time (1954, 86). Nevertheless, years, the larger temporal units, are counted serially in an 
irreversible sequence. One can go back in time only through 'ction and fantasy. !e point 
is that Americans, males and females alike, perceive both time and space in lineal terms. It is 
of some interest that a native Aleut environmentalist from Alaska claims that it is precisely 
the lineal bias of Western society that causes problems in the repeated failure to understand 
the cyclical worldview systems of many aboriginal societies (Merculie8 1994).
We may conclude, therefore, that Dorothy Lee was right when she alluded to the 
American (and Western) propensity toward codifying reality in lineal terms. In fact, the 
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straight/circular dichotomy is of some antiquity; it existed in classical Greek literature and 
philosophy (Bellew 1979). However, we may wish to modify slightly Ruth Benedict’s pes-
simistic dictum that “we do not see the lens through which we look.” Inasmuch as folklore 
does encapsulate native cognitive categories, we may through its analysis indeed be able 
to see at least some small portion of that lens, as I hope these few lines have succeeded in 
demonstrating. On the other hand, perhaps I simply assumed what I planned to prove, in 
which case I am undoubtedly guilty of circulus probandi.
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Much Ado About “Sweet Bugger All”: 
Getting to the Bottom of a Puzzle 
in British Folk Speech
Introduction
Dundes’s frequent reference to folklore’s homoerotic symbolism, which is missed by schol-
ars who are narrowly focused on genre studies, supported Freud’s view that homosexual-
ity was “constitutional,” or innate, in humans, but was socially suppressed. Freudian theory 
holds that society inhibits same-sex a8ection, especially for males, and individuals deal 
with the restraint by expressing their desires, as well as frustrations, in symbols found in 
dreams—and folk customs and narratives. For instance, in “Infantile Sexuality” (his sec-
ond of !ree Contributions to the !eory of Sex), Freud noted that the “anal zone” is sig-
ni'cantly “erogenous” at an early age. He wrote, “!rough psychoanalysis, one 'nds, not 
without surprise, the many transformations that normally take place in the sexual excita-
tions emanating from here, and that this zone o5en retains for life a considerable fragment 
of genital irritability” ([1905] 1995).
Another of Dundes’s concerns, drawn from Freud, was the relation of folklore to human 
development and gender identity. Following sexual development through the life course, 
Freud understood puberty as a special period when con6icting desires—a8ective ties to 
the mother and father, a combination of homoerotic and heterosexual impulses, simul-
taneous longing for past childhood and future adulthood—produced anxieties that were 
projected in an abundance of rituals, jokes, and customs. Freudian theory further holds 
that a common response to extra societal pressure on the male is for him to separate from 
his feminine attachments by symbolically repudiating his mother, so as to 't the expec-
tation of acquiring the manly traits of independence, aggression, and strength. !e boy 
shi5ed his attachments to other males, Freud observed, and dealt with ambivalent feelings 
of embracing, and replacing, the father. Of consequence to the nature of male initiatory 
rituals, male bonding invites the risk of homophobic prejudice, and males o5en compen-
sate with ritualized displays of aggressive, hypermasculine, and homophobic behavior, or 
so the theory goes.
To Dundes, it appeared odd that, according to this theory, homosexuality was an inte-
gral part of the social and psychological dynamic of male development evident in the 
symbolism of folklore, but that cultural scholars had been relatively silent on the matter. 
212  !e Meaning of Folklore
Dundes surmised that despite the paths of folklore investigation opened by the Freudian 
revolution, cultural scholars, particularly folklorists, resisted taking this interpretative 
route, both on an external level, because of a socially instilled homophobia, and internally, 
because of their proclivity toward anal eroticism—evident in an “obsession” with collec-
tion and classi'cation of piles of texts (see his essay on the “Psychology of Collecting” at 
the end of this volume). Texts with homosexual themes were de'ned as “obscene,” and not 
analyzed, even though risqué material in jokes, customs, and speech are prevalent in oral 
tradition. !is, to Dundes, epitomized the folkloristic dilemma of keeping an open mind 
while probing the folk mind. Stated as a question, can scholars free themselves from cul-
tural biases so as to render the meaning of traditions in culture—especially when there is 
a suppression of liberated, critical inquiry? Notable exceptions to the prevalent suppres-
sion of scholarly inquiry into erotica, frequently cited by Dundes as Freudian analyses of 
humor, were Gershon Legman’s Rationale of the Dirty Joke, which included a long section 
on homosexuality (1975, 55–183), and Martha Wolfenstein’s Children’s Humor (1978), 
with a foreword by Alan Dundes. Elliott Oring is a prominent folklorist who o5en dis-
puted Dundes’s interpretations of humor as projections of sexual and aggressive tenden-
cies. Instead, Oring proposed the contextual concept of “appropriate incongruity” as an 
alternative to psychoanalytic interpretation (2003, 1992). Dundes emphasized humor as 
societal constructs, but there are also a variety of essays on individual humor (e.g., Oring 
1984b; Davies 1998).
As a folklorist, Dundes strove to view the relation of folklore to homosexuality as one 
more problem to be explicated. In examining the acquisition of gender identity during 
adolescence, manly displays invited analysis because of their function in repudiating the 
feminine by enacting homosexual activities. To Dundes, the prevalence of homoerotic 
content in folkloric performance also suggested the constant emergence and enactment 
of folklore as expressions of wish ful'llment, and as projective processes. In addition to 
viewing folklore as a consequence of anxiety and ambiguity, a 'ctive plane or social outlet in 
which con6icts could be mediated, Freudian theory raised questions of the psychological 
source of folklore for Dundes, particularly in the symbolic models of dreams. Although his 
interpretive logic is rooted in Freudian theory (i.e., the discernment of symbols as signi'ers 
in the outward, disguised expression of repressed thoughts which are moving from uncon-
scious to conscious levels), Dundes applied the interdisciplinary concepts of cultural rela-
tivism, textual and contextual comparison, and linguistic structuralism to depathologize 
homosexuality, and place it in a cross-cultural perspective. He unshackled homosexuality 
from the biological determinism of “constitution” and reproductive function, and located 
it culturally in the issues of societal worldview, and of gender, age, and national identity.
In this essay concerning the folk speech complex of “bugger,” representing a sodomite, 
Dundes went beyond the usual facile comparison of linguistic di8erence between British 
and American English (e.g., a “li5” in Britain is an “elevator” in the United States). He 
addressed the symbolic and cognitive signi'cance of distinguishing active from passive 
sexual roles in the British mindset. !is led to questioning the meaning of replacing bugger 
in America with words that did not di8erentiate between these roles. Characteristically, 
Dundes used a play on words in the title of “Much Ado About ‘Sweet Bugger All.’” Readers 
may think of Shakespeare’s play “Much Ado About Nothing,” and wonder whether cul-
tural impact can be shown from an analysis of a single word. !e “nothing,” though, refers 
to the idiomatic meaning of “bugger all,” and Dundes showed that there is indeed much 
ado about it. He demonstrated the national obsession with rhetoric and its negation in the 
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United States, and raised the question of the relationship of language to culture. !e ratio-
nale for this analysis was that rhetoric was a socially constructed vehicle for self-knowl-
edge, while language was the primary expression, from early on in people’s lives, of the 
workings of a mind responding to social and historical conditions. Folk speech told schol-
ars about deep-seated values conveyed, through tradition, into everyday life. Similarly, 
Dundes argued that what made people laugh was o5en what they took most seriously, or 
was what they had di7cultly in broaching in everyday speech, and in their consciousness. 
Humor therefore deserved analysis, to understand anxieties in the course of life and the 
contexts of di8erent cultures.
Although Dundes presented the divide across the Atlantic vis-à-vis the word bugger in 
either/or terms, readers can consider whether the shared American and British fondness 
for “boogie” and “bogey” men in children’s folklore may be related conceptually, if not 
etymologically, to bugger. Boogie and bogey are usually traced to a specter or goblin, but 
they are frequently reported as applying to a dreadful character (consistently male), an old, 
ugly, or black man. !e “bug” root is found, in fact, in various 'gures scaring children, such 
as buggie, bugaboo, and bugbear. Linguist John Widdowson observed that the complex 
of boo, bug, boggart, pooh, and poop all have “unpleasant or frightening connotations” 
because of the use of labial sounds in the initial positions of these words. According to oral 
tradition, scary “boogie” 'gures o5en lurk in closets and under the bed. Narrations involv-
ing these 'gures exert social control over children. But is this because of an unconscious 
fear of molestation, as well as the more conscious fear of the dark? Or is the tradition con-
nected to Freud’s idea of anal sexuality early in human development, by suggesting the risk 
of assault on a child’s erogenous zone while that child is sleeping in the dark? Is there sex-
ual signi'cance in the common rhetoric of the boogie man “having,” “getting,” “grabbing,” 
“gobbling,” “pouncing on,” and “bagging” children, especially as a metaphor for the conse-
quences of “immoral or undesirable behavior,” to quote Widdowson (1977)?
Boogie men in both America and Britain are connected by being less o5en ghosts and 
goblins than scary men, and they are o5en connected racially to dark or diabolical 'g-
ures. Yet Dundes has a credible point that in America, the sexual object may be male or 
female, and the binary collapses between receiver and giver. !e American jazz dance of 
boogie-woogie (perhaps a play on the erotic “oriental” dance of “hoochie-coochie” at late-
nineteenth-century world fairs) is usually visualized as a gyration of the hips and but-
tocks, and is especially sexually suggestive in the frequent call to “boogie my woogie” or 
“boogie on down!” !e genre—a musical performance with energetic key pounding and a 
host of double entendre lyrics—can also be viewed as sexual, with animated variations on 
the upper keys overlaying a steady bass beat. An example of a traditional verse in African-
American boogie music, with its sexual bravado and verbal dueling, is: “I like your mama, I 
like your sister too, I did like your daddy, but your daddy wouldn’t do, I met your daddy on 
the corner the other day, You know about that he was funny that way.” (For more on homo-
sexual themes in blues and boogie music, see chapter four in Paul Oliver’s !e Meaning of 
the Blues [1960]). Even if readers accept or deny that there are more cognates of bugger in 
American usage than Dundes allowed, they should heed Dundes’s central proposition that 
the cultural context, and folkloric expression, of related tendencies toward homophobia 
and homoeroticism vary according to historical and social conditions.
Prior to writing this essay, Dundes had inquired into di8erences of worldview between 
Americans and Brits in “Misunderstanding Humor: An American Stereotype of the 
Englishman” (1982; reprinted in his Cracking Jokes [1987]). In this study, he examined 
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jokes concerning the symbolism of national di8erences in the English language. O5en 
distinctions between English and American usage (such as the British use of “tin” for 
what Americans call a “can”) became the basis of humor, underscoring the stereotype that 
Americans were inferior while the Brits were superior. Linguistically, Dundes observed, 
Brits viewed the Americans as exaggeration-prone, and the Americans viewed Brits as 
favoring understatement. Perhaps inspiring the later study on “bugger,” Dundes reported 
“one of the very best examples of the marred anecdote tradition” was a misinterpretation 
of a limerick by an Englishman on an American practice of sex.
For other interpretations by Dundes of homoeroticism in di8erent cultural traditions, 
see Dundes, Leach, and Özkö 1970; Dundes 1979b (reprinted in Interpreting Folklore 
[1980b]); Dundes and Pagter 1991; Dundes and L. Dundes 2002; and Dundes 2002a, 
2004c. For examples of folklorists applying Dundes’s explanations for homoeroticism in 
folklore, see Mechling 1980; Newall 1986; Dresser 1994; and Bronner 2006a.
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Much Ado About “Sweet Bugger All”: Getting to the 
Bottom of a Puzzle in British Folk Speech
Introduction
!ere is a well-known quotation enjoying near proverbial status claiming that “England 
and America are two nations (countries) divided by a common language.” According to 
the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, this bit of oxy moronic wisdom is usually attributed 
to George Bernard Shaw (Partington 1992, 638) despite the fact that it does not seem to 
appear in the playwright’s published writings. It is not listed, for example, in Bryan and 
Mieder’s compre hensive !e Proverbial Bernard Shaw: An Index to Proverbs in the Works 
of George Bernard Shaw (1994).
On a purely lexical level, it is easy enough to demonstrate the “divide” and there have 
been quite a number of semi-popular books containing lists of many of the distinc-
tive vocabulary di8erences (de Funiak 1967; Bickerton 1973; Moss 1978; Schur 1987; 
Walmsley 1987; Davies 1997). I am not speaking of variations in spelling, for example, 
American “6avor” versus British “6avour,” nor am I concerned with di8erences in pro-
nunciation, for example, of the word “tomato” (Americans pronounce the second vowel 
like the one in “may” while the English pronounce the second vowel like the one in the 
abbreviated form of “mamma,” that is, “ma”) but of actual clear-cut lexical distinctions. 
Examples would include the following:














An example of the sort of sexual terminology that is the subject of this article would be 
wank o8 (British) and jerk o8 (American).
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!is brief list is meant only to give a few representative examples of de'nite di8erences 
between British and American English (cf. Zviadadze 1983 and Davies 1997). !ese lexi-
cal pairs tend to be in complementary distribution. No American would feel comfortable 
referring to a lorry carrying a load of crisps. Nor would s/he be likely to refer to a “jerk” as 
a “wanker” even though both terms derive similarly from slang idioms for masturbation. 
And few Americans are even aware of the large number of British slang expressions involv-
ing the term “bugger.”
Bugger and Buggery
Bugger in its original and literal sense refers to an act of sodomy; that is, an act of anal pen-
etration. Bugger as a noun signi'es the active agent in such an act while bugger as a verb 
refers to the act itself. Legman (1975, 75) o8ers several folk de'nitions of buggery: Queen 
Victoria asks her chamberlain, “What is a bugger?” “A bugger, Your Majesty,” replies the 
courtier imperturbably, “is a man who does another man an injury behind his back.” !is 
text comes from England c. 1927. In a variant, it is a butler who replies, “A bugger is an 
individual who enlarges the circle of his acquaintances.” Another folk de'nition of bug-
gery cited by Legman is: “Buggery: !e right man in the wrong place,” which he points out 
is undoubtedly intended as a spin-o8 of the folk de'nition of adultery as “!e wrong man 
in the right place” (Legman 1968, 791).
Buggery in Limericks
!e popularity of buggery as a folk theme is nowhere more evident than in limericks. 
Among the dozens referring to buggery reported in Legman’s canon ical collections, the 
'rst published originally in Paris in 1953 (1974, 92–108) and the second compilation 
some years later (1977, 187–218), is the following:
!en spoke the headmaster of Rugger,
A most accomplished old bugger:
“I spend half each night
With a smooth catamite.
My wife? I don’t even hug’er” (Legman 1977, 212, no. 1051).
Although some buggers are thus depicted as women-hating homosexuals, there are also 
limericks indicating that females may provide appropriate fodder for such appetites (cf. 
Legman 1974, 110, no. 534), or the object of a bugger’s action in the world of limericks 
may frequently be an animal rather than a human. Legman includes numerous examples 
under “Zoophily” (1974, 118–36; 1977, 238–71) and La Barre in his pioneering survey 
of limerick content notes that “Male bestiality occurs with an ape, hog, cat, parrot, mule, 
porcupine, bear, swans, owls, a duck and a bug” (1939, 208). One representative example, 
a truly classic limerick, should su7ce:
!ere was a young man of St John’s
Who wanted to bugger the swans,
But the loyal hall-porter
Said, “Pray take my daughter!
!em birds are reserved for the dons” (Legman 1974, 130, no. 637).
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!e limerick is a 'xed-phrase folkloristic genre, meaning that the reciter performs a 
given text exactly verbatim each time s/he narrates it. (Free-phrase genres, in contrast, 
allow for improvisation and the wording may vary.) !e precise and invariable generic 
restrictions with respect to meter and rhyme make it an ideal form for obscene content 
(for discussion of some of the more formal characteristics of limericks, see Matthews 1911, 
144–45; Bouissac 1977; Bibby 1978, 69–75). !e underlying rationale is to manage to 
compress as much content as possible within severely limiting textual constraints, so the 
limerick embodies the more or less successful insertion of sexual content in a narrowly 
de'ned restrictive poetic container. If artfully constructed, the last line of the limerick may 
well serve as a 'tting climax to a purported sexual intrigue.
In any case, the abundant limerick tradition clearly demonstrates that buggery unques-
tionably refers to anal intercourse, and can refer to male or female sexual objects, human or 
animal. It is also noteworthy, as Legman points out, that the limerick is part of the folklore 
of the educated classes (1964, 439; cf. La Barre 1939, 204; Belknap 1981, 28) rather than 
the uneducated, and since buggery is such a frequent subject of limericks, one can logi-
cally assume that the popularity of “bugger” idioms in England cannot be explained away 
as simply being a vulgar practice of lower-class speech. !ere is even a classic anecdote that 
attributes the use of the word to none other than King George V. Supposedly, on his death-
bed in 1936, his last words were said to be “How goes [or “is”] the Empire?” But a much 
more famous and well-known tradition o8ers an alterna tive version. According to this 
bit of apocrypha, his physician to cheer him up suggested he would soon be well enough 
to visit his favorite resort, Bognor Regis, at which point the King allegedly responded: 
“Bugger Bognor!” (Guthke 1992, 207 note 4; Green 1999, 20).
Although there has been some debate about where and when the limerick form may 
have originated (Baring-Gould 1967, 29; Belknap 1981), a few author ities have claimed 
an English origin for it. Brander Matthews remarked, “!e humble limerick has the dis-
tinction of being the only 'xed form which is actually indigenous to English” (1911, 145). 
Similarly, Norman Douglas, in his delightfully witty 1928 compilation, Some Limericks, 
insisted that limericks are “English to the core” and “are as English as roast beef ” (1928, 
24 and 25). Others, including Legman (1974, lxxii), concur with respect to the theory that 
the limerick seems to be an original English creation. Whether or not the theory is correct, 
it is safe to say that whatever the origin of the limerick may have been, the frequency of 
occurrence of “buggery” in English limericks is irrefutable. Moreover, it is also to be found 
repeatedly in “rugby songs,” a staple of the English bawdy folk song tradition (Morgan 
1967; 1968). Here is just one stanza from the classic “!e Good Ship Venus,” which in fact 
is in limerick format:
!e captain’s name was Slugger
He was a dirty bugger
He wasn’t 't
To shovel shit
On any bugger’s lugger (Morgan 1967, 68).
“Bugger” in British Folk Speech
A survey of entries in various English dictionaries does reveal that “bugger” is “chie6y 
British” (Aman 1986–87, 238–41). !is is con'rmed by entries in Ameri can slang 
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dictionaries stating that “!e standard English sense ‘sodomite’ is no longer commonly 
understood in the U.S.” (Lighter 1994, 293). Writing in the 'rst half of the twentieth cen-
tury, Mencken claimed that “bugger” was “not gener ally considered obscene in the United 
States.” Mencken also recalled that as a small boy, he heard his father use “bugger” o5en “as 
an a8ectionate term for any young male,” adding that “if it shows any 6avor of impropri-
ety today the fact must be due to English in6uence” (1938, 314). An authoritative diction-
ary of American regional English cites a 1945 discussion of New England sailor slang that 
observed that “to bugger is to confuse or perplex,” such that “I’ll be buggered” is an expres-
sion of mild astonishment. !e discussion cited includes:
!at seamen—at least '5y years back—had not the remotest idea of the real 
meaning of the word is amply proved . . . by the fact that they used it freely in the 
presence of respectable women. (Cassidy 1985, 437)
Along the same lines, we 'nd that “bugger all,” which means “nothing,” is labelled as 
“Rare in the United States” (Lighter 1994, 294). What we have, then, is “bugger” as a very 
common slang item in Great Britain (and Australia) that is virtually absent in American 
slang. Moreover, it is “a wholly innocent word in America” but “not at all welcome in polite 
conversation in Britain” (Bryson 1990, 224). Hughes, in his Swearing: A Social History of 
Foul Language, Oaths and Profanity in English, ranks “buggery” as the most 6exible term 
of all English obscenities (1992, 31), claiming it is even more 6exible than “fuck” though 
Sheidlower’s remarkable compilation (1995) of phraseological constructions based on the 
F word might challenge that assertion. (It is curious that the 'eld known as “Phraseologie” 
[cf. Pilz 1981] in Germany and Europe generally, a 'eld which treats traditional idioms 
ranging between single lexical items of folk speech and sentential proverbs, appears not to 
be o5en identi'ed by that label in the Anglo-American academic world.)
Perhaps the most common phraseological construction involving “bugger” is “bugger 
o8,” demanding that the addressee depart, leave immediately, get lost, or cease bothering the 
speaker. We 'nd “bug o8 ” in American slang, meaning “Get out!” or “Go away!” (Cassidy 
1985, 434; Lighter 1994, 295; Spears 1997, 51), but with absolutely not the slightest con-
notation of “hugger.” !e likely original English phrase in question, “bugger o8,” is deemed 
equivalent to “piss o8 ” (Phythian 1986, 135) or “sod o8 ” (ibid., 164), which is another 
expression totally absent from American folk speech. It is noteworthy that the exhorta-
tion to “piss o8 ” in this context is also not common in American folk speech although the 
expression “pissed o8,” meaning angry, disgusted or fed up, is widespread in the United 
States (Wentworth and Flexner 1967, 393), albeit sometimes eu phemised as “to be P.O.’d” 
(Burke 1993, 9). !e popularity of the “Piss o8 ” idiom in England is suggested by the dis-
missive acronymic POETS, standing for “Piss O8 Early, Tomorrow’s Saturday.”
“Sod” is clearly short for “sodomite” (Schur 1987, 338). According to one authority, “Sod 
all” is an intensi'cation of “bugger all,” which is, in turn, an intensi'cation of “damn all, and 
means ‘not a goddamned thing’” (ibid.). Another comparable locution meaning “nothing” 
is “fuck all” (Sheidlower 1995, 123), which also seems to be largely in British usage. What 
this suggests is that “bugger” equals “sod” equals “fuck.” !e only di8erence is that “bugger” 
and “sod” have homosexual connotations whereas “fuck” can in theory refer to either sex.
A verbal technique of emphasising the absoluteness of the state of “nothing,” especially 
with reference to the alleged degree of knowledge held by an individual, consists of inserting 
the adjective “sweet” before the idiom. Accord ingly, while “bugger all” does mean “nothing,” 
“sweet bugger all” means “absolutely nothing.” In similar fashion, “Sweet Fanny Adams” or 
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“Sweet Fanny” or “Miss Adams” (Brophy and Partridge 1931, 364), or “sweet e8-all” or 
“Sweet F.A.” (Ayto and Simpson 1993, 253) are slightly disguised ways of saying “Sweet 
fucking all” meaning “not a goddamned thing” (Schur 1987, 358). I do not believe that 
“Sweet Fanny Adams” and its variations are known to any extent in the United States. Both 
“bugger” and “fanny” are listed as o8ensive and vulgar words “to be avoided by an American 
in Britain” (Davies 1997, 95). “Bugger all” is also found in Australia where it is de'ned as 
meaning “Very little” (Hudson and Pickering 1987, 25). Doing “bugger all” therefore means 
“doing nothing whatsoever” ( Jonsen 1988, 73). Brophy and Partridge, in their extended dis-
cussion of World War I British soldiers’ slang, report an Australian soldier’s description of a 
desert as “miles and miles and bloody miles of b—r all” (1931, 289; cf. Schur 1987, 36). !e 
continued traditionality of the expression in Australia is attested by the title of a pamphlet 
protesting the plight of the aborigines: We Have Bugger All!: !e Kulaluk Story (Buchanan 
1974). Incidentally, Brophy and Partridge indicate that “Bill Adams” served as a euphemism 
for “Bugger all” much as “Fanny Adams” did for “Fuck All” (1931, 282).
Lest any American reader still be sceptical about the prevalence of bugger idioms in 
British folk speech, let me cite a small sample of some of the more colourful examples. “Go 
to buggery” (Go away), “Oh bugger” (damn), “Oh bugger me” (frustration), “I’m bug-
gered if I know” (I haven’t a clue), “Well, bugger me” (I’m surprised or Well, I never did 
hear the like), “Bugger me sideways” (even more surprised), “Bugger me with a wire brush” 
(extremely surprised), “It’s buggered” (it’s messed up), “Bugger it” (damn or fuck it), “It’s a 
bugger” (that’s a really taxing situation or a tiresome problem to be dealt with), “A bugger’s 
muddle” (an absolute mess), “What a bugger!” (Something’s gone wrong or not turned 
out as expected), “I don’t give a bugger” (I care not a jot or I don’t give a damn), “Bugger 
this/that for a lark” (I’m having none of it or I don’t want to continue doing this annoy-
ing or boring activity), and “Bugger this (Stu8 that) for a game of soldiers” (I’m fed up and 
not happy with the plans for the further conduct of this operation, reminiscent of a futile 
military exercise) and “Blown (Gone, all) to buggery” (vanished, usually with a nuance of 
having been totally demolished). !e great variety of buggery idioms lends credence to the 
comment made in a popular primer on Australian slang that “bugger” seems to function 
as a “utility word” that, at least in Australia, has lost its original o8ensive connotation and 
can be used whenever one can’t think of the “right word” to employ in a given situation 
(Bowles 1986, 18; for an enlightening discussion of the semantics of “bugger” in Australia, 
see Wierzbicka 1997, 223–27).
!ere are many other derivative expressions. For example, “to play silly buggers” means 
to get up to mischievous tricks, or to pay insu7cient attention to an issue or to behave 
in an inappropriate and foolish manner (Phythian 1986, 136). Australian sources de'ne 
“Silly buggers” as “People who waste time on trivial things” or “play the fool” (Hudson 
and Pickering 1987, 25 and 99) or “who badly mismanage a situation” (Bowles 1986, 18). 
Australian prime minister Bob Hawke, during a visit to Japan in the 1980s, used a vari-
ant form when he said, “We are not going to play funny buggers,” an expression that his 
in terpreter was unable to render in Japanese (Wierzbicka 1997, 224). “Sillybuggers” is 
described as “A mythical game supposedly played by a person trying to avoid work or be 
deceptive” (Hudson and Pickering 1987, 115). “Buggeration” means utter ruin and confu-
sion: “!is word is o5en used as an exclamation of impatience by middle-class and upper-
class speakers” (!orne 1990, 68). A New Zealand slang glossary lists “buggerama” as an 
“exclamation of mock disgust or distress” (McGill 1988, 22). An “embuggerance factor” is 
something unforeseen that unexpectedly delays or impedes the execution of a plan ( Jolly 
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and Wilson 1989, 97). A vivid idiom dating from World War I evidently referring to being 
given an irritating and lengthy runaround is “buggered about from arse-hole to breakfast 
time” (Partridge 1985, 39). “Bugger’s grips” or “buggery grips” or “bugladders” ( James 
1999, 23) refers to sideburns or side-whiskers (mutton chops). According to one source, 
“!e phrase invokes the idea of any unorthodox protuberance inviting homosexual atten-
tion” (!orne 1990, 69). Speci'cally, the active member of the homosexual pair might 
grasp his companion’s sideburns from behind to facilitate anal intercourse. Bugger’s grips 
would thus be roughly analogous to “love handles” in American folk speech, a term that 
refers to rolls of fat around the waist that can be held on to during lovemaking (Spears 
1997, 239). An alternative Royal Navy slang term for “bugger’s grips” is “mu8 diver’s depth 
marks” ( Jolly and Wilson 1989, 189), but this refers to the heterosexual act of performing 
cunnilingus (Rodgers 1972, 139; Richter 1995, 147).
While “bugger” has a primary meaning of “sodomite,” it is also true that the word can 
be employed in a totally non-sexual sense to refer to a guy, a chap, a fellow (Partridge 1972, 
124). “Silly old bugger” can be used a8ectionately to someone who has done something 
either stupid or touching. In the latter case, for instance, if the person had gone out of his 
way to help or reward the speaker, the phrase would be appropriate. Similarly, “Poor (lit-
tle) bugger” could serve as a means of expressing pity for someone who has su8ered some 
kind of misfortune or disaster. !e addition of “little” would be used if the referent were 
a small child (usually male). “Little bugger” or “cute little bugger” by itself can function 
as a term of a8ection (typically to a small male child). On the other hand, the basic taboo 
nature of “bugger” probably accounts for why “beggar” is sometimes substituted instead. 
!ere is even the euphemistic “I’ll be beggared” in place of “I’ll be buggered” (Partridge 
1972, 60). Such euphemisms are unmistakable markers of taboo words, comparable in 
American English to “By golly” (for By God), “gosh darn” (for God damn), “Dagnabbit” 
or “Doggone it” (for God damn it), “my gosh” or “my goodness” (for my God), “Oh my” 
(for Oh my God), “egad” (for Oh God), “Oh shoot” or “Oh sugar” or “Aw shucks” (for 
Oh shit), “Oh fudge” (for Oh fuck), “Phooey” (for fuck), “Jeez” or “Jeez Louise” or “Gee 
whiz” or “Gee Whillikers” (for Jesus), “By Jimmy” (for By Jesus), “Cripes” or “Crikey” (for 
Christ), “Jeepers Creepers” or “Jimmy Cricket” (for Jesus Christ), “for crying out loud” 
(for Christ’s sake), “Holy Cow” (for Holy Christ) and “Sacrébleu” in French (for “Sacré 
Dieu”) (cf. Allan and Burridge 1991, 38–9; Hughes 1992, 13–14; Burke 1993; Green 
1997, 137–46).
!e taboo nature of “bugger” is also signalled by the fact that Brophy and Partridge 
felt it necessary to dash the word in their 1931 compilation of military slang. In fairness, it 
should be noted that up until 1934, one could be 'ned or imprisoned for saying or writing 
“bugger” (Bryson 1990, 224). “Bugger” has even been called “one of the most unprintable 
words in British English” (Pyles 1952, 151). In 1954, the BBC broadcast Dylan !omas’s 
play Under Milk Wood, apparently unaware of the fact that the name of the 'ctional Welsh 
town Llareggub described in the play was an ingenious literary back-slang creation, namely, 
“bugger all” spelled backwards (Moss 1978, 128; Richter 1995, 32). Sometimes, establish-
ment institutions are more alert to detect possible verbal transgressions. According to one 
anecdote, which may or may not be apoc ryphal, Oxford University Press once considered 
entitling the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as simply “Shorter Oxford Dictionary” but 
upon re6ection decided that the resultant acronymic abbreviation might prove to be an 
embarrassment (Schur 1987, 338).
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Origin of the Term
!e alleged origin of “bugger” seems not to be in dispute. Most authorities accept the the-
ory that the word derives from the French “Bougre,” meaning “a Bulgarian,” with the idea 
that Bulgarians were thought to indulge in anal intercourse (Hyde 1970, 36–7; Hughes 
1992, 129; Williams 1994, 164). In twel5h-century France, “bogre,” meaning here-
tic, evolved into “bougre” in the thir teenth century, meaning sodomite (Coward 1980, 
239). A pamphlet entitled Dom-Bougre, published at the time of the French Revolution, 
indicates that buggery served as a recognised form of birth control (Bretonne 1789, 15). 
In England, the initial meaning of heretic (1340) evolved into sodomite (1555) before 
becoming a general term for “chap, fellow or customer” (1719) according to another sum-
mary (Hughes 1992, 254). Supposedly, the medieval Latin “Bulgarus” for Bulgarian was 
the source of the French term (Aman 1986–87, 238–41). Certainly, it is common xeno-
phobic practice to attribute sexual perver sity or illness to another nation or people. So the 
English call syphilis “the French disease” (Roback 1979, 33; Green 1997, 236), just as the 
Germans do, calling the same malady “französische Krankheit” (Roback 1979, 104). !e 
French, however, call syphilis “the disease of Naples” (ibid., 99; Allan and Burridge 1991, 
174) or “le vice italien” (Hyde 1970, 6; Coward 1980, 234). Sodomy is described by simi-
lar blason populaire traditions. For example, in modern Greek folk speech, sodomy is called 
“ala toúrka,” that is, “in the Turkish way” (Koukoules 1983, 148). In American folklore, 
however, the same activity is associated with modern Greeks. !e “Greek way” refers to 
anal copulation (!ampson 1988, 184; Green 1997, 231).
Despite the overwhelming consensus and conventional wisdom pointing to a 
“Bulgarian” origin of “bugger,” there is another possibility that has hitherto not, to my 
knowledge, been considered by scholars. In ancient Greece, a critical distinction was made 
between active and passive male homosexuals. It is no disgrace to be the active mem-
ber of a homosexual pair, but it was considered to be dishonorable to be the submissive 
“female” individual. !e English utili tarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) 
commented on this in an essay recommending the decriminalisation of sodomy written c. 
1785: “According to the notion of the antients there was something degrading in the pas-
sive part which was not in the active . . . it was playing the woman’s part: it was therefore 
unmanly” (1978, 395). Even, apparently, in ancient Assyrian law where it is mandated that 
“If a man has lain with his neighbour . . . he shall be lain with and be made a eunuch,” the 
punishment for the “active” participant, as David Daube astutely remarks, is that “he is to 
su8er 'rst the despicable passive role, then castration—in a way, a double unmanning” 
(Daube 1986, 447–48).
A similar di8erentiation was articulated in Old Norse culture. !e condition of anal 
submission was called argr (Vanggaard 1972, 118; cf. Weisweiler 1923, 16–27). As one 
scholar puts it, “!e man who is argr is willing or inclined to play or is interested in play-
ing the female part in sexual relations” (Sorensen 1983, 18). !ere is also a synonymous 
word, ragr, created by metathesis which even occurs in a more overt form also produced 
by metathesis, rassragr, with the initial morpheme derived from anus or “arse” (Weisweiler 
1923, 27–9; Strom 1974, 6). But what is signi'cant in the Norse case is that there is a 
word, baugr, that means anus (Pipping 1930; Ross 1973, 82). (!e word literally refers to 
“ring” but then so does the Latin word “anus.”) Inasmuch as buggery speci'cally refers to 
anal intercourse (whether with male or female partners), the phonetic and semantic simi-
larity is quite striking. One might speculate that it was the Old Norse word “baugr” in the 
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sense of anus that is the true root of English “bugger” and that the anti-Bulgarian blason 
populaire merely provided a convenient later verbal foil and support for the folk speech. 
In the Old Norse tradition, just o8ering a male a ring evidently constituted a highly o8en-
sive insult as it implied that the male had submitted to or would submit to anal intercourse 
(Ross 1973). In English slang, “ring” means anus but can also signify vagina (Phythian 
1986, 147; !orne 1990, 426; Richter 1995, 186).
Explaining “Bugger’s” Presence in England and 
Absence in the United States
Questions of origins are almost always problematic, however, and the obvious issue, with 
respect to “bugger,” is not so much where and when it began as why is it so prevalent 
in British oral and written tradition? And secondly, why is it essentially absent in the 
United States? !e answer to the 'rst question may lie in part in legal and moral atti-
tudes towards homosexuality and the speci'c act of buggery in England. Whether or 
not pederasty was ever an Indo-European adolescent rite of passage, as has been sug-
gested (Bremmer 1980; cf. Tarnowsky 1967; Bleibtreu-Ehrenberg 1990), there is plenty 
of documentation of the fact that male homosexual acts including buggery were fairly 
common in sex-segregated institutions in England for many centuries. !ese institutions 
include the mili tary, prisons, boarding schools, and universities among others. Henry 
VIII’s Act of 1533 proclaimed that “the detestable and abominable Vice of Buggery” 
was a felony, punishable with death by hanging (Hyde 1970, 39; Vanggaard 1972, 167), 
and buggery remained in theory a capital o8ence in England until 1861 and “conviction 
from that date until 1967 was punishable by life imprisonment” (Gilbert 1976, 72). !e 
1967 Sexual O8ences Act did legalize homosexual acts between consenting adults (age 
twenty-one) in private, but no mere legislative act could possibly succeed in overturning 
centuries of stigmatized behaviour with one stroke of the pen. !ere is surely no need to 
rehearse the various trials, for example famous ones like that of Oscar Wilde, to prove 
that buggery was, and continues to be, a very serious moral issue in England (Bloch 1934; 
Bailey 1975, 145–52). Indeed, part of the hubbub arising from the publication of D. H. 
Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover and the trial held at the Old Bailey was caused by his 
graphic descriptions of anal intercourse, though in this case involving a male and a female 
(Sparrow 1962). Some de'nitions of buggery include anal intercourse with women as 
well as with animals though the term for the latter is more o5en referred to as “bestiality” 
(Hyde 1970, 37 note 1; Aman 1986–7, 229).
C. S. Lewis, remembering his days at Wyvern College, downplays the pederasty that 
occurred. “I cannot give pederasty anything like a 'rst place among the evils of the Coll” 
(1955, 108). Older boys “would have preferred girls to boys if they could have come by 
them” but “we should have to say that pederasty, however great an evil in itself, was, in that 
time and place, the only foothold or cranny le5 for certain good things . . . A perversion 
was the only chink le5 through which something spontaneous and uncalculating could 
creep in” (1955, 109–10). Leaving aside the rather explicit metaphorical language con-
sisting of “cranny le5 for good things” and “only chink which some thing . . . could creep 
in,” we have the testimony of what anthropologists would label a “participant observer” 
con'rming the existence of “buggery” in a representative upper-class English educational 
institution. Similar personal accounts refer to practices at other elite schools, for example, 
Harrow and Eton (Hyde 1970, 110–12). Supposedly, British schoolboys once spoke of 
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the three B’s of single-sex public boarding school life: “birching, boredom and buggery” 
(Paros 1984, 161). A diary entry written in the 1960s by a sixteen-year-old boy muses, “the 
thought of actually buggering a little boy is repulsive to me but they’re just a substitute, 
something pretty to look at when there are no girls around” (Lambert and Millham 1974, 
23). Knowler comments, “Generations of public-school boys have reported sodomy” but 
con'rms that “Girls would be best, but as the sailor says in Fanny Hill, ‘any port in a storm’” 
(Knowler 1974, 112 and 113), quoting a proverb seemingly appropriate as a justi'cation 
for buggery (Legman 1977, 197 no. 979). Knowler adds that poet Rupert Brooke, acting 
as temporary housemaster at Rugby, said, “What is the whole duty of a house-master? To 
prepare boys for Con'rmation, and turn a blind eye on sodomy” (Knowler 1974, 113). 
One angry letter written a5er the Oscar Wilde trial in 1895 asked indignantly, “Why does 
not the Crown prosecute every boy at a public or private school or half the men in the 
Universities?” (Hyde 1970, 170).
Iwan Bloch, in his book Sex Life in England, in speaking of homosexuality but almost 
certainly referring to buggery in particular makes this strong statement: “No other peo-
ple has looked upon this act with so much disgust or judged those participating in it as 
harshly” (1934, 124). Knowler makes a more restrained comment: “I know of no evidence 
that the British are more inclined to homosex ual practice than other nations. We certainly 
view it with less tolerance than some” (1974, 111). If there is any truth to this judgment, 
one can well understand why the accusation of having indulged in pederasty could carry 
so much emotional freight. No one would want to be called a “bugger” in such a climate 
of prejudice. So, I would maintain that it was not just the threat of legal punishment that 
brought buggery to the forefront of public consciousness, but rather, the general attitude 
towards male homosexual acts, an attitude which was no doubt responsible for the enact-
ment of the legislation pertaining to sodomy in the 'rst place.
!e question then arises as to what were the causes of this abhorrence of pederasty. A 
simplistic answer might refer to the biblical charter prohibiting homosexual acts. Leviticus 
20:13: “If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have com-
mitted an abomination: they shall surely be put to death” (cf. Leviticus 18:22) and the 
sad saga of Sodom and Gomorrah provide ample charters for both Jewish and. Christian 
homophobia (Bailey 1975; Goodich 1974–76). One intriguing, if somewhat speculative, 
argument suggests that God is not really homophobic but, rather, simply opposed to the 
misuse or wasting of precious male semen (Cohen 1990, 7 and 14), which would also 
account for the prohibition against acts of bestiality and masturbation. While the Bible 
tends to treat both active and passive participants in a homosexual act as equally guilty, 
Derek Bailey has suggested that patriarchal and androcentric bias may be a factor in plac-
ing a particular stigma on the male who takes or assumes the female role. !e logic runs 
along the following lines: if God created man superior to woman, then a man who acts as a 
woman “has betrayed not only himself but his whole sex” (1975, 162).
Whether or not the biblical tradition is responsible for the European tradition of 
attaching particular disgrace to the passive homosexual, there can be no question that, as 
observed previously, the “female” participant who submits to anal intercourse is considered 
to be especially disgraced. Legman phrases the distinction succinctly: “!e insertor is male, 
the insertee homosexual” (1975, 150). Once again, the relevant Scandinavian data is typi-
cal. Argr signi'es “what a man must not be, since in that case he is no man” (Sorensen 1983, 
24). Calling a man argr constitutes a serious insult. In Norse terms, “!e man attacked 
must show that he is 't to remain in the community . . . that is to say, he must challenge 
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his adversary to battle” (Sorensen 1983, 32). !e word argr is not dissimilar in sound to 
“bugger” and, has been noted, “baugr” means anus. Extrapolating from this, we might pro-
pose that “bugger o8 ” is a verbal attempt to resist any attempt to be put in the humiliating 
position of serving as a “female” homosexual victim of a predatory male. Moreover, since 
in European practice (as opposed to the letter of the biblical law), the active participant 
in a homosexual relationship is not considered to be shameful—he is, a5er all, still func-
tioning as a male, as the penetrator, not the penetrated—he can assert his masculinity by 
o8ering to “bugger” anything and everything. In American folk speech, the same function 
is achieved by the word “fuck.” !ough referring to what is basically a heterosexual act, a 
male typically uses the word in addressing a fellow male. But whereas an American male 
uses “fuck” in such instances, an Englishman uses “bugger” or “sod” instead.
!is may help explain the frequent use of “bugger” in British folk speech. It can be seen 
as a kind of hyper-masculinity marker serving as a total repudiation of any implication that 
the speaker would consider playing a female role in a sexual act. Of course, women, at least 
in modern times, may also employ the term, but perhaps only as a means of aping male 
speech. On the other hand, the British male’s underlying concern with “covering one’s 
back(side)” for fear of being attacked literally or 'guratively by an “arse-bandit” (!orne 
1990, 13; Ayto and Simpson 1993, 6) or “bum bandit” ( Jolly and Wilson 1989, 46) or 
“bumjumper” (Bowles 1986, 85) might conceivably be related to what has been termed 
the “backside 'xation” of the English (Knowler 1974, 105) re6ected in English music hall 
humour centred on the buttocks (Gorer 1955, 192). Knowler observes that the mere men-
tion of the word “bum” can “raise a giggle” (1974, 105). As for the fear, real or imagined, 
of being attacked from the rear, a remark from a '5een-year-old public school boy tells the 
tale as well as anything: “Congreve’s queer. We don’t like them here. Whenever he comes 
down the corridor, people stand aside and go ‘Eeeuggh!’ and say ‘Backs to the wall chaps, 
here comes Congers!’” (Lambert and Millham 1974, 258).
!ere is yet another possible factor involved in the repugnance felt for the act of bug-
gery and that is its animalistic associations. Again, the folk speech is telling. One of the 
most common slang adjectival terms for ventro-dorsal intercourse is dog-style or doggie-
fashion (!orne 1990, 141; Lighter 1994, 620, Richter 1995, 68). Accordingly, men who 
participate in sexual acts entailing penetration from the rear are deemed to be no better 
than savage brutes.
In addition, it has been suggested that anal intercourse is unclean because of the likeli-
hood of the sodomiser being contaminated by contact with “dirty” fecal material (Gilbert 
1981, 65–6). In case the reader 'nds this suggestion far-fetched, s/he might take note of 
the folk metaphor “to be up the creek (without a paddle)” that means being hopelessly 
stuck in a situation without being able to extricate oneself. Regardless of whether or not 
the lack of a paddle has castratory overtones, the fact is that the original full form of the 
expression is “to be up shit creek,” referring to the dangers of being engaged (or discov-
ered) in an act of homosexual anal intercourse (Wentworth and Flexner 1967, 562). !e 
twentieth-century marginally euphemistic folk metaphors “to stir fudge” or “to stir choco-
late” for anal intercourse (Richter 1995, 209) would seem to o8er additional evidence for 
the contamination argument. Similarly, such British slang terms for predatory sodomites 
as “chocolate bandit,” “fudgepacker,” “brownie-hound,” and “turd burglar” (!orne 1990) 
would seem to further corroborate the thesis.
But why is “bugger” not to be found to any great extent in American folk speech? !e 
answer may come from the fact that Americans do not tend to distinguish active from 
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passive homosexuals. For prudish Americans, both participants in a homosexual act are 
equally abhorrent (as the Bible states). Consequently, no American male wants anything 
to do with “bugger.” Instead, “fuck,” which carries no obvious homosexual connotation, is 
used to “put down” a male opponent. Since American males do use “fuck” to insult a rival 
or enemy, they are in e8ect threatening to carry out a homosexual act. But the use of “fuck” 
(rather than “bugger”) tends to conceal the homosexual implica tions of the threat. !is 
may explain why “bugger” and its many colorful idioms have remained in England and 
have failed to cross the Atlantic. !e di8erences in British and American folk speech are 
signi'cant. Most Americans telling a “jerk” to “bug o8 ” would not know that the terms in 
question referred originally to masturbation and anal intercourse. !ere seems little doubt 
that “bug o8 ” is an abridged version of “bugger o8 ” (Hughes 1992, 169). I suspect most 
Englishmen, or English males, at any rate, telling a “wanker” to “bugger/sod o8 ” would 
be well aware of these terms’ sexual connotations. In marked contrast, Americans, for their 
part, know “sweet bugger all” about “sweet bugger all.”
And to illustrate this, let me conclude by citing a joke, which would be easily intelli-
gible anywhere in the English-speaking world except for the United States. A judge in a 
London court addresses the defendant and says, “Is there anything you would like to say 
before I pass sentence?” !e defendant mutters, “Bugger all!” !e judge, somewhat hard of 
hearing, leans over and asks the baili8, “What did he say?” “He said ‘Bugger all,’ my Lord.” 
“!at’s strange, I distinctly saw his lips move.”
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(A) Science in Folklore? Folklore in Science? 
(B) Viola Jokes: A Study of Second String Humor
Introduction
Addressing the question “Who are the folk?” at the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 1977, Dundes told the group identifying themselves 
as scientists that he understood the popular perception that “folklore is precisely what sci-
ence has advanced from” (see Bascom 1977). Dundes declared that the notion that science 
displaces folklore was false. One reason this fallacy arose, he explained, was the European 
intellectual construction of several hierarchical dichotomies, in response to nineteenth-
century industrialization. He set up the following table to highlight the European equiva-
lence of folk with peasantry, and civilization with the elite, who were associated with so-
called rational science.
Folk or Peasant Civilized or Elite
Illiterate Literate
Rural Urban
Lower Stratum Upper Stratum
Instead of a linear table contrasting upper and lower strata, Dundes’s model was one of 
folk encircling human existence. Dundes bemoaned the fact that the concept of folk “as 
an old fashioned segment living on the margins of civilization” persisted into the “mod-
ern” era despite ample evidence from 'eld collections of folklore among the literate, urban, 
upper crust. He proposed to show that these dichotomies were logically, indeed scienti'-
cally, false by demonstrating that “one essential part of the science of folklore includes the 
study of the folklore of science (and scientists).” If such an elite group could be shown to be 
“folk,” then folklore could arguably be viewed as a fundamental, cultural, identity-forming 
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process in socializing people as part of groups. It was a strategy Dundes frequently employed 
in his research, and one he also applied to other “elite” groups, including symphony musi-
cians, mathematicians, physicians (see the essays in the next chapter), computer program-
mers, and college students.
Dundes proposed a “modern conception of folk” as “any group of people whatsoever who 
share at least one common factor.” He added that “it does not matter what the linking fac-
tor is—it could be a common occupation, language, or religion—but what is important is 
that a group formed for whatever reason will have some traditions which it calls its own. 
In theory a group must consist of at least two persons, but generally most groups consist 
of many individuals. A member of the group may not know all other members, but he or 
she will probably know the common core of traditions belonging to the group, traditions 
which help the group have a sense of group identity.” In this de'nition, it is possible to have 
“part-time folk” who engage in traditions temporarily, such as at summer camp or military 
bases, and it is common in modern life to have many overlapping groups and, therefore, 
traditions and identities that one possesses. Another implication of this de'nition is that 
people can take on identities and customs of their own choosing and creation, in addition 
to inheriting identities and following traditions. Besides working with the usual identity 
categories of ethnicity, religion, nationality, region, and occupation, one could observe 
folklore emerging from the formation of a family, group of friends, or people who share 
an interest (e.g., motorcyclists, surfers, and music fans), and from an organization (e.g., 
the Navy, Boy Scouts, or a volunteer association). It should be pointed out that some folk-
lorists building on this de'nition have proposed a host of dyadic traditions (traditions 
emerging from a couple), such as between a person and a pet, and even one with oneself 
(e.g., talking to yourself with ritualized expressions such as “you idiot!”) (see Oring 1984a, 
1986; Mechling 1989b, 2006).
In this chapter, Dundes used a rhetorical device that can be read in other writings, di8er-
entiating between the folklore of a group and a group’s folklore. !e 'rst essay, for example, 
had texts that demonstrated popular, “exoteric” beliefs about lab-coat clad scientists, which 
were di8erentiated from the “esoteric,” insider lore of scientists. (Dundes included the clas-
sic statement on “!e Esoteric-Exoteric Factor in Folklore” by William Hugh Jansen in his 
textbook !e Study of Folklore [1965], in which a de'nition of folk group 'gured promi-
nently.) !e identi'cation of folk ideas, therefore, was not limited to oral stories, but could 
also be seen in the mass media. Dundes carried this message—presented as a speech in the 
'rst essay—directly to scientists in the magazine New Scientist, in an article published the 
same year as his address to the AAAS. Dundes applied the thesis that professions consti-
tute a folk, and, indeed, “the folklore of a group . . . de'nes that group,” to mathematicians. 
!ought of as people dealing with numbers rather than expressive narrative and customs, 
Dundes (with his mathematician son-in-law Paul Renteln) instead showed that mathema-
ticians as a group shared slang, proverbs, limericks, and jokes (Dundes and Renteln 2005). 
Nonetheless, scientists, purportedly devoted to impersonal objectivity, still have the image 
of being acultural, although a few studies following Dundes’s contributions have explored 
the scienti'c realm (Gilkey 1990; Jackson 1972; and Shapiro 1987).
Dundes, as a concert musician (he composed for and performed on the clarinet), was 
also aware of the lore of orchestral musicians, popularly thought of as an elite group. !e 
orchestra provided an apt metaphor for the social dynamics of expressive lore de'ning 
overlapping groups. Orchestra members shared an identity as a musical organization, but 
within the body, humor and speech about “sections” of the orchestra expressed hierarchies 
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within the unit. Instrumental players within the sections had “esoteric” lore that they 
shared among themselves as well. Dundes, the analyst, teamed up with Meegan Brown, 
a musician in the San Diego area, to collect the material in the second essay. In keeping 
with his psychological-outlet theory of humor, he interpreted the material as project-
ing the anxiety connected with performing in a musical group before a live audience. For 
other perspectives on folklore in the esoteric and exoteric lore of musicians, see Groce 
1996; Rahkonen 2000; and Adler 1982. Beyond musicians and scientists, a host of mod-
ern groups have been investigated, with Dundes’s de'nition of the folk group and pro-
cess of identity-formation in mind. For instance, among the entries in the Encyclopedia of 
American Folklife (Bronner 2006b) are nurses, soldiers, sports teams, students, taxi drivers, 
trial lawyers, twelve-step groups, skateboarders, steelworkers, bodybuilders, Boy Scouts, 
automobile racing fans, martial artists, youth gangs, truck drivers, unions, 're'ghters, and 
folklorists. !at is in addition to the familiar folk groups of cowboys, loggers, miners, rail-
roaders, and sailors. So what was Dundes’s answer to the question of “who are the folk?” 
He exclaimed, “among others, we are!”
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Science in Folklore? Folklore in Science?
In August 1846, Englishman William !orns, using the nom de plume 
Ambrose Merton, wrote a letter to the Athenaeum in which he proposed the term “Folklore” 
as an appropriate Anglo-Saxon term to refer to “manners, customs, observances, supersti-
tions, ballads, proverbs, etc. of the olden time.” !is neologism was well received and it has 
achieved virtual world-wide currency. In 1878, the English Folklore Society was created, later 
serving as a model for the American Folklore Society, which began in 1888. As the English 
Folklore Society approaches its centenary, folklorists from many countries may take pride in 
the growth of folkloristics from what was originally an amateurish antiquarian hobby of gen-
tlemen and gentlewomen, who collected quaint customs and beliefs from rural parishes to a 
full 6edged academic discipline with its own panoply of theories and methods.
Professional folklorists are concerned with how the folklore of a given group re6ects 
the ideology and worldview of that group. Folklore, i.e., the myths, epics, folktales, leg-
ends, riddles, proverbs, curses, charms, songs, dances, games, gestures, cos tumes, festivals, 
etc. of a group, provides a unique type of expressive material in which that group’s cogni-
tive categories and anxieties are unselfconsciously set forth. Typically, folk lore provides a 
socially sanctioned framework within which members of the folk in question feel free to 
probe critical issues and problems. One can say in jest or song what one may be ashamed or 
embarrassed to say without the safety of a folkloric form.
In the beginning of the 19th century, the conception of “folk” was limited to the illiter-
ate in a literate society, that is, people who could not read or write in a society which had 
a written language. So the Grimm brothers in Germany and their counterparts in other 
countries collected folklore exclusively from the local illiterates or peasants. Only recently 
in the 20th century have folklorists realized that the original de'nition of folk was too 
narrow. A folk in modern parlance is any group of people who share at least one common 
linking factor. !e common linking factor may be nationality, ethnicity, religion or occu-
pation. !us one could speak of French folklore (as opposed to German folklore), of the 
folklore of Jews or Mormons, and of the folklore of coal miners or cowboys. A 6exible de'-
nition of folk would include an entity as large as a nation or as small as a family. From this 
de'nition, it is clear that folklore is not restricted to rural areas. Cities are full of folklore 
whether it is the folklore of particular city districts or the folklore of such groups as labor 
unions or militant political organizations. Individuals may belong to a number of di8erent 
and distinct folk groups, and as they move from family or ethnic groups to professional or 
occupational groups, they o5en are expected to “code-switch.” Family folklore would be 
inappropriate at the o7ce, just as o7ce folklore might be equally inappropriate at home.
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Scienti'c tongues
From this discussion, it should come as no surprise to learn that scientists qualify as folk. 
For that matter, each subgroup of scientists surely has its own folklore. !e folklore of biolo-
gists is not the same as the folklore of chemists. Some of the folklore of science or scientists 
is rather esoteric and might be virtually unintelligible to anyone outside the in-group. How-
ever, some of the folklore of science is understandable to outsiders. (Indeed some of the folk-
lore about science circulates primarily among non-scientists.) In jokes, one of the most com-
mon forms of folklore in the modern world, stereo types of scientists, may be found.
A physicist, a statistician, and a mathematician were in an aircra5 6ying over Montana. 
!ey looked out and saw below a herd of sheep all of which were white, except one which 
was black. !e physicist began calculating the number of black sheep in the universe, based 
on the sample. !e statistician began calculating the probability of a black sheep occurring 
in any given herd. !e mathematician, on the other hand, knew that there exists at least 
one sheep that is black, ON TOP!
!e role of empiricism is a frequent theme in the folklore of science. In the following 
example, it is a social scientist who is non-empirical.
A chemist, a physicist and an economist are marooned on a desert island without food. 
Suddenly they discover a cache of canned goods but there is no opener. !e chemist begins 
looking about for chemicals in their natural state so he can make up a solution which will 
dissolve the tops of the cans. !e physicist picks up a rock and begins calculating what 
angle, what force, what velocity he will need to strike the can with the rock in order to 
force it open. !e economist merely picks up a can and says, “Let us assume this can is 
open.” (In a variant, “Let us assume we have a can opener.”)
Scienti'c method lampooned
If the need for some form of the experimental method is the hallmark of the natural scien-
tist, that too can be the subject of the folklore of science. In a classic story existing in many 
variant forms—all folklore manifests multiple existence, typically with variation—we 'nd 
the experimental method in a reductio ad absurdum form.
A researcher is studying a unique six-legged caterpillar (in some versions a 6ea). !rough 
extraordinary conditioning, the researcher has trained the caterpillar to jump over a little 
barrier upon command, namely the word “jump.” A true scien tist, he wonders what it is that 
is making the caterpillar jump. It must be the front legs. !e researcher tears o8 the front 
legs and gives the command to jump. !e caterpillar jumps over the barrier. !e researcher 
then pulls o8 the middle two legs. Again he says “Jump,” and again the caterpillar jumps over 
the barrier. Finally, the researcher pulls o8 the two hind legs and gives the command. !is 
time the caterpillar remains immobile and does not jump the barrier. !e researcher there-
fore draws the conclusion that pulling o8 the two hind legs has made the caterpillar deaf.
Not only does this text lampoon the “logic” of drawing faulty conclusions from experi-
mental data, it also expresses the stereotype of the cold and cruel scientist for whom scien-
ti'c truth is more important than ethical questions of cruelty to animals. Caterpillars may 
not be of the same order as white mice, guinea-pigs, or monkeys, but the apparently callous 
behavior of the researcher is relevant. !e phrase “to be a guinea-pig” has become part of 
the folklore of Western nations precisely because of the extended use of guinea-pigs as hap-
less participants (victims) of various scienti'c laboratory experi mentation.
234  !e Meaning of Folklore
If one were asked to select the single most common piece of the folklore of science, 
one might well think of Murphy’s Law. In theory, scientists are seeking to describe the 
nature of objective reality with such descriptions embodying such ideal criteria as predict-
ability. !e codi'cation of a particular principle frequently bears the name of the scien-
tist who discovered or formulated it. So presumably Murphy’s Law was 'rst articulated by 
a man named Murphy. Carrying scienti'c worldview to its extreme form, Murphy’s Law 
and analogous “laws” suggest that even failure is acceptable so long as it can be codi'ed 
and rendered predictable. Here is a representative list of “Basic precepts of science” which 
includes Murphy’s Law:
Murphy’s Law: If anything can go wrong, it will.
Patrick’s !eorem: If the experiment works, you must be using the wrong 
equipment.
Skinner’s Constant: !at quantity which, when multiplied by, divided into, 
added to, or subtracted from the answer you got, gives the answer you 
should have obtained.
Horner’s Five !umb Postulate: Experience varies directly with the equipment 
ruined.
Flagle’s Law of the Perversity of Inanimate Objects: Any inanimate object, 
regardless of its composition or con'gura tion, may be expected to per-
form at any time in a totally unexpected manner for reasons that are either 
totally obscure or completely mysterious.
Allen’s Axiom: When all else fails, read the instructions.
!e Spare Parts Principle: !e accessibility, during recovery, of small parts which 
fall from the work bench, varies directly with the size of the part . . . and 
inversely with its importance to the completion of the work underway.
!e Compensation Corollary: !e experiment may be con sidered a success if 
no more than 50 per cent of the observed measurements must be discarded 
to obtain a correspondence with theory.
Gumperson’s Law: !e probability of a given event occurring is inversely pro-
portional to its desirability.
!e Ordering Principle: !ose supplies necessary for yester day’s experiment 
must be ordered no later than tomorrow noon.
!e Ultimate Principle: By de'nition, when you are investigating the unknown, 
you do not know what you will 'nd.
!e Futility Factor: No experiment is ever a complete failure . . . it can always 
serve as a bad example.
One of the characteristics of folklore is that authors are rarely if ever known. We do not 
know who was the 'rst to tell the story of the six-legged caterpillar or who invented the list 
of “Basic precepts of science.” !is puts folklore, which is transmitted from person to per-
son, in contrast with mass or popular culture, in which the authors of comic strips, televi-
sion series, or movies are known. Popular culture, like folklore, is frequently deemed to be 
unworthy of serious study by the literary Brahmins of the academy, but this is a mistake. 
For popular culture also a8ects the public’s perception of science and scientists. Certainly 
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the stereotype of the mad scientist as depicted in so many horror 'lms is a re6ection of the 
image of the scientist not unlike the one delineated in the caterpillar story. 
I want to consider brie6y one television series and one motion picture to illustrate how 
and what science 'ction as found in popular culture communicates. Typically in Star Trek, 
a space ship makes an uninvited visit to some alien culture which some how threatens the 
existence or safety of the ship. O5en the progress of the ship is imperiled or stopped tempo-
rarily. !e USS initials supposedly stand for United Star Ship and not United States Ship, 
but a clue as to the identity of the ship is suggested by its name Enterprise. !e captain of the 
ship is named Kirk, an English word meaning church. !e rest of the leadership bears simi-
lar names, e.g., Spock, Scotty, McCoy, but when commands are issued, they are carried out 
by an assorted set of ethnic underlings (Asian, African American, etc). If the alien culture 
does not respond to suggestions of reform (along the lines of democracy and Christianity), 
the crew has no choice but to destroy it. !e reform or destruction of the alien culture usu-
ally frees the ship which thus becomes once again a “free Enterprise,” a fantasy-form justi'-
cation of free-6oating American in6uence and intervention all over the world. Science 'c-
tion, like science itself, may not be as free of political implications as “pure” scientists might 
think or wish. In the motion picture Star Wars, we 'nd an interesting combination of folk-
lore and science 'ction. !e plot is basic fairytale with a hero falling in love with an image 
of a prin cess whom he attempts to rescue. His parents dead, Luke Skywalker is raised by fos-
ter parents as is required by the heroic formula. From a wise old man, who functions as the 
traditional donor 'gure of fairy tales, the hero obtains the inevitable magic sword (the life 
force) which belonged to his father. !e hero is accom panied on his quest by an assortment 
of helpers with unique abilities. However, super imposed upon the underlying fairy tale plot 
is a fairly standard Second World War 'lm scenario. !e enemy consists of “stormtroopers,” 
who dress and act like Germans as depicted in World War 'lms. !e little creature who in 
the memorable bar scene tries to collect an outstanding debt owed by the mercenary pilot 
Han Solo speaks a foreign tongue which is accompanied by English subtitles. !e language 
is not identi'ed but if it were to be Japanese, it would support the Second World War pat-
tern in which the Japanese and Germans were part of an axis. In this context, the some-
what e8ete robot C-3PO, who has great polyglot linguistic expertise and who speaks with 
an English accent, might well represent the British ally of the American hero attacking the 
German stronghold. If fairy tale and Second World War adventure 'lm were not enough, 
there is a phallic component in which a boy learns to handle his life force well enough to 
6y through a long slot and drop a bomb down a virtually inaccessible and closely guarded 
tube leading to the one weak spot or Achilles’ heel of the enemy. It may or may not be rel-
evant that the archvillain’s name is Darth Vader which strongly suggests death and father. 
As a concession to modern taste, the hero is taught to close his eyes and trust his (life force) 
feelings while the heroine, something of a liberated woman, refuses to play the conven tional 
passive female part found in fairy tales. Her irreverent attitude seems to delight not one but 
two heroes: Luke Skywalker and Han Solo, who compete for her attentions. 
Science 'ction is not science any more than the folklore of science is science. What is 
important is that one measure of the impact science has had on the modern world lies in 
the artistic e8orts it has inspired. Scientists themselves are in6uenced by folklore. Why, for 
example, was the lunar mission labelled Apollo? With presumably an in'nity of names to 
choose from, why was the name Apollo selected? Selecting the name Apollo consciously or 
unconsciously invoked mythology. In Greek mythology, Apollo the Sun is the brother of 
Artemis or Diana the Moon. A5er achieving enough “thrust” to li5 o8 and overcome the 
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gravitational pull of the (mother) Earth, Apollo the Sun/son rises and is able to land on the 
Moon, his sister, where astronaut Armstrong (whose name means power ful body extrem-
ity) was the very 'rst to step on the virgin soil of the Moon and to erect a 6ag. !e astro-
nauts brought back pieces of Moon to show o8 to peers back home. Who remembers the 
names of the second set of astronauts to land on the Moon? Very few. !e point might be 
that the Moon could be “violated” only once. !is is, of course, not an analysis of heavenly 
bodies but of earthly ones. But that is precisely the issue. Scientists are folk too and as such 
they are bound by folklore. !at is why it is imperative that the science of folklore include 
the study of the folklore of science.
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Viola Jokes: A Study of Second String Humor
There is a substantial scholarly literature devoted to the study of musi-
cal humor. Most of it tends to deal with individual composers and speci'c compositions, 
for example, Haydn’s musical jokes.1 Much less studied are the numerous jokes told by 
and about musicians. Anyone who performs regularly in bands or orchestras is likely to be 
familiar with these traditional jibes. Whether the jokes stem from the anxiety connected 
with performing on one’s instrument (in front of peers or an audience) or the competitive 
aspect of seeking to move from third chair up to second or 'rst chair, there can be no ques-
tion of the jokes’ continued popularity.
As with ethnic humor, there is usually a scapegoat to serve as the butt of the jokes. So 
the English tell jokes about the Irish, the French about the Belgians, the Germans about 
the East Frisians, and so on.2 Almost every cultural group has some other group or sub-
group to beat up on, so to speak. No doubt one of the psychological bene'ts of telling 
such jokes is to bolster feelings of inadequacy. If A says B is inferior, then that automati-
cally makes A feel superior.
In musical joking traditions, di8erent instruments or instrumentalists 'll the role of 
scapegoat. !ere are jokes about conductors or prima donnas, mostly about their high6y-
ing egos. One of the chestnuts about conductors is: What’s the di(erence between a bull and 
a symphony orchestra? !e bull has the horns in 'ont and the asshole in back.3 Another series 
involves drummers and the fact that their musicianship is said to be minimal or lacking 
altogether. What do you call someone who hangs out with musicians? A drummer. But surely 
the leading 'gures in music joke cycles are banjo players and violists.
Viola jokes have been noticed. A brief article by Martin Boyd on the subject appeared 
in !e Strad in 1995. !e following year, Nancy Groce’s “Knowing the Score: !e 
Transmission of Musician Jokes among Professional and Semi-Professional Musicians” was 
published in New York Folklore as well as her more complete compilation !e Musician’s 
Joke Book. In 1997, Dave Marsh and Kathi Kamen Goldmark completed !e Great Rock 
‘n’ Roll Joke Book. In 2001, we 'nd a newspaper essay by Olin Chism entitled “Violins 
Get the Glory, While Viola Is Butt of Jokes” in the Dallas Morning News. But by far the 
most comprehensive consideration of the viola jokes is violist and ethnomusicologist 
Carl Rahkonen’s “No Laughing Matter: !e Viola Joke Cycle as Musicians’ Folklore” in 
Western Folklore in 2000.4
Groce speculates as to why violists have been singled out for jocular disparagement. 
According to Groce, “Violists are widely believed to be intellectually dull, musically timid, 
and to have boring personalities.”5 She also remarks that violists have a much more limited 
solo repertoire than do violins and that generally speaking, viola parts tend to be less tech-
nically exacting than those of other instruments, o5en playing harmony rather than mel-
ody. Violist Rahkonen says much the same: “Orchestral viola parts are easier than violin 
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parts and they tend to be the less important, non-melodic parts. If viola players do get dif-
'cult parts, as they do from time to time, violists in amateur orchestras tend to struggle 
while trying to play them.6 Groce even goes so far as to suggest that the majority of violists 
are failed violinists who may have been encouraged early on by their teachers to switch to 
the less demanding viola. Whether or not this is nothing more than a standard stereotype 
of violists, the fact remains that there is an impressive spate of viola jokes. !e stereotype 
of a violist as a violinist manqué is clearly indicated in the following de'nition of a string 
quartet: A good violinist, a bad violinist, a would-be violinist, and someone who hates violins 
getting together to complain about composers. Here is another version of the same joke. What 
makes up a string quartet? A person who can play violin, a person who can’t play violin, a per-
son who used to play violin, and a person who hates violins.
For the bene't of readers who may not be familiar with this joke cycle, we shall pres-
ent a generous sampling of representative texts.7 One should keep in mind that viola jokes, 
like all traditional jokes, in fact like all folklore, demonstrate multiple existence and varia-
tion. !at means that an individual joke will usually exist in more than one time and place. 
Moreover, the transmission process is such that no two versions will be verbatim identical. 
In some instances, the same basic joke may be told about various instruments. Such paral-
lels to some, though by no means all, of the viola jokes will be noted.
!e 'rst examples have to do with the alleged poor musicianship of violists.
What’s the di(erence between the %rst stand and the last stand in the viola section? 
About two bars. In other versions, the answer is A semi-tone or Half a mea-
sure or About a measure and a half.8
How do you get a violist to play a passage pianissimo tremolano? Mark it solo. !e 
implication is that violists are so unused to playing solos that their nervous-
ness makes them shake their bow uncontrollably resulting in a pianissimo 
tremolando.
How do you get a viola section to play spiccato? Write a whole note with “solo” 
above it.9
Another version of this joke involves vibrato: How can you make a violist play 
with vibrato? Write a fermata over a whole note and mark it solo.10
Vibrato also 'gures in other viola jokes: What’s the di(erence between a viola and 
scraping your nails on a blackboard? Vibrato.11
!e sound made by violas is a common leitmotif in the joke cycle: What’s the dif-
ference between a violist and a dog? !e dog knows when to stop scratching.12
What’s the most common viola tuning system for Western music? Bad-tempered.
Why can’t you hear a viola on a digital recording? Because technology has 
reached such an advanced level of development that all extraneous noise is 
eliminated.
What kind of microphone works best for viola in a live band? A cordless mini con-
denser with a dead battery.
Who makes the best viola mutes? Smith & Wesson.
How do you make a violin sound like a viola? Sit in the back and don’t play or Play 
in the low register with a lot of wrong notes.
How do you get a beautiful sound out of a viola? Sell it and buy a violin.13
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!e majority of viola jokes, however, are variations on the theme of sloppy tech-
nique on the part of violists: What’s the di(erence between a viola player 
and a dressmaker? !e dressmaker gets paid to tuck up the 'ills; A viola 
player . . . never mind.
Why are violists’ %ngers like lightning? !ey never strike the same place twice.
Why do violists get antsy when they see the words “Kama Sutra’’? All those 
positions!
What’s the di(erence between a violist and a prostitute? 1. A prostitute knows more 
than two positions. 2. Prostitutes have a better sense of rhythm.
A German text involving positions suggests that the viola jokes are also to be 
found in Germany: Was sind die drei Lagen auf der Bratsche? Erste Loge, 
Notlage, und Niederlage. (What are the three positions of the viola? First 
position, emergency, and defeat.) An American variant: How many posi-
tions does a violist use? First, third, and emergency.14
Why are viola parts written in Alto Clef ? Harder to prove that wrong notes weren’t 
copying errors.
Where did Alto Clef originate? Bach took a bribe 'om a wealthy viola player.
How is a violist like a terrorist? !ey both mess up bowings [Boeings].
How can you tell if a violist is making mistakes? His bow is moving.15 !e same 
answer is found with a di8erent question: How can you tell if a viola is out 
of tune? !e bow is moving.
What’s the di(erence between a viola and a lawnmower? You can tune a lawn-
mower. !ere is also Why isn’t a viola like a lawn mower? Nobody minds if 
you borrow their viola.16
How do you get two viola players to play in tune (or in unison)? Shoot one of 
them.17
What’s the de%nition of a minor 2nd? Two violas playing in unison.
What’s the de%nition of atonal music? A violist playing Bach.18
What’s the de%nition of a cluster chord? A viola section playing on the C string.
How was the canon invented? Two violists were trying to play the same passage 
together.
Why do violists stand for long periods outside people’s houses? !ey can’t %nd the key 
and they don’t know when to come in.19
Sometimes it is the viola rather than the violist that is subjected to ridicule: 
What’s the useless woody material around the F holes? A viola.20
What is the range of a viola? As far as you can kick it. In another version, the 
answer is: About 35 yards if you have a strong arm.21
What is the de%nition of “perfect pitch”? !rowing a viola into a dumpster with-
out hitting the rim. In several variants, perfect pitch is de'ned as throw-
ing a viola or banjo into a toilet without hitting the rim22; in another, 
perfect pitch consists of lobbing an oboist into a garbage can without 
hitting the rim.23
What’s the di(erence between a viola and an onion? People cry when they chop an 
onion to pieces24 or Nobody cries when they chop up a viola.
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What’s the di(erence between a viola and a trampoline? You should take your shoes 
o( before you jump on a trampoline.
What’s the di(erence between a viola and a TV dinner? !e viola doesn’t %t in a 
microwave oven (unless you break the neck o( ).
What’s the di(erence between a viola and cello? You can %t more violas into a trash 
compactor.25
What’s the di(erence between a violin and a viola? !e viola burns longer.26
!is joke has inspired a follow-up text: Now we all know that a viola is better 
than a violin because it burns longer. But why does it burn longer? It’s usu-
ally still in the case.27 !e implication here is that one reason violists play so 
poorly is that they never practice. Hence their violas remain in their cases 
at all times. !e violist’s supposed reluctance to practice is also re6ected in 
the following texts: A&er his retirement, the violist arrived home carrying 
his viola case. His wife saw the case and asked, “What’s that?” In Germany, 
for example, it is a standing joke that some players leave their instruments 
in their lockers, removing them only for rehearsals and performances. In 
other words, they don’t bring their instruments home to practice.
Why is a viola the perfect murder weapon? It is a classic blunt weapon and it never 
has any %ngerprints on it.28
How is a violist similar to a lawyer? Everyone is happiest when the case is closed. In 
a variant: How its a viola like a jury trial? Everyone breathes a sign of relief 
when the case is closed.29
How do you keep your violin 'om getting stolen? Put it in a viola case.30
Why do viola players keep their cases on their car dashboards? So they can park in 
handicapped spaces.
Why does the violin player keep a spare viola in his trunk? So that he can park 
in the handicapped zone. In a variant: Why did the musician hang a small 
viola 'om his rear view mirror? So he could park in “handicapped” zones.31 
!e implication is that violists by de'nition are considered to be physically 
less gi5ed than other musicians. Accordingly, the viola or a representation 
thereof is a telltale sign of such a limitation. It may or may not be relevant 
that several of the most famous violists were noticeably short in stature 
(for example, Lionel Tertis32 and Lillian Fuchs), for they may possibly have 
felt lesser in some sense, a feeling that might have unconsciously led them 
to choose to play the viola, a “second string” instrument, so to speak. !e 
jokes, however, indicate that although the violist may be handicapped, he 
has turned his handicap into an advantage. It enables him to 'nd a parking 
space, that is, a place in the orchestra that others cannot occupy.
Why are violas bigger than violins? !ey’re really not. It just looks that way because 
violists’ heads are smaller. Here is another version of that joke: Why are vio-
las so large? It’s an optical illusion. It’s not that violas are large, just that the 
viola players’ heads are so small. In yet another version, the joke is at the 
expense of violinists rather than violists: Why are violins smaller than vio-
las? !ey’re actually the same size—it’s the violinists’ heads which are larger.33 
Here the allusion is to the perceived conceit of violinists.
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One notable joke about the purported lack of intelligence of violists is the 
following: What’s the most challenging requirement for %nalists in the 
International Viola Competition? A %nalist must be able to hold his viola 
'om memory.34
Some jokes concern the lack of employment opportunities for violists: What’s 
the di(erence between a viola player driving into town and a plumber driving 
into town? !e plumber is going to a gig.
What’s the difference between a dead viola player lying in the road and a dead 
Country Singer lying in the road? The Country Singer was going to a 
record date.
Why do violin players double on viola? So they can get less work.
De%nition of an optimist: A viola player with a beeper.
A few jokes hint at the relative lack of importance of the viola in the overall orches-
tral setting:
What’s unique about viola concertos? !ey’re the only concertos in which the solo-
ist plays the harmony..35
Why don’t violists play hide and seek? Because no one will look for them.
Why shouldn’t violists take up mountaineering? Because f they get lost, it takes ages 
before anyone notices that they’re missing.
If you’re lost in the desert, what do you aim for? A good viola player, a bad viola 
player, or an oasis? !e bad viola player. !e other two are only %gments of 
your imagination.
A number of viola jokes portray the violist as dead:
What do you do with a dead violist? Move him back one stand.36
What’s the difference between a viola and a coffin? The coffin has the stiff on 
the inside.
Why is the viola section like the Beatles? 25% of them are dead, and the other 75% 
haven’t played together for years.37
If you see a violist and a conductor in the road, which do you hit %rst? !e violist—
business before pleasure.38
!e basic message of viola jokes is that the viola (its solos and sounds) and the violist 
should be avoided if at all possible:
Why do most people take an instant dislike to violists? Saves time.
Why is a viola solo like premature ejaculation? Because even when you know it’s 
coming, there’s nothing you can do about it.
Why do people tremble with fear when someone comes into a bank carrying a vio-
lin case? !ey think he’s carrying a machine gun and might be about to use it. 
Why do people tremble with fear when someone comes into a bank carrying a 
viola case? !ey think he’s carrying a viola and might be about to use it.
What is the most popular recording of the “William Walton Viola Concerto?” 
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Music Minus One. In this joke, which refers to recordings made with the 
accompaniment only so that would-be instrumentalists can practice with a 
full orchestra or other members of an ensemble, the implication is that the 
Walton concerto, featuring the viola as soloist, would sound better with-
out the viola solo part.
Why is playing a viola solo like wetting your pants? Both give you a nice warm feel-
ing while everybody moves away 'om you.39
What’s the de%nition of a perfect gentleman? Someone who can play the viola but 
chooses not to.40
Why did the chicken cross the road? To get away 'om a viola recital.41
!e recognition of the viola joke cycle is attested by the fact that there is even a text 
referring to such jokes: What is the longest viola joke? “Harold in Italy.”42 !is is a reference 
to the composition composed by Hector Berlioz expressly for the viola and orchestra.
What is one to make of this spate of viola jokes? And to what extent, if any, does it 
re6ect actual attitudes towards violists or, for that matter, violists’ attitudes towards them-
selves and their chosen instrument? An examination of several prominent violists’ auto-
biographies clearly reveals that the traditional disdain held by so many towards the viola 
is keenly felt by violists. Consider the following statement made by famed violist Lionel 
Tertis (1876–1975) writing about his experience at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury: “When I 'rst began to play the viola as a solo instrument, prejudice and storms of 
abuse were my lot. !e consensus of opinion then was that the viola had no right to be 
heard in solos, indeed the consideration of its place in the string family was of the scanti-
est. It was not only a despised instrument, but its cause was far from helped by the down-
and-out violinists who usually played it. !e executants in those days were violinists too 
inferior to gain a position in orchestras as such. A wretchedly low standard of viola-playing 
was in fact accepted simply and solely because there was no alternative.”
It turns out that Tertis’s own professional trajectory lends credence to some portions 
of the stereotype. He started out as a violinist and took up the viola on a whim. Henry 
Wood of the Henry Wood’s Queen’s Hall orchestra learned of Tertis’s interest in the viola 
and asked to hear him play. At the time, Tertis was “the last player at the last desk of the 
second violins.” A5er the audition, Terns “jumped from last violinist to principal viola in 
the orchestra.44 Curiously enough, there is a joke which reverses this cursus honorum from 
lowly violinist to high-ranking violist. Moreover, the joke departs from the joking question 
format of most of the viola jokes. Instead, it employs a folktale framework and is in fact a 
variant of a well-known tale of three wishes.45
!e last chair violist of the Minot North Dakota Symphony found a magic lamp, 
and a5er rubbing it, a genie appeared and granted him three wishes. His 'rst 
wish was to be an 80% better player than he was now. !e genie granted his 
wish and—poof—he became the principal violist of the Minot North Dakota 
Symphony. Soon he wasn’t satis'ed with this so he made his second wish—again 
to become an 80% better player than he was and—poof—he became the princi-
pal violist of the Philadelphia Orchestra. Well, he still had one wish to go and—
you guessed it—he asked once more to become an 80% better player than he had 
been. So—poof—he became the last chair second violin of the Minot North 
Dakota Symphony Orchestra.46
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Violist Lillian Fuchs (1902–1995) had an instrument-changing experience somewhat 
parallel to that of Tertis. She began on the piano, but in6uenced by the example of her suc-
cessful older brother Joseph, a talented violinist, she too took up the violin. However, at 
one point, her violin teacher urged her to switch from violin to viola. Her father was ada-
mantly opposed to this and she herself thought her decision might be “the catastrophe of 
her life.”47 In 1992, when she received a Medallion Award for Distinguished Artistry from 
the New York Viola Society, she was asked how she came to play the viola instead of the 
violin. Her answer given in the third person: “Lillian didn’t intend to play the viola. She 
was talked into learning it by her teacher, Franz Kneisel.”48
Violist William Primrose (1904–1982) also reports starting out on the violin and that 
eventually his teacher Eugène Ysaÿe suggested that he switch to viola.49 Like Fuchs’ father, 
Primrose’s father 'rmly opposed the shi5, becoming “deeply despondent” at his son’s deci-
sion.50 Primrose’s father, despite being a violin teacher who himself “doubled” on the viola, 
felt that “anyone who was con'ned to play out his musical life on what he regarded as 
the secondary instrument did but confess his failure as a violinist.”51 At the time, a highly 
respected orchestra player told Primrose, “you’re making the biggest mistake of your life. 
You will regret this as you’ve regretted no other thing.” Late in life at the outset of a lengthy 
interview, Primrose claimed that he would rather accept as a pupil someone who had come 
to the viola via the violin rather than someone who started from the beginning on the vio-
la.53 Rahkonen claims that “one of the 'rst assumptions in junior high school orchestras is 
that the director will switch the poor violinists over to viola, where they will do less harm. 
and perhaps even contribute.”54
Primrose was certainly well aware of the violist stereotype. In describing the make-up 
of a string quartet, he said that “the violist was usually, as we know to our sorrow, a disap-
pointed violinist” and this was one reason why he so admired Lionel Tertis for his many 
years of advocacy of the lightly regarded member of the string family. As Primrose phrased 
it, “a5er he championed the cause of the instrument. those who followed no longer felt 
ashamed to be playing the viola.”56
In his autobiography, Tertis repeatedly referred to the viola in such demeaning folk ver-
biage as a “Cinderella” or “Ugly Duckling.”‘ He spoke of the viola’s reputation “as a nasty, 
growling, and grunting instrument.”58 What this suggests is that violists have internalized 
the stereotype so that it functioned as a self-stereotype. Regardless of whether violists are 
truly inferior musicians or whether the viola is truly an inferior string instrument, the fact 
is that violists are well aware of the stereotype and feel obliged to do their best to overcome 
the stigma attached to their choice of musical vocation.
We should stress that not all the jokes pick on the viola. !ere are other instruments 
that come in for ribbing. !e French Horn, for example, is featured in such texts as: How 
do you make a trombone sound like a French Horn? Put your hand in the bell and miss a lot 
of notes59 or How can you tell you are kissing a French Horn player? Because he has his hands 
up your ass. Bagpipes may also be victimized: Why do bagpipers walk when they play? To get 
away 'om the noise. Other musicians are also featured in traditional jokes. Besides conduc-
tors, singers are famous for their prima donna personalities. What’s the de%nition of a male 
quartet? !ree men and a tenor60 and What’s the di(erence between a soprano and a terror-
ist? You can reason (negotiate) with a terrorist.61 Still, it is the viola, among orchestral instru-
ments, that takes the most jocular punishment.
Unanswered remains the question of why these jokes should exist at all. We know that 
states of anxiety are o5en relieved by humor, but is it su7cient to say that the anxiety or 
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nervousness resulting from a form of stage fright, exacerbated when one has to perform a 
solo in front of one’s peers or in front of an audience, explains the existence of viola and 
other musical jokes? We believe an examination of the content of the jokes, the themes and 
variations so to speak, provide an illuminating clue as to the function and meaning of viola 
jokes. One must keep in mind that viola jokes are told by many musicians, not just string 
players or violists. So whatever the signi'cance of the joke cycle might be, it is likely that it 
is relevant to the act of musical performance.
It is our contention that musical groups, whether large (orchestras or bands) or small 
(string quartets or other small ensembles), are microcosms of the larger European (and 
American) societies that produced them. !e social organization of orchestras and bands 
is extremely hierarchical. Not all musical groups in other cultures have a dictatorial con-
ductor to “govern” and control the group. In fact a Martian might 'nd it strange that the 
conductor holds only a small stick (baton) and does not actually play one of the orchestral 
or band instruments. !e social organization includes a second in command, the concert-
master, typically the 'rst violinist. !e various instrumental sections are ranked such that 
one can be 'rst chair, second chair, third chair, etc. Even at an early age, young musicians 
are encouraged to compete in order to move up the ladder, say from second clarinet to 'rst 
clarinet in a high school band. !e emphasis upon regimentation and order in bands is 
usually marked by a form of folk costume. Military bands obviously have members in uni-
forms, but even high school and college marching bands typically wear some kind of uni-
form dress. Members of orchestras do not wear such uniforms, but on the other hand, for-
mal dress, for example, tuxedos or coat and tails for piano soloists, surely can be construed 
as a sort of uniform, again underlining the formality of such performance events.
!e rigorous nature of performance constraints is by no means limited to the social 
organization of the orchestra or band or even string quartet. !e very nature of musical 
performance is such that strict demands are made in terms of time and place. Members 
of musical groups are required to play together. One must know one’s place and one must 
stay in it. An individual cannot simply play whenever he or she feels like it. !ere is a score. 
One must begin at a particular time and even more important, one must end at a partic-
ular time. Nothing is more embarrassing for an instrumentalist to be heard playing a5er 
all his fellow group members have stopped. Similarly, one of the greatest fears for a musi-
cian is that he or she has lost his or her place during a performance. (It is worth noting that 
several of the viola jokes speci'cally refer to being lost, for example, “lost” in the desert or 
“lost” as a result of mountaineering.) Upon realization that he or she is lost, the befuddled 
musician may cease playing, hoping that he or she will be able to recognize an opportune 
(and correct) moment to start playing again in the right place. !ere is even a joke, usually 
told of a trombonist, that expresses this fear: !e town’s brass band had just %nished a loud 
but not very coordinated selection. !e musicians had just sunk down to their seats a&er bow-
ing to the applause when the trombonist asked: “What are we playing next?” !e band direc-
tor replied, ‘‘!e Stars and Stripes Forever.” “Oh my gosh!” exploded the trombonist. “I just got 
through playing that!”62
If we consider the themes of the viola jokes, we can easily see that they concern playing 
in unison or in tune or the lack thereof. Another theme concerns time rather than tone. 
!e di8erence between the 'rst and last section of violas is said to involve two bars or a 
measure and a half. Such jokes are all about not playing together properly, that is, being 
either ahead or behind one’s fellow musicians. What these jokes seem to do is to provide 
a socially sanctioned vehicle for the expression of rebellion against the various forms of 
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restraint and order inherent in group musical performances. So it is not only violists who 
are afraid of not playing in unison or 'nishing a half measure ahead or behind their com-
rades. In this connection, it is of interest that in Mozart’s Ein musikalischer Spass KV 522 
[A Musical Joke] composed in 1787, part of the humorous scoring by Mozart included 
having an instrument enter one beat too late in both the third and fourth movements.63 
What is perhaps even more striking in the present context is the fact that the instrument 
in question was a viola! !is may suggest that Mozart as well was aware of the tradition of 
making the viola the butt of the string section of the orchestra.
It is not just instrumentalists playing harmony who are concerned with losing their 
place. Soloists also worry about playing in concert with their accompanists or the orches-
tra. Group musical performance by its very nature demands conformity of the highest 
order. Moreover, one mistake, one missed entrance, one false note, can ruin an entire per-
formance for an audience and for the orchestra or band. No matter how seasoned a musi-
cian may be, no matter how many times he or she may have performed a given composi-
tion, there is always the possibility of making a mistake. It is one matter to make a mistake 
in the privacy of one’s practice room at home; it is quite another to make it in front of a 
live audience and one’s peers. We believe it is this constant pressure to perform at the high-
est level, the worry about meeting the expectations of a sophisticated audience or one’s fel-
low musicians that has generated the viola jokes which in e8ect list all the things that could 
possibly go wrong—playing out of tune, missing one’s cue, and the like. What this means 
is that viola jokes ful'll a valuable function in articulating the traditional anxieties of musi-
cians. Telling a viola joke to a fellow musician is a tacit admission that one knows full well 
what pitfalls lie in performing a piece of music. !e listener laughs because he or she rec-
ognizes the point of the joke, albeit unconsciously. Non-musicians would probably not 
'nd most of the jokes very amusing and for that matter might not even understand some 
of the more technical musical terminology. In that sense, some of the viola jokes tend to be 
somewhat esoteric, intelligible only to true cognoscenti. !at special knowledge is required 
only makes such jokes more enjoyable as it is clear that only real musicians can fully appre-
ciate their nuances. In that sense, the telling and re-telling of viola jokes helps create a bond 
among musicians. !ey not only share the jokes; they share the anxieties that produced the 
jokes in the 'rst place.
As to why the viola joke cycle 6ourished in the 1990s, it is di7cult to say. Rahkonen, 
who claims that the cycle began in 1991, admits that he “could 'nd nothing speci'c to 
point to a cause for the beginning of the cycle.”64 Presumably, the tensions articulated in 
the jokes have existed for centuries. It is always di7cult to pinpoint the actual moment of 
the onset of a joke cycle and just as hard to explain why the cycle started at that particular 
time. In this instance, we might speculate that the popularity of the viola joke cycle seems 
to have coincided with the emergence of a censorious perspective known as “political cor-
rectness.” According to the guidelines of PC, it was no longer permissible to poke fun at 
minority cultures. Racist and sexist jokes were, in theory, no longer acceptable.65 Dumb 
“Pollack” or dumb “blonde” jokes were considered o8ensive and de'nitely not PC. In that 
context, it became necessary to 'nd some other group that could be depicted as “dumb” or 
otherwise undesirable or inferior.66 As violists already had a stereotyped reputation as sec-
ond class citizens, it was a simple enough matter to abuse them verbally as a group that few 
would feel obliged to defend. Of course, assuming there is any causal connection between 
“political correctness” and the emergence of viola jokes in the early 1990s, the question of 
why political correctness should have emerged at that particular time remains.
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In any event, the empirical reality of the viola jokes is irrefutable. As we have suggested, 
much of the content of the jokes expresses fundamental sources of abiding concern among 
musicians. !ere will probably always be anxiety connected with performing in a musical 
group before a live audience. !e nervousness and the excessive 6ow of adrenalin may even 
be considered positive factors in helping to make a musician perform at his or her very 
best. But the inescapable presence of anxiety also means that musicians will need an escape 
valve to relieve the pressure. And that is why we believe that viola jokes or their successors 
in the future will continue to circulate among both professional and amateur musicians.
Notes
 !e jokes reported in this article were collected by Meegan M. Brown in 1996 from several 
fellow musicians in the San Diego area, from members of the Ying Quartet, and mostly from 
nationwide alumni of the Interlochen Arts Camp in Michigan. We are indebted to famed 
opera staging director Jonathan Miller who was kind enough to send us several pages of musi-
cians’ jokes.
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Medical Speech and 
Professional Identity
(A) !e Gomer: A Figure of American Hospital Folk Speech
(B) “When You Hear Hoofbeats, !ink Horses, Not Zebras”:
A Folk Medical Diagnostic Proverb
Introduction
Showing that medical professionals constituted a folk group, with a complex of subgroups 
(physicians by specialty and school background, residents at di8erent stages of develop-
ment, and nurses assigned to di8erent units), 't into Dundes’s general goal of demonstrat-
ing that elite scienti'c groups de'ned their group identity through folklore. !eir com-
munication is replete with slang and story that express their relation to one another, and 
to patients. One approach to identifying and interpreting the material heard from medical 
professionals, therefore, was to gauge folklore’s capacity to convey values within the group, 
and to express attitudes toward those outside the group. In other words, it not only de'ned 
the group, but also marked the boundaries and hierarchies within a sociocultural system of 
which patients were generally unaware.
!e hospital setting separated Dundes’s analysis of medical professionals from others 
he did of elite groups. Scholarship o5en distinguished folklore by cultures of region, reli-
gion, ethnicity, age, and gender, Dundes saw the medical professional in a distinct insti-
tutional context, one that di8ered, inside its doors, in its visual appearance and social 
world. It was a world of emergency and stress, with life and death at stake, and therefore 
provided an excellent test of folklore’s function to express and mediate anxiety. Indeed, 
as the 'rst essay shows, di8erent types of hospitals (Dundes discussed the distinction of 
Veterans Administration hospitals) had their own lore, re6ecting their institutional cul-
ture. Dundes hypothesized that the more stress a group faced, dealing with life and death 
issues in the hospital complex, the more likely it was that folklore, o5en of a morbidly 
humorous nature, would arise or would be needed.
An early indication of Dundes’s interest in the subject was in his interpretation of several 
legends in American Folk Legend (Hand 1971). !ere, he reinterpreted the legend, known 
as “!e Cadaver Arm,” circulating in medical schools. In this legend, medical students put 
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a coin in a cadaver’s hand and drive through a toll booth. !e attendant is startled when 
the driver leaves that arm behind as the medical students speed away. Dundes pointed out 
that the story was one of many about cadavers among medical students. He concluded that 
among professional groups, this unusual concentration of narratives around the theme of 
dead bodies provided “an outlet for the anxiety initially felt about treating a dead human 
body, as a mere ‘nonhuman’ object.” One of the story’s lessons is that doctors cannot get 
too attached to their patients’ ailments. In addition to separating the would-be doctors in 
the narrative from their previous identities as part of the public, o8ering the cadaverous 
arm with a coin attached reversed the normal roles of patient and doctor. !is, according 
to Dundes, functioned as a way to deal with the anxiety of taking money from sick or dying 
people. (See Dundes’s summary of this interpretation in “Getting the Folk and the Lore 
Together” [1976a], presented in the next chapter).
In the 'rst essay, Dundes collaborated with a nurse, Victoria George, to collect mate-
rials—printed in the form of photocopied sheets as well as communicated orally—by 
questionnaire and interview. Dundes compared the stereotypes patients had of doctors 
and nurses with the lore devised by hospital sta8 for patients. According to Dundes, 
the “gomer” was a prime example of sta8 slang. It referred to a chronic problem patient, 
o8ering a safety valve for ritual reversal—turning human tragedy into comedy. In addi-
tion, Dundes extended the interpretation of the socioeconomic gap between the 'gure 
of the gomer (as the “dregs of society”) with the aIuent doctor (begun with his treat-
ment of the “Cadaver Arm”) to one of “critical di8erences in class and values.” Here, the 
stress is the ethical responsibility of the doctor to treat all patients equally, despite his 
or her class biases.
!e second essay is about a proverb—“If you hear hoofbeats think horses, not zebras”—
used in hospital instruction. Published twenty-one years a5er the Gomer piece, it was also 
written with health professionals. One was his daughter Lauren Dundes, a medical sociol-
ogist at Western Maryland College, and the other was Michael Strie8, a physician with the 
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. Indicating the divide between the prov-
erb, as part of “esoteric” hospital lore, and the public, the senior Dundes explained to the 
editor, “I don’t think the majority of proverb scholars know the proverb despite its wide-
spread popularity among doctors” (Mieder 2006a, 153). Of interest in interpreting the 
proverb is the fact that it can hold multiple meanings, in changing socioeconomic con-
texts, for the professional medical community.
An advertising campaign by the Carcinoid Cancer Foundation, begun at the start of the 
twenty-'rst century, may change the esoteric nature of the proverb, although the campaign 
is primarily aimed at healthcare professionals. Using the zebra and its stripes as logos, the 
advertisement gives “!e Story Behind the Zebra”: “Physicians are taught ‘If you hear hoof 
beats think horses, not zebras.’ Zebras, like Carcinoid Cancer, are less common. !erefore 
we want to remind the medical community to also ‘think zebras.’” Following the custom 
of displaying di8erent colored ribbons for various causes (pink for breast cancer, yellow for 
soldiers abroad), carcinoid cancer advocacy groups brandish black-and-white striped rib-
bon pins, stu8ed zebra dolls, and car magnets. Fundraisers include “!e Zebra Ball: Stars 
for the Stripes,” and a book, Carcinoid Cancers, Zebras and Stardust (Girsch-Bock 2006). 
Audiences of the hit television show CSI: Las Vegas (featuring scienti'c details of foren-
sic science) may have wondered about the zebra proverb, used in a segment (“Pirates of 
the !ird Reich” in 2006) to refer to an apparently outrageous theory by the lead medi-
cal investigator, which of course turned out to be right. It also remains to be seen whether 
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another proverb suggested by the Carcinoid Foundation takes hold in the medical com-
munity: “You must suspect it to detect it.”
For further folkloristic work with the culture of healthcare professionals, see 
Tangherlini 1998; Hu8ord 1989; Berkman 1978; Burson 1982; Burson-Tolpin 1989; 
Winick 2004: and Meehan and Bronner 2006.
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!e Gomer: A Figure of American Hospital Folk Speech
One of the groups least studied by folklorists is the medical profession. To be 
sure, there has been a long-standing scholarly interest in folk medicine, but this refers pri-
marily to medicine practiced by patients themselves or by healers not usually considered to 
be part of the “scienti'c” medical establishment. Folk medicine, in fact, is o5en contrasted 
with so-called scienti'c medicine. !is has perhaps tended to suggest that scienti'c medicine 
is devoid of any folkloristic content. Yet doctors and nurses not only constitute an impor-
tant occupational folk group, they constitute one which by its very nature involves an unusu-
ally great amount of anxiety. It is to be expected that matters of health care which are liter-
ally concerned with life and death create nervous tension—not just for the patient but also 
for the dedicated medical personnel who are charged with the responsibility of treating the 
patient. In most hospitals, a rich albeit esoteric folklore 6ourishes providing a much needed 
outlet for doctors and nurses who are under almost continual round-the-clock pressure.
Unless readers have had professional training in medicine, they will probably not be 
familiar with in-group hospital folk speech. In some instances, the terminology is speci'-
cally designed to conceal information from patients. “Code Blue,” for example, is used in 
some California hospitals to alert personnel that someone is in extremis and that emer-
gency assistance is needed immediately. If “Code Blue 123” is announced on the public 
address system, it creates far less anxiety for the general patient population than would an 
announcement that the patient in room 123 is su8ering cardiac arrest. Similarly “Dr. Red” 
(or in some versions Mr. Firestone) is paged to indicate that a 're has broken out. “Mr. 
Strong, Mr. Strong, 456” means that help is needed in room 456 to subdue an unruly or 
di7cult patient. By using this “secret” code language, hospital sta8 members can commu-
nicate e8ectively and at the same time they can reduce the chances of causing widespread 
panic and alarm among patients.
Acronymic initials used by doctors in the admission process are also a part of hospital 
folklore. FLK, for instance, means “Funny Looking Kid.” !is might be put on the record 
to indicate that the admitting doctor noticed something odd about the appearance of a 
child but also that he was unable to pinpoint exactly what it is. (It would not necessarily be 
written on the permanent record but rather on a temporary card in the Kardex 'le which 
is commonly used for quick reference by the sta8 to determine at a glance a patient’s condi-
tion, diagnosis, prescribed medication, etc.) FLK is not really derogatory; it suggests rather 
that the diagnosis is incomplete. Such a label on the admitting card would alarm neither 
the patient nor the patient’s parents.
Similar to FLK is the code acronym TSTSH which stands for “Too Sick To Send 
Home.” !is could also be used by a doctor in the admitting process when he 'nds himself 
unable to diagnose accurately the patient’s condition. !e code initials indicate only that 
the patient appeared to be too ill to be released and that the lack of a proper full-6edged 
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diagnosis should not be construed by a doctor entering the scene later to be grounds for 
assuming there was nothing wrong with the patient. Some of the acronymic folklore 
is never written. For example, there is ECU, Eternal Care Unit, which is a euphemism 
for death or the a5erlife. Among hospital personnel, the question “Where is patient so-
and-so?” might be answered, “He went to the ECU.” Another example of a traditional 
acronym is the triple H. HHH, at least in the past when enemas were quite commonly 
prescribed, stood for “high, hot, and a hell of a lot.” !is term, in contrast to the preceding 
ones, could be revealed to patients.
Among the most interesting examples of hospital folk speech are those items which 
refer to patients, especially those patients who are incapacitated or who present particu-
lar problems for the hospital sta8. A patient who has su8ered extensive brain damage, for 
example, as the result of a severe stroke, may be termed a “vegetable.” !e term suggests 
that although the patient is technically alive, he or she may be totally unable to speak and 
perhaps even unable to think. !is term may be known by some members of the general 
public, but the term “gork” which means much the same thing is probably not. !us a 
“gork ward” is a “vegetable garden.” Neither “vegetable” nor “gork” would ever be used in 
front of a patient or his family. According to one apocryphal story, a doctor visiting such a 
patient would daily ask the nurse, “Did you water the gork today?” and he did so in front 
of the patient. As it happened, the patient’s speech was impaired but there was nothing 
wrong with his mind. Eventually he recovered his speech faculties, and he brought suit 
against the doctor for having subjected him to unnecessary mental anguish, namely being 
termed a gork. !is cautionary tale not only warns medical sta8 members about using in-
group folklore in front of patients but it also expresses the increasing concern of doctors 
with the dangers of being named in malpractice or negligence suits 'led by disgruntled 
patients. Clearly the term “gork” would never be put on a patient’s medical chart—unlike 
some of the acronyms discussed above.
Of all the terms used by hospital sta8 members to refer to patients, one of the most 
fascinating is “gomer.” !e gomer is a stereotyped patient character known reluctantly by 
most doctors and nurses who work in what are called “high stress areas.” High stress areas 
are those units in a hospital where severely ill patients are found. Such areas include the 
intensive and coronary care units and, of course, the emergency room. Nowhere in the hos-
pital are the energies and skills of the medical sta8 more in demand, and this is why there is 
great resentment among the sta8 if they feel their talents and dedication are being wasted 
on individuals whom they consider to be malingerers and hypochondriacs.
What precisely is a “gomer?” He is typically an older man who is both dirty and debili-
tated. He has extremely poor personal hygiene and he is o5en a chronic alcoholic. A der-
elict or down-and-outer, the gomer is normally on welfare. He has an extensive history of 
multiple admissions to the hospital. From the gomer’s standpoint, life inside the hospi-
tal is so much better than the miserable existence he endures outside that he exerts every 
e8ort to gain admission, or rather readmission to the hospital. Moreover, once admit-
ted, the gomer attempts to remain there as long as possible. Because of the gomer’s desire 
to stay in the hospital, he frequently pretends to be ill or he lacks interest in getting well 
on those occasions when he really is sick. O5en he appears to be confused and hostile—
though he may be genuinely grateful for the care and attention he does receive. One must 
remember that most patients look forward to the day when they are able to leave the hos-
pital. In contrast, the gomer looks forward to the day when he is readmitted to the hos-
pital and dreads the day he may have to leave. !is presents a frustrating problem for the 
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hospital sta8, and it is no doubt this frustration which has encouraged the development 
of the folk 'gure of the gomer.
!e gomer is reported in hospitals all over the United States.1 Since the gomer is famil-
iar primarily to doctors and nurses who work in high stress areas, he is found mostly in 
large county hospitals, Veterans Administration hospitals, and university teaching hos-
pitals. !e gomer is rarely encountered in private hospitals, which usually screen their 
patients very carefully before admitting them. Because of the gomer’s inevitable lack of 
adequate 'nancial resources, he is customarily rejected by private hospitals and sent to 
charity or public hospitals.
Informants were unsure about the origin of the term “gomer.” Some mentioned Gomer 
Pyle, the name of the central character of a popular television series in the 1960s still 
shown on reruns in the 1970s. According to the Dictionary of American Slang, gomer or 
gomar is an Air Force slang term meaning “A 'rst-year or naive Air Force cadet.”2 In the 
television series, Gomer Pyle was portrayed as a bumpkin and a loser (although sympa-
thetically). !e loser connotation would be akin to the gomer as he appears in hospital 
folklore. Other informants suggested a biblical source for the gomer (see Genesis 10:2–3; 
1 Chronicles 1:5–6; Ezekiel 38:6; and Hosea 1:3), but this seems unlikely.3 It is possible 
though by no means demonstrable that the term derives from an older English slang abbre-
viation GOM meaning Grand Old Man. It is also conceivable that “gomer” is a modern 
derivative of such older words as Scottish gomerel meaning fool or simpleton or Anglo-
Irish gomus meaning fool.4 !ere is also a word gome which may be cognate with Latin 
homo meaning man. A second word gome has a dialect meaning (listed as obsolete) refer-
ring to heed, attention, notice, or care. “To take gome” would thus mean to give heed or to 
pay attention to, or to take care of. If this is relevant, then a gomer might logically be an 
individual who needed attention and care, a meaning quite close to the current usage in 
American hospital folklore.
Several folk etymologies have been proposed for “gomer.” Di8ering interpretations of 
the word as an acronym seem to fall roughly along geographical lines. On the east coast 
of the United States, gomer is explained as an acronym for “Get Out of My Emergency 
Room.” On the west coast, the interpretation more usually advanced is “Grand Old Man 
of the Emergency Room.”’ !ere is agreement, however, that gomer always refers to a man. 
(One informant claimed that the female version of a gomer was a “gomerette.”)
It is di7cult to determine just how long “gomer” has been a part of American hospital 
folklore. One report took it back at least to 1964 when it was used by medical students at 
the University of Washington in Seattle.6 Several informants thought they remembered its 
being used in the 1950s. Some doctors and nurses suggested “gomer” might be of recent 
coinage because until the advent of Medicare and comparable state programs, a “gomer” 
would not have been able to a8ord extensive and expensive medical treatment. Presumably 
as socialized medicine increases, the folklore of individuals perceived to be abusers of the 
system will develop. To the extent that a form of subsidized medicine has existed for some 
time, as in Veterans Administration hospitals (not to mention the venerable tradition of 
charity wards in major public hospitals), it is quite likely that “gomer” or some analogous 
folk expression has had a much longer life in tradition than we are able to document.
Although “gomer” appears to be the most common term in hospital argot for an 
unkempt, unsavory, chronic problem patient, there are others. Among the near synonyms 
are: “turkey,” “crock,” “trainwreck,” “lizard,” and “reeker.”7 !ree informants, all sta8 mem-
bers of San Francisco General Hospital’s Emergency Room, mentioned “grume” de'ning 
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it as a 'lthy “gomer,” in other words, an individual whose condition was even worse than 
the average “gomer.” “Grume” which comes from the Latin grumus meaning “little heap” 
can in medical parlance refer to a clot (as in blood). Folklorists may know the term from 
the phrase grumus merdae referring to the curious custom of some burglars leaving a “call-
ing card” or pile of feces behind at the scene of the crime.8
Gomer’s pre-eminence as a term is attested to by its occasional occurrence in song9 as 
well as by its serving as the inspiration for derivative expressions. For example, one infor-
mant, a doctor who had worked in the emergency room at San Francisco General, reported 
that he had seen nurses there make what are called “gomersicles.” A gomersicle, an obvi-
ous popsicle oikotype, is made by freezing the patients’ orange juice on tongue depres-
sors (which results in something resembling the various frozen desserts on a stick available 
commercially). !ese improvised snacks are then eaten by the doctors and nurses while 
they make rounds on patients they consider to be gomers. Normally doctors and nurses 
wouldn’t eat in front of patients, so the eating of gomersicles suggests a certain lack of 
respect toward gomers.
Generally speaking, “gomer” is a term used more by younger sta8 members. As a mat-
ter of fact, older hospital sta8 members and senior administrators tend to resent the use of 
the term. For example, a forty-one year old head nurse from the Yale-New Haven Hospital 
said, “!e use of the term says more about the user than about the patient. It would be nice 
to think that it is only used by professionals when they are very tired and discouraged.” 
Older informants understood the reason for the term gomer, but they considered its use to 
be unprofessional and excessively cruel.
!e resistance to the term—as well as to letting the outside world know about the exis-
tence of the term—created de'nite obstacles to the conduct of 'eldwork. A5er Victoria 
George distributed questionnaires at a Veterans Administration hospital in the Bay Area, 
she received an irate telephone call from the Chief Nurse of the hospital, demanding to 
know who she was—she is in fact a Licensed Vocational Nurse although not at that hos-
pital and what she was doing circulating such a disgusting questionnaire in her hospital. 
!e Chief Nurse contended that the questionnaire and the proposed study were distaste-
ful because “gomer” had such negative connotations. When Miss George suggested the 
possibility that the gomer may have originated in Veterans Administration hospitals, the 
Chief Nurse replied, “I’ve worked in hospitals in the midwest where I tried to stop peo-
ple from talking about ‘gomers’ and having just arrived here [the San Francisco Bay Area] 
I have found that everyone talks about ‘gomers’ in the west too.” She continued, “It is the 
university doctors who bring the expression ‘gomer’ to the Veterans Administration hos-
pitals, and I wouldn’t think my sta8 would say such things. It must have come from the 
University!” (!is sentiment could, of course, have been partly a reaction to the fact that 
we were individuals from the University of California, Berkeley, who were making the 
inquiry about the gomer. In terms of projection, this makes perfect sense. Rather than have 
the University point an accusing 'nger at members of the medical profession for using 
such a calloused concept, a member of the profession was suggesting that it was the uni-
versity community which was responsible for the term.) A5er the questionnaires—most 
of which were blank—were retrieved from this Chief Nurse, an interesting additional one 
was received through the mail from a nurse in the very same hospital. !is nurse elected to 
answer the question “Where do you work?” by writing, “!e V.A., home of the gomer.”
!e particular association of the gomer with V.A. hospitals was con'rmed by an 
expression elicited from a female intern who had been a medical student at a Veterans 
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Administration hospital in Omaha, Nebraska, in 1974. !e expression “gomer patrol” 
referred to a group of rehabilitated gomers who came back to the V.A. hospital to take vol-
unteer jobs sweeping the 6oors and the like because they very much wanted to be around 
the hospital and to be with their gomer friends. Other informants who knew the phrase 
“gomer patrol” indicated they had not heard the expression anywhere except in V.A. hos-
pitals. !e point is that even if the gomer did not originate in V.A. hospitals, there can be 
no question that the term is in common use in these hospitals. Administrators in such hos-
pitals may do their best to stamp out such folklore (on the grounds that it is not in the best 
interest of projecting and protecting a favorable public image of doctors and nurses) but 
the gomer lives on—in fact and in folklore!
By a strange coincidence, it was in the same San Francisco Bay Area V.A. hospital where 
most of the questionnaires were returned blank that a “gomer assessment sheet” had been 
collected several years earlier in 1974.10 !is assessment sheet was circulated to doctors and 
medical students on Sunday morning rounds which are o5en especially long and tedious. 
!e gomer point list is a prime example of in-group xerographic folklore. !rough humor, 
a feeling of in-group solidarity is achieved. !e humor is at the expense of the patient and it 
is for this reason that many doctors and nurses would prefer the gomer point list to remain 
strictly within the group.
!e gomer point list surely functions for medical students as a remarkable enumeration 
of many of the things which can go wrong in patient care or rather things that patients can 
do to make life di7cult or unpleasant for the hospital sta8. !e list also reassures the medi-
cal student or intern that he is not the only one who has to contend with the array of prob-
lems and frustrations caused by gomers. !e premise of the gomer point lists is that the 
examining doctor is supposed to grade the patient as to his degree of gomerism. No doubt 
this parody also provides a form of revenge for all the required charts and records that con-
scientious medical personnel are constantly 'lling out for gomers and other patients. !ere 
are many gomer point lists; no two are identical. Some have special rules; for example, point 
values may double a5er midnight. !e following 1974 version is representative. Many of the 
abbreviations and terms will not be familiar to the lay person, but some, like “Pt.” for patient, 
or “dx” for diagnosis, will probably be intelligible enough without further explanation.
Gomer Assessment
Characteristic Assessed point value
1. Transferred to another service on day of admission11 2
2. Stool found under dressing at 'rst post op dressing changer12 10
with no B.M.’s recorded 14
3. Chart weighs over two pounds13 2
4. No known address other than other V.A. hospitals 6
5. Develops new complaint on evening of discharge14 4
6. Returns from leave with hematoma beneath incision15 4
7. Attempt at discharge by resident fails 6
each additional failure 2
8. Pt. has seizure or hematemesis while checking out clothing for discharge16 5
9. Pt. sent to ward by admitting physician with dx which pertains to organ system
actually involved -3
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10. If diagnosis by admitting physician is correct -5




Spanish American War 15
Civil War 25
If due to arrow wound 50
12. Pulls I.V. out18 6
If in full restraints with teeth 15
If edentulous 20
13. Removes Foley catheter with bag in6ated19 9
5 cc bag 10
30 cc bag 30
In full restraints    additional 10
14. Urinates on physician 10
on nurse 8
on orderly  6
on medical student 4
15. Defecates in doctor’s bag    with honors  23
16. Patient visited by American Legion 1
each additional visit 1
visited by VFW  1/2
by VFW auxiliary 3
17. Pt. writes irate letter to American Legion on discharge 8
to Congressman 10
18. Pt. gets Foley drainage tube tied into pajama tie 10
19. Pt. has tracheotomy performed because of inability to trigger IPPB20 12
20. Past history reads “See old chart”21 1
21. Concentration of Airwick required in patient’s room causes conjunctivitis 
among visiting personnel22  4
22. Patient answers all questions asked to any other patient on open ward  11
23. Patient drinks from urinal  12
from another patient’s urinal  14
24. Resident irately calls admitting when patient arrives on ward23  6
25. Pt. fractures hip while leaving hospital  8
26. Remains in hospital through entire resident rotation24  10
each additional rotation  15
27. Service connected syphilis contracted before 1935  13
28. Unable to do B.E.; pt. returned to ward25  7
29. Films have to be repeated more than twice  2
each additional repeat  2
30. Films acceptable on 'rst try  -5
31. Admitted with diagnosis of ataxia manifested by scratch marks on forehead 
secondary to attempts at nose picking26  13
32. Refused admission at another VA hospital before being admitted  2
each additional hospital  2
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33. If Foley catheter is under more than 10 lbs. of traction without complaints 
from patient  11
34. Toenails cannot be cut with clippers, chisel or drill  7
35. Semiformed guaiac positive stool found more than 7 1/2 5. from bed 
of source27  9
each additional foot, add  1
each wall or window, add  3
on sidewalk below window near bed  14
36. Any two of the following: beard, lice, jaundice, disorientation, dacubiti, 
fecal impaction, ETOH on breath28  4
37. Regulates his own I.V.  4
other patients’ I.V.’s  4
38. Bites bulb o8 of oral thermometer 3
rectal thermometer  4
another pt.’s rectal thermometer  11
39. Found in another patient’s bed29  3
each additional pt. in bed  3
40. Drinks a5er shave lotion purchased in canteen  5
each additional bottle  3
41. Pt.’s status prompts investigation by American Legion  6
42. Frequently overlooked on rounds30  3
43. Asks for schedule of American Legion movies on initial workup31  1
44. Source of admitting history is patient’s mistress  4
patient’s mother  7
45. Admitting orders include, “Bath, STAT”32  5
46. Patient eats pajamas  11
another patient’s pajamas  13
47. Found in hallway without pajama bottoms  10
48. Loses more than 20 lbs. of adm. weight when put on diuretics33 14
49. Found with dentures in upside down 7
50. Develops chemical tracheitis secondary to aspiration of a 6y34  11
51. Decubitus on occipital protuberance35  11
52. Defecates in or on bed of another pt.  14
if while in bed with another pt.  19
53. Pt. irately asks “on what grounds” when told that he is going 
to be discharged36 10
54. Pt. states “I’m a disabled American Veteran” when irate resident, intern or 
medical student is called at 3 AM to restart I.V. pt. has pulled out while hav-
ing the DTs37  17
Gomer point lists circulate in typewritten or xerographic form. It would be truly 
astonishing to 'nd any individual who had committed to memory any of the more 
extensive versions. At Presbyterian Hospital in San Francisco in 1976, informants in 
the absence of a written list could remember only the following gomer items (which 
one can easily see are much less detailed than are the analogous o8enses in the preced-
ing text).38
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1. Drinking own urine    2
2. Drinking roommate’s urine   4
3. Drinking from urinal while restrained  6
4. Having a seizure without dropping a cigarette39 10
5. Admitting note ends with “sorry”   10
6. Climbing out of bed    2
7. Climbing out of roommate’s bed   4
8. Biting through intravenous tubing  8
9. Long yellow 'ngernails    6
10. Toenails that curl under    6
11. Covered with feces that is 've or more days old 10
12. Attempting to eat plastic silverware  8
13. Admitted to nursing home before the age of 40 10
14. Wearing patient gown backwards   4
15. Positive O sign40    6
16. Positive Q sign4I    8
17. Pulling out Foley catheter   5
18. Pulling out Foley catheter with balloon up  7
19. Defecates in medical student’s bag   15
20. BUN higher than IQ42    10
21. Drinks out of toilet when NPO43   10
22. Lice on patient survive 5 Kwellings44  12
!ese gomer point lists provide a very vivid and graphic portrait of the gomer. Several 
informants mentioned “gomer Olympics” with awards (medals) for patients who vomited 
the farthest or for patients who made the greatest number of suicide attempts in one week. 
!is may be sick humor, but it is, a5er all, humor which is literally a response to sickness. 
Doctors and nurses are humans like everyone else and they need folkloristic outlets for the 
expression of their anxieties just as the members of any folk group do.
It is not hard to understand why medical practitioners might feel anger and hostility 
toward individuals who demand and o5en receive a disproportionate amount of the pre-
cious time and energy of the hospital sta8. Why should doctors and nurses have to care 
for someone who evidently cares little or nothing about himself ? No matter what is done 
for such patients, they will only return again and again to the hospital admitting room in 
the same miserable, unfortunate condition. In fact, the logic could easily be: the better the 
care in the hospital, the sooner the gomer will return to plague the sta8 once more. In con-
trast, there is presumably an incentive to cure a normal pesty or pesky patient. !e sooner 
he or she is cured, the sooner he or she can be released from the hospital. !is is decidedly 
not the case with the gomer. !ere seems to be no way of escaping permanently from such 
patients. Creation of the gomer 'gure and compiling gomer point lists is one of the few 
available defenses against this deplorable situation.
Other possible factors contributing to the tension existing between hospital sta8 mem-
bers and gomers include critical di8erences in class and values. On the whole, doctors tend 
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to come from aIuent families, and they may not be accustomed to seeing or interacting with 
the “dregs of society” on a regular basis. Like other members of the middle or upper class, 
doctors may resent the gomer in part because he is perceived to be a creature or product of 
the welfare state. !e gomer is considered to be a Medicare abuser, and it is the tax monies 
paid by doctors themselves, among others, that presumably pay for the care of such patients.
Gomers create stress in the hospital setting. In theory, doctors and nurses are pledged 
to o8er the 'nest medical care they can to patients regardless of these patients’ ethnic, reli-
gious, social and personal characteristics. Yet in practice, the personal hygiene and habits 
of the gomer are so repugnant and distasteful as to prove o8ensive even to the most hard-
ened and dispassionate sta8 member. !e inevitable stress in any doctor-patient relationship 
resulting from the anxiety which accompanies illness and its treatment is greatly exacerbated 
by the wretched and foul condition of the gomer. As folklorists we know that the greater 
the stress, the greater the need for folklore to relieve the pressures caused by that stress. !e 
gomer as a 'gure of American hospital folk speech provides an esoteric socially sanctioned 
outlet for such pressures. !e gomer as a shared folk concept tends to unite the hospital 
sta8. Any in-group is likely to be strengthened by concentrating upon creating a stereotype 
of the out-group. So doctors and nurses need to have stereotypes of patients. It has long been 
known that patients need to resort to stereotypes about doctors and nurses. For example, 
it has been observed that patients’ jokes such as the story of the nurse who wakes you up to 
give you a sleeping pill are not new, but are part of hospital folklore.45 !e point is that it is 
just as necessary and normal for medical practitioners to have folklore about patients.
Although the expression “gomer” would never be used directly to a patient or even 
in front of him or members of his family, it is possible notwithstanding that at times the 
gomer does sense the attitude of the sta8 toward him. In any case, the idealized stereo-
types of doctors and nurses held by most patients and to some extent the doctors’ and 
nurses’ own professional behavioral code requires the suppression of emotion. Doctors 
and nurses are supposed to be cool and calm no matter what the medical crisis may be. !e 
patient known as a gomer severely tests this professional facade with its requisite polite-
ness and “bedside manner.” As long as such patients exist, the gomer and other forms of 
American hospital folklore will continue to thrive. Like so much of folklore, the gomer 
and speci'cally the gomer assessment point list o8er a safety valve opportunity for ritual 
reversal. !e more disastrous and disgusting the behavior, the more points are assigned. 
Unrewarding activities are rewarded through the magic mirror of folklore, and for a much 
needed moment in the unremitting strain of hospital routine, human tragedy is miracu-
lously translated into human comedy.
Notes
1.  Information was obtained by sending questionnaires to eight hospitals in 've major American 
cities. Sixty-three questionnaires were 'lled out and returned by personnel from Yale-New 
Haven Hospital, Albany Medical Center, Millard Fillmore Hospital in Bu8alo, University of 
Utah Medical Center in Salt Lake City, and from the following four hospitals in San Francisco: 
University of California Medical Center, Veterans Administration Hospital, San Francisco 
General Hospital, and Presbyterian Hospital of the Paci'c Medical Center. We wish to thank 
all of the individuals who were kind enough to take the time to complete the gomer question-
naire. It should be noted that the geographical range of the data collected is much greater than 
that suggested by the list of hospitals above inasmuch as doctors and nurses move relatively 
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freely from one part of the country to another. Responses to the question where the informant 
had 'rst heard of the gomer elicited no less than thirty-six di8erent places.
2.  Harold Wentworth and Stuart Berg Flexner, Dictionary of American Slang (New York: !omas 
Y. Crowell, 1967), p. 687.
3.  Nevertheless, it is interesting that Andrew Borde in 1552 in !e breviary of healthe claimed 
that “gomer passion,” by which he apparently meant such supposed sexual anomalies as mastur-
bation and nocturnal emissions, was derived from the earlier sin of the people of Gomorrah. 
See Robert H. MacDonald, “!e Frightful Consequences of Onanism: Notes on the History 
of a Delusion,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 28 (1967), 431. !e more general connotations 
of “self-abuse,” a conventional euphemism for masturbation, might well apply to the modern 
gomer who makes little e8ort to take care of himself.
4.  We have relied upon the Oxford English Dictionary (1933) for our discussion of gomerel and 
gome. For gomus, see also J. S. Farmer and W. E. Henley, Slang and Its Analogues (New York: 
Arno Press, 1970).
5.  !is might seem to suggest that the west is a bit more tolerant and hospitable than the east! 
One informant could recall only a portion of what she remembered of a di8erent acronymic 
referent: “Goes Out _____ _____ Repeatedly.” !e variation in alleged referents of course con-
'rms the overall traditionality of the word “gomer.”
6.  !is information was collected in December 1964, by M. Patricia Miller from Susan Halverson 
who was at that time a Registered Nurse in Oakland, California.
7.  A turkey is a patient who is feigning illness and/or has an obnoxious personality. A crock is also 
a patient pretending to be sick. Crock implies lie, as in the more general idiom “a crock of shit.” 
A trainwreck is someone who is very sick. He has several medical problems simultaneously and 
he is usually comatose. A lizard is a physically dirty patient with scaly skin. A reeker is a dirty 
patient with a strong disagreeable body odor.
8.  See Albert B. Friedman, “!e Scatological Rites of Burglars,” Western Folklore, 27 (1968), 171–
179; and !eodor Reik, !e Unknown Murderer (New York: International Universities Press, 
1945), pp. 76–81.
9.  !e following parody of the “Twelve Days of Christmas” was collected by Victoria George 
from the San Francisco General Hospital Emergency Room in 1977. Written by nurses Lauren 
Lockridge and Philis Harding, it contains a number of examples of hospital folk speech:
On the twel5h day of Christmas












and a gomer in the D.T.s
 For the bene't of readers unfamiliar with medical argot, Central Emergency has sent the fol-
lowing to Mission Emergency Hospital: Twelve interns are 6ailing about, that is, acting in a 
frantic way to no useful purpose. Eleven surgeons are performing with scalpels. Ten grumes 
(extra 'lthy gomers) are scratching to relieve their itching. Nine turkeys are having or are pre-
tending to have seizures. Eight women are waiting to have pelvic examinations. Seven psychotic 
patients are screaming. Six victims of stabbing are cursing. Five women have pelvic in6ammatory 
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disease. Four individuals are brought in “Dead on Arrival.” !ree individuals are brought in 
with 6ail chests, that is, with crushed rib cages. Two drug users who overdosed with Heroin are 
admitted. A gomer su8ering from delerium tremens is the 'rst to enter the emergency room, a 
fact which signals the importance of the gomer in hospital life.
10.  !is excellent text was collected in March 1974, by Jo Anne Morrow from William Cory who 
was then a medical student in San Francisco.
11.  Rather than burden those readers who may already be acquainted with hospital routine by 
repeatedly interrupting the text with bracketed explanations, we have chosen instead to place 
brief explanatory remarks in footnotes for those who desire further information about abbre-
viations and medical procedures. !e transferral to another service means that the patient upon 
admission presented a complaint, but the doctor later found something entirely di8erent. (Or 
it could refer to the fact that when an examining doctor investigated an initial complaint he 
found it to be groundless, whereupon the patient registered a new complaint requiring a trans-
fer to another service and a di8erent examiner.)
12.  !is means that the patient somehow managed to place feces under his sterile dressing a5er sur-
gery and before the doctors changed it a few hours later. Such a patient would probably be in a 
confused state.
13.  !e excessive weight of the chart implies that the patient has been in the hospital a long time, 
long enough to have accumulated a very extensive chart.
14.  When the patient discovers he is scheduled to be released, he 'nds another symptom so that he 
can stay longer in the hospital.
15.  A hematoma is a tumor containing e8used blood or what in lay terms is called a bruise or swell-
ing. !e implication is clearly that the patient didn’t take very good care of himself.
16.  Hematemesis means vomiting blood. !is and seizures are considered serious medical prob-
lems, and either would require additional hospitalization. 
17.  Many doctors and nurses tend to consider low back pain as an attention-getting device rather 
than a legitimate complaint.
18.  I.V. means intravenous.
19.  A Foley catheter is a tube inserted into the urethra extending into the bladder for the purpose 
of draining the bladder of urine. A balloon is attached to the end of the tube that is in the blad-
der to hold it in place. It is quite painful to pull out.
20.  A tracheotomy is the surgical creation of an opening into the trachea (windpipe through the 
neck. !rough a tube which is inserted in this opening, the patient breathes. IPPB is an abbre-
viation for the Intermittent Positive Pressure Breathing machine which is started by the patient 
taking a deep breath through a mouthpiece. If a patient were unable to do this, doctors might 
well perform a tracheotomy.
21.  Old chart is a record of past hospitalizations. If a patient came in with the same problem repeat-
edly, a doctor might make this notation. !e implication is also that the patient has a very exten-
sive past history. In theory, a doctor should always make a new examination and record a current 
history, but when confronted with a gomer, a doctor might be sorely tempted not to bother.
22.  Conjunctivitis is an irritation of the mucous membrane of the eyes. Airwick is a commercial 
brand-name air freshener designed to remove or conceal unpleasant odors. A strong deodor-
izing agent, Airwick in very concentrated form could cause eye irritation. !e reference is, of 
course, to the foul smell of the gomer caused by his poor personal hygiene.
23.  !e doctor is angry because he feels that this patient has been admitted unnecessarily.
24.  A resident’s rotation is usually of six weeks duration which would mean a fairly protracted hos-
pital stay for the patient.
25.  B.E. refers to a barium enema. Barium sulfate is used in a standard X-ray procedure to visualize 
the digestive tract including the colon. In order for a clear X-ray picture to be taken, the colon 
must be free of fecal matter. Most patients are easily prepared for this through diet and/or lax-
atives. Some gomer types, however, are very full of stool and the test has to be repeated again 
and again. Not until the gomers have evacuated their colons completely are there likely to be 
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successful X-ray 'lms. (!e reference in the next entry to repeated 'lms has to do with the same 
problem.) !e time required for the gomer to prepare himself su7ciently for the barium enema 
may thereby entail an extra day or two in the hospital.
26.  Ataxia is a failure of muscular coordination resulting in irregular muscular action. Presumably 
a patient with this condition desiring to pick his nose might miss, causing scratches on his fore-
head. !e image evoked is similar to the Polack joke: How did the Polack get 35 holes in his 
head? Trying to learn to eat with a fork. See Alan Dundes, “A Study of Ethnic Slurs: !e Jew 
and the Polack in the United States,” Journal of American Folklore, 84 (1971), 201.
27.  Guaiac is a test to determine whether there is blood in the feces. Guaiac positive means that 
blood is present. Most gomers are alcoholics and bleeding problems are common enough 
among severe alcoholics.
28.  A decubitus ulcer is a bed sore. It is caused by prolonged pressure resulting from a patient’s con-
'nement to bed for a long period of time. ETOH means alcohol.
29.  !is refers to a patient’s being disoriented or confused.
30.  !is suggests the patient has been there so long that the doctors have nothing more to say about 
him and see little point in checking him.
31.  !e implication is that if a patient is well enough to want to know what movies are playing, he 
is probably not sick enough to warrant being admitted, and he is simply using the hospital as a 
recreation center.
32.  STAT means immediately if not sooner—from the Latin statim. !e patient is so dirty that the 
admitting doctor is unable to examine him thoroughly.
33.  While it is likely that a gomer might be su8ering from 6uid buildup, losing twenty pounds 
through diuretics is probably a facetious allusion to the gomer’s having been on a liquid diet 
before coming to the hospital, the liquid being some form of alcohol!
34.  !e patient has an infected trachea (windpipe) as a result of having inhaled a 6y.
35.  !is is a bed sore on the back of the head. It implies that the patient has been lying down in bed 
absolutely supine for an extended period of time.
36.  !e patient does not want to be released from the hospital.
37.  D.T.s means delirium tremens, a condition marked by sweating, trembling, hallucinations, etc., 
caused by excessive drinking of alcohol.
38.  !is gomer list was collected orally by Victoria George from her colleagues. !e various details 
were elicited individually from di8erent informants.
39.  If an individual were really having a seizure, it would be impossible for him to hold on to a ciga-
rette. !e description means that the patient is only pretending to have a seizure.
40.  !is refers to the mouth positioning of a sleeping or comatose patient. Speci'cally, the mouth is 
slightly open and more or less in the shape of an O. In some versions, it signi'es that the patient 
is totally unresponsive and that he may be about to die.
41.  !is is a variant of the previous sign. !e patient’s mouth hangs open in the shape of an O but 
in this case his tongue is hanging out, suggesting an overall con'guration of Q. !e Q sign indi-
cates a more serious condition than the O sign inasmuch as the protrusion of the tongue may 
signify the loss of muscular coordination.
42.  BUN, an abbreviation for blood urea nitrogen, is a test which provides an index of renal func-
tion. Since many gomers have poor renal function, their BUN would be high. Normal results 
are 18–22 so that even a high BUN 'gure would be far less than the average IQ of 100. An IQ 
lower than a BUN would be low indeed.
43.  NPO means nothing by mouth (nihil per ōs), that is, the patient is to have nothing to eat or 
drink.
44.  Kwell is a commercial brand of lindane, a preparation used in treatment of scabies and pedicu-
losis (lice infestation). It is a fairly strong agent which normally kills lice with one application.
45. Rose Laub Coser, “Some Social Functions of Laughter: A Study of Humor in a Hospital 
Setting,” Human Relations, 12 (1959), 176. For more examples of hospital folklore see Lois A. 
Monteiro, “Nursing-Lore,” New York Folklore Quarterly, 29 (1973), 97–110.
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“When You Hear Hoofbeats, !ink Horses, Not Zebras”: 
A Folk Medical Diagnostic Proverb
In 1995, a case history was reported in the Journal of Clinical Endocrinology and 
Metabolism entitled “Sometimes the Hooves Do Belong to Zebras! An Unusual Case of 
Hypopituitarism.” In 1993, a guest editorial “Horses and Zebras” in Regional Immunology 
o8ered alternative explanations for immune regulation in lungs. In 1992, Drs. Stephen G. 
Pauker and Richard I. Kopelman published a case history in the New England Journal of 
Medicine “Interpreting Hoofbeats: Can Bayes Help Clear the Haze?” !ey recommended 
the use of “Bayes’ rule” which refers to the likelihood of disease in a patient with a given 
set of 'ndings being estimated as the proportion of patients with the same 'ndings who 
also have the disease, and this inspired a letter to the editor by Dr. Otto Kuchel. !is let-
ter, accompanied by a response from the authors, appeared a year later in the same jour-
nal. In none of these three instances is the reference to hoofbeats, horses and zebras in any 
way explained. !e clear implication is that readers of these technical case histories, that is, 
members of the medical profession, are thoroughly familiar with a traditional metaphor 
involving hoofbeats, and that therefore no explanation of the metaphor is necessary.
In 1993, a case history contained originally in Kenneth Klein’s Getting Better: A Medical 
Student’s Story (1981:93, 95–96) was reprinted in Health but with a new title: “When You 
Hear Hoofbeats, !ink Horses, Not Zebras: Case No. 1478.” !e title is not explained, 
but the case well illustrates the sense of the expression. It involved a woman who hadn’t 
had a period for over three months. At the time Klein was a young inexperienced medi-
cal student who tried to impress his supervisor by rattling o8 a series of possible diagno-
ses along with various tests that might be run in order to con'rm or discon'rm them. His 
supervisor’s response: “Whew! !at’s a very nice di8erential diagnosis, but you forgot an 
important cause of secondary amenorrhea, in fact the most common one. Remember, in 
medicine common things are common. What’s the 'rst test to do before you get all those 
fancy hormone assays?” Klein racked his brains but could not think of anything else. His 
supervisor had to tell him which test to run. “Half an hour later, the pregnancy test came 
back positive.” !e moral is clear: Klein had proposed zebras when he should have been 
thinking horses!
In 1996, Kathryn Hunter in an essay in !eoretical Medicine devoted entirely to a dis-
cussion of the proverb claims that “When you hear hoofbeats, don’t think zebras” is clini-
cal medicine’s most frequently heard maxim (1996:225). But she astutely points out that 
the aphorism paradoxically contains the seeds of its own negation. !ere wouldn’t be any 
point in attempting to dissuade doctors from thinking zebras if there were not an obvious 
tendency to do so. It is rather analogous to understanding that the Ten Commandments 
plainly refer to wishful thinking on the part of all those who adhere to the religious faiths 
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based on the Decalogue. !ere would be little point in forbidding behavior for which 
there was no desire to indulge. Hunter describes the paradoxicality of the maxim very well 
indeed: “. . . the zebras are there, unforgotten, unforgettable, right in the aphorism. Not 
only does the advice generate its own contradiction among the young, but as a reminder 
to forget, it is paradoxical in itself. As long as the injunction not to think zebras comes 
to mind, zebras cannot be unthought. Physicians think zebras as they think not to think 
them” (1996:2128). And certainly the vast majority of the various communications in 
medical journals referring to “zebras” would tend to support Hunter’s argument.
In 1995, in a chapter of his book, !e Man Who Grew Two Breasts which bears the title 
“!e Hoofbeats of a Zebra,” Berton Roueché describes the sad case of a young woman whose 
myasthenia gravis went undiagnosed for some years until one doctor 'nally recognized her 
symptoms. !e doctor who had had a long-standing special interest in the disease explained 
his success: “!ere is a saying about diagnosis—about why doctors o5en fail to recognize one 
of the less-common diseases. It goes: When you hear hoofbeats, you don’t necessarily think 
of a zebra. I recognized the hoofbeats of a zebra. !at was my only magic” (1995:175).
In 1996, Dr. Charles Davant in an article in Medical Economics entitled “When 
You Hear Hoofbeats, Sni8 the Air,” referred to “the old saw—think horses, not zebras, 
when you hear hoofbats (1996: 107). But a5er presenting several case histories encoun-
tered as a family physician in Blowing Rock, North Carolina, Davant takes issue with the 
advice articulated in the “old saw” when he concludes “As I’ve always maintained hoof-
beats sometimes do belong to zebras” (1996:114). In 1997, virologist C. J. Peters chose 
to title the prologue to his fascinating autobiographical account of his lifetime of track-
ing virally caused infectious diseases “!e Hoofbeats of Zebras.” Peters begins his book 
“!ere’s an old adage in medicine that goes something like this: Common things occur com-
monly. Uncommon things don’t. !erefore, when you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not zebras 
(1997:1). Hunter o8ers another version of the 'rst portion of the adage: “Uncommon pre-
sentations of common diseases are more common than common presentations of uncom-
mon diseases” (1996:227). But Peters as a medical specialist, tends to be more concerned 
with zebras than horses. In his words, “I didn’t want to be overly alarmist, because I knew 
very well that most hoofbeats in our neck of the woods come from horses . . . But what if 
the hoofbeats we were hearing weren’t from the proverbial horses? What if it was zebras 
a5er all?” (1997:261, 19). Pauker and Kopelman end their 1992 communication with 
a stronger warning: “Hoofbeats usually signal the presence of horses, but the judicious 
application of Bayes’ rule can help prevent clinicians from being trampled by a stampeding 
herd that occasionally includes a zebra” (1992:1013). Similar caution is urged by Dr. Alan 
J. Waldman of the Department of Psychiatry at the College of Medicine at the University 
of Florida. His 1992 letter to the Journal of Neuropsychiatry, starts with “A classic axiom 
taught to virtually all medical students, especially during their internal medicine rotation 
is ‘When you hear hoofbeats, think of horses and not zebras.’” But Waldman continues, 
“Yet in the practice of neuropsychiatry one must be continually aware that the hoofbeats 
may in fact not be horses” (19923:113). He then proceeds to demonstrate the validity of 
his caveat by reporting two case histories where what appeared initially to be psychiatric 
symptoms proved to be the results of relatively rare metabolic disorders.
In yet another attempt to counter the alleged wisdom of the proverb, this time from 
the area of dermatology, Dr. Richard W. Sagebiel, writing an editorial in the Journal of the 
American Academy of Dermatology in 1995 entitled “Who needs zebras?,” begins by claim-
ing that few medical students avoid the obligatory saying, “When you hear hoofbeats, think 
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horses, not zebras.” He calls it a “perpetuated cliché” which encourages “sloppy thinking.” 
He is particularly concerned with a medical “zebra” called desmoplastic neurotrophic mel-
anoma (DNM). Admitting that it is “uncommon, perhaps rare, and di7cult to diagnose,” 
Sagebiel nevertheless urges his colleagues to be on the lookout for it. In his words, “Few 
among us look at a nonpigmented ‘scar’ and think DNM. And yet if we do not begin to 
pay attention to the ‘zebras’ of diagnosis, then as consultants we will be replaced by gen-
eralists who will think ‘horses’” (1995:800). Specialists’ fear that they might be replaced 
by generalists who are deemed incapable of distinguishing the more exotic zebras from 
the commonplace horses seems to be quite widespread, judging from the number of com-
munications found in so many medical journals, especially those serving as the principal 
forums of specialized medical practitioners, urging that one cannot ignore the serious-
ness of failing to recognize life-threatening zebras. Indeed, it would appear that the origi-
nal medical school aphorism advising newly educated doctors to think horses rather than 
zebras has been virtually repudiated insofar as the conventional wisdom seems rather to 
propose the opposite: think zebras, not horses!
It is di7cult to ascertain just how old the hoofbeats proverb is. Samuel Shem in his best-
seller !e House of God, a fast-paced novel describing the rigors and horrors of being an intern 
a5er completion of medical school 'rst published in 1978, refers disparagingly to a typical 
medical student when he “hears hoofbeats outside his window, the 'rst thing he thinks of 
is a zebra” (1998:46). !ere can be no question about the meaning of “zebra” in this con-
text as Shem provides a helpful glossary of terms as an appendix to his novel where zebra is 
de'ned as “an obscure diagnosis” (1998:429). Elsewhere in the novel, the protagonist doc-
tor reports that he learned more about functioning in the intensive care unit from the expe-
rienced night nurse than he had in his “four rare'ed” medical school years which were 'lled 
with details of “zebraic diseases” (1998: 335). Yet this term “zebra” most o5en heard initially 
in the course of a medical school internship or residency, that is, during the early stages of 
training, not surprisingly is older than 1978. A retired cardiologist in Berkeley, California, 
reported in 1998 that he had learned the following dictum at Cincinnati General Hospital 
circa 1960: “If you hear hoofbeats behind you, don’t turn around and expect to see zebras.” 
Hematologists at Johns Hopkins Hospital con'rmed this approximate dating of the dic-
tum, and it is very likely that the expression is considerably older than 1960.
Although the proverb seems to be largely con'ned to the medical community and is 
not widely known to the general population, there is some slight evidence that it may 
have di8used outside the world of medical practice. For instance, Shems Friedlander’s 
book When You Hear Hoofbeats !ink of a Zebra 'rst published in 1987 contains no 
reference whatsoever to anything remotely related to medicine. !e book is a literary 
polemic advocating Su'sm and the title is meant merely to encourage the reader to stop 
thinking in old tradition-bound ways and to start trying to gain knowledge of Allah 
through Islam and Su'sm (Friedlander 1987:1). On the other hand, the fact that the 
proverb seems to be largely restricted to members of the medical profession may explain 
why it is not to be found in Charles Clay Doyle’s valuable 1996 listing of “new” proverbs 
of the twentieth century.
!e ostensible meaning of the proverb in its more familiar medical context is to warn 
medical students about the dangers of looking too hard for esoteric rare diseases, thereby 
perhaps resulting in the overlooking of the most obvious and common diagnosis indicated 
by the symptoms manifested by the patient. !ere is another proverb employed by physi-
cians which conveys the same message: “It’s always darkest at the foot of the lighthouse.” 
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!e proverb’s meaning is that things that are common and should be easy to see are o5en 
overlooked in favor of the remote. !is proverb which is found in general usage, not just 
in a medical context, exhibits various forms, as does all folklore, e.g., “It is always dark just 
under a lamp” or “It is always darkest under the lantern” (Mieder 1992:134) and it is also 
known in Japan “!e base of a lighthouse is dark” (Mieder 1986: 278).
!e advice is also reminiscent of that o8ered by “Occam’s razor.” William of Occam, 
an early fourteenth century English philosopher, (c. 1285–1349), is credited with articu-
lating the principle Entia non sunt multiplicando praeter necessitatem which literally trans-
lates roughly as “Entities should not be multiplied without necessity.” However, the gen-
eral agreed-upon meaning, according to the Oxford Dictionary of English Proverbs, is that: 
“for purposes of explanation, things not known to exist should not, unless it is absolutely 
necessary, be postulated as existing.” In other words, the simpler explanation is always to be 
preferred over a more complex one.
!e problem with Occam’s razor is that simple solutions to complex problems do not 
always su7ce. And the same holds for the hoofbeats proverb. Sometimes, it does turn out 
that the hoofbeats were made by zebras, not the more common horses. Some doctors have 
even had their own very personal experience in the fallacy of always assuming horses rather 
than zebras. For example, Dr. John H. Frierson writing in the Virginia Medical Quarterly 
in 1995 provides a telling illustration. “It started out,” he says, “as a sore right shoulder 
which I attributed to a combination of golf practice and yard work.” At the suggestion of 
a physiatrist who made a provisional diagnosis which included bursitis, he tried physical 
therapy which did a8ord some temporary relief, but soon therea5er the symptoms moved 
to his le5 shoulder and then down to both legs. “At its peak,” Frierson reports, “I was a 
virtual cripple.” Finally, a neurologist helped make the correct diagnosis of polymyalgia 
rheumatica (PMR), and a rheumatologist then prescribed prednisone and a single dose 
completely relieved all the soreness and sti8ness. Frierson’s conclusion: the initial diagno-
sis of a quite common ailment such as bursitis had been a mistake. “No consideration was 
given to the rarer ‘zebra’ diseases, i.e., PMR. As a result time was lost in making the diag-
nosis” (1995:79). Frierson’s 'nal advice: “So watch out for the ‘zebras.’ !ey’re out there 
and they’ll getcha!”
How the dilemma in choosing the proper diagnosis on the basis of just hoofbeats can 
be exacerbated is illustrated in the following narrative:
Late at night in an institution—presumably a famous teaching hospital—an 
internist and a family practitioner are sitting in the on-call room and hear the 
unmistakable sound of hoof beats in the hallway. !ey both look up at each other, 
and the family practitioner says, “My God! Horses?” And the internist cocks his 
head, listens for a second more and says, “No, Zebras” (Prasad 1998:19).
In this text, there is a clear opposition between the generalist and the specialist. !e 
generalist interprets the hoofbeats as being those made by horses. !is is the obvious, more 
common inference to be drawn. However, the generalist does not simply assert his conclu-
sion. Rather he puts his remark in the form of a question, as if asking for con'rmation from 
the specialist. !e internist, the specialist in this instance, listens further apparently utiliz-
ing his greater knowledge of such phenomena before correcting his generalist colleague 
by pronouncing the hoofbeats as those made by zebras. !e explosion of medical knowl-
edge has made it more and more di7cult for general practitioners to keep pace with all the 
new advances made in all branches of medical research. !e corresponding increase in the 
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number of specializations in medicine has created an even larger gap between members 
of such specializations and the old-fashioned general practitioner. A zebra belongs to the 
equus family, but it is rather a distinctive example with its striking black and white stripes. 
Presumably it takes a highly experienced ear to be able to distinguish the sound of exotic 
zebra hoofbeats from those made by ordinary garden-variety horses. And that is precisely 
why the metaphor is so apt. Of course, the very idea of being able to make any kind of an 
educated guess as to the identity of an animal solely on the basis of the sound of hoofbeats 
is itself a bit of folkloric fantasy attesting to the very real di7culties faced by physicians who 
are o5en asked to diagnose illnesses without very much in the way of de'ning symptoms.
So what can we conclude about the dictum, aphorism, adage, proverb: When you hear 
hoofbeats, think horses, not zebras? Is it true folk wisdom, in this instance, true folk medi-
cal wisdom with respect to the di7cult task of making diagnoses from limited data? !e 
answer to this question turns on the very nature of the proverb genre. Proverbs contain rel-
ative, not absolute wisdom. !e wisdom is always contingent on time and place, in short, 
on context. !e very existence of contradictory proverbs in many languages and cultures 
demonstrates the relativity of proverbial wisdom. “Look before you leap” recommends 
caution before action; “He who hesitates is lost” advocates an opposite course. “Absence 
makes the heart grow fonder” is poor solace for the cynical “Out of sight; out of mind.” 
Hunter reminds us: “!ey say you can’t teach an old dog new tricks” and “You’re never 
to old to learn” (1996:239). With the understanding that proverbial wisdom is always 
bounded by contextual considerations, we can see that “!ink horses” might be good 
advice for young doctors who have just completed medical school and inevitably have 
been introduced to a plethora of rare and esoteric diseases. On the other hand, more expe-
rienced medical practitioners who are well aware of the greater statistical frequency of 
“common” diseases should remain vigilant for the possibility of a zebra occurring on occa-
sion among herds of horses.
!e importance of context also is apparent in consideration of two co-existing yet 
contradictory modern phenomena: defensive medicine and managed care. In the case of 
the former, physicians may conduct tests or procedures to investigate the possibility of 
a zebra which, if overlooked, could result in a lawsuit. !e other force, managed care, 
which controls spending by closely monitoring physicians’ treatment of patients, encour-
ages the interpretation of hoofbeats as horses to avoid unnecessary spending with a low 
probability of 'nding a zebra. !us, doctors must consider the adage amidst constraints 
which include the threats of malpractice if zebras are ignored and refused reimbursement 
if zebras are sought.
!e issue of general practitioner or generalist versus specialist is not so easy to resolve. 
Clearly, patients need both kinds of physicians. !e rapidly expanding universe of infor-
mation relevant to a particular disease is such that only a specialist can possibly keep up. 
No one physician can possibly be expected to have total knowledge of all areas of medi-
cal practice. So by de'nition, a generalist’s competence in any one area cannot match that 
of the quali'ed specialist. On the other hand, the whole is always greater than the sum 
of its parts. Partial knowledge, no matter how great, may not necessarily lead to the opti-
mum treatment. If one asks a surgeon for advice, the recommendation is very likely to be 
for surgery! A general practitioner who can synthesize the sometimes contradictory coun-
sel of specialists remains critical for ideal patient care. So in that sense, when one hears 
hoofbeats, one should not really choose between assuming either horses or zebras, but one 
should rather in the best interest of the patient consider both alternatives.
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Getting the Folk and 
the Lore Together
Introduction
!is essay addresses the connection of Dundes’s folkloristic perspective with semiotics, 
concisely de'ned as the study of signs. !e ideas in it became central to his symbolist 
approach in “Projection in Folklore” (1976a), which was incorporated in Interpreting 
Folklore (1980b), and it stood as a manifesto for a psychoanalytic enterprise within folk-
loristics. Dundes originally wrote it in 1975 as a presentation to the Charles Sanders Peirce 
Symposium on Semiotics and the Arts at Johns Hopkins University. !e goal of semiot-
ics, to understand how meaning is made and understood, was of special importance to 
Dundes, evident in his opening verbal salvo: “Folklore means something.” What it meant, 
he announced, was o5en not obvious from a literal reading of folkloric texts; it was indeed 
o5en something about something else. !e source of that meaning in something else 
involved anxiety, ambivalence, or ambiguity, contextualized in sociohistorical conditions 
as well as in psychological development. !e title of the essay referred to the polarization 
between those scholars emphasizing the social basis of the folk, and the predominantly lit-
erary approach to the texts of lore. Dundes proposed to bring the two together in the dis-
cipline of folklore study, by drawing attention to the mind as a source of projective expres-
sion that re6ects and creates social organization and interaction.
As a structuralist in6uenced by Ferdinand de Saussure’s ideas of signs (the basic unit 
of language) and signi'cation (the separation of the signi'ed object from the signi'er), 
and the distinction between langue (the systematic dimension of natural language) and 
parole (speaking, or manifestations of langue), Dundes also related folkloristics to semi-
otics, interpreting expressive culture as symbolic systems. Dundes’s contribution was to 
suggest applying psychoanalytic concepts of the unconscious, and projection, to the study 
of meaning in a cultural context. “!ere is patterning and system in folklore,” Dundes 
asserted, “so that the symbol employed in any one given folkloristic (con)text may be 
related to a general system of symbols.” In folkloristic analysis, his preference for the rhet-
oric of symbol over signs derived from the psychological view that meanings resided not 
only in language, but also in the entire domain of culture. !is view was the background 
for his statement that “what I am saying is that within a cultural relative system of symbols, 
the use of a particular symbol may be remarkably consistent. I also hasten to add that sym-
bols may carry multiple meanings.”
274  !e Meaning of Folklore
Dundes presented folkloric examples (jump rope rhymes and wedding rituals) that he 
interpreted earlier as an anthropological “mirror of culture,” but which, in this essay, he 
couched as symbolic readings in “projective” processes. He revised the Freudian theory of 
projection by distinguishing projection that transfers feelings and desires to an external 
object, so that, for example, male sexual impulses might be viewed in phallic references. 
Dundes called this projective process one of “more or less direct translations of reality 
into fantasy.” Projective inversion, on the other hand, described a sublimation or avoid-
ance, where an undesirable wish toward someone else was reversed, so that the statement 
“I hate him” became “He hates me.” Dundes argued that the projective inversion in the 
Oedipal plot inverted the son’s wishful thinking to kill the father into the father killing the 
son. From the viewpoint of the son, blame is placed on the victim (the father), and guilt 
is avoided. Dundes used this concept of projective inversion to explain narrative details 
involving incest, murder, cannibalism, and homosexuality, all of which appear out of place 
if seen as a true mirror of culture (see, for example, “Madness in Method Plus a Plea for 
Projective Inversion in Myth” in the present volume; also 1989e, 1976b, 1991b).
In the present essay, Dundes referred to Henry Nash Smith’s theory of “virgin land,” 
which deserves some elaboration because of its use of symbolist approaches in the inter-
pretation of American culture. Smith had argued that even before America was settled, an 
image of the New World had been developed in narrative and art, comparing it to a bibli-
cal garden paradise and mythical wilderness. Europeans imagined the lure of America as 
a bounty of fertile, untrampled land. !e natives did not deserve this plenty, European 
thinking went, because, using the rhetoric of reproduction, they supposedly did not make 
the land productive or cultivable. Smith saw a new national identity emerging even among 
a panoply of settlers, as a result of communicating shared values through the symbolic 
lessons of folklore, literature, and art. Settlers may not have been aware of the fusion of 
these values into cognitively held “myths” or folk ideas, but their expressions and actions 
revealed collectively shared beliefs that were distinct from those in Europe ([1950] 2005). 
Smith’s theory, then, related to Dundes’s, in representing the importance of folklore in 
identity-building, at a national as well as a local level, and in positing that the meaning of 
these expressions and actions had sources in unconsciously held ideas. Dundes made more 
of the sexual symbolism of the land’s “virginity” than Smith, and related the national mis-
sion to penetrate the untouched frontier to updated ideas, such as America’s space pro-
gram, science 'ction, and commercial advertising. (For a connection of Dundes’s ideas to 
American Studies, see Gürel 2006).
Along with the virgin land of the frontier, race is another constructed American image, 
Dundes viewed it as one more anxiety-producing problem which was expressed in folk-
loric form. He pointed out that the constructed binary of white/black in American cul-
ture favored the superiority of whiteness. Even celebrated black folk heroes, such as John 
Henry, drew his critical inquiry into unconscious racism. Dundes contended that in social 
movements such as the Civil Rights movement, this troubling binary produced humor-
ous responses that testi'ed to the adjustments needed for social change. From a symbolist 
approach, the elephant jokes which arose during the period combined sexual imagery with 
the social symbolism of the elephant (representing African Americans). Simon Bronner 
made the argument that there was a symbolic shi5 of the elephant to women’s indepen-
dence, as the feminist movement advanced during the 1970s (Bronner 1988, 125–27). 
For more discussions of racial (and racist) folklore, see Dundes and Abrahams 1987; and 
Dundes [1973] 1990. For an alternative reading of the elephant joke, see Oring 1975b.
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Getting the Folk and 
the Lore Together
Folklore means something—to the tale teller, to the song singer, to 
the riddler, and to the audience or addressees. A given item of folklore may mean di8er-
ent things to di8erent tale tellers or to di8erent audiences. It may mean di8erent things to 
di8erent members of the same audience; it may mean di8erent things to a single tale teller 
at di8erent times in his life. So much seems obvious. But despite the assiduous collection 
of scores and scores of folk lore texts, there has been precious little attention paid to what 
these texts mean—which is sad and curious, for folkloristics, with semiotics, must ulti-
mately be concerned with meaning.
One di7culty impeding the study of folklore’s mean ing stems from the fact that a 
goodly portion of folk lore is fantasy, collective or collectivized fantasy. I do not refer here 
to any Jungian sense of a collective unconscious. When I speak of folklore being collec tive, 
I mean that a myth or a folksong is known by more than a single individual—usually many 
indi viduals—and it is transmitted from person to person, o5en over the course of genera-
tions. Collective folk lore also di8ers from individual dreams. Dreams ap pear to be simi-
lar to narratives, in part because they are related in words. But folktales, unlike individual 
dreams, must appeal to the psyches of many, many individuals if they are to survive.
It is my contention that much of the meaning of folkloric fantasy is unconscious. 
Indeed, it would have to be unconscious—in the Freudian sense—for folklore to function 
as it does. For among its func tions, folklore provides a socially sanctioned outlet for the 
expression of what cannot be articulated in more usual ways. It is precisely in jokes, folk-
tales, folksongs, proverbs, children’s games, gestures, etc. that anxieties can be vented. If 
people knew exactly what they were doing when they told a joke to their boss or to their 
spouse (or if the boss or spouse knew what they were doing), the joke would probably cease 
to be an escape mechanism. People need such mechanisms, which is why there will always 
be folklore, and also inci dentally why there is always new folklore being created to take care 
of new anxieties—I refer, for example, to the folklore of bureaucracy transmitted so e8ec-
tively by the o7ce-copier machine.
!e unconscious nature of so much of folklore makes the study of meaning di7cult, 
but not impos sible. Fortunately, there is patterning and system in folklore, so that the sym-
bol employed in any one given folkloric (con)text may be related to a general system of 
symbols. !is does not mean that I think any one symbol is necessarily universal. In fact, 
I know of no symbol which is reported from all peoples, just as I know of no myth which 
has uni versal distribution. What I am saying is that within a culturally relative system of 
symbols, the use of a particular symbol may be remarkably consistent. I also hasten to add 
that symbols may carry multiple meanings.
I intend to illustrate the above by referring to several speci'c examples of folklore, but 
before I do so I should like to mention brie6y the crucial device of projection. In psychol-
ogy, projection refers to the tendency to attribute to another person or to the environment 
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what is actually within oneself. What is attributed is usually some internal impulse or feel-
ing which is painful, unacceptable, or taboo. !e individual is not consciously aware of 
that; he or she per ceives the external object as possessing the taboo tend encies, without 
recognizing their source in himself or herself.
Most of the examples of folklore I shall discuss will be familiar ones, to allow readers to 
con'rm or reject my ideas out of their own knowledge of the culture.
Let us begin with a standard jump rope rhyme.
Fudge, fudge, tell the judge
Mama’s got a newborn baby.
It ain’t no girl, it ain’t no boy
Just a newborn (or “common” or “plain ol’,” or “ordinary”) baby
Wrap it up in tissue paper
!row (send) it down the elevator.
First 6oor, miss
Second 6oor, miss, etc. (until jumper misses)
What does this rhyme mean? Were we to ask little girls jumping rope to it to give us a full 
explication du texte, what would we elicit? What does “fudge” mean? Why is there a judge? 
Is it merely, as some might say, a matter of “judge” rhyming with “fudge” or “fudge” rhym-
ing with “judge?”
I think not. Folklore is admirably concise, and I am persuaded that whatever is con-
tained in a folkloric text is meaningful—even if we do not always have full insight into that 
meaning. Why would in dividuals bother to remember something and repeat it with such 
gusto if it had no meaning? It seems clear that if an item remains in tradition, it must have 
meaning for the carriers of the tradition.
We can see that the jump rope rhyme re6ects sibling rivalry. A newborn baby is a threat 
to the older chil dren, who may resent all the attention paid to it. We know that there is 
o5en a wish on the part of older children to dispose of the new baby. Wishful thinking 
and wish ful'llment, of course, are widely found in folklore. !ere is more than a hint that 
Mama has committed a crime in producing a sibling rival. !e crime is signaled in the 'rst 
line, insofar as a judge is to be informed. (And possibly the punish ment for the “crime” of 
throwing the baby away is projected to the judge.)
But why fudge? If one thinks of the color and texture of fudge, and is also familiar with 
infantile sexual theory, one can arrive at a possible explana tion. In the days before sex edu-
cation was taught in elementary school, young children in our culture did not always fully 
grasp the nature of childbirth. A5er having been told by a parent that a baby brother or 
sister was present in mother’s obviously expanding abdomen and that it would soon come 
out to join the family, the bewildered child frequently assumed that this new baby would 
come out of the stomach area in the same way that material exited from the child’s own 
stomach, namely, via the anus. !e equa tion of feces with babies is reported extensively in 
psychoanalytic literature, although I doubt that any little girl jumping rope would o8er 
any such inter pretation of the possible meaning of “fudge.”
Yet there is additional evidence, for cultural sym bols rarely occur in unique single texts. 
Another children’s rhyme, though not one used for jumping rope, goes as follows:
Milk, milk, lemonade
Around the corner, fudge is made.
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Gestures accompanying this rhyme point in turn to several areas of female anatomy (breast, 
breast, geni tals, and anus). However distasteful or crude one may 'nd the rhyme, one can-
not very well deny the explicit equation of fudge and feces.
Returning to our original jump rope rhyme, we can now better understand the action 
taken. Wrap it up in tissue (toilet) paper, throw it down the ele vator. !e new baby is “gi5-
wrapped to go,” namely, to be 6ushed down the toilet-elevator. Notice also that the more 
skillful the jumper, the greater the number of 6oors, the farther away, the baby is sent. !e 
rhyme thereby provides a most e8ective way of “passing” judgment or “wasting” a sibling 
rival, in a symbolic and socially acceptable way—a healthy re lease of a normal tension.
Children’s projections of parents occur more commonly in narrative form than in 
rhymes. Fairy tales, for instance, are essentially stories about children and their relation-
ships to siblings and parents. !e “step” relationship is a convenient device to allow full-
6edged hatred; a girl can hate wicked stepsisters or stepmothers with a clear conscience. 
Fairy tales with girl protagonists may include not only wicked siblings rivals but also a 
wicked mother in form of a stepmother or witch. Fairy tales with boy heroes may include 
the same kind of wicked brothers, plus a male antagonist in the form of a monster (such 
as a dragon) or a giant. Let me select one fairy tale found primarily in England and the 
United States to illustrate the nature of such symbolic projection. 
Once upon a time, a boy named Jack lived alone with his mother! !at very opening 
should give pause to anyone with a psychological bias. In boy-centered fairy tales, the 
father is o5en missing or dead—which allows the boy to be “alone with his mother.” (In 
girl-centered fairy tales, the mother is similarly missing or deceased which allows the girl 
to be alone with her father.)
As most will remember, Jack trades his milk-giving cow to an old man who gives him 
some beans in exchange. At the sight of Jack’s beans, his mother insists he throw them out 
the window. (I shall refrain from commenting on each any every symbol.) !e next day, a 
huge beanstalk is discovered. Jack’s mother begs him not to climb it, but he disobeys. Up 
in the beanstalk world, there is a cannibalistic giant who o5en in some vague way is linked 
to Jack’s father—e.g., the giant allegedly stole Jack’s father treasures. Fortunately, someone 
up there helps Jack: It is Mrs. Giant. Did it ever strike you as somewhat peculiar that Mrs. 
Giant would help a total stranger, a young boy, taking sides against her own husband? (In 
this Oedipal projection, the upper world is an extension of the lower one.) And it may also 
be worth recalling where Mrs. Giant hides Jack—it is in her oven. (!e symbolism of ovens 
in European folklore is generally quite consistent.)
In any event, the stupid old giant fails to see Jack hiding in his wife’s oven. Finally, Jack 
rushes down the stalk with the giant close in pursuit. As it happens, down at the bottom 
of the beanstalk, waiting with a hatchet in hand, is Jack’s mother. Taking the hatchet, Jack 
cuts down the stalk, which causes the death of the giant, and the story ends with Jack liv-
ing happily ever a5er—with his mother.
Surely the maternal aid in both the upper and lower world can be understood as a pro-
jection of the young boy’s point of view, in terms of an Oedipal struggle against the vil-
lainous giant.
From Jack and the beanstalk, I should like to turn to another example of projection. 
!is example is not folklore, but is dependent on folklore and folkloristic associations. 
Further, it demonstrates the importance of projection, which in my view is such an impor-
tant device that it may utilize even historical events. !e example of projection I have in 
mind is the 'rst lunar landing. I must insist that nothing of what I am about to present 
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in any way demeans the real and splendid achievement of landing on the moon. My sole 
purpose is to demonstrate, if I may, the power of folkloric projection in all of our lives—
whether we are aware of it or not.
First of all, we have the name of the lunar mission. It was Apollo. I should stress that it 
is precisely in the selection of names and symbols that those interested in psychoanalytic 
semiotics are a8orded prime data. It might be erroneous to interpret a detail which is inte-
gral to the scienti'c apparatus, but the choice of the name Apollo is not such a detail. In 
theory, the mission might have had any one of a hundred names.
!e name Apollo is a conscious or perhaps uncon scious invocation of traditional 
mythology, in which Apollo the sun is the brother of Diana the moon. !us mytholog-
ically speaking we have a brother try ing to reach or land on his sister. And what are the 
semantic associations of Diana? One of the most obvious is virginity; Diana is tradition-
ally associated with chastity.
Once the projective metaphor has been pointed out, it is easy enough to see its con-
sistency. Among the principal problems to be overcome in the Apollo missions was gain-
ing enough power to escape the gravitational pull of the earth. !e standard term for 
this power was “thrust.” Keeping in mind that the mythological associations of the earth 
include “mother,” we have the astronauts trying to get up enough thrust to escape the gravi-
tational pull of mother earth. (I shall not dwell on the symbolism of rockets other than to 
recall that “to have a rocket in my pocket” can be a euphemistic phrase for mas turbation. 
Cf. “pocket pool.”)
And what were the names of the three astronauts, and who was chosen to be the 'rst 
man on the moon? Neil Armstrong. Why was Armstrong the 'rst? Was it mere alpha-
betical order? No, it was not, because in that event, Aldrin would have been 'rst, not 
Armstrong or Collins. Could it have been the associa tion of Jack Armstrong, the all-Amer-
ican boy, hero of radio adventure serials of several decades past? And could it have been 
that the name Armstrong was deemed appropriate because it literally refers to a strong 
body extremity? A well placed television camera allowed all other earthlings to voyeuristi-
cally watch as Armstrong’s leg emerged from the capsule and stepped upon the surface of 
the moon. Certainly it made symbolic sense for the name of the 'rst man to stand on the 
moon to begin with the 'rst letter of the alphabet. Who can remember the names of any 
of the men who made the second lunar landing? !e point is that the moon could only be 
violated once. No one cares who the other violators were. It is, a5er all, only on a maiden 
voyage that a bottle of cham pagne is broken over a ship’s hull.
Once on the moon, the astronauts put up an Ameri can 6ag, a common symbolic ritual 
act for claiming virgin land for one’s mother country (or fatherland). We may have here 
the same projection which led earlier generations of American explorers into what Henry 
Nash Smith has so aptly termed the “Virgin Land.” What did the astronauts bring back 
as souve nirs of their conquest? Pieces of rock. In this context, the whole mission involved 
going out to get a piece of virgin moon to show o8 to one’s peers back home —a super 
masculinity dream come true! Americans surely wanted to get to the moon before the 
Russians did.
!e fantasy I have just delineated is not a uni versal one; in some cultures the moon is 
considered masculine. But in American culture the moon is de'nitely feminine. It even 
has the maternal associa tions of a cow jumping over it or being made of green cheese. 
!e maternal associations of the moon hint at an Oedipal projection; and in English the 
choice of the name Apollo at least permits the pos sibility of a homonymic pun on sun/son. 
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So the sun/son who leaves mother earth to be the 'rst to violate the virgin moon (sister, 
mother) may well be related to American fantasy—regardless of the purely scien ti'c fea-
tures of the mission.
!e lunar mission brings to mind the interweaving of folklore and history. !e point is 
that historical events and personages may serve as anchors for 6ights of projective fantasy. 
I believe many historians err seriously in dismissing or ignoring elements which they label 
as spurious or apocryphal. Folklore, as an item of folk speech—think of the phrase “that’s 
(just) folklore”—means error, that is, something to be care fully weeded out of otherwise 
accurate historical source material. As a folklorist, I have learned to respect what the folk 
say and think about history re gardless of the historicity of their words and thoughts. What 
happened is important, but no less important is what people think happened or what peo-
ple wished had happened. Folk history may tell us more about folk than about history, but 
surely that is worth knowing.
!e folk history of George Washington, for ex ample, includes his famous confron-
tation with his father over the chopping down, not of a beanstalk, but of a cherry tree. 
Actually George, a son in that anecdote, is more celebrated for his paternal role. Why is it, 
for instance, that George Washington is reputed to have slept in so many beds on the east 
coast of the United States? Signs proclaim that George Washington slept here, not ate, 
drank, or visited here. Of course, if he is considered to be the father of our country then the 
verb choice is apt—as is the par ticular style of monument erected to honor him.
But can there be any validity to the projections discussed thus far? I can anticipate the 
most obvious objection: Readers may have watched the lunar landing, and they did not 
think of any associations of Apollo-Diana, brother- sister incest, etc. !ey did not think of 
the lunar land ing as a violation of the moon. Any tension they may have felt was strictly 
due to their genuine concern for the safety of the astronauts.
But sometimes the tension was excessive. Some in dividuals refused to believe that the 
lunar landing actually occurred. Rather they assumed that the whole event was simply a 'c-
tionalized television program. Several individuals su8ered breakdowns evidently precipi-
tated by the successful lunar landing. And here one must reiterate the important point that 
folkloric projection is o5en, though not always, unconscious. Rarely is the nature of the 
projection consciously recognized. I am always amused by would-be critics of the Oedipal 
reading of the Oedipus story when they claim that the Freudian interpretation is invalid 
because Oedipus didn’t know that he was killing his father and marrying his mother. !at 
is precisely the point. It is the bringing of the unconscious into the purview of the con-
scious which is di7cult and painful for the psyche. Projection is one of a number of psy-
chological defense mechanisms which provide an un conscious screen or arena for the dis-
play of the causes of anxiety; it is for this reason that folkloric pro jections are so indispens-
able as tools in the human arsenal for mental health.
One helpful aspect of the study of folkloric pro jections is the possible play of “literal 
versus meta phorical.” Sometimes seeing projections as literal versions of metaphors—or, if 
one prefers, as meta phorical transformations of literal statements—can greatly aid in deci-
phering the unconscious content of folklore.
Let me illustrate this by brie6y considering an im portant detail of American wed-
ding ritual, the bride’s casting her 6oral bouquet to the females in attend ance. What is the 
meaning of this act? (I wish to reiterate my 'rm conviction that semiotics must ulti mately 
be concerned with meaning.) In terms of the literalization of metaphor, the bride, through 
the ritual act of throwing away her 6oral bouquet, is sig nifying her willingness or intention 
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of being de 6owered. Interestingly enough, the 6owers once separated from the bride fur-
nish an example of contagious magic—which is analogous to simile, by the way—as the 
lucky girl who catches the bouquet is said to be the next to marry.
An even better example of the literalization of metaphor in folkloric projections may 
be found in another genre, namely nursery rhymes. “!ere was an old woman who lived 
in a shoe; she had so many children she didn’t know what to do.” Now, what possible con-
nection could there be between a woman living in a shoe and her having a superabundance 
of children?
Upon re6ection, we may recall that there is a tra ditional connection between shoes 
and marriage. Not only does Cinderella 'nd her prince charming through the perfect 't 
between her foot and a glass slipper, but in American culture we continue to tie old shoes 
on the bumpers of cars carrying newlyweds o8 on their honeymoon.
!e mystery of the precise nature of the connec tion is solved by another version of the 
Mother Goose rhyme, reported from the Ozarks from the 1890s. “!ere was another old 
woman who lived in a shoe. She didn’t have any children, she knew what to do.” (One 
could easily cite additional illustrations, such as “Cock a doodle doo / My dame has lost 
her shoe [a real challenge for transplant surgeons] / Her mas ter’s lost his 'ddling stick / 
!ey don’t know what to do.”) At any rate, the consistency of the symbolism should be 
apparent. In nursery rhymes, in fairy tales, in post-wedding customs, the same symbolic 
equation is found. !is supports the idea that symbol patterns are culturewide.
I fear I may have done a serious disservice to my thesis by using so many examples of 
sexual sym bolism. Some may think that I have misconstrued the term “semiotics” as being 
the scienti'c study of the “seamy.” So I must stress that projection in folklore is not limited 
to sexuality. Any anxiety  producing topic can 'nd expression in projective form. For exam-
ple, there is projection in the modern urban legend in which a family is obliged to take its 
old grandmother along on a vacation trip. In a remote area, grandmother dies and the fam-
ily is forced to curtail its vacation. Strapping the body to the roof of the Volkswagen, the 
family starts for home. Enroute the family stops for lunch, during which time the car plus 
grandmother’s corpse is stolen. Some times the absence of the body causes delay in pro-
bating grandmother’s will.
I have argued that this legend re6ects American attitudes toward the older genera-
tion and toward death. In terms of wishful thinking, there is the wish that grandmother 
should die and that someone else should dispose of the body. In terms of the literaliza-
tion of metaphor, grandmother is “taken for a ride.” !e normally unutterable merce-
nary interest in grandmother’s demise also 'nds expression in the concern about the 
delay in probate.
Similarly, there is projection in the standard legend of the medical school prank in 
which a group of medical students crossing a toll bridge leave a ca daver’s arm holding the 
coin in the surprised and shocked grasp of the tollbooth attendant. Medical stu dents have 
anxiety—at least initially—about handling cadavers and probably also about paying their 
way through life at the expense of the health of their patients. A5er all, the families of 
patients are charged for operations whether the operations are successful or not. Doctors 
have to learn to be dispassionate, ob jective practitioners, able to leave their patients’ medi-
cal problems behind them (e.g., anatomical parts such as an arm), even as these problems 
literally hold the lucrative 'nancial rewards of medical practice. Notice that in this pro-
jection, the fear and shock of taking money from a dead man’s hand is displaced from the 
medical students to the outside world, the tollbooth attendant.
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Racism is another anxiety-producing problem which is expressed in folkloric form. Let 
us brie6y consider the folksong “John Henry.” A popular folksong, this ballad tells the sad 
story of a black steel-driver who wages a valiant struggle against the steam drill. He wins 
the battle but the victory is Pyrrhic, for in the end John Henry dies. I have had white mid-
dle class school teachers tell me they use this folksong in the classroom as an example of 
African-American folklore. !ey like the ballad’s de piction of the increasingly important 
issue of man versus machine. !is is all well and good, but as a projection, John Henry is 
little more than the white stereotype of what black men should be. John Henry is strong, 
doggedly loyal to the white boss, and he dies doing the white man’s work. He is, in short, a 
pro jection of the ideal “good nigger,” completely re moved from the rough, aggressive, mili-
tant stance of the “bad nigger.” He even dies with his hammer in his hand—no threat there 
to the white womanhood of the south. !e ballad of John Henry is thus more part of white 
folklore about blacks than of African- American folklore, and its continued use in schools 
promotes the image of the strong, docile, Uncle Tom 'gure of the black male.
!e unconscious aspects of folkloristic projection make its use all the more insidious—
and perhaps dan gerous—inasmuch as few individuals are aware of the semiotic implica-
tions of the projection. Racism is nonetheless virulent for its being unconscious. Many 
whites may not see the racism in an advertisement for “6esh-colored bandaids” but it is 
there all the same. A terse bit of African-American folklore conveys a unique indictment of 
the use of white folklore in class rooms containing black students. !ere’s the young black 
girl who asks a question of the mirror on the wall. “Mirror, mirror on the wall, who’s the 
fairest one of all?” And the mirror answers, “Snow White, you black bitch, and don’t you 
forget it!” Americans inherited from Europe an entire semiotic of color in which black was 
evil and white was good. Even a lie, if it’s white, is all right. “Black is beautiful” is a con-
scious attempt by the black community to 'ght the semantic set of countless words (black-
mail, black guard, blackball, black-list, etc.) which assert the contrary.
Projections are to be found in all types of litera ture including comics, television, and 
motion pictures. My discussion today is based primarily upon folklore only because I am 
most familiar with folkloric data. But popular culture too can and must be understood as 
projective material. One thinks of the generic “western” with its rugged individual hero, 
who o5en has to take the law into his own hands vigilante style, in order to prevail over the 
“bad guys” and to establish law and order.
Similarly, we might look at Star Trek, a popular television program which relates the 
adventures of an eternally 6oating bastion of American values in the context of popular 
science 'ction. Typically the space ship makes an uninvited visit to some alien culture 
which somehow threatens the existence or safety of the ship, (Or the ship itself is invaded 
by the alien culture.) O5en the progress of the space ship is im periled or stopped. Its leader 
heroes, of obvious Anglo -Saxon ancestry (Kirk, Spock, Scotty, McCoy), assisted by vari-
ous assorted ethnic underlings, take whatever action they deem necessary to free the ship. 
Since the ship’s name is “Enterprise,” we have an all too thinly disguised projection of what 
Americans will do in the name of free enterprise. And what does the crew of the Enterprise 
do? !e usual solution consists of converting or destroying the alien cultures. Only a5er 
such justi'able homicide can the United Star Ship (= U.S.S. = U.S.) Enterprise return to 
its set course—in accordance with its “manifest destiny.”
Projection can involve placement in the far distant past or the far distant future, which 
is why one can study projection in myth (the far distant past), or projection in science 'c-
tion (the far distant future). !e plots and dramatis personae are strikingly similar in myth 
282  !e Meaning of Folklore
and science 'ction. In sum it is the projection which is crucial, not so much the time or 
place or local coloring. It is the removal from reality to fantasy which allows the human 
spirit free rein to por tray its spiritual struggles and to play out its mo ments of anguish.
Sometimes, however, even fantasy does not a8ord su7cient disguise for such struggles, 
not with out recourse to what I would call projective inversion. Most of the projections dis-
cussed thus far have been more or less direct translations of reality into fantasy. But there 
are some human problems that evidently require more elaborate disguise.
One of the 'nest examples of projective inversion in folklore is the one 'rst analyzed by 
Otto Rank in his brilliant monograph, !e Myth of the Birth of the Hero, 'rst published in 
1909. In this classic study, Rank attempts to explain why the Indo-European hero should 
so o5en be born of a virgin mother and why he should be abandoned to die immediately 
a5er birth. According to Rank, it is an Oedipal plot from the son’s point of view. A vir-
gin mother repre sents a complete repudiation of the father and espe cially of his necessary 
role in procreation. In Oedipal theory, it is supposedly the son who would like to get rid 
of his father, which would thereby reserve his mother for his exclusive use. But a narrative 
in which a son deposed or disposed of his father would produce considerable guilt. !us, 
according to Rank, the child’s wish to get rid of the father is neatly trans posed in the myth 
to the father’s getting rid of the child.
Rank called this projection, but I would like to call it projective inversion. !e son’s 
wishful thinking is projected in inverted form so that the father does everything he can 
to kill the son. One obvious ad vantage of such projective inversion is the avoidance of 
guilt. !e son need not feel guilt for wanting to get rid of his father; to the contrary, the 
traditional fantasy projects the “crime” and the presumed re sponsibility for the crime 
upon the victim. Projective inversion thus permits one to blame the victim. Rather than 
feeling guilt, the son-hero can justi'ably take Oedipal style revenge and kill the villain-
ous father 'gure.
Let me give an example of projective inversion from modern American legend. !e 
gist of the legend is a report that black youths have castrated a young white boy in a pub-
lic bathroom. Like all legends, it is told as true, and in fact several years ago (1969) it 
was reported repeatedly by telephone to various police stations in San Francisco. !e 
legend’s sudden popularity was almost certainly related to the dis cussion of the bussing 
of school children in San Fran cisco to achieve desegregation. But historically, one may 
ask which race has castrated which race? It is surely whites who castrated blacks as pun-
ishment for actual or imagined crimes. But in this exemplar of urban folklore, through 
projective inversion, the whites have metamorphosed their own fears of the stereotyped 
super-phallic black male into a form where their victim becomes the aggressor. !e wish 
to castrate black males is projected to those males who are depicted as castrating a white 
boy. !is makes it possible to blame the black victim for the crime the white would like 
to commit.
!is raises once again the question of the interrela tionship of historical event to folk-
loristic projective fantasy. Some scholars tend to feel that historical and psychological 
approaches are mutually exclusive, but I believe this to be a serious error. Frequently a his-
torical event may rekindle an old projection or in spire a new one.
It has been suggested, for example, that the ele phant joke cycle of the early 1960s might 
be related to the rise of the Civil Rights movement of the same period. Elephants, like 
blacks, are associated by whites with African origins. In the joke cycle, elephants were typi-
cally described in terms of color—”Do you know why elephants are gray? So you can tell 
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them from bluebirds”—and in terms of making phallic leaps down from trees upon unsus-
pecting victims. “Why do elephants climb trees? To rape squirrels.” !e Civil Rights move-
ment aroused longstanding fears among whites that the superphallic militant black male 
might assert himself with respect to former white oppressors. As mentioned in the analysis 
of the pre vious legend, castration, symbolic or literal, is one solution. “How do you keep an 
elephant from charg ing? Take away his credit card.” “How do you keep an elephant from 
stampeding? Cut his ‘tam peter o8.”
In the same way, I believe it is possible to show historical roots for other recent American 
folkloric phenomena. For example, the spate of “dead baby” jokes in the early 1970s pro-
vides a challenging in stance. “What’s red and hangs from the ceiling? A baby on a meat-
hook.” “What’s red and sits in the corner? A baby chewing on a razor blade.” It is never easy 
to make sense of nonsense, but that does not mean that nonsense has no meaning. !ese 
jokes, told by post-pubertal adolescents, may re6ect simple sibling rivalry; but that would 
not explain why this particular cycle became so popular in the early 1970s. Sibling rivalry, 
a5er all, has presumably always ex isted. I would hazard a guess that new techniques of con-
traception (including the pill), and especially the liberalized laws governing abortion, have 
generated an increased discussion (and guilt) concerning the “murder” of babies.
Whether not a particular joke cycle or leg end derives from a historical impetus is not 
crucial for the present argument. !e issue is whether or not there is a projective aspect to 
the collectivized forms of fantasy we call folklore. If so, as I believe, then there are impor-
tant implications for semiotic studies, in which the projective aspect has thus far been 
almost totally ignored. For example, one of the 'nest examples, in my opinion, of semiotic 
analysis is Paul Bouissac’s insightful descriptions of various circus acts. In his essay “Poetics 
in the Lion’s Den: !e Circus Act as a Text,” Bouissac analyzes the constituent elements of 
a lion act performance. He even describes some of the standard tricks as metaphorical, e.g., 
the lion walks in the center of the ring to be ridden by the man, or the lion straddles two 
stools to allow the man to bend under him and carry the lion on his shoulders. Bouissac’s 
analysis is 'ne as far as it goes. My point is that semiotics seems to stop with description, 
classi'cation, and typology, whereas description, classi'cation and typology ought to be 
beginnings not ends.
Circus acts, like zoological gardens, involve human attitudes toward animals and 
toward animality—in cluding human animality. Part of the thrill and pleasure in circus 
and zoo is the implicit struggle of man versus animal. !e animals are caged and kept in 
check, as man’s own animal nature is supposed to be. Yet there is always the possibility, the 
danger, or the risk one could call it, that the animal will escape the bonds of man, or to put 
it metaphorically that emotion and passion will escape the bonds of reason. One technique 
used to keep the animal or animality in check consists of requiring the animal, in this case 
a lion, to perform human acts. In terms of pro jective inversion, one is tempted to suggest 
that al though people would like to yield to “animal” desires and to perform animal acts, 
this is not a guilt-free wish. Hence, through inversion, it is pretended that animals would 
like to be like humans. !e more human the behavior performed by the animal, the more 
complete the projective inversion. !e inver sion is hinted at by such sequences as those in 
which the animal 'rst carries the man, and later the man carries the animal. !e latter trick 
would appear to reverse the normal roles of man and beast.
Whether or not my particular analysis of a lion’s act in terms of projection is valid, the 
issue, it seems to me, is the necessity of adding a consideration of projection to conven-
tional semiotic analysis. For in my view, psychoanalytic semiotics could be applied to a 
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wide variety of phenomena, folkloric and otherwise. One could, for example, imagine a 
projec tive study of the bull'ght. In addition to studying the structure of the bullring or 
the social hierarchy of the participants, one could also perceive the matador versus the bull 
as a projection. It is not just man versus animal, culture versus nature, but a projection of 
traditional male rivalry in Spanish (and other Mediterranean) cultures. In a homosexual 
battle of masculinity, it is critical just who penetrates whom. If the matador penetrates the 
bull properly, then the bull becomes feminized (as symbolized by having one or more of 
his extremities—tail, hoofs—cut o8 as trophies). As a projective drama, the bull'ght is a 
ritualized cognate of ordinary verbal dueling as found among adolescent youths.
!ere is great variety in the projective dimensions of even a single item of folklore. Each 
age and each individual in an age is free to interpret art, music, and literature anew. And so 
it is with folklore. Each individual who tells a tale or who hears a tale cannot help but proj-
ect his or her own person ality into that tale, which is why the study of pro jection in folk-
lore cannot be limited to the text alone; the process of projection also occurs in the very 
act of communicating an item of folklore.
As one example, let us take a text related to me in 1964 by a black male informant 
from Alabama. “Gov ernor Wallace of Alabama died and went to heaven. A5er entering 
the pearly gates, he walked up to the door of a splendid mansion and knocked. A voice 
inside exclaimed, ‘Who dat?’ Wallace shook his head sadly and said, ‘Never mind, I’ll go 
the other way.’”
First of all, the item is older than 1964; a similar joke was told during World War II 
with Adolf Hitler as the protagonist, confronted by a heavenly voice with a pronounced 
Jewish accent. In the present ver sion, the projective aspects include wishful thinking (for 
Wallace’s death) and Wallace’s being sent to hell by his own prejudice. !e historical fact 
of Governor Wallace’s having stood dramatically at the door of the University of Alabama 
to deny admission to black students is also relevant—as is no doubt the context of a black 
informant telling the joke to a white folklorist.
But the joke may function as a projective text for whites as well as blacks. What is under-
stood by in dividual whites when they hear the stereotyped dia lect “Who dat?” Clearly the 
implication is that a black man is inside the mansion. But individuals di8er markedly as to 
the identity of the black voice. Some think it is God; others think it might be Saint Peter. 
A few assume it is a doorman or gatekeeper or other menial. !e joke itself does not say, 
and I would argue that it is projection on the part of the interpre ter that governs the iden-
tity made. Similarly, some whites claim they understood from “Who dat?” that heaven is 
now integrated, while others assumed that heaven has been completely “taken over” by 
African Americans. None of this is articulated in the joke proper, but it is part of the joke 
as semiotic text.
!us folklore is not only projective material, but it allows if not encourages projection 
on the part of the participants as the lore is communicated. In fact, I would go so far as to 
argue that if folklore did not provide a socially sanctioned outlet for projection, it would 
almost certainly cease to exist. !e problem in folkloristics is that while we have literally 
thousands upon thousands of folklore texts recorded, the pro jective part of the semiotic 
text has not been re corded. So it is that we continue to have lore without reference to folk, 




Gallus as Phallus: 
A Psychoanalytic 
Cross-Cultural Consideration 
of the Cockfight as Fowl Play
Introduction
A year before Dundes died, he re6ected on his tremendous output of essays in over forty 
years of publishing and told me that the present essay could be his “most important and 
signi'cant,” although he noted that others probably have received more attention. His 
regard for this study, originally published in 1993, was due to the way it integrated several 
important positions he took through his career. First, it exempli'ed a folkloristic meth-
odology of working with cross-cultural variants and identifying the structural underpin-
nings of texts, leading to a symbolist, psychoanalytic interpretation. Second, it provided 
explanations about gender identity, by postulating that men engaged in combat games to 
prove their manhood. !e symbolic system in the text of the event was apparent—seeing 
the cock'ght, in its various cultural contexts, as “mutual masturbation or a phallic brag 
duel.” A victor displayed his manhood by emasculating an opponent, in an all-male setting, 
through the threat of castration, or symbolically transforming him into a female. !e par-
ticipants might not have been aware of the symbolism, and that, in Dundes’s logic of expla-
nation, demonstrated the function of folklore, as a frame of play or fantasy in order to deal 
with anxieties and con6icts. Dundes o8ered the general statement that “the whole point 
of folklore in general, and the cock'ght as an instance of folklore, is to allow individuals 
to do or say things they could not otherwise do or say. If people actually knew what they 
were doing, e.g., in telling a joke, they could not participate in that activity, e.g., tell that 
joke” (1994, 241). !ird, it illustrated the unconscious content of folklore, which allows 
it to function as it does, that is, as a socially sanctioned outlet for the expression of taboo 
thoughts and acts. Fourth, it set forth the implications such studies had regarding schol-
ars’ cultural biases against psychoanalytic interpretation. A frequent theme for Dundes 
was that, because of these biases, scholars tended to negate his prevalent call for “depth” of 
analysis, and read cultural events as texts of social relations.
!e motivation for writing “Gallus as Phallus” came from re-evaluating Cli8ord 
Geertz’s seminal essay “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cock'ght” (1972), which later 
became the anchor for the widely used book !e Interpretation of Cultures (1973). In light 
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of Dundes’s essays such as “!e Study of Folklore in Literature and Culture: Identi'cation 
and Interpretation” (1965c, and chapter 2 in the present volume), one could understand 
his attraction to Geertz’s analytical work on a folk custom, with its rhetorical emphasis on 
“interpretation.” Geertz, like Dundes, also used the metaphor of depth to describe latent 
meanings, although Dundes referred to Freudian depth psychology, while Geertz’s “deep 
play” had its roots in philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s term, and in the sociological tradition 
of Max Weber. Dundes, like many other professors, assigned Geertz’s essay in seminars as 
a prime example of the ethnographic analysis of events as “texts” that could be symboli-
cally read. For Geertz, the cock'ght was a text, because it constituted “a Balinese reading 
of Balinese experience; a story they tell themselves about themselves.”
Yet Dundes became dissatis'ed with Geertz’s reductionist argument that cultural texts 
of “deep play” stood, ultimately, for relations of social status in a single culture, especially 
when Dundes recognized cross-cultural patterns and the hard-to-miss literalization of 
“cock” references, thereby suggesting homoerotic phallic symbolism. From this analysis, 
Dundes asked, could generalizations be made from the cock'ght to other male competi-
tive contests, shedding light on gender identity? In one of Dundes’s last essays, in Manly 
Traditions (Bronner 2005), he located the cock'ght in a continuum running from com-
petitive games to actual warfare because in these activities males “demonstrate their mas-
culinity at the expense of male opponents whom they feminize.” Dundes speculated that 
there were a number of contributing factors to the concept that men had a greater need to 
prove their masculinity than women did to rea7rm their femininity. One was the infan-
tile conditioning of boys growing up in a “strongly female-centered world.” !erefore, boys 
later broke away from the world of women and joined the world of men, by engaging in 
all-male puberty rites. He also hypothesized that in adolescence, the time when male sexu-
ality peaked, the only sexual objects immediately available were other males. As a result, 
Dundes surmised, all-male competitive sport teams, and the military, were organizations 
where sexual energies could be expended on other males within a group, or on males con-
strued as opponents. Dundes also proposed a biological factor, the male phallic erection. 
Because an erection is a temporary state, he thought that males felt the need for proving, 
repeatedly, that they were able to achieve this “indisputable demonstration of masculinity.” 
Dundes claimed that winning one match or one game probably was not enough: “One has 
to prove one’s ability to feminize or emasculate one’s opponent again and again” (2005a).
For other case studies by Dundes testing these hypotheses on gender identity, see 
2002a, 1987h, and 1997b; and Dundes and Falassi 1975. For examples of folkloristic 
gender studies of ritual and festival that cite Dundes’s ideas, see Mechling 2001; Bronner 
2006a, 2005a, 2004; and Suárez-Orozco 1993.
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Gallus as Phallus: A Psychoanalytic Cross-Cultural 
Consideration of the Cock'ght as Fowl Play
The cockfight is one of the oldest, most documented and most widely distrib-
uted traditional sports known to man.* It has been reported in ancient India (Sarma 1964; 
Bhide 1967; Chattopadhyay 1973), ancient China (Cutter 1989a, b), ancient Iran (Modi 
1911), and ancient Greece (Witte 1868). From Greece, cock'ghting moved to Rome, as 
mosaics attest (Magaldi 1929). !e earliest recorded cock'ght in China dates from 517 
B.C. (Cutter 1989a, p. 632; 1989b, p. 10), which would make cock'ghting at least 2500 
years old. (See also Danaë 1989, p. 34, who suggests that cock'ghting existed before 2000 
B.C.) !e antiquity of cock'ghting in India is attested by a speci'c reference in the Kama 
Sutra (3d century A.D.), Chapter 2 of Part 1, where young women are advised to study 
some sixty-four arts, of which number 41 includes “!e rules of cock'ghting,” the clear 
implication being that a woman would be more pleasing to men who are vitally interested 
in such activities (Vatsyayana 1963, p. 14).
!ere is some consensus that the cock itself (and perhaps the cock'ght) may have orig-
inated in southeast Asia (Peters 1913, p. 395; Tudela 1959, p. 14), where it di8used to 
China, India, and eventually Iran and on to classical Greece and Rome before moving to 
Western Europe and thence to the Caribbean. !e cock may have come to the New World 
as early as the second voyage of Christopher Columbus in 1493 (Tudela 1959, p. 15). 
From Asia, the cock'ght spread eventually nearly throughout the Americas. !e cock-
'ght, however, is by no means universal, as it seems never to have spread to any great extent 
to native North and South America or to sub-Saharan Africa.
Once popular in much of western Europe, including England (Pegge 1773; Egan 
1832; Boulton 1901), Scotland (Beattie 1937); Ireland (Beacey 1945; O’Gormon 
1983), and Wales (Peate 1970), cock'ghting is still to be found in the north of France 
(Demulder 1934; Cegarra, 1987, 1988, 1989), in Belgium (Desrousseaux 1886, 1889, 
pp. 115–124; Delannoy 1948; Remouchamps and Remade 1949), and in Spain ( Justo 
1969; Marvin 1984). Nowhere is cock'ghting enjoyed more than in southeast Asia, 
as is con'rmed by reports from Borneo (Barclay 1980), Celebes (Kaudern 1929, pp. 
337–348), and Java (Serière, 1873, pp. 92–100; Kreemer 1893; Soeroto 1916–1917), 
Malaysia (Wilkinson 1925), the Philippines (Bailey 1909; Lee 1921; Lansang 1966; 
Guggenheim 1982), Sarawak (Sandhi 1959), Sumatra (Scheltema 1919), and, of 
course, Bali (Eck 1879; Knight 1940; Bateson and Mead 1942; Geertz 1972; Picard 
1983). Cock'ghting is equally popular in the Caribbean (Challes 1972), for exam-
ple, in Martinique (Champagnac 1970; A8ergan 1986), in Haiti (Paul 1952; Marcelin 
1955a, h), in Cuba (Wurdemann 1844, pp. 87–93; Hazard 1871, pp. 191–195), 
and in Puerto Rico (Alonso 1849, pp. 77–93; Dinwiddie 1899; Cadilla de Martinez 
1941; Calderin 1970; Feijoo 1990). !ere are cock'ght enthusiasts throughout Latin 
America, for example, in Argentina (Mantegazza 1916, pp. 69–71; Saubidet 1952, pp. 
345–356), Brazil (Leal 1989), Colombia (León Rey 1953), Mexico (Mendoza 1943); 
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and Venezuela (Armas Chitty 1953–1954; Acosta Saignes 1954; Marquez 1954; Perez 
1984; Cook 1991, pp. 79–94).
In the United States, cock'ghting is technically banned in most states. Nevertheless, 
we have published accounts of cock'ghts from California (Beagle 1968), Connecticut 
(Liebling 1950), Florida (Vogeler 1942), Georgia (Hawley 1987), Louisiana (Del Sesto 
1975; Hawley 1982; Donlon 1991), New York (Hyman 1950), North Carolina (Roberts 
1965; Herzog 1985), Tennessee (Cobb 1978; Gunter 1978), Texas (Braddy 1961; 
Tippette 1978), Utah (Walker 1986), Vermont (Mosher 1989, pp. 96–102), and Virginia 
(Anderson 1933; Carson 1965, pp. 151–164), among others.
Some of the abundant literature devoted to cock'ghting includes detailed discussions 
of the various “rules” that prevail in di8erent locales (cf. Eck 1879; Nugent 1929; Saubidet 
1952, pp. 354–356; Marquez 1954; Champagnac 1970, pp. 58–65; Herzog 1985; Harris 
1987). Other writings are concerned with the elaborate intricacies of breeding and car-
ing for 'ghting cocks—one source noted 253 di8erent names of breeds and cross-breeds, 
and this list included only English-language designations (Nugent 1929, p. 79; see also 
Jull, 1927; Finsterbusch 1980). A number of how-to manuals are incredibly speci'c and 
include the minutiae of recommended regimen right down to the details of diet (see, e.g., 
Phillott 1910; Feijoo 1990).
!e cock'ght has been a source of inspiration for a host of poems and short stories 
(Fraser 1981; Cutter 1989h) as well as paintings (Tegetmeier 1896; Bryden 1931; Gilbey 
1957; Marçal 1967, pp. 350–351; Cadet 1971, pp. 159–165). !ere is, for example, an 
entire Irish novel based on cock'ghting (O’Gormon 1983; for an American novel, see 
Willeford 1972). Cock'ghting has its own folk speech, which has led to the compilation 
of cock'ght slang glossaries ( Jaquemotte and Lejeune 1904; Mendoza 1943; Saubidet 
1952, pp. 345–354; León Rey 1953; Marcelin 1955b; Perez 1984, pp. 17–78). In English, 
too, the cock'ght has provided a rich set of metaphors for everyday life. !e phrases “to 
turn tail,” “to raise one’s hackle(s),” and “to show the white feather” are some of the most 
familiar (Scott 1957, pp. 118–119). Similarly, to be “cocky” or “cocksure,” or to be “cock 
of the walk” (Gilbey 1957, p. 24), and perhaps “to pit” (someone against another) presum-
ably derive ultimately from the lexicon of cock'ghting. !ere is one etymology, possibly a 
folk etymology, for the word “cocktail,” that supposedly comes from “cock ale” or a liquid 
concoction designed to serve as a tonic to strengthen 'ghting cocks (Nugent 1929, p. 80). 
It is also tempting to ponder the possible metaphorical associations of the “cock” found in 
guns (as in “Don’t go o8 half-cocked”) or in pipes where cocks regulate the 6ow of liquids 
(or gases). Among the more esoteric cock'ghting traditions that have been studied are the 
names of 'ghting cocks in Brazil (Teixeira 1992) and the folk art motifs used to decorate 
the carrying boxes used in northern Utah (Walker 1986, pp. 39–41).
Most considerations of cock'ghting invariably cite the classical instance of !emistocles, 
who was leading his Athenian army against the Persians in the '5h century B.C. when he 
chanced to see some cocks 'ghting. His alleged, but o5-quoted, remarks were: “!ese 
animals 'ght not for the gods of their country, nor for the monuments of their ancestors, 
nor for glory, nor for freedom, nor for their children, but for the sake of victory, and that 
one may not yield to the other” (Pegge 1773, p. 137). !is impromptu speech suppos-
edly inspired and rallied the troops of !emistocles. (!e standard source is Aelian, Varia 
Historia 2: 28; cf. Bruneau 1965, p. 107.)
Particular techniques are found in speci'c local cock'ghting traditions. Some of these 
seem to be quite ancient. For example, there is an arcane system of cock'ghting lore in the 
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Philippines that suggests that there are de'nite times of the day that favor cocks of a par-
ticular color (Guggenheim 1982, p. 11). !is set of associations of calendar and cock color 
is almost certainly related to a complex “cock almanac” reported in south India (Saltore 
1926–1927, pp. 319–324).
!e most common form of cock'ght involves a one-on-one confrontation between 
two equally matched cocks, a battle that may be interspersed with standard periods of 
respite. Yet there is considerable variation within the one-to-one scenario. For example, a 
nineteenth-century account of cock'ghting in Cuba summarizes some of the alternatives:
!ere are various modes of 'ghting: Al cotejo—that is, in measuring, at sight, the 
size or spurs of both chickens. Al peso—or by weight, and seeing if the spurs are 
equal. Tapados—where they settle the match without seeing the chickens, or, in 
fact, “go it blind.” De cuchilla—when they put on the arti'cial spurs, in order to 
make the 'ght sharper, quicker, and more fatal. Al pico—when they 'ght without 
any spurs. (Hazard 1871, pp. 192–193)
!ere were other, more elaborate forms of cock'ghting. !ese include the battle royal 
and the Welsh main, once popular in England. We may cite an eighteenth-century descrip-
tion of these special forms of cock'ghting:
What aggravates the reproach and the disgrace upon us Englishmen, is those 
species of 'ghting which are called the Battle-royal, and the Welsh-main, known 
nowhere in the world, as I think, but here; neither in China, nor in Persia, nor 
in Malacca, nor amongst the savage tribes of America. !ese are scenes so bloody 
as almost to be too shocking to relate; and yet, as many may not be acquainted 
with the horrible nature of them, it may be proper, for the excitement of our aver-
sion and detestation, to describe them in a few words. In the former an unlim-
ited number of fowls are pitted; and when they have slaughtered one another 
for the diversion, dii boni! of the otherwise generous and humane Englishman, 
the single surviving bird is to be esteemed the victor, and carries away the prize. 
!e Welsh-main consists, we will suppose, of sixteen pair of cocks; of these the 
sixteen conquerors are pitted a second time; the eight conquerors of these are 
pitted a third time; so that, incredible barbarity! thirty one cocks are sure to be 
most inhumanly murdered for the sport and pleasure, the noise and nonsense, 
nay, I must say, the profane cursing and swearing, of those who have the e8ron-
tery to call themselves, with all these bloody doings, and with all this impiety 
about them, Christians. (Pegge 1773, pp. 148–149; see also Boulton 1901, pp. 
189–190)
As the unmistakable tone of the preceding passage reminds us, a large part of the mass 
of writings devoted to the cock'ght concerns the question of whether the sport should be 
banned on the grounds of excessive cruelty to animals. According to one source (Powel 
1937, p. 191), the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals insists that the cock-
'ght “is a blot on civilization’s fair escutcheon.” !e typical strategy of the humane protest 
against cock'ghting consists of simply describing cock'ghts in gory detail:
In almost every 'ght at least one cock is seriously multilated or killed. In about 
half of the 'ghts, more or less, both birds are maimed beyond further use if 
not killed. Eyes are gouged out, abdomens slit and slashed until the birds are 
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anguished monstrosities, legs and wings are broken. But so long as a bird can and 
will keep facing towards the opposing cock he is le5 in the pit and cheered for his 
“courage.” (Anon. 1952, p. 11; cf. Hawley 1989)
Of course, the cock'ghting community has fought back. One of their common argu-
ments is that cock'ghting is much less cruel than other sports, less cruel, for example, than 
boxing, in which men may be maimed or even killed. In England, cock'ghting, which is 
illegal, is compared to foxhunting, which is legal, by one cocker as follows: “Cock'ghting 
isn’t as unfair as foxhunting, you see. One of my cocks has a 50–50 chance of winning. 
What chance has a fox got when there are '5y hounds chasing him? A million to one 
shot of getting away” (Penrose 1976, p. 236). Another standard argument is that cocks are 
naturally inclined to 'ght, and that man is only facilitating or expanding on what occurs 
by itself in nature. Even the use of ga8s or blades is defended on the grounds that they are 
“used solely to end a 'ght quickly, and the winner will then return to his harem to prop-
agate his species whilst the loser will die the death he has chosen” ( Jarvis 1939, p. 378). 
Incidentally, there are many di8erent types of ga8s, for instance “brike special, skeleton, 
split socket, bayonet, jagger, regulation, and hoisters” ( Jones 1980, p. 144; cf. Worden and 
Darden 1992).
Another argument put forth by cock'ghters is “that it is impossible to make a cock 
'ght an adversary if the bird does not wish to 'ght . . . if at the particular moment the 
joy of battle is not in him, neither skill by the ‘setter’ nor insult by the adversary will 
make him 'ght. !e game-cock is never an unwilling gladiator” ( James 1928, p. 140). 
Yet another popular argument is that people raise chickens to be slaughtered for food—
think of all the fried chicken franchises in the United States alone. Is that more cruel to 
the species than cock'ghting? Cock'ghters are wont to point out that chickens raised 
for market may be slaughtered when they are anywhere from eight to ten weeks of age. 
In contrast, a gamecock 
will not even be fought before he’s one year old and during that one year, he will 
receive excellent care. . . . Many are retired to stud a5er only three or four wins. 
!e question seems to be whether it is less cruel for the cock to be killed by a man 
rather than by another cock. (Tippette 1978, p. 274; see also Allred and Carver 
1979, p. 59)
Despite continuing e8orts to ban the cock'ght, there are places where cock'ghting is 
legalized. In the north of France near the Belgian border, there are thirty-two authorized 
“gallodromes” (Cegarra 1989, p. 671). In Puerto Rico, there are reportedly six hundred 
cockpits with 100,000 'ghts annually, attended by two million spectators. Promoted by 
the island’s o7cial Department of Recreation, cock'ghts are even broadcast on television 
(Bryant 1991, p. 20). Even in places where cock'ghting is o7cially illegal, it thrives.
While the vast majority of the written reports of cock'ghting tend to be purely descrip-
tive and not the least bit analytic, there is a small body of literature that seeks to interpret 
the cock'ght. Of these, unquestionably the most famous is Cli8ord Geertz’s (1972) “Deep 
Play: Notes on the Balinese Cock'ght.” !is essay marks a turning point in the history of 
cock'ght scholarship. All modern writing on the subject is directly or indirectly derived 
from Geertz’s discussion of the Balinese material. Geertz argued in his interpretation of 
the cock'ght “the general thesis is that the cock'ght, and especially the deep cock'ght, is 
fundamentally a dramatization of status concerns” (p. 18). According to Geertz,
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What sets the cock'ght apart from the ordinary course of life . . . [is] that it 
provides a metasocial commentary upon the whole matter of assorting human 
beings into 'xed hierarchical ranks and then organizing the major part of collec-
tive existence around that assortment. (p. 26)
Geertz thus interpreted the cock'ght exclusively in terms of Balinese social organization 
or social structure.
Geertz’s reading of the Balinese cock'ght has attained the status of a modern clas-
sic in anthropology (Watson 1989) although it has received some criticism (Roseberry 
1982; Parker 1985; Schneider 1987). Anthropologist James A. Boon (1977), an expert 
on Balinese ethnography who is understandably reluctant to criticize one of his former 
mentors, remarked that “Geertz does not survey the range of Balinese cock'ghts; rather 
he telescopes repeated observations into an ideal-typical description of a choice elabora-
tion of the form in one village area” (p. 33). More severe is Vincent Crapanzano (1986), 
who, although very admiring of Geertz’s “interpretive virtuosity” (pp. 53, 75), contends 
that Geertz o8ered his own subjective interpretation of the Balinese cock'ght. Moreover, 
Crapanzano argues, Geertz presented little or no empirical evidence in support of his inter-
pretation (pp. 72–75). Crapanzano concludes there is “no understanding of the native 
from the native’s point of view. !ere is only the constructed understanding of the con-
structed native’s constructed point of view,” and Geertz’s “interpretation is simply not con-
vincing” (p. 74; cf. Fine 1992, p. 248).
Crapanzano’s critique is echoed by Jacobson (1991), who maintains that Geertz made 
assertions unsupported by ethnographic data.
Yet no evidence presented warrants conclusions about how Balinese think or feel 
about themselves or their society. Whereas the language and rules of the cock-
'ght are described in detail, perceptions are simply attributed to Balinese. In short, 
Geertz develops his interpretation of the interpretive function of the Balinese cock-
'ght by stating and restating his claims without providing data that substantiate 
them. He presents no evidence for accepting his reading of the “text.” (pp. 52–53)
Unlike Crapanzano and Jacobson, anthropologist Scott Guggenheim (1982) has him-
self made an ethnographic study of a cock'ght, in this case in the Philippines. Guggenheim 
agrees with Geertz that cock'ghting is a “cultural performance” (p. 29), but he disagrees 
that the cock'ght provides an indigenous or native model of social structure or status hier-
archy. In some ways, Guggenheim argues, the cock'ght in the Philippines is “strikingly 
blind to social reality” and the cock'ght as folk model “skews social reality” (p. 29). In 
this context,
!ere is, for example, no mention of women, despite women’s prominent role 
not only in household management, but in marketing agriculture, wage-earning 
labor, professional occupations, and politics. Nor does it say very much about 
what all those high ranking people do to deserve their positions, besides buying 
expensive chickens. (p. 29)
!e theoretical issue here, with respect to the role and function of folklore in culture—
and the cock'ght is an example of folklore: it is a traditional game or sport—is that the 
old-fashioned Boasian notion of “folklore as culture re6ector,” which wrongly assumed a 
one-to-one relationship between folklore and culture, is inadequate. Folklore, to be sure, 
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does articulate and sometimes enforces the norms of a culture, but it also, o5en at the same 
time, o8ers a socially sanctioned escape from those norms. !is is what Bascom (1954) 
called the paradoxical double function of folklore (p. 349). To the extent that folklore 
involves fantasy, and I believe that it does to a very great extent, the literal one-to-one 
relationship posited between folklore and culture automatically assumed by a majority of 
anthropologists and folklorists is doomed to failure as a methodological principle designed 
to illuminate the content of folkloristic phenomena. Just as anthropologists inevitably 
assume that myths provide a “charter” for belief in social organization, á la Malinowski’s 
literal, anti-symbolic theory of myth, so Geertz and others wrongly interpret the cock'ght 
as a charter or articulation of social structure, status hierarchy in particular. Guggenheim 
(1982) is on the right track in pointing out that the cock'ght in the Philippines hardly 
quali'es as a model of normal Filipino social structure—why are women le5 out of the 
cock'ght, he asks? But like other anthropologists who have considered the cock'ght, he 
fails to appreciate its obvious and overt symbolism.
Although Guggenheim pays the usual social anthropological lip service to symbolism, 
his conclusions show that he too has missed the basic underlying signi'cance of the cock-
'ght: “Taken as a symbolic system, cock'ghting successfully couples individual self-iden-
tity and self-esteem, social and political loyalties, and even aesthetic satisfaction to an ele-
gant and exciting event” (p. 30). How do Geertz’s and Guggenheim’s interpretations of 
the cock'ght compare with other anthropological analyses of the same event? Del Sesto 
(1980) sees the cock'ght as “a symbolic representation of man’s continual struggle for sur-
vival, as displays of courage and bravado in the face of adversity, and as attempts to under-
stand the meaning and su8ering of death” (p. 275). Parker (1986) claims that “the cock-
'ght can be seen as a contest that is totally concerned with violence, competition, and 
aggression” (p. 26). Several ethnographers have sensed the importance of the masculine 
elements inherent in the cock'ght. Marvin (1984), in his study of the Andalusian cock-
'ght, sees it as a con'rmation of male values:
In all conversations concerning the cock'ght those involved with the event 
emphasized that it was una cosa de hombres (a men’s thing). It is a totally male-
oriented event, the audience is almost totally male, the birds which 'ght are male 
and the virtues which are extolled are male virtues. (p. 641)
Marvin concludes, “!e cock'ght, though, is a celebration in that it is an event which 
extols certain aspects of masculinity” (p. 68).
!is view is echoed by Leal (1989), one of the few women to analyze the cock'ght. In 
a superb ethnographic account, she also suggests that “cock'ghting is a celebration of mas-
culinity where men, through their cocks, dispute, win, lose, and reinforce certain attributes 
chosen as male essence” (p. 210). !is report from Brazil reaches conclusions similar to 
those of another female ethnographer who investigated cock'ghting in northern France 
near the Belgian border. !e latter con'rms the masculinity aspect: “cock'ghts represent 
only one exclusive part of human society, that of the virile element” (Cegarra 1988, p. 55). 
Similarly, Danaë, in his magisterial survey of cock'ghting worldwide, concludes with a dis-
cussion of cock'ghters as an esoteric masculine society (1989, pp. 227–247). A8ergan, in 
his study of cock'ghting in Martinique, claims it is an outlet for male identity and aggres-
sion by male members of an oppressed group (1986, p. 120), while Kimberley Cook, in her 
analysis of cock'ghting in Venezuela, sees it as a “ritualistic 'rm of aggression” where men 
vie to gain public recognition of their virility (1991, pp. 89–90).
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All these interpretations of the cock'ght, in my opinion, are 6awed to some extent. 
Perhaps the most obvious methodological weakness is the failure to employ a comparative, 
cross-cultural perspective. !e quintessential anthropological credo of cultural relativism 
notwithstanding, it is always a mistake to study data from one particular culture as if it 
were peculiar to that culture if comparable, if not cognate, data exist in other cultures. !e 
cock'ght is found outside of Bali, the Philippines, Louisiana, Tennessee, Brazil, northern 
France, Martinique, and Venezuela. Hence any would-be interpretation of the cock'ght 
based on data from just one of these locations is bound to be inadequate. Let us assume, 
strictly for the sake of argument, that Geertz’s interpretation of the Balinese cock'ght as 
a “native” representation of Balinese status concerns is correct. If so, what, if anything, 
does this tell us about about the possible signi'cance of the cock'ght in all of the other 
many cultures in which the cock'ght occurs? Balinese social structure is not to be found 
in Puerto Rico or Belgium. !e point is that if an item of folklore has cross-cultural distri-
bution, it must be studied from a cross-cultural perspective, especially if one is interested 
in possible symbolic aspects. !is does not mean that the cock'ght necessarily means the 
same thing in all of its cultural contexts—although this cannot be ruled out a priori. !e 
study of a cross-cultural phenomenon in just one cultural context is clearly a limited, par-
tial one. In that sense, all previous studies of the cock'ght have been limited and partial.
Along with the plea for a larger comparative perspective to view the cock'ght, I sug-
gest that the cock'ght itself cannot be understood without being seen as an exemplar of a 
more comprehensive paradigm involving male gladiatorial combat. !ere are many forms 
of male battle, running the gamut from simple children’s games to all-out war. It is my con-
tention that the cock'ght can best be analyzed as part and parcel of that paradigm.
Accordingly, let us begin our consideration of the cock'ght as an instance of the broad 
category of male competitive games and sports. I believe one can discern a common under-
lying symbolic structure shared by most if not all such activities. It might be useful to dis-
tinguish three basic variants with respect to the nature of the participants. !e 'rst would 
be human male versus human male. !is category includes fencing, boxing, wrestling, ten-
nis, badminton, ping-pong, and such board games as chess and checkers. By extension, it 
could also subsume male team sports such as football, soccer, hockey, lacrosse, basketball, 
and so on. !e second category would be human male versus male animal. Perhaps the 
classic illustration of this category is the bull'ght. !e third category would be male ani-
mal versus male animal. Here the obvious example is the cock'ght.
It is my contention that all of those games and sports are essentially variations on one 
theme. !e theme involves an all-male preserve in which one male demonstrates his viril-
ity, his masculinity, at the expense of a male opponent. One proves one’s maleness by femi-
nizing one’s opponent. Typically, the victory entails (no pun intended!) penetration. In 
American football, the winning group of males get into their opponents’ “end zones” more 
times than their opponents get into their end zones (see Dundes 1987, pp. 178–194). In 
the bull'ght, the battle of man against bull is to determine whether the matador penetrates 
the bull or whether the bull’s horns penetrate the matador. !e penetrator comes away tri-
umphant and with his masculinity intact; the one penetrated loses his masculinity. In the 
case of the bull'ght, the expertise and skill of the matador can be rewarded with di8erent 
degrees of symbolic castration of the bull. !e bull, if penetrated cleanly and dextrously, 
may have his hooves, ears, or tail cut o8 to be “presented” to the successful matador.
!e cock'ght, despite its great antiquity and its continued popularity into the twentieth 
century, has never been properly understood as male phallic combat. Despite an enormous 
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literature devoted to the cock'ght ranging from vivid descriptions to purported analyses, 
there is to my knowledge no single discussion that takes adequate account of the symbolic 
nature of the contest. I should like to test my hypothesis that the cock'ght is a thinly dis-
guised symbolic homoerotic masturbatory phallic duel, with the winner emasculating the 
loser through castration or feminization. I believe that the evidence for this interpretation 
is overwhelmingly abundant and cross-cultural in nature. Nevertheless, it seems to me that 
the symbolic meaning of the cock'ght is not consciously recognized either by those who 
participate in the event or those who have written about it. !e sole exception occurs in 
Cook’s chapter on cock'ghting on the island of Margarita o8 the coast of Venezuela in her 
1991 doctoral dissertation, when she remarks “that when two individual men 'ght cocks 
and one loses, the loser assumes a feminine role” (1991, p. 98; see also A8ergan 1986, p. 
119). Baird (1981–1982, p. 83) claims that among the ancient Greeks the cock'ght sym-
bolized homosexual rape.
Let us 'rst consider the gallus as phallus. In all of the many essays and monographs 
devoted to cock'ghting, only a few actually comment on the phallic nature of the cocks. 
Scott (1941) in a paragraph in his survey volume Phallic Worship does mention the phal-
lic signi'cance of the cock (p. 262), but in his full-length history of cock'ghting (Scott 
1957), he drew no inferences from this. In Geertz’s (1972) essay, which was 'rst presented 
at a conference held in Paris in October of 1970, we are told:
To anyone who has been in Bali any length of time, the deep psychological iden-
ti'cation of Balinese men with their cocks is unmistakable. !e double enten-
dre here is deliberate. It works in exactly the same way in Balinese as it does in 
English, even to producing the same tired jokes, strained puns, and uninventive 
obscenities. (p. 5)
It is a pity that Geertz was not a bit more ethnographically speci'c here, inasmuch as he 
failed to give even a single example of the “tired jokes” and “uninventive obscenities.” Tired 
jokes and uninventive obscenities constitute valuable folkloric data that any journeyman 
folklorist 6uent in the language would have almost certainly recorded. Geertz (1972) does 
cite Bateson and Mead’s (1942) contention that the Balinese conception of the body “as 
a set of separately animated parts” allows them to view cocks as “detachable, self-operat-
ing penises, ambulant genitals with a life of their own” (p. 5), but then claims that he does 
“not have the kind of unconscious material either to con'rm or discon'rm this intriguing 
notion.” Again, one regrets his failure to collect the jokes, puns, and obscenities available to 
him. So, although Geertz did nominally acknowledge that cocks “are masculine symbols 
par excellence” among the Balinese, this fact did not play a major part in his interpretation 
of the cock'ght as a whole.
!e English word “cock,” meaning both rooster and phallus, is the subject of wit among 
cock'ghters in the United States. According to Hawley (1982), “One Florida infor-
mant was heard to say ‘My cock may not be the biggest, but it’s the best in this county.” 
Apparently such double meanings were so common as to make older cockers use the term 
“rooster” in mixed company (p. 105; see also Baird 1981).
Among the various surveys of the folklore of cocks (e.g., Gittée 1891; Fehrle 1912; 
Raseh 1930; and Coluccio 1970), only a few bother to mention the cock as a symbol of 
virility (Castillo de Lucas 1970, pp. 363–364; Cadet 1971, p. 109). !e phallic associa-
tions of the rooster, even apart from its apparent potential for magical resuscitation in 
cock'ghting, explains why the cock was a logical, if not psychologically obvious, choice 
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as a symbol for resurrection (Modi 1911, p. 112). Resurrection, if understood as reerec-
tion, or even in the narrow Christian sense of rising miraculously from the dead, is per-
fectly understandable in cock'ght terms. !ere are numerous reports in the cock'ght lit-
erature of a cock, apparently totally vanquished and lying motionless, somehow managing 
to recover su7ciently to arise and earn a victory over its opponent. !is phallic symbol-
ism would help explain why the cock is so o5en found atop penile Christian architectural 
constructions such as church towers, o5en in the form of weather vanes which pointedly 
mark wind direction (see Callisen 1939; Kretzenbacher 1958; Cadet 1971, pp. 166–168, 
199–204; see also Forsyth 1978 and Baird, 1981–1982). !e same rationale would illu-
minate the occurrence of a cock'ght motif on sarcophagi and other funerary monuments 
(Bruneau 1965, p. 115; Forsyth 1978, pp. 262–264). It would also elucidate the frequent 
occurrence of the “Coq gaulois” as an emblem mounted on the prows of French warships 
(Vichot 1970).
Occasional comments indicate that cock'ghting is analogous to sexuality. In a Filipino 
cock'ghting manual we are told, “An ideal cock must be able to top a hen several times before 
letting her get up, because sex and gameness complement each other. . . . Indeed, no other 
sport has as much connection with sex as cock'ghting” (Lansang 1966, pp. 41, 59, 139). 
!e explicit anthropomorphic projection upon roosters and chickens in the Philippines 
is such that a strict double standard is maintained. Cocks are expected to indulge them-
selves, but hens are considered to be “sexually promiscuous” (p. 151), and breeders must 
keep watch over hens in the barnyard “because the hen is a natural whore” (p. 140).
Similar male chauvinism is found in other descriptions of chickens and roosters:
Females are strongly sexual and thus impulsive. !eir actions are instinctively 
generated by feelings, and they need the presence of a male. !ey are amorous. 
Nature made them so and provided that their actions be governed by their sexual 
impulses. Males are cooler in disposition and have developed a di8erent brain. 
!ey act according to logic. Females act impulsively. (Finsterbusch 1980, p. 166)
Hard to believe that these are descriptions of chickens and roosters, and not humans!
It is likely that the symbolic equation of cock and human phallus exists regardless of 
whether or not the term for “rooster” in a given culture refers explicitly to the male organ. 
In Spanish and Portuguese, for example, we are told that this verbal equation does not 
exist. However, in Brazil, a “tea of cock’s spurs is recommended for sexual potency” (Leal 
1989, p. 241). In an Arabic tract from the thirteenth century we learn, “If you take a cock’s 
blood and mix it with honey, and place it on the 're, and apply the mixture to the penis 
of a man, it will increase his virile power as well as his sexual enjoyment” (Phillott 1910, p. 
91). Moreover, if a woman ate a cock’s testicles a5er intercourse, she greatly increased her 
chances of becoming pregnant (Smith and Daniel 1975, p. 54; Hawley 1982, p. 106). In 
other words, customs and belief systems make the connection between rooster and phal-
lus perfectly clear. !ere are also numerous winged phallic amulets in the shape of cocks 
(Baird 1981–1982, p. 84).
!e sexual component is alluded to only en passant by most writers on cock'ghts, if 
it is mentioned at all. In an essay in Esquire, Crews (1977) remarked that when a man’s 
cock quits in the pit, he su8ers profound humiliation. When a man’s cock quits! Yes, that’s 
part of the ritual, too. Perhaps the biggest part. A capon—a rooster that has been castrated 
to improve the taste of the meat—seldom crows, never notices hens, and will hit nothing 
with spur or beak. But a game fowl is the ultimate blend of balls and skill, all of which is 
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inextricably bound up with the man who bred it and fed it and handles it in the pit (p. 8). 
Attributing “balls” to cocks is not all that unusual. In Andalusia, for example, according to 
Marvin (1984, p. 66), men may say admiringly of an especially aggressive cock “tienes los 
cojones de ganar bien” (“it has the balls to win well”) (p. 65). !e same idiom is found in 
Nathanael West’s account of a cock'ght in !e Day of the Locust, when the Mexican cocker 
Miguel praises a red rooster: “!at’s a bird with lots of cojones” (West 1950, p. 123). One 
di7culty in “proving” the sexual component of the cock'ght lies in the fact that such a com-
ponent is largely unconscious. Consequently, it is not easy to obtain informant con'rma-
tion of the symbolism through interviews. Wollan (1980) phrased the problem as follows:
How much of this symbolism is present in modern cock'ghting, and how much 
of it would be understood by cockers themselves, is di7cult to say. How to 
research the topic is equally puzzling. Conversation promises to yield little infor-
mation about cock'ghting as a symbol, and certainly nothing about its sexual 
dimensions. Hence, interpretation of a sort not commonly done, certainly not in 
fashion in the social sciences, would seem indispensable. (p. 28)
Hawley, whose 1982 Florida State doctoral dissertation in criminology sought to de'ne 
cock'ghters as a deviant subculture, claimed that in his 'eld experience “sexual entendre 
was encountered infrequently. . . . However, the implicit sexual nature of the activity was 
omnipresent” (p. 104). Still, he admitted, “Sexual animism was de'nitely the most di7-
cult cultural theme to study in any fashion systematically or haphazardly . . . [and] a ticklish 
subject to study in the 'eld under the best of conditions” (pp. 107, 147). Hawley himself 
does not doubt “the signi'cance of the cock as a symbol of aggressive, male-oriented sexual 
behavior.” In his words, “!e cock is, to all appearances, a walking unselfconscious set of 
eager genitals . . . the cock represents male sexuality raised (or lowered) to the most primi-
tive extremity.” But, Hawley remarks, “the obvious sexual signi'cance of the cock is charac-
teristically ignored by the cocking fraternity in all but the most casual and relaxed settings” 
(p. 121). Hawley might have added the anthropological and folkloristic fraternities as well. 
A far too typical comment contained in one of several essays devoted to a twenty-year retro-
spective view of Geertz’s 1972 essay exempli'es the “meaningless” school of interpretation. 
One of the co-authors, a Louisiana native who wrote his Master’s thesis on Louisiana cock-
'ghts, claimed he “found many, if not most, of the same metaphors in cock'ghts in south-
ern Louisiana that Geertz observed in Bali,” but his “reading was that cock'ghts there had 
no deep meaning but were just for fun” (Chick and Donlon 1992, p. 239).
Yet the sexual symbolic signi'cance of the “cock” is attested by countless bawdy jokes. 
One exemplar can stand for many: Q. What is the di8erence between a rooster and Marilyn 
Monroe? A. A rooster says “Cock-a-doodle-do.” Marilyn Monroe says “Any cock’ll do.” It 
may or may not be relevant that St. Augustine in his interesting fourth-century discussion 
of cock'ghts discusses them in a paragraph that begins with a consideration of the sexual 
organs of animals which one cannot bear to look at (Russell 1942, p. 95).
If we accept the premise that the gallus can symbolically be a phallus, and if we provi-
sionally accept the possibility that there is an underlying sexual component in the cock-
'ght, we must next emphasize that the cock'ght is an all-male event. Women do not usu-
ally attend cock'ghts. An early eighteenth-century account of cock'ghting in England 
speci'cally remarks that “ladies never assist at these sports” (Saussure 1902, p. 282). Geertz 
(1972) even bothers to comment that “the cock'ght is unusual within Balinese culture in 
being a single-sex public activity from which the other sex is totally and expressly excluded” 
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(p. 30n). Even in those cultures where women arc permitted to observe cock'ghts, they 
are not active participants and do not handle the cocks. Some women resent their vir-
tual exclusion from the world of cock'ghting, and they resent as well the extraordinary 
amount of time their male companions devote to that world. From northern France we 
have a report of a female reproach that carries an overt sexual connotation: “He holds his 
cocks more o5en than he holds me” (Cegarra 1988, p. 58). Also from northern France, 
we 'nd a distinction between women who may kill chickens as part of preparing food and 
men who are involved in cock'ghts. !e 'ghting cock is a wild animal whose death, nec-
essarily violent, is symbolic. !e arming of cocks for battle is an a8air of men, not women, 
and should not be confused with the domestic household requirement of killing chickens 
for food (p. 59).
!e separation from women in cock'ghts is also signaled by the fact that the roosters 
themselves are not permitted access to hens during the period immediately preceding a 
cock'ght. !is form of quarantine is surely analogous to the modern-day football coach’s 
forbidding his players to spend the night before a game with their wives or girlfriends, or 
to a bull'ghter’s sexual abstinence the night before a bull'ght. Here is an account of the 
training of roosters in the Texas-Mexico area:
!e most important experience of the young stag commences when his trainer moves 
him from his solitary cage and places him in a hennery. !ere he bosses his harem of 
hens, living and learning the meaning of his cockhood. Later, when the trainer takes 
him away from the pullets, the cockerel turns into a bird of Mars. Now he has a lust 
to 'ght, his lust arising from his strong sex drive. (Braddy 1961, p. 103)
In another account from Texas, we are informed, “!ey have had no food this morning, and 
for two weeks have been penned up and deprived of female company” (Gard, 1936, p. 66).
In the Philippines, “it is a mistake to release your stag in a place where too many hens 
are kept, for so many hens make him tread o5en, and much treading greatly debilitates a 
bird and makes him feeble when he comes to 'ght” (Lansang 1966, p. 61). We learn that 
in Martinique sexual abstinence during the cocks’ training is strict and that one makes a 
concerted e8ort to keep hens away from the cages in which the cocks are contained the 
evening before or the day of the cock'ght for fear the cocks will dissipate their energies 
(A8ergan 1986, p. 114). In the north of France, too, keeping the cock in isolation away 
from females is suppose to increase his aggressivity tenfold (Cegarra 1989, p. 673).
In Brazil, cocks
are not permitted sexual intercourse for long periods before 'ghting. . . . It is 
believed that sexual abstinence will give [them] the strength and will to 'ght, 
and that decreased sexual activity will create better quality semen. !e underly-
ing assumption is that sexual intercourse or even contact with a female will turn 
the male into a weaker being. (Leal 1989, p. 238)
In some traditions, the handler as well as the cock must abstain from heterosexual inter-
course. In the Philippines, “sex should be avoided before going to the cockpit; the man 
stupid enough to have sex before a match will be ignominiously humiliated when his bird 
runs away.” However, “Sex is heartily recommended for a5er the 'ght, when men no lon-
ger need conserve their vital energies” (Guggenheim 1982, p. 10).
!e renunciation of heterosexuality in conjunction with the cock'ght seems to sup-
port the idea that the cock'ght is an all-male, or homosexual, a8air. !us, if the gallus 
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is a phallus and if there is a sexual component to the cock'ght, it is a matter played out 
between two sets of males: roosters and men. In this sexual battle, one begins with two 
males, but ends with one male and one female. Is there any evidence to support this con-
tention? In Malaysia, the term used for matching two roosters for a forthcoming 'ght 
may be relevant. “!e stakes are all deposited with a stake-holder (who receives a percent-
age for his good services); and the cocks are plighted or ‘betrothed’ to one another by the 
simple ceremony of allowing each bird one single peck at its rival” (Wilkinson 1925, p. 
65). !e curious idiomatic usage of the word “betrothal”—the author does not provide 
the Malay native term—for the matching of two male cocks is signi'cant. !ey are mates, 
analogous to heterosexual humans, but the 'ght is to determine which one will be the male 
and which the “female.” In Bali, according to Bateson and Mead (1942), “In speaking of 
real courtship, the Balinese liken the behavior of boy and girl to that of two cocks strain-
ing toward each other with their heads down and their hackle feathers up” (p. 172). !at 
the Malay term and Balinese image are not 6ukes is corroborated by a parallel custom in 
Martinique in which the two cocks to be paired in combat are said to be joined in “mar-
riage” (Champagnac 1970, p. 72; A8ergan 1986, p. 115). Of possible relevance to the mat-
rimonial metaphor is the Anglo-American usage of the term “6irt” to refer to the initial 
contact of the two cocks (Egan 1832, p. 152; Worden and Darden 1992, p. 277).
In one of the 'nest ethnographic accounts of the cock'ght to date, Leal (1989) describes 
the crowd’s cheers during a typical Brazilian bout.
During a 'ght every movement of the cock is followed by the crowd’s cheers of 
“go ahead! Mount him! (monta nele! trepa nele!).” Inasmuch as “to mount” or “to 
climb” (trepar) are also expressions commonly used to refer to sexual intercourse, 
usually implying the man’s position in the sexual act, the crowd’s cheers are not 
only metaphorical. (pp. 217–218)
Here is certainly incontrovertible evidence supporting the equation of “gallus as phallus.” 
Leal even recorded a folk poem that con'rms the already explicit erotic signi'cance of 
“mounting”:
Quien tuviera la suerte Who would have the luck
que tiene el gallo that the cock has,
clue en medio de la juria that in the middle of the 'ght
monta a caballo. to be mounted on a horse. (p. 218)
!e allusions to courtship, marriage, and mounting do underscore the sexual nuances 
of the cock'ght, but what evidence is there to support the proposition that the loser in a 
cock'ght is deemed a female?
In a cock'ght, sometimes a cock will freeze in the face of a feared opponent. !is so-
called tonic immobility (Herzog 1978) might simply be a desperate defense mechanism, 
that is, playing dead to prevent the dominant cock from attacking further. More commonly, 
a cock that loses its nerve may choose to 6ee. In an account from Texas, we are told:
When a beaten gamebird decides to withdraw from the battle, he li5s his hackle, 
showing to the spectators the white feathers underlying his ru8. !is act gave rise 
to the famous expression “showing the white feather,” which symbolizes coward-
ice. (Braddy 1961, pp. 103–104)
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In the north of France, a cock that 6ees, crying, is immediately declared to have lost 
if his opponent is standing (Demulder 1934, p. 13). Such 6ight and such crying are 
deemed cowardly acts. In Belgium, too, a cock that starts crying is declared vanquished 
( Jaquemotte and Lejeune 1904, p. 226). In the mid-nineteenth century, the pioneer-
ing Italian anthropologist and sexologist Paulo Mantegazza, perhaps best known for his 
Frazerian survey, !e Sexual Relations of Mankind (1916), visited Argentina, where he 
described a cock'ght. He remarked on the di8erent ways the 'ght could end. One way 
involved an exit from the arena “siempre abierta para los cobardes” (always open for cow-
ards) in which a bloody and beaten rooster might sing, calling for aid from the hens of 
his harem (p. 69).
!ere is even better evidence that winning in a cock'ght is associated with masculin-
ity, whereas losing is considered to belong to the realm of the feminine. In Venezuela, one 
may hear a spectator yell, “Vamos, como tu padre!” (“Let’s go, like your father!”) to exhort 
a cock to do better (Marquez 1954, p. 45); in Brazil, during a cock'ght, one may hear com-
ments referring to the losing cock along the lines of “the mother’s blood is showing” (Leal 
1989, p. 216).
In Colombia, a cock that runs away is thought to cry like a chicken (León Rey 1953, 
p. 93). In Mexico, to be a “gallo-gallina,” a rooster-hen, is to be a coward or homosexual 
(Mendoza 1943, p. 123). In Venezuela, there is a general folk belief that a rooster who 
“clucks” like a chicken is a sure sign of an imminent disgrace (Acosta Saignes 1954, p. 39). 
In Andalusia, too, a cock may lose a 'ght by 6eeing from its opponent while making a low 
clucking sound. !is is called “canta la gallina,” which may be translated as “the hen sings” 
(Marvin 1984). Anthropologist Marvin astutely observes, “What should be noted here is 
not only does the bird 6ee but it also makes what is perceived to be the sound of a hen, a 
female. !is behavior is regarded as reprehensible, for the cock is not acting as a true male” 
(p. 64). Here is prima facie evidence that the loser in the Andalusian cock'ght is consid-
ered to be a chicken rather than a rooster, a female rather than a male. In Borneo, we 'nd 
a possible parallel; we are told that “occasionally the bird was “chicken,” and ran a5er the 
'rst scuIe (Barclay 1980, p. 18), although it is not altogether certain whether “chicken” is 
a native-language term in Borneo or not. !e placing of it in single quotes suggests, how-
ever, that it might be. Of course, in American folk speech, to be “chicken” is to be cowardly, 
especially among a group of male peers.
!e feminization of the loser in a cock'ght cannot really be disputed. In Martinique, 
there is a proverb “Kavalie vol a dam,” which presumably has a literal meaning of “a cav-
alier 6ies to a lady [dame].” !e proverb refers to the fact that there must always be an 
adversary for a cock, but, more important in the present context, that a good cock never 
hesitates to 6y toward his opponent (as does a man toward a woman). !e winning cock 
a7rms his maleness, his virility, while the loser is forced to take the female role with a 
strongly negative connotation. It is clearly preferable to be a true female than a false (e8em-
inate) male (A8ergan 1986, p. 119). Also in Martinique we 'nd the idiom “faire la poule” 
(to be chicken) applied to a cock who cowers in front of an opponent, refusing to 'ght 
(Champagnac 1970, p. 35). Leal (1989) reports that in Brazil, if a losing rooster attempts 
to run from the pit “crying like a chicken” (cacarejando feito galinha), this would consti-
tute the worst kind of dishonor to the cock’s owner and supporters since “symbolically at 
that moment the cock and the men become females.” “Chicken” is a slang term for both 
“loose woman” and coward (p. 211). Such data support our contention that the losing 
cock in a cock'ght becomes feminized, becomes a chicken.
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Other details of the cock'ght take on new signi'cance in the light of the argument 
here proposed. !ese details include speci'c techniques designed to stimulate or revive a 
wounded cock. Pre'ght preparation sometimes involved inserting stimulants in prescribed 
ori'ces. For example, in Bali, according to Geertz (1972), red pepper might be stu8ed 
down a cock’s beak or up its anus to give it spirit (p. 6). Guggenheim (1982) reported that 
in the Philippines “sticking chili up the anus” (p. 10) was thought to increase the cock’s 
“natural ferocity.” In Belgium, just before a 'ght a cock might be given a piece of sugar 
soaked in cognac (Remouchamps and Remacle 1949, p. 65).
Another pre'ght ritual is reported from Haiti. !ere, in order to convince the judge 
that no poison has been placed on a particular cock’s spurs—poison that would unfairly 
eliminate the opposing cock if it entered its bloodstream—the cock’s handler will suck the 
spurs of his cock and perhaps also the beak and neck of his bird as well (Marcelin 1955b, p. 
59). For the same practice in the Philippines, see Roces (1959, pp. 65–66); for Martinique, 
see A8ergan (1986, p. 115). !ere also the cock is forced to drink the water in which he is 
bathed. !is is similar to a technique in southern Louisiana where an o7cial uses a wet cot-
ton ball to wipe the metal ga8s a5er which he squeezes water drops into the cock’s mouth 
(Donlon 1990, 282; 1991, p. 106). In Venezuela, Cook (1991, p. 92) notes the poison is 
applied at the last minute, right before the 'ght starts because otherwise the cock with the 
poisoned spur might accidentally scratch itself.
!is practice is reasonable enough, but a similar one used to resuscitate wounded cocks 
during a 'ght requires a di8erent rationale. In Bali, during breaks in the 'ght, handlers 
are permitted to touch their birds to revive them. !e handler “blows in its mouth, put-
ting the whole chicken head in his own mouth and sucking and blowing, 6u8s it, stu8s 
its wounds with various sorts of medicines, and generally tries anything he can think of to 
arouse the last ounce or spirit which may be hidden somewhere within it” (Geertz 1972, 
p. 9). An earlier account of cock'ghting in Bali con'rms that the handlers try to revive 
their cocks’ “ardour by petting, massage or by blowing into their beaks” (Knight 1940, p. 
81), !is means of “sucking the wounds of an injured cock is one of the oldest prescrip-
tions for healing a bird” (Smith and Daniel 1975, p. 86). A physician traveling in Cuba in 
the mid-nineteenth century con'rmed the practice as he reported seeing owners “sucking 
the whole bleeding head repeatedly” (Wurdemann 1844, p. 92). !e technique continues 
to be popular and is reported from Tennessee (Gunter 1978, p. 166; Cobb 1978, p. 92) 
and Texas (Braddy 1961, p. 105) among other places. Literary critic Stanley Edgar Hyman 
(1950), describing a cock'ght he attended in Saratoga Springs, New York, in the summer 
of 1949, noted the following:
For centuries, it has been the custom for the handler during the breaks in the 
'ghting, to wipe the blood out of his chicken’s eyes on his mouth—a procedure 
that undoubtedly goes back to the ancient ritualistic origins of the sport, which 
are to be found in cock sacri'ce and blood-drinking. (p. 101)
Hyman, of course, presented not one shred of documentary evidence for his hypothetical 
ritual origin of the practice. He was well known for his ardent advocacy of “myth-ritual” 
theory, according to which all folklore was supposedly a survival from an original ritual of 
some kind (see Bascom 1957). In some versions of the practice, the handlers blow water 
on the wounded cock, but some cock'ghters preferred the licking system “because of the 
supposed healing power of human saliva” (Cobb 1978, p. 92). An informant at a New York 
state cock'ght claimed that cold water is dangerous for the birds’ systems but that “human 
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saliva not only is just the right temperature but is well known to have e8ective germicidal 
properties (Hyman 1950, p. 101).
A5er a 'ght is over, a handler may attempt to apply a more conventional disinfectant 
to the cock’s wounds such as tincture of iodine, but one old tradition (in Belgium and in 
England) insists that it is preferable to urinate on the wounds immediately a5er the com-
bat on the grounds that urine is the best of disinfectants (Remouchamps and Remacle 
1949, pp. 75–76; Scott 1957, p. 49). !ere are also reports that a cock should be fed urine. 
Scott (1957) remarked, “I well remember a famous exhibitor telling me some thirty years 
ago that the secret of getting birds into perfect show condition was to feed them on wheat 
which had been steeped in urine” (p. 42). In Brazil a handler “will put the cock’s entire 
head inside his mouth in a desperate attempt to revive the cock for the coming round” 
(Leal 1989, pp. 237–238). Leal has o8ered an ingenious interpretation of the exchange 
of bodily 6uids between man and cock (p. 244). !e man gives his body 6uids saliva and 
urine to the cock while the cock gives his blood to the man: “Man’s 6uids (food, saliva, 
urine) become cock’s 6uids (semen and blood)” (p. 246). Still, the act of sucking the cock’s 
whole head seems to require further explanation. In Venezuela, for instance, the practice 
is called “mamar el gallo” (Olivares Figeroa 1949, p. 186), which might be translated as 
“sucking the cock”—”mamar” being the same word used for babies’ nursing; mamar as in 
mammary gland, and ultimately the term “mama.”
Hawley (1987), in his description of cock'ghts in the southern United States writes, 
“!e handlers try to revive the weakened birds by various seemingly bizarre methods: tak-
ing the bleeding bird’s head into his mouth to warm it and drain blood from its lungs” (pp. 
22–23). Hawley (1982) mused about this practice in his unpublished doctoral disserta-
tion, not in print.
Occasionally the seemingly bizarre resuscitative behavior in which handlers indulge 
during cock'ghting has been observed to be the source of some coarse, jocular, 
and sometimes disapproving commentary from spectators and informants. As one 
might expect, when a handler puts a wounded cock’s head in his mouth to suck out 
the blood, he is indeed engaging in behavior that some would 'nd highly fraught 
with sexual implications. Since, according to informants, this maneuver is highly 
e7cacious in reviving fatigued birds, perhaps the sexual entendre is unwarranted. 
It is, nonetheless, a disconcerting sight for the uninitiated to behold. (p. 106)
!ere is another curious technique sometimes employed to revive a wounded cock. 
A Georgia informant, for example, a5er remarking, “I’ve seen guys put a whole chicken’s 
head in their mouth,” went on to describe another practice, “And one trick I’ve seen . . . 
they will blow that chicken in his vent, you know, if he’s about dead or about cut down 
or something. !ey’ll blow him back there to try to help him get a little air and get him 
cooled o8 ” (Anon. 1984, p. 483). A striking parallel to this practice is reported from south 
India. Among the people of Tuluva, we learn that
sometimes, the beaten cock will again be encouraged to 'ght, by its owner, who, 
a5er taking it to a place near by, will pour cold water over its head or will air it 
through the anus. . . . !e method of airing through the anus is a very curious one, 
and they say cocks, once beaten, if they survive this process of resuscitation, gen-
erally strike down cock a5er cock in the combat, much to the pride of their own-
ers. (Saltore 1926–1927, p. 326)
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According to anthropologist Peter Claus (1992, personal communication), who has carried 
out extensive 'eldwork among the Tulu, the Tulu handlers still engage in this technique 
of reviving an injured or fatigued cock. In fact, blowing in the cock’s anus is even used jok-
ingly as a metaphor in everyday life. For example, if a student were tired and nervous about a 
forthcoming examination, a friend might facetiously volunteer to blow in his anus to inspire 
him to put forth greater e8ort in studying for the exam. !ere is apparently an analogous 
procedure employed with cattle in India. Gandhi (1929) in his autobiography spoke against 
“the wicked processes . . . adopted to extract the last drop of milk from . . . cows and bu8a-
loes” and even went so far as to claim that it was this very process of “phooka” (“blowing”) 
that had led him to give up drinking milk altogether (pp. 245, 474).
In our attempt to demonstrate that the cock'ght is a homoerotic male battle with mastur-
batory nuances, another important facet of the event must be considered. As Guggenheim 
(1982) put it, “Whatever the social, psychological, or political reasons why people attend 
cock'ghts, any cocker will say the main reason he goes is to bet” (p. 19). In the Celebes, 
“Cock-'ghts are always connected with betting” (Kaudern 1929, p. 340). Geertz (1972), 
a5er an initial overview of the generic Balinese cock'ght, gave considerable detail of the 
intricate betting system employed by the participants and observers of the cock'ght. Geertz 
failed to note that betting accompanies cock'ghts in almost all parts of the world where 
cock'ghting occurs. !is omission is one consequence of his failure to consult other eth-
nographic reports of the cock'ght, even those concerned with the phenomenon in Bali 
(Eck 1879; Knight 1940) or nearby Java (Kreemer 1893; Soeroto 1916–1917), another 
area studied by Geertz. Usually the betting is one-to-one, that is, one person will call out a 
bet and another person will accept it (Parker 1986, p. 24). In this way, the betting scenario 
mirrors the one-on-one action of the 'ghting cocks. A cocker turned academic describes 
betting in his thesis as follows: “Betting at cock'ghts is an overt expression of machismo. 
!e larger the bet the bigger the man. . . . In a cock'ght the betting opponents are in a face-
to-face confrontation, a man-against-man contest so to speak” (Walker 1986, p. 49).
While one may well applaud Geertz’s (1972) poetic insight that the cock'ght’s “func-
tion, if you want to call it that, is interpretive: It is a Balinese reading of Balinese expe-
rience; a story they tell themselves about themselves” (p. 26), one may not agree with 
Geertz about what that story is. Is the Balinese cock'ght simply an extended metaphor 
for the Balinese social status hierarchy? And what is the connection between the gam-
bling behavior of the Balinese (and others) and the cock'ght proper? Had Geertz or 
other anthropologists been at all familiar with the psychoanalytic theory of gambling, 
he might have been better able to relate the two sections of his essay: the cock'ght and 
the betting on the cock'ght.
Ever since Freud’s brilliant (1928) paper on “Dostoevsky and Parricide,” the psychoan-
alytic community has been aware of the possibility that gambling is a symbolic substitute 
for masturbation. “!e passion for play is an equivalent of the old compulsion to mastur-
bate; ‘playing’ is the actual word used in the nursery to describe the activity of the hands 
upon the genitals” (p. 193). Actually, Ernst Simmel (1920) had previously suggested that 
“the passion for gambling thus serves auto-erotic grati'cation, whereby the playing is fore-
pleasure, the gaining orgasm, and the loss ejaculation, defecation and castration” (p. 353). 
Lindner (1953) discussed the gambling-masturbation equation with clarity:
Now gambling and masturbation present a wide variety of parallels—Both are 
repetitive acts, both are compulsively driven, and the nervous and mental states 
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accompanying the crucial stages in the performance of each are almost impos-
sible to di8erentiate. (p. 212)
A characteristic of gambling that is perhaps most reminiscent of masturbatory activity 
is the “inability of the gambler to stop” (Fuller 1977, p. 28), even when winning. Here 
we cannot help but be reminded of the Filipino manual on cock'ghting that warns 
against “holding-handling” the cock in public, as “handling is habit-forming and once 
acquired, it is hard to get rid of ” (pp. 97–98). As we shall seek to demonstrate, both 
the cock'ght itself and the gambling that accompanies it are symbolic expressions of 
masturbatory behavior.
It should be noted that not all psychiatrists agree with the Freudian hypothesis of a 
masturbatory underpinning to compulsive gambling. However, for every psychiatrist who 
says, “In my experience with compulsive gamblers I 'nd no support for Freud’s formula-
tion that compulsive gambling is a replacement for compulsive masturbation” there is one 
who reports, “What I had found, in my one patient (a gambler), to be the core of the psy-
chopathology—the struggle against masturbation the content of his unconscious mastur-
bation fantasies” (Niederland et al. 1967, pp. 180, 182). Fuller (1977), in the most exten-
sive survey of the psychoanalytic study of gambling to date, concurs that masturbation 
may underlie it, but he argues that there is an anal component as well (to the extent that 
gamblers play with money—a fecal symbolic substitute).
!e somewhat eccentric Wilhelm Stekel (1924) regarded sexuality as the most impor-
tant component of gambling, and he used a bit of folkloristic evidence, a proverb, to sup-
port his contention. !e proverb “Glück in Spiel, Unglück in der Liebe” (p. 240; see also 
Greenson 1947, p. 74), unquestionably a cognate of the English proverb “Lucky at cards, 
unlucky in love,” does suggest a kind of limited good. !ere is only so much luck (= sexual 
energy). If one uses it up in gambling, for example, playing cards, then there will be insuf-
'cient for heterosexual lovemaking. !ere is some clinical evidence to support this con-
clusion. It involves a compulsive gambler who fell in love. “He had abandoned gambling 
during the 18 months of his involvement, and resumed it when “the love” was discarded 
(Galdston 1960, p. 555). !is view that there is a 'nite amount of sexual capacity, or per-
haps of sexual 6uid, is reminiscent of old-fashioned views of masturbation. !e idea was 
that all the ejaculations resulting from masturbation decreased the amount of sexual 6u-
ids available for heterosexual acts. !e connotations of the German word “Spiel” in the 
proverb, analogous to the English word “play,” do include explicit allusions to masturba-
tion (see Borneman 1971). !e proverb might then he rendered, “Lucky in masturbation, 
unlucky in (heterosexual) love.” (!is discussion of the proverb is mine, not Stekel’s.) !e 
proverbial equation might also be relevant to the alleged connection between gambling 
and impotence. !e argument is essentially that the “excitement of gambling and the sym-
bolic equivalents for sexual release built into many games serve as a substitute for sexual 
relationships” (Olmsted 1962, pp. 104–105, 120).
According to Bolen and Boyd (1968), “Latent homosexual manifestations are present 
in the antifeminine aspect of the gambling hall where there is relative exclusion of women 
and ‘antifeminine vocabulary’ (i.e., queens [in card games] are referred to as ‘whores’)” 
(p. 622; see also Greenson 1947, pp. 64–65). Greenson (1947) had this to say about the 
homosexual component of gambling:
!e fellow gamblers are cohorts in homosexual activities. Gambling with other 
men was equivalent, in the unconscious, to comparing penises with other men; 
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winning meant having the largest penis or being the most potent. Excitement 
together o5en represented masturbation. (p. 74)
Greenson was speaking in general about gambling and not with reference to the cock'ght, 
but his comments do seem applicable to the cock'ght. !e allusion to penis compari-
son cannot help but remind us of the care with which cocks are weighed—in the United 
States, the cocks are matched on the basis of weight down to ounce distinctions. Bateson 
and Mead (1942) note that in Bali “before the 'ght each man holds the other man’s cock 
so that he can feel the enemy cock’s strength and make sure that it is not much stronger 
than his own (p. 140). In this context, the cock'ght might be construed as a metaphorical 
performance of a phallic brag session: “My cock is stronger than yours” or “My cock can 
outlast yours.” !is view is con'rmed by a statement made by a cocker who wrote a thesis 
on cock'ghting in Utah: “As a man’s own penis or cock is the sta8 of his manhood so by 
extension is his 'ghting cock an extension of himself. !e man whose cock lasts the lon-
gest and thus wins the 'ght is judged the better man. A man’s own sexual prowess is largely 
judged by how long he can maintain an erection. !e obverse helps prove this statement. 
A man who is plagued with premature ejaculation is someone to be pitied and given pro-
fessional counseling. !us by association a man who has a battle cock with staying power 
[and] pride and [which] 'ghts to the end is macho indeed” (Walker 1986, pp. 59–60).
Bergler (1957), expanding on Freud’s analysis of gambling, argued that “the uncon-
scious wish to lose becomes . . . an integral part of the gambler’s inner motivation” (p. 24; 
see also 1943, pp. 379, 381; Fuller 1977, p. 88). !e logic, in part, is that if gambling is 
really symbolic masturbation, then the participant should feel guilt for this act and should 
expect to be punished by a parent or parental surrogate. Bergler (1943) even goes so far as 
to speak of the gambler as a “naughty” child who expects punishment a5er performing his 
forbidden act (p. 386). According to this logic, the gambler is obliged to play until he loses 
because losing constitutes a form of punishment by an external authority, that is, fate.
!e question is: to what extent, if any, is it legitimate to interpret the cock'ght (and 
the gambling that accompanies it) as a symbolic form of male masturbation? Here we may 
turn to the relevant ethnography to 'nd an answer to this question. Time and time again, 
we read reports of how much time a cock handler devoted to grooming and stroking his 
bird. In the Philippines, we learn, “the cock is handled and petted daily by his master” 
(Lansang 1966, p. 140). Bailey (1909) described a cock tied on a wagon in the Philippines 
as being “unremittingly fondled” (p. 253). Again from the Philippines, a how-to primer 
for cock handlers warns against excessive handling or stroking of the cock, especially in 
public: “You can do the holding-handling at home as much as you desire.” But the prospec-
tive cock handler is told in no uncertain terms that “handling” is habit-forming and, once 
acquired, hard to get rid of (Lansang 1966, pp. 97–98). !e grooming behavior found in 
the Philippines is by no means unique. In Martinique, “the cock is the object of a veritable 
loving passion on the part of its master, who caresses, fondles, kisses it and tells it sweet 
words” (A8ergan 1986, p. 119).
What about Bali? Knight (1940) reported, “You may be sure to 'nd any [male] mem-
ber of the village community from the age of '5een up to eighty using any leisure moments 
toying with and fondling their birds” (p. 77). Bateson and Mead (1942) described Balinese 
behavior in similar detail:
!e average Balinese man can 'nd no pleasanter way to pass the time than to 
walk about with a cock, testing it out against the cocks of other men whom he 
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meets on the road. . . . RuIing it up, smoothing it down, ruIing it up again, sit-
ting among other men who are engaged in similar toying with their cocks—this 
passes many hours of the long hot a5ernoons. (pp. 24–25)
Long before Geertz (1972) described the Balinese cock'ght, Bateson and Mead (1942) had 
remarked, “!e evidence for regarding the 'ghting cock as a genital symbol comes from 
the postures of men holding cocks, the sex slang and sex jingles, and from Balinese carv-
ings of men with 'ghting cocks” (p. 140). Yet, despite this insight and such commentaries 
accompanying photographs as “Many men spend hours sitting, playing with their cocks” 
(p. 140), Bateson and Mead stop short of calling the cock'ght itself a form of mutual sym-
bolic masturbation. On the other hand, according to Olmsted (1962), “Bateson and Mead 
have remarked on the fact that in Bali, cocks are 'rst taken to, and held and petted and 
fondled at just about the time that masturbation must be given up as ‘babyish’ . . .” (p. 181). 
!is observation (which unfortunately is not documented by Olmsted) clearly suggests 
that cock grooming is a direct substitute for masturbation. In a fascinating gestural com-
parison, Bateson and Mead (1942) claim that a mother “may ruIe the penis [of a baby] 
upward with repeated little 6icks, using almost the exact gesture that a man uses when he 
ruIes up the hackle feathers of his 'ghting cock to make it angry” (p. 131).
Even Geertz (1972) could hardly avoid the overt behavior of the Balinese:
Whenever you see a group of Balinese men squatting idly in the council shed 
or along the road in their hips down, shoulders forward, knees up fashion, half 
or more of them will have a rooster in his hands, holding it between his thighs, 
bouncing it gently up and down to strengthen its legs, ruIing its feathers with 
abstract sensuality, pushing it out against a neighbor’s rooster to rouse its spirit, 
withdrawing it towards his loins to calm it again. (p. 6)
Geertz never once mentioned the word “masturbation,” nor do any of the other post-
Geertzian analysts of the cock'ght except for Cook, in her 1991 doctoral dissertation, 
who calls “the careful cleaning, stroking, bouncing and constant handling that 'ghting 
cocks receive from their owners” a form of “symbolic masturbation” (1991, p. 98).
For those skeptics who may not be able to see the possible symbolic meaning of a han-
dler’s massaging the neck of his cock, I call their attention to the fact that in American 
slang “to choke the chicken” is a standard euphemism for masturbation and that a “chick-
en-choker” is a male masturbator (Spears 1990, p. 33).
Once the masturbatory underpinnings of the cock'ght are recognized, many of the 
details of the cock'ght can be much better understood. For example, there is a common 
rule that the handler can touch his own bird, but should at no time touch the opponent 
bird. In Tennessee, for example, “when a cock hangs a ga8 in its opponent, the informant 
stated ‘never touch another guy’s bird’” (Cobb 1978, p. 93). Ostensibly the rule is to pre-
vent someone unethical from harming the opponent bird, but symbolically it suggests 
that one is expected to handle only one’s own phallus. !e same rule is reported in the 
Philippines. When cocks are being matched, we are told, “don’t let anyone hold your cock 
to avoid regrets later” (Lansang 1966, pp. 96, 179). Filipinos in California adhered to the 
same code: “You never do that, touch someone else’s bird” (Beagle 1968, p. 29).
Typically, cocks are kept in covered baskets right up until the time they are scheduled to 
enter the pit. !e cock is exposed at the last minute for everyone to admire (and to encour-
age betting). A5er the exposure, the opposing cocks are juxtaposed so that they are in 
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striking or pecking distance of one another (so as to stimulate them to want to 'ght). We 
can now more fully appreciate the possibly symbolic signi'cance of the particular means 
handlers use to resuscitate 6accid cocks. By taking the cock’s head into their mouths and 
sucking on it and blowing on it, we would seemingly have an obvious case of fellatio. 
Normally, it is considered demeaning for a male to indulge in such behavior—at least in 
public. It is worth recalling that the term of choice in Anglo-American slang for someone 
who performs such an act is “cock sucker.” (!e reference to “blowing” may carry a similar 
symbolic association. It is interesting that an Irish description refers to a handler who “put 
his bird’s head into his own mouth to revive it. It used to work all right but whether he was 
sucking or blowing, I could not decide” (Crannlaighe 1945, p. 512). Also relevant may be 
the gambler’s custom of “blowing” on dice before throwing them.)
Additional ethnographic evidence alludes to oral-genital acts. In Brazil, the cockpit 
may have a bar or restaurant adjacent where drinks and barbecued beef are available. 
Leal (1989) reports that men may joke along the lines of “We are eating your cock,” even 
though chicken is not served there (p. 232). Such speci'cs of joking behavior (of the 
sort Geertz, 1972, mentioned but failed to record) is absolutely critical for a full under-
standing of the symbolic signi'cance of the cock'ght. According to Leal (1989), “Jokes 
are made about ‘mounting’ (trepar) or ‘eating’ (comer) ‘someone’s cock’ (that is to say, 
the cock’s owner) in the cock'ght situation. Both words, trepar and comer, in Brazilian 
Portuguese are used for coitus while cock can stand for man, although not for a man’s 
genitals” (p. 241).
Another piece of ethnographic data from Brazil bears on the connection between cock-
'ghting and masturbation.
When a good quality cock leaves the pit badly hurt there is a general commo-
tion and his owner or handler carefully examines his wounds. As soon as the 
cock is better, the handler checks the cock’s sexual organs to see if they have been 
a8ected: with the cock supine the man gently rubs behind the cock’s leg in the 
direction of its testicles. If the cock ejaculates and the sperm contains blood, it is 
considered that the cock is seriously hurt and will not be able to 'ght again. (Leal 
1989, pp. 239–240; see also Finsterbusch 1980, p. 245)
In a novelistic account of a cock'ght set in northern Florida, massaging a cock’s testicles 
is deemed a foul disqualifying that cock. !e explanation: “You rub a cock’s balls and 
you take every speck of 'ght right out of him. It’s a deliberate way of throwing a 'ght” 
(Willeford 1972, pp. 180–181).
Usually, the masturbatory aspects of the cock'ght are not quite so overt. An 1832 
account of a cock'ght in England describes one individual attending a cock'ght:
He was trying to look demure and unmoved . . . but I was told that he was a cler-
gyman, and that he would be “quite up in the stirrups” when the cocks were 
brought in. He forced himself to be at ease; but I saw his small, hungry, hazel 
eyes quite in a fever—and his hot, thin, vein-embossed hand, rubbing the uncon-
scious nob of his umbrella in a way to awaken it from the dead—and yet all the 
time he was a8ecting the uninterested, incurious man! (Egan 1832, p. 151)
Fuller (1977) remarked that sometimes, especially in 'ctional accounts of gambling, “the 
masturbatory element erupts through its defenses” (p. 101), which seems to apply to the 
abstemious clergyman attending a cock'ght and rubbing the nob of his umbrella.
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!e present argument also illuminates the fact that cock'ghts are illegal in many coun-
tries. No doubt being outside the law makes cock'ghts more exciting for those participat-
ing. In other words, it is illegal to play with cocks in public; hence, one must do it sub rosa, 
in secret. !at authorities ban cock'ghting but then allow it to take place in secret loca-
tions seems to con'rm its symbolic value. Masturbation is typically proscribed by parents, 
but masturbation occurs nonetheless. We can now better appreciate Geertz’s description 
of a Balinese cock'ght. “!is process . . . is conducted in a very subdued, oblique, and even 
dissembling manner. !ose not immediately involved give it at best but disguised, sidelong 
attention; those who, embarrassedly, are involved, attempt to pretend somehow that the 
whole thing is not really happening (Geertz 1972, p. 8, my emphasis).
Other symbolic inferences can be drawn from the notion that the cock'ght may be a 
sublimated form of public masturbation. Harris (1964, p. 515) quoted earlier psychoana-
lysts who suggested that orgasm and death might be symbolically equivalent. We know 
that even in Shakespeare’s day not only did “cock” mean “penis” (Partridge, 1960, p. 88), 
but “to die” meant to experience orgasm (p. 101). So, metaphorically speaking, if one’s 
cock dies, one achieves orgasm. In the cock'ght, if one’s cock dies and the opponent’s 
does not, one loses money as well; that is, one is punished for reaching orgasm in an all-
male environment in a mutual-masturbation duel. !e bleeding of the losing cock fur-
ther strengthens the image insofar as there is a visually empirical loss of 6uid for all the 
world to see. Of course, the winning cock may bleed as well. Presumably both masturba-
tors lose 6uid at the end of the cock'ght, the di8erence being that the winner is not pun-
ished, but rather is rewarded for outlasting his opponent, the loser. He has masturbated 
but remains alive perhaps to masturbate on another occasion. !at a particularly strong 
cock may 'ght again and again demonstrates the “repetition compulsion” aspect of cock-
'ghting (and masturbation).
If the cock'ght does represent symbolic masturbation with grown men playing with 
their cocks in public, all the details from the grooming behavior to the gambling make 
sense. !e grooming, involving the heavy use of the hands is analogous to shaking dice, 
shuIing cards, or pulling the handles on slot machines (one-armed bandits). Although 
Geertz (1972) made passing reference to “a large number of mindless, sheer-chance type 
gambling games (roulette, dice throw, coin-spin, pea-under-the-shell)” (p. 17), it was actu-
ally Bateson and Mead (1942) who reminded us that the dice thrown at a cock'ght are 
“spun with the hand” (p. 143). !e cock'ght involves not only the risk of injury to or the 
loss of one’s cock, but also the loss of money wagered on the 'ght. Losing would constitute 
“punishment” for indulging in symbolic masturbation while winning would permit great 
elation as having masturbated and gotten away with it. !e Balinese say “Fighting cocks . . . 
is like playing with 're only not getting burned” (Geertz, 1972, p. 21). As Lindner (1953) 
put it, winning con'rms the gambler-masturbator’s feelings of omnipotence (p. 216). To 
be rewarded for masturbating is surely 6ying in the face of convention. In most cock'ghts, 
however, there are more losers than winners.
If a gambler’s losing is a form of symbolic castration, as Freudians suggest (Fuller 1977, 
p. 102), then betting in a cock'ght would exactly parallel the symbolic infrastructure of 
the cock'ght itself. If one’s cock loses by being put out of commission or by being killed, 
this would be a symbolic instance of castration. (One is reminded of Cicero’s quip in Pro 
Murena when, in trying to ridicule Zeno’s Stoic teachings such as the idea that all misdeeds 
are equal, he remarked “‘!e casual killing of a cock is no less a crime than strangling one’s 
father” [Cicero 1977, p. 263].) If one had bet on one’s cock and lost, the castration would 
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be corroborated and con'rmed. If, on the other hand, one’s cock prevails, one avoids the 
immediate threat of castration, and if one wins the bet on one’s cock, one does the same 
thing symbolically speaking.
From the foregoing analysis, one can see that the link between the cock'ght and the 
betting associated with it is much less obscure. Both the cock'ght and the betting are 
related to male masturbation. We can, then, also better understand why women are not 
welcome at cock'ghts. Geertz (1972) noted that the cock'ght was unusual in Balinese cul-
ture “in being a single-sex public activity from which the other sex is totally and expressly 
excluded” (p. 30n). But he o8ered no explanation whatsoever for this. If men are compet-
ing in public with their cocks, one can easily appreciate why they prefer to do so without 
women present. In terms of the thesis of this essay, the whole point of the phallic competi-
tion is to “feminize” one’s opponent. ‘!is symbolic feminization becomes less meaningful 
in the presence of actual women.
We may now have insight into some of the 'rst reports of cock'ghting in England 
and western Europe. According to most histories of cock'ghting, the sport seems to have 
emerged among adolescent schoolboys, a custom that goes back to the middle ages (Anon. 
1888, p. 812; Demulder 1934, p. 13; Vandereuse 1951). !is schoolboy tradition of cock-
'ghting continued into the early twentieth century (Cegarra 1988, p. 56). O5en there 
would be a series of elimination bouts, with the schoolboy owner of the winning cock 
called “Roi du Coq” (“King of the Cocks”) (Vandereuse 1951, p. 183). !ere were related 
customs in which a rooster was beheaded (Vandereuse 1951, p. 197; see also Coluccio 
1970, pp. 75–76) or a group of boys threw sticks at a rooster suspended between two trees. 
!e boy whose stick delivered the death blow was proclaimed king (Vandereuse 1951, p. 
199). Given the symbolic analysis of the cock'ght proposed here, it seems perfectly rea-
sonable for it to be popular in all-male secondary schools.
One more element in the totality of cock'ghting is, I believe, worthy of mention. It 
concerns the breeding of roosters. Many of the treatises on cock'ghting o8er advice about 
how best to produce a “game” cock. One old Georgia informant reported:
!ose chickens were raised—most of ‘em came from one hen and one rooster. 
!ey single mated ‘em. !ey’d take the o8spring from that and test ‘em in the pit 
to see whether they suited them or not. If they did, then they’d take six full sisters 
and the sisters’ father or grandfather and they’d breed all those hens. !at’s what 
they call inbreeding and line breeding. (Allred and Carver, 1979, p. 52)
In one of the many books devoted to cock'ghting, we 'nd an alternative term: “Full 
blood” mating. “‘Full blood’ mating was approved; father with daughter, mother with son, 
brother with sister” (Gilbey 1912, p. 8). !e oedipal implications of such breeding prac-
tices are obvious enough. “You can only try your hens single breeding them and keeping 
exact records of their sons’ performances, and when you come across a true-blooded hen, 
do not hesitate to breed the choicest son back to his mother” (Finsterbusch 1980, p. 165). 
According to this same source, “when fowls are bred in, it can be done in two forms: (1) in 
a vertical sense, i.e., from parents to o8spring and grandparents to grandchildren; or (2) in 
a horizontal sense, i.e., from sister to brother or inter-cousins” (p. 140).
In a cock'ghting novel, we are told that a cock bred from a father and a daughter “usu-
ally runs every time,” whereas “those bred from mother and son have the biggest heart for 
'ghting to the death” (Willeford 1972, p. 39). Breeders may well argue for the genetic e7-
cacy of such inbreeding, but from a psychoanalytic perspective—in which breeders might 
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be said to identify with their cocks (and their behavior), such breeding might constitute 
wishful thinking as well as fantastic acting out. !e point is that such fantasies would not 
be at all inconsistent with masturbation.
With all of the rich ethnographic detail available in print concerning the cock'ght, it 
is surprising to read what anthropologists have written about it. !e refusal to acknowl-
edge the existence of clear-cut symbolic data can only be attributed to what might gener-
ally be characterized as an anti-symbolic stance among social and cultural anthropologists. 
So-called symbolic anthropologists are among the chief examples of those espousing what 
I would term an anti-symbolic stance. Symbolic anthropologists unfortunately de'ne sym-
bolism very narrowly, typically limiting it to matters of social structure.
Although some authors (e.g., Hawley 1989) have observed a “sexual subtext” in the 
cock'ght, they are quick to say that “sometimes a cock'ght is just a cock'ght or a gain-
ing opportunity, and not an implicit homoerotic struggle” (p. 131). Hawley, for example, 
di8ers with “animal rights activists, who see cock'ghters (and hunters and gun owners) as 
‘insecure about their masculinity’ “ (p. 131). (For attempts to disprove the negative stereo-
types of cock'ghters see Bryant [1991]; and Bryant and Li [1991].) A cocker who tem-
porarily turned academic to write a thesis about cock'ghting in northern Utah remarked: 
“Most leave a cock'ght as emotionally and physically spent as if they had engaged in 
extreme sexual activity. I am not saying the release is sexual, but the physical and emotional 
release is very similar” (Walker 1986, p. 28). Geertz (1972), a5er dutifully noting phallic 
elements, totally ignored them in his analysis of the Balinese cock'ght as being a metaphor 
for concerns about status and hierarchy.
Leal (1989), notwithstanding her splendid ethnographic documentation of the phallic 
nature of the Brazilian cock'ght, declines to interpret it along such lines. Says Leal:
We can see the cock'ght as a play of images where ultimately what is at stake is 
masculinity, not cocks, not even “ambulant penises” as Bateson, Mead or Geertz 
suggested. . . . I wonder if the equation cocks = penises is not an oversimpli'ca-
tion, speci'c to English-speaking people. . . . In my understanding, phallus itself 
is a sign invested with the meaning of manliness and power: androcentric cul-
tures ascribe power to the ones who have penises. In contrast to Bateson and 
Mead, Geertz does not limit his analysis to the cock as a phallic symbol; mascu-
linity and status concern are his main points. (p. 220)
!us Leal falls back to a nonphallic reading when she says, “Without doubt cock'ghting is 
a dramatization of male identity” (p. 227). Her position is stated clearly enough:
!e association men/cocks, which seems to be self-evident in cultures that have 
the word cock as a signi'er for penis, is not an obvious one in gaucho culture. I 
am not denying the semantical association man/cock; rather I am suggesting that 
in cock'ghting situations, the meaning of cock imagery cannot be reduced to the 
notion of male genitals. . . . (p. 240)
For Leal, if a man is able to “perform the tasks and rites which assure masculinity he 
becomes a man; he acquires the phallus, which means he gains prestige and power” (p. 
240). It should be noted that in northeast Brazil far from where Leal carried out her 'eld-
work—little boys’ genitals can be called “pintinho” (“little chick”), in contrast to adult 
men’s, which are o5en called “galo” (“rooster”) (Linda-Anne Rebhun 1992, personal 
communication). Still, Leal’s view is echoed by Marvin (1984), who in his ethnographic 
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account of cock'ghts in Andalusia noted, “Unlike Bali, in Spain there is no identi'ca-
tion of men as individuals with their cocks” (p. 63). Certainly the data from English is 
more explicit. One thinks of the slang term “pecker” for penis, for example. In a cock'ght 
where both cocks are wounded, it is the one who is still able to “peck” his opponent who is 
declared the winner. !e pecker wins!
My own view is that it is not an oversimpli'cation found exclusively among English-
speaking people to equate cocks and penises, especially in view of the ample evidence of 
that equation available wherever cock'ghting exists. !e data from Bali and from Brazil 
are exceptionally explicit, even though both Geertz (1972) and Leal (1989) tend to dis-
miss the obvious phallic implications of their data in favor of interpretations that favor 
emphases on “status” and “prestige and power.” Indeed, it is my opinion that it is an over-
simpli'cation of the cock'ght to claim that it is only about status hierarchy and prestige.
!e predictable tendency of social anthropologists to interpret virtually all aspects of 
culture solely in terms of social structure and social organization is easily discernible in 
previous readings of the cock'ght. !e combination of the bias toward social structure 
and the bias against psychoanalytic symbolic interpretation has prevented anthropologists 
from understanding the explicit implications of their own ethnographic data. It is ironic 
and paradoxical that social anthropologists—as well as conventional folklorists—invari-
ably condemn Freudian interpretations as reductionistic, whereas in fact it is social anthro-
pologists who are reductionists. !ey reduce all folkloristic phenomena (such as myths 
and cock'ghts) to re6ections of social structure.
Geertz (1972) and those anthropologists who have followed his basic approach to the 
cock'ght have erred in not being comparative in perspective, in failing to see the cock'ght 
as a form of mutual masturbation or a phallic brag duel, in not o8ering a plausible explana-
tion as to why women are unwelcome at cock'ghts, and, above all, in misreading the over-
all symbolic import of the cock'ght with its paradigmatic aim of feminizing a male oppo-
nent either through the threat of castration (via the ga8 or spur) or by making the losing 
cock turn tail to be labeled a female “chicken.”
Psychoanalysts, to my knowledge, have not considered the cock'ght. Ferenczi (1913) 
did discuss the case of a 've-year-old boy who very much identi'ed with roosters (to the 
extent of crowing and cackling) but who was also at the same time very much afraid of 
roosters. Ferenczi suggested that the boys morbid dread of cocks “was ultimately to be 
traced to the threat of castration for onanism” (p. 212).
Is there any evidence of symbolic castration in the traditional cock'ght? I argue that 
all those versions of the cock'ght which involve the attachment of sharp metal spurs (also 
called “heels” or “slashers”) to the cock’s feet add a castrative element to the sport. Some 
cultures forbid the use of such armor, in which case the natural spurs of the rooster may 
serve a similar purpose. Placing spurs on one’s cock essentially entails arming a phallus. It 
is, in my view, symbolically equivalent to competitive kite-'ghting in southeast Asia and 
elsewhere, where a young man will attach pieces of broken glass to his kite string. He does 
so with the hope that his kite-string will sever that of his opponent. In kite-'ghting, the 
initial action is get one’s kite up (a symbolic erection), but this is quickly followed by the 
battle to cut one’s opponent’s kite o8. Bateson and Mead (1942, p. 135) noted that kite-
'ghting is a form of “vicarious con6ict” analogous to cock'ghting, but did not explicitly 
mention castration. In cock'ghting, one puts sharp blades on one’s cocks to cut down 
one’s opponents’ cocks. If the gallus is a phallus, then cutting a cock could properly be 
construed as symbolic castration. !ere is an anecdote about a Javanese o7cial who was 
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employed by the Dutch government which lends credence to this interpretation. When 
asked by the Dutch authorities to take action against illegal cock'ghts, he did not want 
to betray his own people and refused to do so. Instead, he proposed to castrate the cocks 
so that they would not wish to 'ght. No one paid any attention to the new rule because 
the men felt that if they castrated their cocks, they themselves would be castrated as well 
(Serière 1873, p. 101).
If my analysis of the cock'ght as a symbolic, public masturbatory, phallic duel is sound, 
one should be able to understand why participants might be reluctant or unable to articu-
late consciously this symbolic structure. In e8ect, the cock'ght is like most folklore fan-
tasy: its content is largely unconscious. If the participants consciously realized what they 
were doing, they would in all probability not be willing to participate. It is precisely the 
symbolic facade that makes it possible for people to participate in an activity without con-
sciously understanding the signi'cance of that participation.
Less forgivable and understandable is the utter failure of anthropologists and folklor-
ists to decipher the symbolic signi'cance of the cock'ght. Anthropologists can presump-
tuously label their super'cial ethnographic descriptions of the cock'ght as “deep,” but call-
ing “shallow” deep does not make it so. Perhaps psychoanalytic anthropologists and folk-
lorists should not really complain. If conventional anthropologists and folklorists actually 
understood the unconscious symbolic dimensions of human behavior—such as that con-
sistently demonstrated in the cock'ght—there would be far fewer challenges for psycho-
analytic anthropologists and folklorists to take up.
Note
 *I am indebted to Rafaela Castro Belcher and Margot Winer for their bibliographical surveys 
of cock'ghting compiled in my folklore theory seminars in 1976 and 1986 respectively. For 
additional references, I am grateful to Jim Anderson, Caroline McCullagh, Judy McCulloh, 
Dan Melia, and Herb Phillips. I thank folklore archivist Almudena Ortiz for her assistance in 
translating several Spanish idioms, and my student Mariella Jurg for translating several passages 
from Dutch to English.
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The Symbolic Equivalence of 
Allomotifs: Towards a Method of 
Analyzing Folktales
Introduction
Having argued for changing the units of folk narrative analysis from etic elements of motifs 
and types to emic ones of motifemes and allomotifs, Dundes contemplated how to inte-
grate these units into a consistent method (see “From Etic to Emic Units in the Structural 
Study of Folktales” [1962g], chapter 4 in this volume). He was aware of the criticism that 
his interpretations were speculative and could not be proven empirically. Indeed, Dundes 
disarmed critics by rebuking Freudian theory, with which he was associated, for universal-
istic assumptions. His contribution as a folklorist, he announced, was to make interpreta-
tion culturally situated and relative. He thus elaborated on an objective method that could 
provide reproducible results, take into account contextual concerns, and still incorporate 
psychoanalytic principles of the mind’s symbol-making capacity.
Dundes used the outline of “identi'cation and interpretation,” which he had earlier 
established as a framework for folkloristic investigation (see “!e Study of Folklore in 
Literature and Culture” [1965c], chapter 2 in this volume), and focused particularly on 
establishing “symbolic equivalence” as the key analytical outcome leading to interpreta-
tion. A5er all, most of the questions in his interpretations of folklore revolved around var-
ious symbolic readings of folkloric texts within their cultural contexts (e.g., the hook in 
hookman parking legends as a phallus, money in gambling activities related to cock'ghts 
as masturbation, fudge in children’s jump-rope rhymes as feces). “Where did he come up 
with that?” skeptics asked. Besides doubting the theoretical premise of symbols in folklore 
disguising wishes and desires in response to repressed anxieties, they objected on proce-
dural grounds: “How could these symbolic equivalencies possibly be con'rmed and vali-
dated as anything but the analyst’s perception, unrelated to the meaning intended by the 
tradition-bearer?”
As an answer, Dundes proposed a way to “decipher” the symbolic code in folktales, 
but he also suggested that the method could be applied to all folklore genres. Folktales 
were a focus because of the issue of units of analysis. Since the emic units were based on 
the “syntagmatic” structural model of narration proposed by Russian formalist Vladimir 
Propp (involving the positioning of narrative functions in their sequence within a plot, as 
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opposed to the paridigmatic approach of Claude Lévi-Strauss, arranging thematic binary 
relations in a story), they facilitated an identi'cation step, geared toward the interpretation 
of meaning (see chapter 6, “Structuralism and Folklore,” in this volume). Dundes argued 
that emic structural units empirically represented stories as they are told. !e motifemes 
or functions within the narrative sequence are predictably stable, but di8erent allomo-
tifs or symbols could be inserted into those functional slots. Dundes surmised that those 
symbols consistently placed in the same motifemic slot are equivalent, and this could be 
veri'ed by a comparison of many 'eld-collected texts. He found this especially convincing 
when a single teller used di8erent allomotifs in the composition of the story, suggesting 
their congruence mentally. Dundes represented the logic of explanation mathematically, as 
“If A = B and B = C, then A = C.” Having established a symbolic equivalence (e.g., money/
feces, womb/tomb, decapitation/castration), then psychoanalytic and cross-cultural anal-
yses could determine the signi'cation of the expression in a social context. He was careful 
to note that symbols can have multiple meanings, depending on the situation or culture in 
which they are used, such as his discussion of the equivalencies, in di8erent traditions, of 
eyes to testicles, breasts, or buttocks.
Dundes applied this method to the story of the “Rabbit-Herd” (AT 570), in which he 
sought to prove the symbolic equivalence of head and phallus, evident in the congruent 
actions of decapitation and castration (see chapter 6 of Parsing !rough Customs [1987h]). 
In one of his last publications, he used this equivalence to explain the ritual beheadings of 
American civilians by Iraqi captors, which had shocked American viewers. In answer to 
the question of why the civilians were decapitated rather than shot, strangled, or beaten, 
Dundes answered that capturing the head of a male opponent was symbolically possess-
ing his masculinity, and simultaneously acquiring a trophy of victory, much as bull'ght-
ers claim an extremity of a conquered bull (2005a). For other applications of Dundes’s 
method, see Carroll 1992a, 1992b; Holbek 1993; and S. S. Jones 1990.
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Towards a Method of Analyzing Folktales
Folktales contain fantasy and more o5en than not, the fan tasy is 
expressed through symbols. Folktale plots are 'lled with a wide variety of incredible magi-
cal transformations, objects and powers (cf. the D or Magic motifs in the Motif-Index of 
Folk-Litera ture), and since no one has ever o8ered solid evidence of the actu al existence 
of a self-grinding salt-mill (D 1601.21.1) or a magic object which answers for a fugitive 
(D 1611) and the like, it is not unreasonable to assume that such 'ctional creations might 
be sym bols of some kind. Indeed, except for a few remaining fanatic lit eralists who might 
insist that folktales are ultimately historical and factual with respect to their portrayal of 
reality, most folk-tale scholars would presumably accept the notion that the content of 
folktales includes symbols. !e important question is not really whether folktales are sym-
bolic, but rather what are they symbolic of, and is there any rigorous and reliable method-
ology available to folklorists interested in investigating the symbolism of folktales. In sum, 
if there is a symbolic code in folktales, how can folklor ists decipher this code?
In theory, it ought to be possible to devise a method which could be utilized to unlock 
the secrets of symbolism in folklore, and moreover unlock them in a way that is replica-
ble. Two or more scholars should be able to apply the same methodology and produce 
the same results. !e problem with nineteenth century solar mythologists and twentieth 
century Freudians is that typically the symbolic read ings of folktales presented give the 
appearance of being arbitrary, subjective, and unsubstantiated. For a Freudian psychoana-
lyst, it is sometimes deemed su7cient if a single patient has o8ered a free association to a 
symbol or if some authority 'gure of the past (pre ferably Freud himself ) has previously 
articulated a particular symbo lic equation.
Freud well knew the dangers of interpreting symbols, and in the present context, it is 
signi'cant that he speci'cally recognized the value of folkloristic data for the serious study 
of symbols. In a remarkable paper written in 1911 with the collaboration of David Ernst 
Oppenheim, a professor of classics interested in mythology, Freud examined a number of 
folktales in which dreams occurred. !e tales for the most part were taken from the peri-
odical Anthropophyteia (1904–1931) edited by folklorist F. S. Krauss which provided an 
impor tant outlet for the obscene folklore collected by eminent folklorists around the turn 
of the century (and which could not be published in the conventional folklore journals). 
!e dreams in these tales were “interpreted” either by characters in the tales or by the 
denouements of the plots. Freud was obviously delighted to discover that the pe nis and 
feces symbolism found in the folktale dreams corresponded al most exactly to his under-
standings of the symbolism found in the dreams of his patients. !e congruence of folk 
and analytic dream symbol interpretations does not necessarily “prove” the validity of the 
interpretations. Both the folk and psychoanalysts could simply be in error. Still, the con-
gruence noted by Freud and Oppenheim does require some explanation. !e folk make 
their interpretations of sym bols with no help from psychoanalytic theory and without any 
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favorite theory they are predisposed to champion. (It is more likely that psychoanalytic 
theory found inspiration and help from the folk. For example, the possible connection 
between toilet training and adult anal characteristics such as a concern for order and clean-
liness was made in German and Austrian folklore long before Freud suggested the connec-
tion in 1908—cf. Dundes, 1981.)
!e study by Freud and Oppenheim is a promising one, but it must be pointed out that 
the vast majority of folktales do not have explicit interpretations of the symbols presented 
in the tales. And so the question remains just how can folklorists decode the symbolic 
structure of folktales as well as other genres of folklore?
Most of the conventional approaches to the study of folktales are not concerned with 
the possible symbolic meanings of the tales. !e comparative method, for example, seeks to 
assemble as many ver sions of a particular tale type as possible in order to make an ed ucated 
guess at the tale’s original form, age, and place of origin. !e hypothetical construction of 
an archetype of each individual trait of the tale as well as the entire tale itself can be accom-
plished without paying any attention whatsoever to the symbolism of the traits. Similarly, 
the application of syntagmatic (Propp) or paradigmatic (Lévi-Strauss) structural analysis to a 
folktale can be carried out without regard for symbolic implications. Propp delin eated a thir-
ty-one function schemata for Aarne-!ompson tale types 300–749 without worrying the 
least little bit about the possible sym bolism of individual functions or motifs. As the com-
parative folktale scholar desires to show the distribution of a tale through space and time, so 
the structuralist folktale scholar attempts to describe the underlying structure of a tale.
Students of the folktale have become accustomed to distin guishing the various di8er-
ent theoretical approaches to folktale, e.g., the Finnish (comparative) historic-geographic 
method, structur al analysis, psychoanalysis, etc. One could easily get the mistaken notion 
that these approaches or methods are totally separate and dis tinct, and that they cannot be 
used together to attack a common prob lem. In fact, it sometimes appears that the practitio-
ners of one theoretical approach are downright hostile to the others, as if the methods were 
somehow mutually exclusive. !us if one is a good com parativist, he or she might see little 
value in structural or psychoanalytic studies. Similarly, a good structuralist might demean 
the painstak ing work of the comparativist who carefully locates and compiles hun dreds of 
versions of a given tale. Both comparativists and structuralists tend to dismiss the psycho-
analytic readings of folktales—if they bother to comment on them at all—as being merely 
the doctrinaire applications of a Procrustean a priori theory. While it is unlikely that any 
scholar would object to the idea of synthesizing these and other approaches, it seems that 
intellectual synthesis is more an ideal than a common practice.
I should like to propose a method for the analysis of folktale symbolism which depends 
upon a combination of the comparative method and structuralist theory with implications 
for psychoanalytic theory. I believe the methodology, if valid, can be employed anywhere 
in the world—though my particular examples shall be drawn from the European folktale 
tradition. And I further suggest that the method can be ap plied to any genre of folklore, 
not just folktales.
First of all, what is needed is a large number of versions of a tale type. A single version of 
a tale is insu7cient to carry out the methodology set forth here. In fact, the more versions 
of a tale available, the more reliable the results of the methodology are likely to be. Since we 
have a substantial number of completed comparative studies of folktales (cf. the tale types 
in the Aarne-!ompson tale type index which have double asterisked bibliographical ref-
erences), we have ample materials with which to test the method.
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Secondly, we need to take (Proppian) structural analysis into account. We understand 
from Propp that folktales consist of sequential sets of functions (which I have relabelled 
motifemes). Although Propp was not concerned to name the various motifs which could 
ful'll a gi ven function (motifeme) slot, I have suggested (1962) that such motifs be termed 
allomotifs. !us for any given motifemic slot in a folk-tale, there would presumably be two 
or more alternative motifs, that is, allomotifs, which might occur. If we have a full-6edged 
compara tive study of a tale available, we probably have a good idea of what the range of 
allomotifs are for any one motifeme. Please note again that the concept of allomotif can-
not be applied if one has just a sin gle version of a tale type. One would need at least two 
versions to demonstrate the variation within a motifeme and probably a great many more 
than two versions to ascertain the full gamut of allomoti'c var iation.
Now what has this to do with the analysis of folktale symbol ism? Propp in his 1928 
Morphology was only interested in the func tional (or structural) equivalence of what I have 
termed allomotifs. But I submit that the equivalence may be symbolic as well as function al. 
So if motif A and motif B both ful'll the same motifeme in a tale type, I think we are justi-
'ed in assuming that in some sense the folk consider them mutually substitutable. A may 
be used in place of B and B may be used in place of A. !is is so even if any individual sto-
ryteller knows only one of the alternatives. In a study (1980B) of Aarne-!ompson tale 
type 570, the Rabbit-Herd, I have pointed out that if the hero fails to herd the rabbits, the 
king may punish him in a number of ways including throwing the hero into a snake pit, 
cutting o8 his head, or cutting o8 the hero’s male organ. !ese alterna tives occur in di8er-
ent versions of the tale. !e point is that they are allomotifs. !e plot is advanced equally 
well with any of them. What this suggests, among other things, however, is that cutting o8 
the hero’s head is regarded as the equivalent of cutting o8 the he ro’s phallus. One of Vance 
Randolph’s Ozark informants actually knew both allomotifs, using decapitation for mixed 
audiences of males and females while reserving emasculation for audiences of males only 
(cf. Randolph, 1977:47).
From a theoretical point of view, if A and B are allomotifs of a given motifeme, it is 
true that we do not necessarily know whether A is a symbol of B or B is a symbol of A. !e 
combination of comparative materials with structuralism tells us only that A = B or B = A. 
On the other hand, the folklorist is perfectly free to investigate the allomo tifs in his or her 
sample in cultural context to determine if one or more are taboo or sensitive in nature. !e 
fact that an informant uses one mo tif for an audience of men and women, and another for 
an audience of men only would argue that the latter was the tabooed alternative. It would 
thus be perfectly logical to assume—on the basis of the allomo tif evidence from Aarne-
!ompson tale type 570—that decapitation was a symbolic form of cutting o8 the phal-
lus. Please note that this equation comes from folklore data, from the folk so to speak, not 
from some folklorist blindly committed to psychoanalytic theory. It may be that both the 
folk and psychoanalysis are wrong, that decapitation is not symbolic emasculation, but the 
fact that folklore contains the symbolic equation independent of and apart from psycho-
analytic inter pretations remains to be explained.
A symbolic equation having once been established through al lomoti'c comparison in 
folktales may well be manifested in other folklore genres. For example, if cutting o8 a head 
= cutting o8 a phallus, one might reasonably expect to 'nd other instances of a head-phal-
lus equation. One thinks of the pretended obscene riddle: What sticks out of a man’s paja-
mas so far that one can hang a hat on it. Answer: his head. !e same equation is found in 
traditional custom. Among the gamut of apotropaic methods employed to ward o8 the 
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evil eye are: displaying overtly phallic amulets, making the ' ca gesture, touching one’s gen-
itals, and spitting (Dundes, 1980A:99, 111). How can we explain why the act of spitting 
should be a part of this paradigm? Well, if head equals phallus, then spitting equals ejacu-
lation, and saliva equals semen. Not only does the initial con sonant cluster “sp” occur in 
both sputum and sperm, but there is the further corroborative metaphorical evidence from 
the idiom “spitten image” (or “spit and image” or “spitting image”) used in English to refer 
to a child who greatly resembles his father. !e symbolic e quivalence is also attested in 
such jokes as the two twins conversing in the womb. One asks the other, “Who’s that bald-
headed guy that comes in here every night and spits in my eye?” (Legman, 1968:584).
From the same methodological viewpoint, we can see that eyes and breasts are equiva-
lent allomotifs in Aarne-!ompson tale type 706B, Present to the Lover. Maiden sends to 
her lecherous lover (brother) her eyes (hands, breasts) which he has admired (cf. Dundes, 
1980A:113). It should be emphasized that eyes may symbolize refer ents other than breasts. 
For example, in Aarne-!ompson tale type 1331, !e Covetous and the Envious, the plot 
summary is as follows: Of two envious men one is given the power of ful'lling any wish, 
on condition that the other shall receive double. He wishes he may lose an eye. In a ver-
sion of the tale type reported from New York City in 1936 (Legman 1975:611), we 'nd 
“A Jew in heaven is told that whatever he asks for, Hitler will get double. He asks that one 
of his testi cles be removed.” So eyes and testicles can be equivalent allomotifs—which may 
explain why in Irish mythology there is motif J 229.12, Prisoners given choice between 
emasculation and blinding, and also why Oedipus blinds himself as self-imposed punish-
ment for the sexual crime of incest (cf. Dundes, 1962:102). Some students of symbolism 
in folklore have wrongly assumed that a given object always had one, 'xed, standard sym-
bolic meaning. !e data suggest otherwise. One of the methodological points of this exer-
cise is precisely to indi cate that there may be di8erent sets of allomoti'c equivalences for 
a given item or image, even in the same culture. !e eye, for in stance, can also be meta-
phorically understood as an anus (cf. Dundes, 1980A:127). If we apply the same method 
proposed here for folktales to traditional idioms, we can easily document this symbolic 
equation. In Anglo-American folk speech, one can express an emphatic negative response 
to a proposition by saying either “In a pig’s eye” or “In a pig’s ass” (Cohen and Germano 
1980:65). Since the alternatives are equivalent, eye = ass. Again, it is important to keep in 
mind that it is not a question of applying some a priori rigid theory to un lock the symbolic 
code of folklore. It is rather the folklore itself which provides the necessary key. By assem-
bling many versions of an item of folklore (the comparative method) and by examining the 
varia tion occurring within the structure of the item (structuralism), one can determine sets 
of allomoti'c equivalents. !e folklore data suggest then that in the Euro-American cul-
tures in which the above tales or idioms occur, eyes may be symbols of breasts or testicles 
and a single eye may be a symbol of the anus.
!e method brie6y proposed here can be applied within a sin gle culture assuming that 
variation within a given motifemic slot oc curs. In such a context, one has the possibility 
of delineating a culture-speci'c or culturally relative set of symbolic equations. On the 
other hand, to the extent that a particular tale type is found in more than one culture—
and few folktales are limited in distribu tion to one culture—one may employ the method 
to investigate the di7cult question of cross-cultural symbolic equivalents. Please keep in 
mind that cross-cultural symbolic equivalents are not the same thing as universal symbols. 
For one thing, if few tales are found in just one culture, even fewer may be said to have 
worldwide distribu tion. Most folktales have very de'nite limited distribution pat terns. 
!e Symbolic Equivalence of Allomotifs 323
!us there are Indo-European (and Semitic) folktales, African/African-American folk-
tales, Asian-American Indian tales, etc. Accord ingly, a listing of all the allomotifs occuring 
in a motifemic slot in an Indo-European folktale would yield only symbolic equivalences 
for Indo-European cultures. From such data, it would be methodolo gically incorrect to 
assume the universality of such equivalences. One cannot assert that eyes = breasts in all 
cultures without presen ting speci'c evidence of the existence of such an equation in all cul-
tures, not an easy task.
!e methodology does permit, however, the application of the comparative method 
to the question of the distribution of symbolic e quations. One could identify equations 
from allomoti'c sets in one cultural context and then compare these results with symbolic 
equa tions derived from allomotif sets in other cultures. By such com parisons, one could 
address the longstanding issue of the distribu tion of symbols with some data rather than 
sheer speculation.
!ere is a 'nal methodological technique which is made pos sible through the identi'ca-
tion of symbolic equivalences. In terms of our mathematical metaphor, if we establish that 
A = B and we al ready know that B = C, then we might be able to suggest that A = C. In 
Genesis (2:21–23), God “caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept; and he took 
one of his ribs, and closed up the 6esh in stead thereof.” From this rib, God fashioned Eve. 
!e creation of the 'rst woman from Man’s rib, Motif A 1275.1, is not a very wide spread 
myth, though it is a puzzling one. What is the signi'cance of God’s removing one of Adam’s 
bones to create Eve? Is there a sym bolic element here? I believe it is the “bonelessness” of a 
portion of a man’s anatomy which is critical. For one thing, the human phal lus, unlike the 
phalluses of man’s primate relatives, does not have a bone. Man is missing the os baculum. 
Early man could easily have noticed the human male lacked a bone in an area of his body 
in con trast to many of the animals he slaughtered for food. Yet how can we prove that the 
phallus was ever perceived as a boneless object? An answer comes from riddles and tradi-
tional metaphors. A Rigveda text begins: “His stout one appeared in front hanging down as 
a boneless shank” while an Exeter Book riddle text reads “I have heard of some thing which 
increases in a corner, swelling and rising, li5ing the covers. A proud-minded maid seized that 
boneless thing with her hands; with a garment the prince’s daughter covered the swelling 
thing” (Watkins, 1978). !us both literally and 'guratively, the missing bone in man clearly 
refers to his phallus. Having identi'ed this symbolic equation (A = B), we may look at the 
account in Genesis (B = C) in a new light. In a male chauvinist creation myth in which bio-
logical reality is reversed so that man creates woman from his body, it is perfectly appropriate 
for man to use his genital organ ( Just as woman uses hers in giving birth). !e “rib” transla-
tion of “Bone of my bones, and 6esh of my 6esh” is very likely a euphemis tic one.
I am convinced that the methodological combination of the comparative method and 
structuralism can be applied in any culture. Unfortunately, there have been relatively few 
full-6edged compara tive studies of Australian aboriginal tale types or African tale types 
undertaken. Hence it is not easy to determine the allomoti'c vari ation for tales in these 
areas. On the other hand, once such compar ative investigations have been carried out, one 
could apply the me thod set forth here. Similarly, I believe the method can be applied to 
genres other than folktale. Once such studies have been comple ted, it may be possible to 
either validate or reject symbolic equa tions proposed in the past by psychoanalysts and 
others. It is time that folklorists themselves made an attempt to better understand the sym-
bolic nature of the materials they have collected and classi'ed for so long.
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Creation of the Mythopoeic Male
(Postscript) Madness in Method
Plus a Plea for Projective Inversion in Myth
Introduction
Dundes’s 1962 interpretation of the widespread “earth-diver” myth (motif A 812) as an 
example of the projection, in fantasy, of male “pregnancy envy” and anal birth, set the 
stage for several other applications of this post-Freudian idea to folklore, religion, and 
media. !e essay was also signi'cant for its critical survey of previous anthropological, and 
Freudian and Jungian, approaches to myth. He found that psychoanalytical approaches 
tended to overstate the universality of symbols, while most anthropological approaches 
were too literal in reading myths or too culturally speci'c in their contextual accounts. 
Both approaches were guilty of confusing genres (between folktales and myths, particu-
larly) and overlooking variants that folklorists had identi'ed. Dundes proposed a mod-
ern folkloristic approach, focusing on symbolic patterning in cross-cultural variants while 
questioning, for the purposes of interpretation, the particular symbols and speci'c projec-
tions that were culturally relative. As Dundes stated, “insofar as conditions of early child-
hood may vary from culture to culture, so adult projective systems, including myth, may 
also vary.” !e key psychoanalytic premise he applied was developmental and gendered: 
“!ere is a relationship, perhaps causal, perhaps only correlational, between the initial 
conditions of infancy and early childhood (with respect to parent-child relations, sibling 
relations, etc.) and adult projective systems, which include myth” (1984b).
!e story of this essay’s writing reveals the challenges that Dundes faced in propos-
ing psychoanalytic approaches. In Bloody Mary in the Mirror, he recalled a class on South 
American Indian folklore at Indiana University, led by professor Erminie Wheeler-
Voegelin. In response to a report by a fellow student on the plot—involving a series of 
animals diving into primeval 6oodwaters to scoop up mud, which then expands magi-
cally to form the earth—Dundes commented that “it was a classic case of male anal-erotic 
creativity (in which males attempt to compete with females by creating from a substance 
produced by their bodies)” (2002a). Dundes remembered being ridiculed by his class-
mates, but he persisted nonetheless, and prepared the present paper, which was originally 
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published in the premier 6agship journal of the American Anthropological Association 
(1962b). !e essay has not been without its critics, but it has stood, through the years, as 
an exemplary post-Freudian interpretation of myth.
!e criticisms came 'rst from anthropological circles. From a qualitative viewpoint, they 
questioned his cross-cultural comparisons (scorned as a “shreds and patches” approach) 
without 'eld experience in the cultures. Quantitatively, they critiqued Dundes for drawing 
conclusions without a broader statistical inventory of variants (see Parker 1963). Dundes 
responded that for a hypothetical symbolic interpretation of a myth, having hundreds 
more examples would not make the interpretation any more correct. Regarding the par-
ticularistic cultural test, Dundes’s argument was “that since in all cultures, there are some 
restrictions governing the infant’s handling of his faeces, there may well be symbolic sub-
stitutes for faeces” (1963). Since Dundes’s application of pregnancy envy is o5en viewed 
as a feminist psychoanalytic interpretation, it may seem surprising that another criticism 
applied to Dundes’s work was the tendency of male ethnographers to “talk about creation 
through excrement and other eIuvia as well as to enact elaborate male rites of couvade and 
not to address childbirth” (Weigle 1987). Dundes’s answer was that ethnographers gener-
ally, and male ethnographers particularly, were resistant to psychoanalytic ideas of com-
pensatory creativity as a result of mental blocks against this symbolism.
Dundes was still commenting on issues of method thirty-seven years a5er his “earth-
diver” essay came out. In “Madness in Method” (1996a), given as a postscript to this chap-
ter, Dundes summarized much of his mythological analysis, using the concept of projective 
systems (particularly inversions), as well as male birth-envy. He continued his line of think-
ing about womb envy in an examination of the biblical myths of Genesis, and editorialized 
that they caused “social damage and mental anguish of Western women.” Public intellec-
tuals, such as Joseph Campbell, popularized 'nding Jungian archetypes in myth. Dundes 
countered by addressing the di8erences between Jungian and Freudian intepretations, and 
criticized the Jungian assumption of the existence of precultural, pan-human archetypes, 
which are manifested in myths. (For more critical comment on the Campbellian craze, 
see Dundes 2005c). In the “Madness in Method” essay, Dundes echoed his early concern 
that myths (which he de'ned as “sacred narratives explaining how the world and mankind 
came to be in their present form” that are told as true and set in the postcreation era) were 
confused with folktales (“narratives understood to be 'ctional). “Mythologists,” unlike 
folklorists, narrowly considered their material without reference to variants and compa-
rable genres. !us the present essays are signi'cant not only for their de'nition of myth 
and an interpretative approach to it, but also for describing the disciplinary distinction of 
a folklorist.
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Few anthropologists are satisfied with the present state of scholar-
ship with respect to primitive mythology. While not everyone shares Lévi-Strauss’s extreme 
pessimistic opinion that from a theoretical point of view the study of myth is “very much 
the same as it was '5y years ago, namely a picture of chaos” (1958:50), still there is gen-
eral agreement that much remains to be done in elucidating the processes of the formation, 
transmission, and functioning of myth in culture.
One possible explanation for the failure of anthropologists to make any notable advances 
in myth studies is the rigid adherence to two fundamental principles: a literal reading of 
myth and a study of myth in monocultural context. !e insistence of most anthropologists 
upon the literal as opposed to the symbolic interpretation, in terms of cultural relativism 
as opposed to transcultural universalism, is in part a continuation of the reaction against 
19th century thought in which universal symbolism in myth was o5en argued and in part 
a direct result of the in6uence of two dominant 'gures in the history of anthropology, 
Boas and Malinowski. Both these pioneers favored studying one culture at a time in depth 
and both contended that myth was essentially nonsymbolic. Boas o5en spoke of mythol-
ogy re6ecting culture, implying something of a one-to-one relationship. With this view, 
purely descriptive ethnographic data could be easily culled from the mythological mate-
rial of a particular culture. Malinowski argued along similar lines: “Studied alive, myth, 
as we shall see, is not symbolic, but a direct expression of its subject matter” (1954:101). 
Certainly, there is much validity in the notion of my thology as a cultural re6ector, as the 
well documented researches of Boas and Malinowski demonstrate. However, as in the case 
of most all-or-nothing approaches, it does not account for all the data. Later students in 
the Boas tradition, for example, noted that a comparison between the usual descriptive 
ethnography and the ethnographical picture obtained from mythology revealed numerous 
discrepancies. Ruth Benedict (1935) in her important Introduction to Zuni Mythology 
spoke of the tendency to idealize and com pensate in folklore. More recently, Katherine 
Spencer has contrasted the correspondences and discrepancies between the ethnographi-
cal and mytho logical accounts. She also suggests that the occurrence of folkloristic mate-
rial which contradicts the ethnographic data “may be better explained in psycho logical 
than in historical terms” (1947:130). However, anthropologists have tended to mistrust 
psychological terms, and consequently the pendulum has not yet begun to swing away 
from the literal to the symbolic reading of myth. Yet it is precisely the insights a8orded by 
advances in human psychology which open up vast vistas for the student of myth. When 
anthropologists learn that to study the products of the human mind (e.g., myths) one must 
know something of the mechanics of the human mind, they may well push the pendulum 
towards not only the symbolic interpretation of myth but also towards the discovery of 
universals in myth.
Freud himself was very excited at the possibility of applying psychology to mythology. 
In a letter to D. E. Oppenheim in 1909, he said, “I have long been haunted by the idea 
that our studies on the content of the neuroses might be destined to solve the riddle of the 
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formation of myths . . .” (Freud and Oppenheim 1958:13). However, though Freud was 
pleased at the work of his disciples, Karl Abraham and Otto Rank, in this area, he realized 
that he and his students were amateurs in mythology. In the same letter to Oppenheim 
he commented: “We are lacking in academic training and familiarity with the material.” 
Unfortunately, those not lacking in these respects had little interest in psychoanalytic the-
ory. To give just one example out of many, Lewis Spence in his preface to An Introduction 
to Mythology stated: “!e theories of Freud and his followers as to religion and the origin 
of myth have not been considered, since, in the writer’s opinion, they are scarcely to be 
taken seriously.” What was this theory which was not to be taken seriously? Freud wrote 
the follow ing: “As a matter of fact, I believe that a large portion of the mythological con-
ception of the world which reaches far into the most modern religions, is nothing but psy-
chology projected to the outer world. !e dim perception (the endopsychic perception, as it 
were) of psychic factors and relations of the unconscious was taken as a model in the con-
struction of a transcendental reality, which is destined to be changed again by science into 
psychology of the unconscious” (1938:164). It is this insight perhaps more than any other 
that is of value to the anthropologist interested in primitive myth.
!ere is, however, an important theoretical di7culty with respect to the psychoana-
lytic interpretation of myth. !is di7culty stems from the fact that there are basically 
two ways in which psychoanalytic theory may be applied. A myth may be analyzed with 
a knowledge of a particular myth-maker, or a myth may be analyzed without such knowl-
edge. !ere is some doubt as to whether the two methods are equally valid and, more spe-
ci'cally, whether the second is as valid as the 'rst. !e question is, to employ an analogy, 
can a dream be analyzed without a knowledge of the speci'c dreamer who dreamed it? In 
an anthropological context, the question is: can a myth be interpreted without a knowl-
edge of the culture which produced it? Of course, it is obvious that any psychoanalyst 
would prefer to analyze the dreamer or myth-maker in order to interpret more accurately a 
dream or myth. Similarly, those anthropologists who are inclined to employ psychoanaly-
sis in interpret ing myths prefer to relate the manifest and latent content of myths to spe-
ci'c cultural contexts. However, this raises another important question. Do myths re6ect 
the present, the past, or both? !ere are some anthropologists who conceive of myths 
almost exclusively in terms of the present. While tacitly recognizing that traditional myths 
are of considerable antiquity, such anthro pologists, nevertheless, proceed to analyze a pres-
ent-day culture in terms of its myths. Kardiner’s theory of folklore, for instance, reveals this 
bias. Speaking of the myths of women in Marquesan folklore, Kardiner observes, “!ese 
myths are the products of the fantasy of some individual, communicated and probably 
changed many times before we get them. !e uniformity of the stories points to some 
common experience of all individuals in this culture, not remembered from the remote 
past, but currently experienced.” According to Kardiner, then, myths are responses to cur-
rent realities (1939:417, 214). Róheim summarizes Kardiner’s position before taking issue 
with it. “Accord ing to Kardiner, myths and folklore always re6ect the unconscious con-
6icts of the present generation as they are formed by the pressure brought to bear on them 
by existing social conditions. In sharp contrast to Freud, Reik, and my self, a myth repre-
sents not the dim past but the present” (1940:540).
!e evidence available from folklore scholarship suggests that there is remarkable sta-
bility in oral narratives. Myths and tales re-collected from the same culture show consid-
erable similarity in structural pattern and detail despite the fact that the myths and tales 
are from di8erent informants who are perhaps separated by many generations. Excluding 
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consideration of modern myths (for the myth-making process is an ongoing one), one can 
see that cosmogonic myths, to take one example, have not changed materially for hundreds 
of years. In view of this, it is clearly not necessarily valid to analyze a present-day culture 
in terms of that culture’s traditional cosmogonic myths, which in all likelihood date from 
the prehistoric past. An example of the dis regard of the time element occurs in an inter-
esting HRAF-inspired cross-cultural attempt to relate child-training practices to folk tale 
content. Al though the tales were gathered at various times between 1890 and 1940, it was 
assumed that “a folk tale represents a kind of summation of the common thought patterns 
of a number of individuals . . . “(McClelland and Friedman 1952:245). Apparently com-
mon thought patterns are supposed to be quite stable and not subject to cultural change 
during a 50 year period. !us just one version of a widely di8used North American Indian 
tale type like the Eye Juggler is deemed su7cient to “diagnose the modal motivations” of 
the members of a culture. Nevertheless, Kardiner’s theoretical perspective is not entirely 
without merit. Changes in myth do occur and a careful examination of a number of vari-
ants of a particular myth may show that these changes tend to cluster around certain points 
in time or space. Even if such changes are com paratively minor in contrast to the over-all 
structural stability of a myth, they may well serve as meaningful signals of de'nite cul-
tural changes. !us, Martha Wolfenstein’s comparison of English and American versions 
of Jack and the Beanstalk (1955) showed a number of interesting di8erences in detail, 
although the basic plot remained the same. She suggested that the more phallic details in 
the American versions were in accord with other cultural di8erences between England 
and America. Whether or not one agrees with Wolfenstein’s conclu sions, one can appre-
ciate the soundness of her method. !e same myth or folktale can be pro'tably compared 
using versions from two or more separate cul tures, and the di8erences in detail may well 
illustrate signi'cant di8erences in culture. One thinks of Nadel’s (1937) adaptation of 
Bartlett’s experiment in giving an arti'cial folk tale to two neighboring tribes in Africa 
and his dis covery that the variations fell along clear-cut cultural lines, rather than along 
individualistic lines. However, the basic theoretical problem remains unre solved. Can the 
myth as a whole be analyzed meaningfully? Margaret Mead in commenting brie6y on 
Wolfenstein’s study begs the entire question. She states: “What is important here is that 
Jack and the Beanstalk, when it was 'rst made up, might have had a precise and beauti-
ful correspondence to the theme of a given culture at a given time. It then traveled and 
took on all sorts of forms, which you study and correlate with the contemporary cultural 
usage” (Tax 1953:282). !e unfortunate truth is that rarely is the anthropologist in a posi-
tion to know when and where a myth is “'rst made up.” Consequently, the precise and 
beautiful correspondence is virtually unattainable or rather un reconstructible. !e situa-
tion is further complicated by the fact that many, indeed, the majority of myths are found 
widely distributed throughout the world. !e historical record, alas, only goes back so far. 
In other words, it is, practically speaking, impossible to ascertain the place and date of the 
'rst appearance(s) of a given myth. For this reason, anthropologists like Mead despair of 
'nding any correspondence between over-all myth structure and culture. Unfortunately, 
some naive scholars manifest a profound ignorance of the nature of folklore by their insis-
tent attempts to analyze a speci'c culture by analyzing myths which are found in a great 
many cultures. For example, the subject of a recent doctoral dissertation was an analysis of 
19th century German culture on the basis of an analysis of the content of various Grimm 
tales (Mann 1958). Although the analyses of the tales were ingenious and psychologically 
sound, the fact that the Grimm tales are by no means limited to the con'nes of Germany, 
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and furthermore are un doubtedly much older than the 19th century, completely vitiates 
the theo retical premise underlying the thesis. Assuming the validity of the analyses of the 
tales, these analyses would presumably be equally valid wherever the tales appeared in the 
same form. Barnouw (1955) commits exactly the same error when he analyzes Chippewa 
personality on the basis of a Chippewa “origin legend” which, in fact, contains many stan-
dard North American Indian tale types (Wycoco). It is clearly a fallacy to analyze an inter-
national tale or widely di8used myth as if it belonged to only one culture. Only if a myth is 
known to be unique, that is, peculiar to a given cul ture, is this kind of analysis warranted. 
It is, however, perfectly good procedure to analyze the di8erences which occur as a myth 
enters another culture. Certainly, one can gain considerable insight into the mechanics of 
accultura tion by studying a Zuni version of a European cumulative tale or a native’s retell-
ing of the story of Beowulf. Kardiner is at his best when he shows how a cultural element is 
adapted to 't the basic personality structure of the borrow ing culture. His account of the 
Comanche’s alteration of the Sun Dance from a masochistic and self-destructive ritual to 
a demonstration of feats of strength is very convincing (1945:93).
!e question is now raised: if it is theoretically only permissible to analyze the di8er-
entiae of widely di8used myths or the entire structure of myths peculiar to a particular 
culture, does this mean that the entire structure of widely di8used myths (which are o5en 
the most interesting) cannot be mean ingfully analyzed? !is is, in essence, the question 
of whether a dream can be analyzed without knowledge of the dreamer. One answer may 
be that to the extent that there are human universals, such myths may be analyzed. From 
this vantage point, while it may be a fallacy to analyze a world-wide myth as if it belonged 
to only one culture, it is not a fallacy to analyze the myth as if it belonged to all cultures 
in which it appears. !is does not preclude the possibility that one myth found in many 
cultures may have as many meanings as there are cultural contexts (Boas 1910b:383). 
Nevertheless, the hypothesis of a limited number of organic human universals suggests 
some sort of similar, if not identical, meaning. It should not be necessary to observe that, to 
the extent that anthropologists are scientists, they need not fear anathe matic reductionism 
and the discovery of empirically observable universals. !e formula e = mc2 is nonetheless 
valid for its being reductionistic.
A prime example of an anthropologist interested in universals is Kluck hohn. In his 
paper, “Universal Categories of Culture,” Kluckhohn contends that “!e inescapable fact 
of cultural relativism does not justify the conclusion that cultures are in all respects utterly 
disparate monads and hence strictly noncomparable entities” and “Valid cross-cultural 
comparison could best proceed from the invariant points of reference supplied by the bio-
logical, psychological, and socio-situational ‘givens’ of human life” (1953:520, 521). Of 
even more interest is Kluckhohn’s conviction that these “givens” are manifested in myth. In 
“Recurrent !emes in Myths and Mythmaking,” he discusses “certain features of mythol-
ogy that are apparently universal or that have such wide distribution in space and time 
that their generality may be presumed to result from recurrent reactions of the human 
psyche to situations and stimuli of the same general order” (1959:268). Kluckhohn’s recur-
rent themes appear somewhat similar to Freud’s typical dreams. Although Freud speci'-
cally warned against codifying symbolic translations of dream content and, although he 
did clearly state his belief that the same dream content could conceal a di8erent mean-
ing in the case of di8erent persons or contexts, he did consider that there are such things 
as typical dreams, “dreams which almost every one has dreamed in the same manner, and 
of which we are accustomed to assume that they have the same signi'cance in the case of 
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every dreamer” (1938:292, 39). While there are not many anthropologists who would 
support the view that recurrent myths have similar meaning irrespective of speci'c cultural 
context, that does not mean that the view is false. For those who deny universal meanings, 
it might be mentioned that the reasons why a particular myth has widespread distribution 
have yet to be given. !e most ardent di8usionist, as opposed to an advocate of polygenesis 
or convergence, can do little more than show how a myth spreads. !e how rarely includes 
the why. In order to show the plausibility of a symbolic and universal approach to myth, a 
concrete example will be analyzed in some detail.
One of the most fascinating myths in North American Indian mythology is that of 
the earth-diver. Anna Birgitta Rooth in her study of approximately 300 North American 
Indian creation myths found that, of her eight di8erent types, earth-diver had the widest 
distribution. Earl W. Count who has studied the myth for a number of years considers the 
notion of a diver fetching material for making dry land “easily among the most widespread 
single concepts held by man” (1952:55). Earth-diver has recently been studied quite exten-
sively by the folklorist Elli Kaija Köngäs (1960) who has skillfully surveyed the mass of pre-
vious pertinent scholarship. !e myth as summarized by Erminie Wheeler -Voegelin is:
In North American Indian myths of the origin of the world, the culture hero 
has a succession of animals dive into the primeval waters, or 6ood of waters, to 
secure bits of mud or sand from which the earth is to be formed. Various animals, 
birds, and aquatic creatures are sent down into the waters that cover the earth. 
One a5er another animal fails; the last one succeeds, however, and 6oats to the 
surface half dead, with a little sand or dirt in his claws. Sometimes it is Muskrat, 
sometimes Beaver, Hell-diver, Craw'sh, Mink who succeeds, a5er various other 
animals have failed, in bringing up the tiny bit of mud which is then put on the 
surface of the water and mag ically expands to become the world of the present 
time (1949:334).
Among the interesting features of this myth is the creation from mud or dirt. It is especially 
curious in view of the widespread myth of the creation of man from a similar substance 
(Frazer 1935:4–15). Another striking characteristic is the magical expansion of the bit of 
mud. Moreover, how did the idea of creating the earth from a particle of dirt small enough 
to be contained beneath a claw or 'ngernail develop, and what is there in this cosmogonic 
myth that has caused it to thrive so in a variety of cultures, not only in aboriginal North 
America but in the rest of the world as well?
Freud’s suggestion that mythology is psychology projected upon the ex ternal world 
does not at a 'rst glance seem applicable in the case of the earth-diver myth. !e Freudian 
hypothesis is more obvious in other American Indian cosmogonic conceptions, such as 
the culture hero’s Oedipal separation of Father Sky and Mother Earth (Róheim 1921:163) 
or the emergence myth, which appears to be a projection of the phenomenon of human 
birth. !is notion of the origin of the emergence myth was clearly stated as early as 1902 
by Washington Matthews with apparently no help from psychoanalysis. At that time 
Matthews proposed the idea that the emergence myth was basically a “myth of gestation 
and of birth.” A more recent study of the emergence myth by Wheeler-Voegelin and Moore 
makes a similar suggestion en passant, but no supporting details are given (1957:73–74). 
Róheim, however, had previously extended Matthews’ thesis by suggesting that primi-
tive man’s conception of the world originated in the pre-natal perception of space in the 
womb (1921:163). In any event, no matter how close the emergence of man from a hole 
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in Mother Earth might appear to be to actual human birth, it does not appear to help 
in determining the psychological prototype for the earth-diver myth. Is there really any 
“endo-psychic” perception which could have served as the model for the construction of a 
cosmogonic creation from mud?
!e hypothesis here proposed depends upon two key assumptions. !e two assump-
tions (and they are admittedly only assumptions) are: (1) the existence of a cloacal theory 
of birth; and (2) the existence of pregnancy envy on the part of males. With regard to the 
'rst assumption, it was Freud himself who in cluded the cloacal theory as one of the com-
mon sexual theories of children. !e theory, in essence, states that since the child is igno-
rant of the vagina and is rarely permitted to watch childbirth, he assumes that the lump in 
the preg nant woman’s abdomen leaves her body in the only way he can imagine material 
leaving the body, namely via the anus. In Freud’s words: “Children are all united from the 
outset in the belief that the birth of a child takes place by the bowel; that is to say, that the 
baby is produced like a piece of faeces” (1953:328). !e second assumption concerns man’s 
envy of woman’s child bearing role. Whether it is called “parturition envy” (Boehm) or 
“pregnancy envy” (Fromm), the basic idea is that men would like to be able to produce or 
create valuable material from within their bodies as women do. Incidentally, it is this sec-
ond assumption which is the basis of Bruno Bettelheim’s explanation of puberty initiation 
rites and the custom of couvade. His thesis is that puberty rites consist of a rebirth ritual of 
a special kind to the e8ect that the initiate is born anew 'om males. !e denial of women’s 
part in giving birth is evidenced by the banning of women from the ceremonies. Couvade 
is similarly explained as the male’s desire to imitate female behavior in childbirth. A num-
ber of psychoanalysts have suggested that man’s desire for mental and artistic creativity 
stems in part from the wish to conceive or produce on a par with women ( Jones 1957:40; 
Fromm 1951:233; Huckel 1953:44). What is even more signi'cant from the point of view 
of mythology is the large number of clinical cases in which men seek to have babies in the 
form of feces, or cases in which men imagine themselves excreting the world. Felix Boehm 
makes a rather sweeping generalization when he says: “In all analyses of men we meet with 
phantasies of anal birth, and we know how common it is for men to treat their faeces as a 
child” (1930:455; see also Silberer 1925:393). However, there is a good deal of clinical evi-
dence supporting the existence of this phantasy. Stekel (1959:45), for example, mentions a 
child who called the feces “Baby.” !e possible relevance of this notion to the myth of the 
origin of man occurred to Abraham (1948:320), Jung (1916:214), and Rank (1922:54). 
Jung’s com ment is: “!e 'rst people were made from excrement, potter’s earth and clay.” 
(Cf. Schwarzbaum 1960:48). In fact, Jung rather ingeniously suggests that the idea of anal 
birth is the basis of the motif of creating by “throwing behind oneself ” as in the case of 
Deucalion and Pyrrha. Nevertheless, neither Abra ham, Jung, nor Rank emphasized the 
fact that anal birth is especially em ployed by men. It is true that little girls also have this 
phantasy, but pre sumably the need for the phantasy disappears upon the giving of birth to 
a child. (!ere may well be some connection between this phantasy and the widespread 
occurrence of geophagy among pregnant women [Elwin 1949:292, n. 1].)
Both of the assumptions underlying the hypothesis attempting to explain the earth-
diver myth are found in Genesis. As Fromm points out (1951:234), the woman’s creative 
role is denied. It is man who creates and, in fact, it is man who gives birth to woman. Eve 
is created from substance taken from the body of Adam. Moreover, if one were inclined 
to see the Noah story as a gestation myth, it would be noteworthy that it is the man who 
builds the womb-ark. It would also be interesting that the 6ood waters abate only a5er 
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a period roughly corresponding to the length of human pregnancy. Incidentally, it is 
quite likely that the Noah story is a modi'ed earth-diver myth. !e male 'gure sends a 
raven once and a dove twice to brave the primordial waters seeking traces of earth. (Cf. 
Schwarzbaum 1960:52, n. 15a.) In one apocryphal account, the raven disobeys instruc-
tions by stopping to feast on a dead man, and in another he is punished by having his feath-
ers change color from white to black (Ginz berg 1925:39, 164). Both of these incidents are 
found in American Indian earth-diver myths (Rooth 1957:498). In any case, one can see 
that there are male myths of creation in Genesis, although Fromm does not describe them 
all. Just as Abraham, Jung, and Rank had anal birth without pregnancy envy, Fromm has 
pregnancy envy without anal birth. He neglects to mention that man was created from 
dust. One is tempted to speculate as to whether male creation myths might be in any way 
correlated with highly patriarchal social organization.
Of especial pertinence to the present thesis is the clinical data on phantasies of excret-
ing the universe. Lombroso, for example, describes two artists, each of whom had the delu-
sion that they were lords of the world which they had ex creted from their bodies. One 
of them painted a full-length picture of himself, naked, among women, ejecting worlds 
(1895:201). In this phantasy world, the artist 6aunting his anal creativity depicts himself 
as superior to the women who surround him. Both Freud and Stekel have reported cases 
in which men fancied defecating upon the world, and Abraham cites a dream of a patient 
in which the patient dreamed he expelled the universe out of his anus (Freud 1949b:407; 
Stekel 1959:44; Abraham 1948:320). Of course, the important question for the present 
study is whether or not such phantasies ever occur in mythical form. Undoubtedly, the 
majority of anthropologists would be somewhat loath to interpret the earth-diver myth as 
an anal birth fantasy on the basis of a few clinical examples drawn exclusively from Western 
civilization. However, the dearth of mythological data results partly from the traditional 
prudery of some ethnographers and many folklorists. Few myths dealing with excretory 
proces ses 'nd their way into print. Nevertheless, there are several examples, pri marily 
of the creation of man from excrement. John G. Bourke (1891: 266) cites an Australian 
myth of such a creation of man. In India, the elephant-headed god Ganesh is derived from 
the excrement of his mother (Berkeley-Hill 1921: 330). In modern India, the indefati-
gable Elwin has collected quite a few myths in which the earth is excreted. For instance, a 
Lanjhia Saora version describes how Bhimo defecates on Rama’s head. !e feces is thrown 
into the water which immediately dries up and the earth is formed (1949:44). In a Gadaba 
myth, Larang the great Dano devoured the world, but Mahaprabhu “caught hold of him 
and squeezed him so hard that he excreted the earth he had de voured. . . . From the earth 
that Larang excreted, the world was formed again” (1949:37). In other versions, a worm 
excretes the earth, or the world is formed from the excreta of ants (1949:47; 1954:9). An 
example closer to con tinental North America is reported by Bogoras. In this Chukchee 
creation myth, Raven’s wife tells Raven to go and try to create the earth, but Raven pro-
tests that he cannot. Raven’s wife then announces that she will try to create a “spleen-com-
panion” and goes to sleep. Raven “looks at his wife. Her abdomen has enlarged. In her 
sleep she creates without e8ort. He is frightened, and turns his face away.” A5er Raven’s 
wife gives birth to twins, Raven says, “!ere, you have created men! Now I shall go and 
try to create the earth.” !en “Raven 6ies and defecates. Every piece of excrement falls 
upon water, grows quickly, and becomes land.” In this fashion, Raven succeeds in creat-
ing the whole earth (Bogoras 1913:152). Here there can be no doubt of the connec tion 
between pregnancy envy and anal creation. Unfortunately, there are few examples which 
334  !e Meaning of Folklore
are as clear as the Chukchee account. One of the only excre mental creation myths reported 
in North America proper was collected by Boas. He relates (1895:159) a Kwakiutl tale of 
Mink making a youth from his excrement. However, the paucity of American Indian ver-
sions does not neces sarily re6ect the nonexistence of the myth in North America. !e 
combination of puritanical publishing standards in the United States with similar collect-
ing standards may well explain in part the lack of data. In this connection it is noteworthy 
that whereas the earlier German translation of Boas’ Kwakiutl version refers speci'cally 
to excrement, the later English translation speaks of a musk-bag (1910a:159). Most prob-
ably ethnographers and editors alike share Andrew Lang’s sentiments when he alludes to 
a myth of the Encounter Bay people, “which might have been attributed by Dean Swi5 to 
the Yahoos, so foul an origin does it allot to mankind” (1899:166). Despite the lack of a 
great number of actual excremental myths, the existence of any at all would appear to lend 
support to the hypothesis that men do think of creativity in anal terms, and further that 
this conception is projected into mythical cosmogonic terms.
!ere is, of course, another possible reason for the lack of overtly excre mental creation 
myths and this is the process of sublimation. Ferenczi in his essay, “!e Ontogenesis of 
the Interest in Money” (1956), has given the most explicit account of this process as he 
traces the weaning of the child’s interest from its feces through a whole graduated series 
of socially sanctioned substi tutes ranging from moist mud, sand, clay, and stones to gold 
or money. Anthropologists will object that Ferenczi’s ontogenetic pattern is at best only 
applicable to Viennese type culture. But, to the extent that any culture has toilet training 
(and this includes any culture in which the child is not permitted to play indiscriminately 
with his feces), there is some degree of sublimation. As a matter of fact, so-called anal per-
sonality characteristics have been noted among the Yurok (Posinsky), Mohave (Devereux), 
and Chippewa (Barnouw, Hallowell). Devereux (1951:412) speci'cally comments upon 
the use of mud as a fecal substitute among the Mohave. Moreover, it may well be that the 
widespread practices of smearing the body with paint or daubing it with clay in prepara-
tion for aggressive activities have some anal basis. As for the gold-feces equation, anthro-
pologists have yet to explain the curious linguistic fact that in Nahuatl the word for gold 
is leocuitlatl, which is a compound of teoll, “god,” and cuitlatl, “excrement.” Gold is thus 
“excrement of the gods” or “divine excrement” (Saville 1920:118). !is extraordinary con-
'rmation of Freudian symbolism which was pointed out by Reik as early as 1915 has had 
apparently little impact upon anthropologists blindly committed to cultural relativism. 
(See also Róheim 1923:387. However, for an example of money/feces symbolism in the 
dream of a Salteaux Indian, see Hallowell 1938.) While the gold-feces symbolism is hardly 
likely in cultures where gold was unknown, there is reason for assuming that some sort of 
sublimation does occur in most cultures. (For American Indian instances of “jewels from 
excrements” see !ompson 1929:329, n. 190a. In this connection, it might be pointed out 
that in Oceanic versions of the creation of earth from an object thrown on the primeval 
waters, as found in Lessa’s recent comprehensive study [1961], the items thrown include, 
in addition to sand, such materials as rice cha8, betel nut husks, and ashes, which would 
appear to be waste products.) If this is so, then it may be seen that a portion of Ferenczi’s 
account of the evolutionary course of anal sublimation is of no mean importance to the 
analysis of the earth-diver myth. Ferenczi states: “Even the interest for the speci'c odour 
of excrement does not cease at once, but is only displaced on to other odours that in any 
way resemble this. !e children continue to show a liking for the smell of sticky materi-
als with a characteristic odour, especially the strongly smelling degenerated produce of 
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cast o8 epidermis cells which collects between the toes, nasal secretion, ear-wax, and the 
dirt of the nails, while many children do not content themselves with the moulding and 
sni7ng of these substances, but also take them into the mouth” (1956:273). Anyone who 
is familiar with American Indian creation myths will immediately think of examples of 
the creation of man from the rubbings of skin (!ompson 1955:Motif A 1263.3), birth 
from mucus from the nose (Motif T 541.8.3), etc. !e empirical fact is that these myths 
do exist! With respect to the earth-diver myth, the common detail of the successful diver’s 
returning with a little dirt under his 'ngernail is entirely in accord with Ferenzci’s analy-
sis. !e fecal nature of the particle is also suggested by its magical expansion. One could 
imagine that as one defecates one is thereby creating an ever-increasing amount of earth. 
(Incidentally, the notion of creating land masses through defecation has the corollary idea 
of creating bodies of water such as oceans through micturition [Motif A 923.1]. For exam-
ple, in the previously mentioned Chukchee myth, Raven, a5er pro ducing the earth, began 
to pass water. A drop became a lake, while a jet formed a river.)
!e present hypothesis may also serve to elucidate the reasons why Christian dualism is 
so frequently found in Eurasian earth-diver versions. Earl Count considers the question of 
the dualistic nature of earth-diver as one of the main problems connected with the study 
of the myth (1952:56). Count is not willing to commit himself as to whether the earth-
diver is older than a possible dualistic overlay, but Köngäs agrees with earlier scholars that 
the dualism is a later development (Count 1952:61; Köngäs 1960:168). !e dualism usu-
ally takes the form of a contest between God and the devil. As might be expected from 
the tradition of philosophical dualism, the devil is associated with the body, while God is 
concerned with the spiritual element. !us it is the devil who dives for the literally lowly 
dirt and returns with some under his nails. An interesting incident in view of Ferenczi’s 
account of anal sublimation is the devil’s attempt to save a bit of earth by putting it in his 
mouth. However, when God expands the earth, the stolen bit also expands, forcing the 
devil to spit it out, whereupon mountains or rocks are formed (Köngäs 1960:160–61). 
In this connection, another dualistic creation myth is quite informative. God is unable to 
stop the earth from growing and sends the bee to spy on the devil to 'nd a way to accom-
plish this. When the bee buzzes, in leaving the devil to report back to God, the devil 
exclaims, “Let him eat your excrement, whoever sent you!” God did this and the earth 
stopped growing (Dragomanov 1961:3). Since the eating of excrement prevented the fur-
ther growth of the earth, one can see the fecal nature of the substance forming the earth. 
In still another dualistic creation myth, there is even an attempt made to explain why feces 
exists at all in man. In this narrative, God creates a pure body for man but has to leave it 
brie6y in order to obtain a soul. In God’s absence, the devil de'les the body. God, upon 
returning, has no alternative but to turn his creation in side out, which is the reason why 
man has impurities in his intestines (Camp bell 1956:294). !ese few examples should be 
su7cient to show that the dual ism is primarily a matter of separating the dross of mat-
ter from the essence of spirit. !e devil is clearly identi'ed with matter and in particular 
with defeca tion. In a phrase, it is the devil who does the dirty work. !us Köngäs is quite 
right in seeing a psycho-physical dualism, that is, the concept of the soul as being sepa-
rable from the body, as the basis for the Christian traditional dualism. However, she errs 
in assuming that both the creator and his “dop pelgänger” are spiritual or concerned with 
the spiritual (1960:169). Dualism includes one material entity and, speci'cally in earth-
diver dualism, one ele ment deals with dirt while the other creates beauty and valuable 
substance from the dirt.
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It should be noted that earth-diver has been previously studied from a psychoanalytic 
perspective. Géza Róheim, the 'rst psychoanalytic anthropolo gist, made a great number of 
studies of the folklore and mythology of primitive peoples. In his earlier writings, Róheim 
tended to follow along the lines suggested by Freud, Abraham, and Rank in seeing folk 
tales as analogous to dreams (1922:182), but later, a5er he discovered, for example, that 
the Aranda word altjira meant both dream and folk tale (1941:267), he began to speculate 
as to a more genetic relationship between dream and folk tale or myth. In a posthumously 
published paper, “Fairy Tale and Dream” (1953a), this new theory of mythology and the 
folk tale is explained. “To put this theory brie6y: It seems that dreams and myths are not 
merely similar but that a large part of mythology is actually derived from dreams. In other 
words, we can not only apply the standard technique of dream interpretation in analyzing 
a fairy tale but can actually think of tales and myths as having arisen from a dream, which a 
person dreamed and then told to others, who retold it again, perhaps elabo rated in accord 
with their own dreams” (1953a:394; for a sample of Róheim’s exegesis of what he terms 
a dream-derived folk tale, see 1953b). !e obvious criticism of this theory has been made 
by E. K. Schwartz in noting that “one can accept the same psychoanalytic approach and 
techniques for the under standing of the fairy tale and the dream, without having to accept 
the hypothe sis that the fairy tale is nothing else but an elaboration of a dream” (1956: 
747–48). !us Schwartz, although he lists 12 characteristics of fairy tales which he also 
'nds in dreams, including such features as condensation, dis placement, symbolism, etc., 
does conclude that it is not necessary to assume that fairy tales are dreams. Róheim, in 
!e Gates of the Dream, a brilliant if somewhat erratic full-length treatment of primitive 
myth and dream, had already addressed himself to this very criticism. He phrases the criti-
cism rhetorically: “!en why assume the dream stage, since the unconscious would con-
tain the same elements, even without dreams?” His answer is that the dream theory would 
explain not only the identity in content but also the striking similarity in structure and 
plot sequence (1951:348). Actually, the fundamental criticism is not completely explained 
away. !ere is no reason why both dream and myth cannot be derived from the human 
mind without making the myth only indirectly derived via the dream.
Róheim’s theory comes to the fore in his analysis of earth-diver. In fact, he even states that 
the earth-diver myth is “a striking illustration of the dream origin of mythology” (1951:423). 
Róheim has assumed the existence of what he calls a basic dream in which the dreamer falls 
into something, such as a lake or a hole. According to Róheim, this dream is characterized 
by a “double vector” movement consisting both of a regression to the womb and the idea of 
the body as penis entering the vagina. In interpreting the earth-diver as an example of this 
basic dream, Róheim considers the diving into the primeval waters of the womb as an erec-
tion. Of considerable theoretical interest is Róheim’s apparent postulation of a monogenetic 
origin of earth-diver: “!e core of the myth is a dream actually dreamed once upon a time by 
one person. Told and retold it became a myth . . .” (1951:428). Actually, Róheim’s over-all 
theory of the dream origin of myth is not at all necessarily a matter of monogenesis. In fact, 
he states that it is hardly likely as a general rule that an original dream was dreamed by one 
person in a de'nite locality, from which the story spread by migration. Rather, “many have 
dreamed such dreams, they shaped the narrative form in many centers, became traditional, 
then merged and in6uenced each other in the course of history” (1951:348).
!e validity of Róheim’s interpretation of earth-diver depends a great deal on, 'rst of all, 
his theory of the dream origin of myth and, secondly, the speci'c nature of his so-called basic 
dream. One could say, without going so far as to deny categorically Róheim’s theoretical 
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contentions, that neither the dream origin of myth nor the existence of the “basic dream” 
is necessary for an understanding of the latent content of the earth-diver myth. Curiously 
enough, Róheim himself anticipates in part the present hypothesis in the course of making 
some additional comments on earth-diver. In discussing the charac teristic trait of the grad-
ual growth of the earth, Róheim cites an Onondaga version in which he points out the par-
allelism between a pregnant woman and the growing earth. From the point of view of the 
present hypothesis, the parallelism is quite logically attributable to the male creator’s desire 
to achieve something like female procreativity. !us the substance produced from his body, 
his baby so to speak, must gradually increase in size, just as the process of female creativ-
ity entails a gradually increasing expansion. (Here again, the observation of the apparently 
magically expanding belly of a pregnant woman is clearly a human universal.) Róheim goes 
on to mention what he considers to be a parallel myth, namely that of “the egg-born earth 
or cloacal creation.” As will be shown later, Róheim is quite correct in drawing attention to 
the egg myth. !en following his discussion of the Eurasian dualistic version in which the 
devil tries to keep a piece of swelling earth in his mouth, Róheim makes the following analy-
sis: “If we substitute the rectum for the mouth the myth makes sense as an awakening dream 
conditioned by excremental pressure” (1951: 429). In other words, Róheim does recognize 
the excremental aspects of earth-diver and in accordance with his theory of the dream ori-
gin of myth, he consid ers the myth as initially a dream caused by the purely organic stimu-
lus of the need to defecate. Róheim also follows Rank (1912, 1922:89) in interpreting del-
uge myths as transformations of vesical dreams (1951:439–65). Certainly, one could make 
a good case for the idea that some folk tales and myths are based upon excremental pres-
sures, perhaps originally occurring during sleep. In European folklore, there are numerous 
examples, as Freud and Oppenheim have amply demonstrated, of folk tales which relate 
how individuals attempt to mark buried treasure only to awake to 'nd they have defecated 
on them selves or on their sleeping partners. It is quite possible that there is a similar basis 
for the Winnebago story reported by Radin (1956:26–27) in which Trickster, a5er eating 
a laxative bulb, begins to defecate endlessly. In order to escape the rising level of excrement, 
Trickster climbs a tree, but he is forced to go higher and higher until he 'nally falls down 
right into the rising tide. An other version of this Trickster adventure is found in Barnouw’s 
account of a Chippewa cycle (1955:82). !e idea of the movement being impossible to 
stop once it has started is also suggested in the previously cited Eurasian account of God’s 
inability to stop the earth’s growth. !at God must eat excrement to stop the movement is 
thematically similar to another Trickster version in which Trickster’s own excrement, ris-
ing with 6ood waters, comes perilously close to his mouth and nose. However, the fact that 
there may be “excremental pressure myths” with or without a dream origin does not mean 
that excre mental pressure is the sole underlying motivation of such a myth as earth-diver. 
To call earth-diver simply a dream-like myth resulting from a call of nature without refer-
ence to the notions of male pregnancy envy and anal birth theory is vastly to oversimplify 
the psychological etiology of the myth. Róheim, by the way, never does reconcile the rather 
phallic interpretation of his basic dream with the excremental awakening dream interpreta-
tion of earth-diver. A multi-causal hypothesis is, of course, perfectly possible, but Róheim’s 
two interpretations seem rather to con6ict. In any event, Róheim sees creation myths as 
prime examples of his dream-myth thesis. He says, “It seems very probable that creation 
myths, wherever they exist, are ultimately based on dreams” (1951:430).
!e idea of anal creation myths spurred by male pregnancy envy is not tied to the 
dream origin of myth theory. !at is not to say that the dream theory is not entirely 
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possible but only to a7rm the independence of the two hypotheses. In order to docu-
ment further the psychological explanation of earth-diver, several other creation myths 
will be very brie6y discussed. As already men tioned, Róheim drew attention to the cosmic 
egg myths. !ere is clinical evi dence suggesting that men who have pregnancy phantasies 
o5en evince a special interest in the activities of hens, particularly with regard to their lay-
ing of eggs (Eisler 1921:260, 285). !e hens appear to defecate the eggs. Freud’s famous 
“Little Hans” in addition to formulating a “lumf ” baby theory also imagined that he laid 
an egg (1949b:227–28). Lombroso (1895:182) mentions a demented pseudo-artist who 
painted himself as excreting eggs which symbo lized worlds. Ferenczi, moreover, speci'-
cally comments upon what he calls the “symbolic identity of the egg with faeces and child.” 
He suggests that excessive fondness for eggs “approximates much more closely to primitive 
coprophilia than does the more abstract love of money” (1950:328). Certainly the egg-
creation myth is common enough throughout the world (Lukas 1894), despite its absence 
in North America. It is noteworthy that there are creations of men from eggs (Motifs T 
542 or A 1222) and creation of the world from a cosmic egg (Motif A 641). As in the case 
of feces (or mud, clay, or dirt), the cloacal creation is capable of producing either men or 
worlds or both.
Another anal creation myth which does occur in aboriginal North America has the spi-
der as creator. !e Spider myth, which is one of Rooth’s eight creation myth types found 
in North America, is reported primarily in Cali fornia and the Southwest. !e spider as 
creator is also found in Asia and Africa. Empirical observation of spiders would quite eas-
ily give rise to the notion of the spider as a self-su7cient creator who appeared to excrete 
his own world, and a beautiful and artistic world at that. Although psychoanalysts have 
generally tended to interpret the spider as a mother symbol (Abraham 1948: 326–32; cf. 
Spider Woman in the Southwest), Freud noted at least one instance in folklore where the 
thread spun by a spider was a symbol for evacuated feces. In a Prussian-Silesian tale, a peas-
ant wishing to return to earth from heaven is turned into a spider by Peter. As a spider, 
the peasant spins a long thread by which he descends, but he is horri'ed to discover as he 
arrives just over his home that he could spin no more. He squeezes and squeezes to make 
the thread longer and then suddenly wakes up from his dream to discover that “something 
very human had happened to him while he slept” (Freud and Oppenheim 1958:45). !e 
spider as the perfect symbol of male artistic creativity is de scribed in a poem by Whitman 
entitled “!e Spider.” In the poem, the spider is compared to the soul of the poet as it 
stands detached and alone in “measure less oceans of space” launching forth 'lament out of 
itself (Wilbur and Muen sterberger 1951:405). Without going into primitive Spider cre-
ation myths in great detail, it should su7ce to note that, as in other types of male myths 
of creation, the creator is able to create without any reference to women. Whether a male 
creator spins material, molds clay, lays an egg, fabricates from mucus or epidermal tissue, or 
dives for fecal mud, the psychological motivation is much the same.
Other cosmogonic depictions of anal birth have been barely touched upon. As Ernest 
Jones has shown in some detail (1951:266–357), some of the other aspects of defecation 
such as the sound (creation by thunder or the spoken word), or the passage of air (cre-
ation by wind or breath), are also of consider able importance in the study of mythology. 
With respect to the latter charac teristic, there is the obvious Vedic example of Pragapati 
who created mankind by means of “downward breathings” from the “back part” cited by 
Jones (1951:279). One account of Pragapati’s creation of the earth relates the passing of 
air with the earth-diver story. “Prajapati 'rst becomes a wind and stirs up the primeval 
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ocean; he sees the earth in the depths of the ocean; he turns himself into a boar and draws 
the earth up” (Dragomanov 1961:28). Another ancient male anal wind myth is found in 
the Babylonian account of Marduk. Marduk conquers Tiamat by the following means: 
“!e evil wind which followed him, he loosed it in her face. . . . He drove in the evil wind 
so that she could not close her lips. !e terrible winds 'lled her belly” (Guirand 1959:51). 
Marduk then pierces Tiamat’s belly and kills her. !e passage of wind by the male Marduk 
leads to the destruction of the female Tiamat. Marduk rips open the rival creator, the belly 
of woman, which had given birth to the world. !ere is also the Biblical instance of the 
divine (af )6atus moving on the face of the waters. Köngäs (1960:169) made a very astute 
intuitive observation when she suggested that there was a basic similarity between the 
spirit of God moving upon the primeval water and the earth-diver myth. !e common 
denominator is the male myth of creation whereby the male creator uses various aspects of 
the only means available, namely the creative power of the anus.
Undoubtedly anthropologists will be sceptical of any presentation in which evidence is 
marshalled á la Frazer and where the only criteria for the evidence appears to be the grist-
worthiness for the mill. Nevertheless, what is important is the possibility of a theory of 
universal symbolism which can be veri'ed by empirical observation in the 'eld in decades 
to come. Kluckhohn, despite a deep-seated mistrust of pan-human symbolism, confesses 
that his own 'eld work as well as that of his collaborators has forced him to the con-
clusion that “Freud and other psychoanalysts have depicted with astonishing correctness 
many central themes in motivational life which are universal. !e styles of expression of 
these themes and much of the manifest content are culturally determined but the under-
lying psychological drama transcends cultural di8er ence” (Wilbur and Muensterberger 
1951:120). Kluckhohn bases his assump tions on the notion of a limited number of human 
“givens,” such as human anatomy and physiology. While it is true that thoughts about the 
“givens” are not “given” in the same sense, it may be that their arising is inevitable. In other 
words, man is not born with the idea of pregnancy envy. It is acquired through experience, 
that is, through the mediation of culture. But if certain experiences are universal, such as 
the observation of female pregnancy, then there may be said to be secondary or derived 
“givens,” using the term in an admittedly idiosyncratic sense. !is is very important for the 
study of myth. It has already been pointed out that from a cultural relativistic perspective, 
the only portion of mythology which can be pro'tably studied is limited to those myths 
which are peculiar to a particular culture or those di8erences in the details of a widely 
di8used myth. Similarly, the literal approach can glean only so much ethnographic data 
from re6ector myths. Without the assumption of symbolism and universals in myth, a vast 
amount of mythology remains of little use to the anthropologist. It should also be noted 
that there is, in theory, no con6ict between accepting the idea of universals and advocat-
ing cultural relativism. It is not an “either/or” proposition. Some myths may be univer-
sal and others not. It is the all-or-nothing approach which appears to be erroneous. !e 
same is true for the polygenesis-di8usion controversy; they also are by no means mutually 
exclusive. In the same way, there is no inconsistency in the statement that myths can either 
re6ect or refract culture. (!e phrase was suggested by A. K. Ramanujan.) Lévi-Strauss 
(1958:51) criticizes psycho analytic interpretations of myth because, as he puts it, if there’s 
an evil grand mother in the myths, “it will be claimed that in such a society grandmothers 
are actually evil and that mythology re6ects the social structure and the social relations; 
but should the actual data be con6icting, it would be readily claimed that the purpose of 
mythology is to provide an outlet for repressed feelings. Whatever the situation may be, 
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a clever dialectic will always 'nd a way to pretend that a meaning has been unravelled.” 
Although Lévi-Strauss may be justi'ed insofar as he is attacking the “Have you stopped 
beating your wife?” antics of some psychoanalysts, there is not necessarily any inconsis-
tency stemming from data showing that in culture A evil grandmothers in fact are also 
found in myth, while in culture B conscious norms of pleasant grand mothers disguise 
unconscious hatred for “evil” grandmothers, a situation which may be expressed in myth. 
In other words, myths can and usually do contain both conscious and unconscious cul-
tural materials. To the extent that conscious and unconscious motivation may vary or be 
contradictory, so like wise can myth di8er from or contradict ethnographic data. !ere is 
no safe monolithic theory of myth except that of judicious eclecticism as championed by 
E. B. Tylor. Mythology must be studied in cultural context in order to determine which 
individual mythological elements re6ect and which refract the culture. But, more than 
this, the cultural relative approach must not preclude the recognition and identi'cation of 
transcultural similarities and potential universals. As Kluckhohn said, “. . . the anthropolo-
gist for two generations has been obsessed with the di8erences between peoples, neglect-
ing the equally real similarities—upon which the ‘universal culture pattern’ as well as the 
psychological uniformities are clearly built (Wilbur and Muensterberger 1951:121).” !e 
theoretical implications for practical 'eld work of seeking psychological uniformities are 
implicit. Ethnographers must remove the traditional blinders and must be willing to col-
lect all pertinent material even if it borders on what is obscene by the ethnographer’s eth-
nocentric standards. !e ideal ethnographer must not be afraid of diving deep and coming 
up with a little dirt; for, as the myth relates, such a particle may prove immensely valuable 
and may expand so as to form an entirely new world for the students of man.
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Postscript
Madness in Method 
Plus a Plea for Projective Inversion in Myth
Myth as a form of folk narrative has long fascinated scholars from a variety of 
academic disciplines including anthropology, classics, literature, philosophy, religion, 
among others. Yet the study of myth by folklorists tends to be virtually ignored by these 
would-be mythologists. Consequently, from a folkloristic perspective, most of these aca-
demic discussions of “myth” have little or nothing to do with myth in the strict and tech-
nical sense of the term. Even in volumes purportedly treating “myth and method” one will 
'nd essays treating folktales and legends, rather than myths. !ere is, of course, nothing 
inherently wrong with analyzing folktales and legends, or short stories or poems for that 
matter, but it is truly dismaying to folklorists to see such analyses wantonly labeled discus-
sions of “myth.”
!e generic distinctions between myth, folktale, and legend have been standard among 
folklorists for at least two centuries, going back to the publications of the brothers Grimm, 
who published separate works on each of these genres.1 For the folklorist, a myth is a sacred 
narrative explaining how the world and mankind came to be in their present form. Myths 
and legends (narratives told as true and set in the postcreation era) are di8erent from folk-
tales, which are narratives understood to be 'ctional, o5en introduced as such by an open-
ing formula such as “Once upon a time.” !ese generic distinctions are independent of 
dramatic personae. !us it is possible to have a myth of the creation of Adam and Eve, but 
once these individuals are created, one can tell legends of these same individuals. Moreover, 
it is also possible to have folktales involving Adam and Eve.2
If we agree that a myth must minimumly involve a narrative, then we can dismiss all the 
references to “myth” as a synonym for error or fallacy. In popular as opposed to academic 
parlance, myth, like the word “folklore,” is frequently used in this sense. !e phrase “!at’s 
just folklore” or “!at’s a myth” means typically that the previously mentioned subject is 
an erroneous belief. Such usage is certainly worth noting, but it has nothing to do with the 
formal de'nition of myth as employed by folklorists.
Members of other academic disciplines may complain about what they perceive to be 
the narrowness and speci'city of the folkloristic concept of myth. !ey claim the right to 
interpret the term “myth” any way they wish, even at the risk of inventing idiosyncratic 
de'nitions of the term. !is is just 'ne as an illustration of free speech or poetic license, 
but such a practice has little to do with scholarship and intellectual rigor. Let me cite one 
or two examples of what I mean.
Little Red Riding Hood is a standard folktale. It is Aarne-!ompson tale-type 333, !e 
Glutton (Red Riding Hood), and it is almost certainly related to Aarne-!ompson tale-
type 123, !e Wolf and the Kids, which is the same tale using exclusively animal characters.3 
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It has been the subject of numerous analyses as it is quite a fascinating tale. In no way can 
the story be considered a sacred explanation of how the world or mankind came to be in 
their present form. Hence it is not a myth. Nor is it told as true. It is a 'ctional story set in 
no particular place and time—“Once upon a time” partly signals the timelessness of the 
plot. As it falls under the rubric of tales of magic (Aarne-!ompson tales 300 to 749), it 
is a particular kind of folktale, namely, a tale of magic, or fairy tale. (Fairy tale, the term 
of choice in English, is a misnomer inasmuch as fairies rarely if ever appear in fairy tales. 
Stories involving fairies—and other supernatural creatures—are usually told as true and 
are consequently legends.) No folklorist would call Little Red Riding Hood a “myth” any 
more than he or she would call Cinderella a myth. (Cinderella is Aarne-!ompson tale-
type 510A, Cinderella.)4
Another all too common mislabeling occurs with respect to the story of Oedipus. 
Classicists, psychoanalysts, and others adamantly insist upon calling the Oedipus story a 
myth. Yet the, story is not a sacred narrative o8ering an explanation of how the world and 
humankind came to be in their present form. It is the standard folktale, namely, Aarne-
!ompson tale-type 931, Oedipus.5
One unfortunate result of the sloppiness of literary critics and anthropologists and oth-
ers in claiming almost any narrative as a “myth” is that folklorists simply cannot trust the 
titles of books and articles allegedly concerned with the subject of myth. For example, if 
one examines Recent Studies in Myths and Literature 1970–1990, one 'nds that more than 
half the entries have nothing whatever to do with myth in the folkloristic sense.6 Most of 
these tend to refer to either themes or patterns, but de'nitely not myths.
In the absence of a proper myth-type index, folklorists usually refer to myths by motif 
number. !e six volume Motif-Index of Folk-Literature, 'rst published in 1932–1936 (sec-
ond revised edition, 1955–58) employs letter pre'xes to indicate motif categories. A motifs 
are mythological motifs, B motifs are animal motifs, C motifs are taboo motifs, and so on. 
!e system is not airtight and there is obviously overlap, as in the case of a myth involving 
an animal that breaks a taboo! Nevertheless, the A section of the Motif-Index does in e8ect 
constitute an inventory of the world’s myths. !us A 710, Creation of the sun, and A 740, 
Creation of the moon, would refer to narratives treating the origins of those celestial bod-
ies. Folklorists expect fellow professionals to use motif designations when appropriate, and 
they deem writings amateurish that fail to do so.
Unlike the tale-type index, wherein all references following a tale-type number 
are assumed to be cognate—that is, historically or genetically related—the references 
grouped under a motif rubric may or may not be cognate. Any myth of the origin of 
death, for example, could in theory be labeled A 1335, Origin of death. Still, one can 
o5en get some sense of the geographic distribution of a particular myth (motif ) from 
the Motif-Index. While on the subject of geographic distribution of myths, let me point 
out that even the most cursory examination of the various A motifs clearly demonstrates 
that no motif is universal. To my knowledge, there is not one single myth that is univer-
sal, “universal” meaning that it is found among every single people on the face of the 
earth, past and present. Indeed, myth scholarship clearly and conclusively proves that 
individual myths have their own particular circumscribed areas of geographical or cul-
tural provenience.
Accordingly, there are Indo-European myths that are not found among native North or 
South American Indians; there are Asian-Amerind myths that are not found in Europe or 
Africa. So it is one thing to say that all peoples may have some myth allegedly explaining 
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how death came into the world, but it is not the same myth. In Africa, for example, the 
most popular origin-of-death myth, according to Abrahamsson’s superb 1951 monograph 
is “!e Message that Failed.”8 !is is motif A 1335.1 Origin of death from falsi'ed mes-
sage. !e gist of this myth is that “God sends the chameleon to mankind with the message 
that they should have eternal life, and the lizard with the message that they must die. !e 
chameleon dawdled on the way, and the lizard arrived 'rst. When she had delivered her 
message, the matter was settled. !e chameleon’s message was no longer valid, and death 
had entered the world.”9
!is is quite di8erent from the standard myth of the origin of death in Oceania. 
According to Anell’s excellent survey, the most common story refers to how “primitive 
man in a bygone age could rejuvenate himself by changing his skin like a snake. In the 
usual version it is an old woman who is rejuvenated in this matter and subsequently reap-
pears before her young children (grandchildren). !ey fail to recognize her in this young 
woman, however, and cry for their mother (grandmother) until she is forced to resume her 
old skin. !is act, alas, leads to death for all mankind.”10 !is is motif A 1335.4 Origin of 
death when early people put on new skins.
Neither the African perverted-message myth nor the Oceanic skin-renewal myths are 
to be found among the large corpus of native North American Indian origin-of-death 
myths.11 !e important theoretical point is that no one origin-of-death myth is found 
among all peoples. Di8erent peoples have di8erent myths!
!e implications of the limited distribution of any of the world’s inventory of myths 
should give pause to all those mythologists who espouse universalist or psychic unity theo-
ries. If there really were panhuman Jungian archetypes, then all peoples should in theory 
have the same myths. !ey do not! So how is it that dozens of literary scholars 'nd credible 
the mystical and nonrational concept of Jungian archetypes? Without empirical evidence 
to support the notion of archetype, it is astounding to folklorists that so many writers on 
myth continue to advocate such an implausible theory.
It would take too long to demonstrate all the logical (not to say psychological) 6aws 
in the Jungian archetype, but let me cite just a few of Jung’s own words on the subject. 
Consider his double talk on the issue of whether archetypes are “inherited.” In a state-
ment made in August 1957, he said, “It is important to bear in mind that my concept 
of the ‘archetypes’ has been frequently misunderstood as denoting inherited patterns of 
thought.” Note his clari'cation: “In reality they belong to the realm of the activities of the 
instincts and in that sense they represent inherited forms of psychic behavior.”12 Actually, 
in his famous essay “!e Psychology of the Child Archetype,” Jung’s view is less garbled. 
Speaking of “impersonal fantasies” “which cannot be reduced to experiences in the indi-
vidual’s past,” Jung maintains that “they correspond to certain collective (and not personal) 
structural elements of the human psyche in general, and like the morphological elements 
of the human body, are inherited.”13
I shall forebear commenting on the blatant ethnocentrism of Jungian myth theory with 
its claim that Jesus Christ is an archetype!14 Keep in mind that archetypes are supposed to be 
pan-human, and as Jung says, “For the archetype, of course, exists a priori.”15 Since archetypes 
are panhuman, and since Jesus Christ is an archetype, then Jesus Christ is presumably part of 
all people’s collective unconscious. What hubris and arrogance in such an assumption!
!e real problem for mythologists comes from the di7culty in applying Jungian the-
ory to myth texts. !e problem stems from the fact that, according to Jung, archetypes are 
unknowable: “Contents of an archetypal character are manifestations of processes in the 
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collective unconscious. Hence they do not refer to anything that is or has been conscious, 
but to something essentially unconscious. In the last analysis, therefore, it is impossible to 
say what they refer to.”16 If the master of archetypes admits that it is impossible to ascertain 
the referents of archetypes, then how can lesser critics presume to do so? Jung continues, 
“If, then, we proceed in accordance with the above principle, there is no longer any ques-
tion whether a myth refers to the sun or the moon, the father or the mother. . . . !e ulti-
mate meaning of this nucleus was never conscious and never will be.”17 I cannot improve 
on this pessimistic statement. What amazes me is how serious scholars could possibly take 
this kind of vague approach as a bona 'de means of studying myth. It is vastly di8erent 
from Freud’s approach to myth, which is utterly opposed to mysticism and a know-noth-
ing attitude. Freud believes that the unconscious content of myth (and other forms of folk-
lore) is knowable, and it is precisely the task of the mythologist to decipher that content.
Most folklorists refuse to consider either Jung or Freud when analyzing myth texts. 
!ey prefer to avoid dealing with the unconscious content of myths; instead they employ 
every means possible to avoid confronting that content. Whether it is moti'ng the texts, or 
mapping a myth’s geographical distribution and guessing at possible paths of di8usion, or 
deconstructing a text into its structural constituents, any method of myth analysis is pref-
erable to coming to grips with the highly human content of myths.
One reason why Freudian theory can be used in myth analysis (whereas Jungian theory 
cannot) is that it is possible to reconcile some Freudian theory with cultural relativism. 
With Jungian pan-human archetypes ( Jung refers as follows to them: “the archetype—
let us never forget this—is a psychic organ present in all of us”)18 there is no place for the 
intervention of culture and cultural di8erences. Archetypes are basically precultural giv-
ens. In contrast to the Freudian notions of symbolism, displacement, condensation, and 
projection, one can add the dimension of culture.
If we assume, for example, that there may be a correlation between patterns of infan-
tile conditioning in a culture with adult-projective systems in that same culture (including 
folklore, 'lm, literature, and the like), then to the extent that infantile conditioning dif-
fers from culture to culture, there could and should be di8erent adult-projective systems. 
And that is precisely what the empirical data suggest. Di8erent cultures have di8erent 
myths; and di8erent cultures have di8erent norms of infantile conditioning (with respect 
to weaning, toilet training, etc.). In any case, a possible correlation between infantile con-
ditioning and adult-projective systems in a given culture is certainly knowable. One can 
examine infantile conditioning and the adult-projective systems in a culture, and either 
there is a demonstrable correlation or there is not. It is not a question of dealing with some-
thing that “was never conscious and never will be.”
I should like to indicate very brie6y the utility of Freudian theory to the analysis of 
myth by distinguishing projection from what I call projective inversion. Simple projection, 
in my view, consists of displacing an individual psychological con'guration directly onto 
another plane or into a di8erent arena. It is roughly analogous to shining a light behind 
shadow puppets (or the 'ngers of a hand) to “project” an image or shadow on a wall or 
screen or other surface. Stellar constellations in the heavens, if perceived as mythologi-
cal gestalt 'gures (o5en involving myths) would be an illustration of simple projection. A 
human drama is projected to the heavens such that heavenly bodies enact or play out the 
problems of human bodies here on earth. (Is it just a coincidence that in Western cosmol-
ogy the earth is situated between the planets Venus [love] and Mars [war]?) Sex and vio-
lence are surely earthly or earthy matters.
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Perhaps a more striking example of projection in myth is found in the World par-
ents myth. !e basic myth is motif A 625 World parents: sky-father and earth-mother 
as parents of the universe. !e sky-father descends upon the earth-mother and begets the 
world. !is is a widespread myth, but it is not universal. Consider motif A 625.1 Heaven-
mother–earth-father. !e World-parents myth would appear to be a celestial projection 
of one of the more common forms of human sexual intercourse, a form that also re6ects 
male dominance: man on top, woman on the bottom. But the more interesting projection 
occurs in motif A 625.2 Raising of the sky. In this widespread myth, a male culture hero (= 
son) pushes the sky-father upward, o8 the earth-mother to make room for mankind. Even 
a non-Freudian ought to be able to see the possible Oedipal implications of that myth.
What I term projective inversion di8ers from straightforward projection inasmuch as 
a reversal or inversion takes place. !e terminology di7culty arises from the fact that it is 
this latter psychological process that Freud and his followers called “projection.” In Freud’s 
terms, the “proposition ‘I hate him’ becomes transformed by projection into another one: ‘He 
hates (persecutes) me,’ which will justify me in hating him.”19 An individual’s view of hate 
or dislike, for example, is supposedly projected outward onto the object of hate or dislike. 
In this way, subject and object exchange places. I think this transformational principle was 
a brilliant insight and further that it has enormous relevance to the study of myth content. 
Otto Rank illustrated it beautifully in his classic !e Myth of the Birth of the Hero.20 Using 
Oedipal theory, Rank argues convincingly that sons want to get rid of their fathers (in order 
to marry their mothers) but as this is a taboo thought, the narrative projection transforms 
this wish into the invariable attempt by the fathers to get rid of their sons.21 Inasmuch as the 
majority of Rank’s narrative illustrations come from folktales (such as Oedipus) or legends 
(such as Romulus and Siegfried), it is clear that the device of projection, or what I prefer 
to call projective inversion, occurs in narrative genres other than myth. Curiously enough, 
Rank fails to interpret the detail of the father’s refusal to give his daughter to any of her suit-
ors in the same way, instead understanding it literally from the father’s perspective (as wish-
ing to retain his daughter for himself ). If Rank were consistent (keep in mind that most of 
the early Freudians did not understand women as well as they understood men), he might 
have realized that the father’s keeping his daughter for himself could have been a projective 
inversion of the daughter’s (Electral) wish to keep her father for herself !22 !e point here is 
that I do think there is a critical distinction between straightforward one-to-one projection, 
as to the heavens, and projective inversion, a distinction that is in many ways analogous to 
the literal-versus-symbolic approaches to myth. Simple projection would be parallel to a lit-
eral approach while projective inversion would be parallel to a symbolic approach.
In a previous study I have sought to utilize projective inversion as a means of explaining 
the puzzling blood-libel legend in which the Jews were said to murder Christian infants 
so as to extract their blood to use in making matzohs. Jews are forbidden to eat blood 
whereas Christians are encouraged to do so, especially via partaking of the Eucharist.23 I 
have argued that Christians have displaced any guilt arising from their cannibalistic eat-
ing of the blood and body of Jesus Christ through a legend involving projective inversion: 
by means of this inversion it is no longer Christians eating the blood-body of a Jew ( Jesus) 
but Jews eating the blood-body of a Christian sacri'cial victim!24 Let me add that with-
out invoking the transformational principle of projective inversion, the blood-libel leg-
end remains an enigmatic, bizarre, and virtually incomprehensible plot in terms of normal 
logic. !ese examples suggest that projective inversion can indeed be applied to the con-
tent of tales and legends. !e question is, Can projective inversion also illuminate myths?
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In the Old Testament there are two distinct creation myths that recount the origin of 
man. In the 'rst chapter of the Book of Genesis, we 'nd what might be termed the simul-
taneous creation of man and woman. Genesis 1:27 reads: “So God created man in his own 
image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them.” Less egali-
tarian is the myth found in the second chapter of Genesis. First in 2:7 we are told “And 
the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the 
breath of life; and man became a living soul.” And then a5er God planted a garden in 
Eden, placed man there, instructed man not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil, and a5er the man, Adam, named all the animals, then and only then did God 
begin a totally separate creation of woman. According to Genesis 2:21 and 22; “And the 
Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept; and he took one of his ribs, 
and closed up the 6esh instead thereof. And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from 
man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man.”
!e 'rst part of the second myth is a version of motif A 1241. Man made from clay 
(earth) while the second part is motif A 1275.1 Creation of 'rst woman from man’s rib. 
!e second myth clearly implies a sequential (as opposed to simultaneous) creation inas-
much as man has to be created prior to woman if his rib is to be used in that creative act. 
Both second-creation myths re6ect a strong undeniable male bias. In the 'rst portion we 
have a typical male creation myth involving the creation of the world or man from feces 
or fecal substitute (clay earth, dust). Men trying to compete with women who are appar-
ently magically able to create new life from their bodies have to resort to cloacal creation in 
order to create new life from their inadequate bodies. In the second portion the very order 
of creation implies social priority man 'rst, woman second! !is male bias is entirely con-
sistent with the notion of a male god as creator, and a male savior 'gure, Noah, who in a 
re-creation myth builds a male womb (ark) that 6oats for approximately nine months. (It is 
noteworthy in this context that Mrs. Noah doesn’t even merit having a name!) in Noahian 
Arkcology, we have an echo or reverberation of the male creation myths of Genesis 1:27, 
and 2:7, 21–22. All this may be persuasive in the light of feminist ideology, but what about 
projective inversion? Can it be applied to these two myths of creation or not?
In the second myth, we see an articulation of the male wish to procreate like females. 
How do females procreate? From their bodies. In biological reality man comes from wom-
an’s body. In the fantasy world of mythical reality, biology is reversed. It is woman who 
comes from man’s body. Moreover, inasmuch as biology dictates that man comes speci'-
cally from the woman’s genital area, the reversal would logically have woman coming from 
man’s genital area. !at is why it is almost certainly the missing bone in man, the os bacu-
lum that is the likely fons et origo of woman. !e penis bone is found among a number of 
animals, a fact no doubt observed by early hunters who slaughtered such animals for food. 
!e 'rst recorders of the biblical narratives would not easily include narratives involving 
a penis bone and so the euphemistic dodge of substituting a rib bone instead was doubt-
less employed.25 !ere are few texts in print from any culture exemplifying motif A 1263.6 
Man created from culture hero’s genitals (but the very existence of the motif at all makes 
this hypothetical interpretation plausible). !e inevitable censorship di7culties involved 
in translating oral tradition into writing or print could account for the dearth of such texts. 
In the Bible, we know that euphemisms were frequently employed. When Abraham asks 
his eldest servant to swear an oath, he instructs that servant “Put, I pray thee, thy hand 
under my thigh” (Genesis 24:2). If one swears by something holy, then it was very likely 
the male genitals, not the thigh, on which the oath was sworn through placement of the 
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hands. !is is signaled even in contemporary times by the words “testify” and “testimony” 
(from testes) and even the word Testament itself. In any event, it is the principle of projec-
tive inversion that allows us to propose such a hypothetical reading of the second myth of 
the creation of woman.
Returning now to the 'rst myth, we recall “So God created man in his own image,” 
which would strongly suggest a very anthropomorphic deity fully equipped with ears, 
eyes, nose, mouth, and so on. If man were created in God’s image, then one could logi-
cally assume that God must look very much like man does. However, armed with the prin-
ciple of projective inversion, we can understand that it was not God who created man in 
his image, but rather man who created God in his image! So just as a patriarchal society 
demanded that normal biology be contravened through myth—by creating a male myth 
whereby woman was said to come from man’s body, so the male invention of a male deity 
(to justify and fortify a male-oriented society) can be denied or concealed by constructing 
a male myth whereby it is a male deity who creates males in his image. Myth once created 
and accepted as dogma or truth is not easily overturned.
!e long-term e8ects of these two instances of male-inspired projective inversions in 
the form of two separate creation myths in Genesis are indisputable. !ey constitute in 
large measure the “sociological charters for belief ” (in Malinowski’s words) in a male-dom-
inated society.26 !e belief in such a society is bolstered by the assumed existence of a male 
deity as well as a myth which claims that woman was created secondarily, almost as an 
a5erthought. When fantasy is elevated to the level of myth, it becomes a force to be reck-
oned with. !us the principle of projective inversion can add a new dimension to the bur-
geoning feminist literature on myth. !e power and deleterious impact of these two myths 
in Genesis continue unabated, and it is hard to gauge just how long it will take to undo the 
social damage and mental anguish of Western women caused directly or indirectly by these 
two fundamental myths in Genesis.
Notes
1.  For a useful delineation of these three genres, see William Bascom, “!e Forms of Folklore,” 
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tale in particular, see Geddes, Various Children of Eve.
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5.  Edmunds and Dundes, Oedipus: A Folklore Casebook.
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For representative discussions of “projection,” see Bellak,“On the Problems of the Concept of 
Projection,” in Abt and Bellak, Projective Psychology, 7–32; and Lindzey, Projective Techniques 
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22.  Ibid., 80. For an Electral interpretation, see Dundes, “To Love My Father All: A Psychoanalytical 
Study of the Folktale Source of King Lear,” in Dundes, Interpreting Folklore, 211–22.
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Theses on Feces: 
Scatological Analysis
(A) !e Folklore of Wishing Wells
(B) Here I Sit: A Study of American Latrinalia
(C) !e Kushmaker
Introduction
I should advise readers that the present rubric of “!eses on Feces,” along with the pre-
vious headings of “Grouping Lore” and “Medical Speech and Professional Identity,” are 
mine. !ey thematize sets of exemplary essays that Dundes wrote. In the present case, my 
title denotes his frequent references to scatological themes in folklore. !e signi'cance of 
this feculent topic is more than the taboo or censorship commonly surrounding its frank, 
if disquieting discussion. As a central image rendered in folk speech, humor, and ritual, it 
has raised, precisely because it is socially and psychologically unsettling, crucial cultural 
questions about symbolic and functional ties to human development, religion, sexuality, 
gender, and cognition. In his work on folkloristic uses of fecal symbolism and traditions, 
Dundes o5en cited a cross-cultural classic by John G. Bourke, entitled Scatologic Rites of All 
Nations (1891). It was bold for its open treatment of the begrimed subject, although its sci-
enti'c subtitle downplayed its sensational contents: A Dissertation upon the Employment 
of Excrementitious Remedial Agents in Religion, !erapeutics, Divination, Witchcra5, 
Love-Philters, etc., in all Parts of the Globe. Dundes was also drawn to Freud’s foreword 
to Bourke’s volume (1913), in which Freud summarized the importance of feces in human 
development. He described an infantile state of interest in bodily secretions and the plea-
sure derived from excretion. He observed that not only are children proud of their defe-
cations, but they also “make use of them in asserting themselves against adults.” Dundes 
used Freud’s thesis—that children view feces as symbolic, assertive “gi5s” to adults. He 
expanded on Freud’s signi'cation of feces in human thought and folk expression in rela-
tion to male appropriation of procreation (“womb envy”), symbolic functions of de'le-
ment and toilet training, and the anal-erotic cultural personality (see book-length analyses 
in Dundes 1984a, 1997d, and 2002c).
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As children grow, Freud theorized, their fascinations with feces are repressed. !e child, 
according to Freud, “learns to keep them secret, to be ashamed of them and to feel disgust 
at their objects.” Referring to the use of projective systems to deal with this repression, 
Freud proposed that “the interest which has hitherto been attached to excrement is car-
ried over on to other objects—for instance, from faeces to money, which is, of course, late 
in acquiring signi'cance for children. Important constituents in the formation of charac-
ter are developed, or strengthened, from the repression of coprophilic inclinations.” Freud 
made a connection between excremental and sexual instincts in children, a link which 
is later “divorced” and “remains incomplete.” Another scatological/sexual tie that Freud 
postulated is the existence of an anal erogenous zone, which is associated with the infan-
tile stage, and remains with a person, but is repressed later in life. In Freudian theory, this 
repression of a created anxiety is sublimated through symbols that are embedded in fanta-
sies, such as folklore. Dundes avowed more than Freud the sublimatory function of scato-
logical imagery in folklore.
Freud commented on folklore not only as material, but as a “method of research” and 
found in Bourke’s tome that folklore study, although di8erent from psychoanalysis, “has 
reached the same results as psychoanalysis.” Freud declared that folklore “demonstrates 
the persistent and indeed ineradicable nature of coprophilic interests, by displaying to 
our astonished gaze the multiplicity of applications—in magical ritual, in tribal custom, 
in observances of religious cults and in the art of healing—by which the old esteem for 
human excretions has found new expression.” For Dundes, the symbolic equivalences of 
money, mud, and the color brown to feces, and of smearing and dropping to excretion—
all apparent in folklore—opened up interpretative possibilities. (See his use of the mud/
feces equation in the last chapter on the earth diver myth.) !ese projections were, he pro-
claimed, “keys” to solving “puzzles” of meaning in the content of folklore. He recognized 
that not all readers would agree, especially early on in his career, but as he found repeated 
examples of fecal symbolism in rituals, beliefs, and narrative, he became more assertive.
An example is “!e Folklore of Wishing Wells” (1962f ), one of Dundes’s 'rst publica-
tions. It appeared, not in a folkloristic journal, but in the psychoanalytic outlet of American 
Imago, which was friendlier to his interpretative stance. Unlike Bourke, whom he cited as 
being preoccupied with exotic “primitive” examples, Dundes examined the ritual of drop-
ping pennies in wishing wells, one of the most prevalent modern folk practices. It had 
primarily been interpreted literally, as giving money in exchange for a wish, but Dundes 
asked, as he o5en did, why the o8ering should take the forms it does. Having established a 
symbolic equivalence of money to feces, he linked “dropping in water” to developmental 
concerns for maternal attention. A key detail, to borrow Dundes’s rhetoric, is the tradition 
of children throwing the coin in the well. Navy lore, in contrast, has the 'ctional story of a 
fecal “kush” being thrown overboard by an adult. !at developmental shi5 led Dundes to 
interpret telling stories of the “kush” as a subversive act, in de'ance of strict military (pater-
nal) discipline (1980c). As a former Navy man, Dundes related this to the formal context 
of the ship, and the role of folklore as a social outlet. (See his recollection of joketelling 
during his tour of duty in Cracking Jokes [1987c]).
“Here I Sit” also dealt with one of his experiences—going to bathrooms in Berkeley, 
where his folkloristic antennae picked up an abundance of written lore. He noted that they 
were much more common in facilities for men, rather than women, raising gender ques-
tions about the praxis of writing verses and sayings he called “latrinalia,” to distinguish it 
from the more general term “gra7ti” for any wall markings. !e key, in this essay, is the 
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behavioral correlation of latrinalia to fecal “smearing,” within the context of male bath-
room inscriptions (1966b). In a rejoinder (Dundes 1963) to an article by Parker (1963), 
Dundes presaged this interpretation by commenting on that critic’s “facetious parentheti-
cal admission that he has repressed desires to play with faeces” (note the rhetorical equiva-
lence of play, facetious, and faeces). “!is could well explain,” Dundes quipped, “his plea-
sure in mudslinging, which for a member of Western culture, at any rate, is very probably 
a derivative of a general infantile impulse to smear” (Dundes 1963).
Ever since Dundes’s latrinalia essay was originally published, it has been cited as a 
benchmark interpretation of bathroom gra7ti. See Gonos, Mulkern, and Poushinsky 
1976; Stocker et al. 1972; Birney 1973; and Longenecker 1977. While the above citations 
are mostly of men’s facilities, for an exemplary look at a woman’s bathroom as “commu-
nity,” see Gordon 2003. For other interpretative essays on folklore using Dundes’s scato-




!e Folklore of Wishing Wells
Although there have been several noteworthy attempts to apply psy-
choanalytic theory to myth, there are other areas of folklore which have thus far not been 
much studied psychoanalytically. One of these areas is that of superstition. !is is some-
what surprising in view of the fact that Freud himself suggested the possible origins of 
such superstitions as bad luck ensuing from the groom’s forgetting the ring (i.e., the groom 
does not really want to marry) or bad luck augured by one’s stumbling across a threshold.1 
However, aside from studies such as Ernest Jones’ “!e Symbolic Signi'cance of Salt in 
Folklore and Superstition,” there are comparatively few extended analyses of superstitious 
beliefs and customs.
One superstition which appears to lend itself to psychoanalytical treatment is the one 
involving wishing wells. According to the modern version of this belief, a person is assured 
of good luck if he drops a small coin, usually a penny, into a well.2 An English 'lm (1945) 
entitled: “Wishing Well Inn” was based upon this popular practice and the 'lm and song 
“!ree Coins in a Fountain” are familiar to most Americans. Actually the custom is of 
considerable antiquity, dating back at least to Roman times.3 In many instances, objects 
other than coins were deposited. !ese objects included stones, pebbles, shells, broken 
plaster, glass beads, buttons, needles, pins, and nails.4 Nevertheless, in spite of the variety 
of objects, the idea of making an o8ering to obtain good luck was apparently the same. 
O5en the good luck desired was in the nature of a cure of a disease. !e wishing well cus-
tom is widespread in continental Europe5 and in the British Isles.6 Curiously enough, it is 
even reported among North American Indians and for example, the basin of an Arapaho 
spring is supposed to have contained beads and wampum.7 Whether the Indian instances 
are attributable to acculturated di8usion or to polygenesis is di7cult to determine. In any 
event, it su7ces for present purposes to say that the practice of throwing a penny into a 
well in order to ensure good luck or to make a wish is well established in American and 
European folklore.
!e question is now raised, why do people part with something of value, albeit only a 
penny, in the hope of being granted a wish? !ere are superstitions whereby one may make 
a wish without making an o8ering, e.g. a5er seeing a shooting star or passing a loaded hay 
wagon. But in the case of the wishing well custom, the o8ering must be made in order for 
the wish to come true. Many persons, otherwise extremely economical will forsake reality 
by discarding perfectly good money. Some of these persons are not particularly supersti-
tious; it is almost as if there were some form of pleasure involved in the simple act of throw-
ing a penny into a well. Despite the supposed present-day scienti'c mindedness, the fact 
that some charity fund raisers have constructed wishing wells in order to collect contribu-
tions attests to the extraordinary appeal of the custom. Perhaps the etiology of this custom 
can be revealed through psychological analysis.
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!ere have been a number of attempts to explain the custom. !e eminent English 
folklorist Edwin Sidney Hartland noted that the custom has interested students of folk-
lore ever since folklore came to be studied.8 However, statements like that made by Robert 
Charles Hope in which he says that wishing wells are a curious survival and that their ori-
gin must be looked for in remote antiquity are of little value since historical origins are 
by no means necessarily identical with ultimate origins.9 As a matter of fact, most folklor-
ists have tended to explain the custom on the basis of animism. According to this view, 
there was early the belief that each well had a guardian spirit. Mackinlay, who held this 
view, claimed that “From a belief in guardian spirits to a belief in the necessity of o8er-
ing gi5s to them is an easy transition.”10 !ese gi5s or o8erings were thus an expression of 
good will and an obvious attempt to propitiate the spirit of the well. Lewis Spence con-
sidered that the ancient practice of throwing coins into wells “must be interpreted as an 
act of placation or sacri'ce to the spirit residing in the well.”11 Apparently although the 
guardian spirit is to be feared, this fearful spirit will accord good luck or the granting of a 
wish to the ritual participant. With regard to those wells renowned for curative powers, 
a di7culty arises which was noted by Hartland. On the one hand, there are articles le5 as 
o8erings to the presiding spirit and on the other hand, these articles contain the disease 
of which the participant desires to be rid. Hartland comments that these two explanations 
appear to be mutually exclusive.12 It seems unlikely that so undesirable an object would be 
well received as a propitiatory o8ering by an intelligent spirit. !e weakness in all previous 
explanations is that the origin is not ultimate (Hartland suggested that the custom was an 
act of ceremonial union with the spirit but he gave no motive for such an act) and that the 
speci'c use of money is not made especially relevant. An explanation seeking the ultimate 
origin of the custom would have to explain the presence of the spirit and also the reason 
for the pecuniary o8ering. !ere may indeed be an “easy transition” from a belief in spirits 
to the necessity of o8ering gi5s to these spirits as Mackinlay contended but the transition 
remains to be seen.
Essentially there are two material objects involved in the action of an individual engag-
ing in the custom: the well and the o8ering, which is usually a penny. Part of the key to the 
puzzle is provided by the very materials of folklore. !e well is a frequent womb or mater-
nal symbol. To employ the bowdlerized language of folklorists, there is a motif13 T 589.6.4, 
“Children laid to come from a well.” !ere are su7cient examples of Kinderbrunnen14 
in European folklore to discourage the common criticism leveled against psychoanalytic 
interpretations, namely of cleverly selecting and stacking evidence. Interestingly enough, 
one well in Lancashire is described as having been constructed in the form of a horseshoe.15 
!e signi'cance of the horseshoe as a female genital symbol is discussed in Jones’ impor-
tant essay on folklore.16 If the well does represent the womb, it requires no great imagina-
tion to identify the guardian spirit of the well as the mother. However, there is still the 
question of the nature of the o8ering.
!ere is general agreement that money is a symbolic equivalent of faeces.17 Although 
one might disagree with Ferenczi when he claims that folklore con'rms the “phylogenetic 
origin of symbols”18—a cultural relativist would settle for repeated ontogenetic symbol-
ism encouraged by consistent transmission of traditional symbols contained in each gen-
eration’s cultural legacy—his account of the ontogenesis of the symbolism of money is 
both clear and convincing. !ere is additional contemporary evidence of this symbol-
ism. A modern slang expression popular among federal employees including servicemen 
emphasizes the symbolic equation. !e employees refer to the activity of payday as “the 
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eagle shits.” One is also tempted to conjecture that the passion of some children (and 
adults) for the parlor game Monopoly and similar games springs from the same source. In 
any event, there is some reason for assuming that the penny is odorless, dehydrated fecal 
material. It is also noteworthy that Ferenczi’s progression from faeces proper to money 
passes through intermediate stages of stones, pebbles, glass marbles, buttons, and so on. 
!is variety of objects is strikingly similar to the various o8erings deposited in wells. 
Assuming the symbolic validity of the two material objects involved in the wishing well 
custom, that is, the well and the o8ering, one can from the latent level elucidate the mani-
fest content of the superstition.
!e Freudian reconstruction of infantile life includes a consideration of toilet-train-
ing. It has been noted that the child is encouraged by the parents, usually the mother, to 
part with the precious excrement. As Reik said, “we owe to Freud the discovery that the 
child regards faeces as a present, a mark of a8ection to be o8ered to a beloved person.”19 
!e pleasure in defecation is depreciated or denied and the child is persuaded to yield his 
“savings”20 or treasure to his mother either for promised rewards or under threats of pun-
ishment. !e pattern of making a fecal o8ering in return for either the good will of the 
mother or .the avoidance of punishment is thus established quite de'nitely in the lives 
of most children in Western civilization. If the child-parent relationship is the prototype 
of man’s relation to deity, then one would expect to 'nd the gi5 of faeces to the parent 
re6ected in the adult’s o8ering to deity. Actually, Bourke reported a number of instances in 
which a devotee defecated on the altar of a deity. For example, the Assyrian Venus suppos-
edly had o8erings of dung placed upon her altars.21 !e fact that fecal material is originally 
conceived as being an e7cacious means of ensuring the attention and love of the mother, 
makes it reasonable that human ordure would be an important ingredient in love phil-
ters. As a matter of record, excrement has historically been used in the preparation of such 
philters.22 If this same infantile pattern does underlie the wishing well superstition, then 
it is understandable that some well spirits are regarded ambivalently. On the one hand the 
spirit of the well must be given the penny in order for the participant to avoid the spirit’s 
punishment and on the other hand, the spirit of the well may reward the individual who 
is willing to sacri'ce something valuable. Hartland’s point is also clari'ed in that it is now 
comprehensible how something disagreeable, to be gotten rid of, could still be a proper 
type of o8ering. Incidentally, one reason why the superstition has continued to 6ourish in 
modern times may be the ever-increasing number of standard plumbing 'xtures. In most 
American homes, for example, the child is taught to put his treasure in a half-'lled “white 
well.” !e etiology does not, however, depend upon comparatively recent innovations in 
household plumbing facilities. !e custom de'nitely antedates 6ush toilets.
!e psychoanalytic perspective would appear to illuminate some of the details of the 
wishing well practice and related practices. For instance, it is signi'cant that in several cases, 
it is stipulated that the coin o8ering must be dropped by a child.23 In a curious Shropshire 
wishing well custom, the votary must throw a handful of water at a particular stone in the 
back of the well. If all the water lands upon the stone without touching any other spot, 
the votary’s wish will be ful'lled.24 !is action may represent the parental reward for the 
exact control of the excretory process, in this case, urination. Another interesting detail is 
the frequent occurrence of rag-bushes with wishing wells. !e rags were presumably part 
of the clothing of the votary. It is possible, although by no means demonstrable, that the 
rag-bushes stem from the same source as the coin o8ering. When a very young child pro-
duces his gi5 for his mother, more o5en than not, the mother accepts the o8ering with a 
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soiled garment. !us, in this light, it is reasonable that a more complete propitiatory ritual 
would include both a fecal and cloth o8ering. !e fact that in later childhood only the for-
mer o8ering is welcomed (provided it is properly placed) whereas the latter is not, might 
account for the comparative rarity of the rag-bushes. !e reason why the faeces under-
goes symbolic transformation while the cloth does not might be the societal prohibitions 
against anything. relating to excrement.
While it is doubtful that many folklorists will accept the above etiological hypothesis, 
perhaps some psychoanalysts may. In any case, regardless of the validity of this particular 
study, it is to be hoped that both folklorists and psychoanalysts will devote some of their 
professional energies towards revealing the rationales underlying one of humanity’s most 
fascinating mental products, superstitions.
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B
Here I Sit: A Study of American Latrinalia
Any American male who has ever had an occasion to enter a public bath-
room such as one found in a railroad or bus terminal has surely observed at one time or 
another one of the many traditional inscriptions found on the walls of the facilities.1 In 
some quarters, e.g. in the rest rooms of some bars and cafés, one 'nds the custom has been 
institutionalized in that a small slate and an accompanying piece of chalk are hanging on 
the wall. !is allows individuals to write freely and at the same time it saves the establish-
ment the expense of continually repainting walls.
Despite the widespread distribution of these inscriptions and despite the fact that many 
of them are demonstrably traditional, one looks in vain for extended collections of pub-
lished texts and for any rational discussion of them or the practice of writing them. Most 
histories of the water closet (e.g. Pudney, Reynolds, Wright) do little more than recognize 
that such traditions exist. Typical is the remark made by poet John Pudney, author of !e 
Smallest Room, who bothers to say (1954:130), “I must here resist the temptation urged on 
me by several men of letters to quote more freely from this poetry of the smallest room.” 
Certainly there can be no doubt as to the antiquity of the genre. In the chapter devoted to 
latrines of John G. Bourke’s classic Scatalogic Rites of All Nations, one 'nds references to 
the obscene poetry written in Roman latrines (1891:136). What little evidence is available 
in print does attest to the age and international spread of this popular form of written folk-
lore. Gershon Legman, an authority on erotic folklore bibliography, mentions (1964:254, 
451) !e Merry-!ought or !e Glass-Window and Bog-House Miscellany of 1731 with 
the only known complete copy at Oxford. In the important journal of obscene folklore, 
Anthropophyteia, one 'nds a handful of brief collectanea, e.g. one entitled “Skatologische 
Inschri5en” or ones by Fischer and von Waldheim, which indicates the presence of the 
form in modern Europe. A fair sampling of Mexican examples appeared in a chapter 
“Gra'tos en Los Comunes” in Jiménez’ best-selling Picardia Mexicana. !e classic study 
of the form in America was made by Allen Walker Read who privately published it in 
1935 under the euphemistic title, Lexical Evidence 'om Folk Epigraphy in Western North 
America: AGlossarial Study of the Low Element in the English Vocabulary. !e title page of 
this eighty-three page monograph announced that the circulation was restricted to stu-
dents of linguistics, folklore, abnormal psychology, and allied branches of the social sci-
ences. Professor Read’s term “folk epigraphy” raises the question of what to call bathroom 
wall writings.
!e term gra7ti is too broad in that it includes all kinds of inscriptions and marks 
placed on walls. Moreover, the walls may be any walls, not just bathroom walls. Professor 
Read included in his compilation everything he saw on walls during an extensive 
sight-seeing trip made in the western United States and Canada in the summer of 1928. 
Much of his material is traditional in form only, but not content. !e various homosexual 
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rendezvous requests with listings of dimensions and telephone numbers are clearly the tra-
ditional in form and are surely worth studying as indicators of one of the obvious func-
tions of men’s rooms in a culture which forbids homosexual activities. However, the spe-
ci'c content of these assignation attempts is o5en idiosyncratic. !e folklorist is primar-
ily interested in those mural inscriptions which are traditional in both form and content. 
!us while he or she may record the hapax logomena or one-time occurrences, he or she is 
more concerned with those which have multiple-existence, that is, those which are found 
with almost exactly the same form and wording in many di8erent places. Obviously, a 
one-time occurrence may become traditional in time, but the vast majority of the nontra-
ditional gra7ti are much too localized to di8use easily. For the traditional inscriptions, I 
propose the term latrinalia. !is is preferable, I think, to the closest thing to a folk term, 
“shithouse poetry” inasmuch as not all latrinalia is in verse or poetic form.
Before examining the nature of latrinalia in America and discussing its signi'cance, I 
should like to comment brie6y on the failure of American social scientists to study this 
kind of material. It is curious that it is perfectly permissible to investigate the gra7ti of 
the past, say the gra7ti of classical cultures, but it is not equally acceptable, academi-
cally speaking, to study the gra7ti of our own culture. !e rationale is apparently that it 
is safe to study the “once removed” whether once removed in space or time, but not so 
safe to study what is all too readily available in one’s immediate environment. Perhaps 
one of the reasons why individuals are attracted to the discipline of anthropology is that 
the “once removed” framework is provided. Archaeologists, practicing “dirt archaeol-
ogy,” are free to dig into the bowels of the earth searching for buried treasures among the 
remains of what men of the past produced. In this connection, archaeologists have even 
begun to indulge in the analysis of coprolites. Physical anthropologists are free to exam-
ine every part of the human body in great detail. Ethnographers can perfectly properly 
go into the “'eld” and voyeuristically observe exotic customs, the analogues of which 
they might be embarrassed to watch at home in their own culture. (One is reminded of 
the folk de'nition of anthropology: the study of man . . . embracing woman!) Even the 
unusually great concern with the 'ner points of kinship may re6ect an abiding and fun-
damental curiosity about basic family relationships. !at ethnographies re6ect the cul-
ture of the ethnographers as much as the people described cannot be doubted. Germane 
to the present study is the lack of data in standard ethnographies on defecation and 
urination. When, where, and how are these acts performed? When and how precisely 
is toilet training for infants introduced? One can read an entire ethnography without 
ever coming upon any reference to these daily necessities. !e study of humainty must 
include all aspects of human activity. 
Since ethnography, like charity, should begin at home (how can we possibly perceive 
the bias of our accounts without fully understanding our own culture?), the study of latri-
nalia is clearly a legitimate area of inquiry. One must not forget that it is humans who 
write on bathroom walls and humans who read these writings. As one writer has put it 
(Reynolds 1943:171–172), “Stereotyped and crude, our lavatory inscriptions are the mea-
sure of our social 'xations; and that enterprising anthropologist who is said to be collect-
ing photographs of them in all parts of the world should reveal more of the truth than all of 
the bombastic historians who will so soon be clothing our grotesque society with digni'ed 
phrases and political stercorations, representing its present antics as studied movements, to 
be explained in terms of high principles and rational conduct.” So then let us proceed with 
our essay in hard core ethnography!
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In American culture, anything which leaves the body from one of its various apertures 
is by de'nition dirty. !e transition is immediate. Saliva is not de'ling until it leaves the 
mouth. Similarly, nasal, ear, or eye secretions (with the possible exception of tears) are 
not o8ensive until they are removed from the body. !e emitted materials are frequently 
as disgusting to the emitter as to others. Few Americans would be able to drink a glass of 
water into which they or someone else had just expectorated or even drooled. It is true 
that French or soul kissing allows for swapping spits, but in this case, the saliva is encoun-
tered while still inside the mouth and it is presumably not deemed dirty. A more mundane 
example would be the removal of partly masticated food from the mouth. Since by de'ni-
tion anything which emerges from the body is dirty and disgusting, an unchewed morsel 
may presents a social problem. Does one grasp it with the 'ngers or with an eating utensil? 
Is there any sense of embarrassment at removing the morsel in front of others and realiz-
ing the removal is being observed? How does one dispose of the chewed bit of gristle? Is it 
placed surreptitiously on one’s plate and perhaps concealed with a convenient lettuce leaf ? 
Of course, there is nothing inherently dirty. Humans, not nature, make dirt and one can 
say that dirt, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the beholder. !e concept of dirt is part of cul-
ture and as such it falls into the province of the cultural anthropologist.
One of the few places where dirt may be displayed and discussed in American culture 
is the bathroom, private and public. Bathrooms, generally speaking, are status symbols and 
not infrequently houses are measured in part by the number of bathrooms they possess. It 
is in the home bathroom that the boy is taught to deposit his feces and urine. Here is one 
place where he is allowed to manipulate his genitals and expose them to view, either his 
own view or the view of others. Not only are the genitals and buttocks exposed, but the 
products of micturition and defecation may also be observed. Later, in public rest rooms, 
the child soon learns that he must make public what has hitherto been private. He must 
urinate alongside strangers and in the course of so doing, he may observe the organs of oth-
ers in the act just as these other individuals may observe him.
Despite the overt behavior, the culturally prescribed pretense that such activities do 
not exist, as manifested in the taboo against referring directly to them, continues. !e 
large number of euphemisms attest to that. !e private family idioms of the home, e.g. to 
go potty, to do number one (urination) or number two (defecation), to wee wee, to make 
a poo, etc., cannot be used in the public context. Children in school are taught to “excuse” 
themselves. (Note that to “excuse oneself ” may carry the sense of apologizing!) !e ironic 
part is that the child must go through the public confessional act of raising his hand to tell 
the teacher and all of his peers that he wishes to answer a “call of nature.” !e child soon 
learns the gamut of farfetched euphemisms ranging from “washing” or “freshening” up 
to “seeing a man about a dog,” going to “shake hands with the head of the family,” or try-
ing to do something about the fact that one’s “back teeth are 6oating.” (For an extended 
discussion of such euphemisms, see Pudney 1954:20–37 and Sagarin 1962:69–74.) Note 
that the term lavatory literally refers to cleaning and thus to sinks, not toilets. Yet the 
word lavatory has become almost taboo and is now substituted for by newer euphemisms 
(Reynolds 1943:179). Once in the school bathroom, however, the behavior cannot be 
anything other than to the point. It is in the public school bathroom (termed boys’ and 
girls’ “basement” at my secondary school in Pawling, New York, though the rooms were 
not located in the basement) that important social interactions take place. Boys meet 
there to discuss the problems of the day while girls similarly go there to gossip. It is in 
many ways a place of comparative freedom from the normal restraints imposed by the 
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adult world. !e necessity of some sexual exposure no doubt contributes to the bath-
room’s role as a place of sanctioned license. It is in public bathrooms, particularly men’s 
rooms, that one 'nds latrinalia.
!e variety of latrinalia forms includes: (1) advertisements or solicitations, normally of 
a sexual nature; (2) requests or commands, o5en concerning the mechanics of defecating 
or urinating; (3) directions, which consist of false or facetious instructions; (4) commen-
taries, either by the establishment or by clients; and (5) personal laments or introspec-
tive musings. !ese categories are not hard and fast and they are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive. A sampling of each of the categories should serve to illustrate the nature of 
American latrinalia.
!e majority of advertisements are probably not traditional in that individuals sim-
ply write their own names and telephone numbers. Furthermore, in view of the paucity 
of published materials, it is di7cult to ascertain whether or not a number of items have 
appeared elsewhere. Typical “want ads,” which may or may not be traditional, include:
1. For a good blow job, call 777 2024
 Bill, don’t call, it’s me, Bob.
2. I’m big. 9” long, 3” round, and ready to go.
 (In another hand) How big is your prick?
In view of the nontraditional content of most latrinalia advertisements, I will proceed to 
the more common traditional category of requests or commands. !e following are usu-
ally placed near men’s urinals:
3. Don’t throw cigarette butts in the urinal—
 It makes them soggy and hard to light.
4.  Please do not throw butts in the urinal.
 Do we piss in your ash trays?
!is is strikingly similar in style to the private swimming pool sign which reads:
1. We don’t swim in your toilet
 Please don’t piss in our pool.
!e pool sign re6ects, of course, the fact that Americans do in fact urinate in swimming 
pools (just as American infants urinate in their baths)!
A large number of urinal latrinalia speci'cally ask for care in aiming the stream of urine. 
Typical examples of this “toilet training” tradition include:
5. We aim to please
 you aim too please
6. It is our aim to keep this place clean.
 Your aim will help.
!ese are o5en written by the management. A common request urges men to stand close 
to the urinal to reduce the chances of spillage.
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7. Stand up close. !e next man might have holes in his shoes.
8. Stand close, the next person may be barefooted.
9. Stand up close. !e next fellow may be a Southerner
 And be barefooted. (Camp Maxey, Paris, Texas, 1945)
10. If your hose is short
 And your pump is weak
 You better stand close
 Or you’ll pee on your feet.
11. Old rams with short horns please stand up close. (Fort Lewis, Tacoma, 
Washington, circa 1945; cf. Read 1935:20)
An appropriately localized version from New England is as follows:
12. Puritans with short muskets step up to the 'ring line. (Damiscotta, 
Maine, circa 1950)
Another example of latrinalia which is posted by the management rather than the cus-
tomers is one found in diners’ restrooms:
13. If you shit here, eat here.
 We don’t want just the tail end of your business.
Occasionally, there are blason populaire latrinalia:
14.  Shake well. Texas needs the water.
For the special case when a man urinates into a toilet rather than into a urinal, special 
instructions may be found:
15.  Be like brother
 Not like Sis
 Li5 the seat
 When you take a piss. (New York City, 1924)
16. Be like Dad and not like Sis
 Pull your lid before you piss. (Camp Maxey, Paris, Texas, 1945)
Some commands are concerned with toilet 6ushing.
17. Flush your toilets for Wichita’s sake. (Hutchinson, Kansas, circa 1958; 
cf. Read 935:20)
18. Flush twice: L.A. needs water.
19. Flush hard. It’s a long way to the kitchen.
!is insult to the chef is a reversal of the conception that man is a dirt-making machine 
which transforms food into feces. !is conception is illustrated by a latrinalia verse in 
French which was found in Oxford, England, in 1947: “Ici tombent en ruines les merveilles 
de la cuisine.” In the above text and the following, the “natural” procedure is reversed as 
feces becomes food.
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20. Don’t 6ush the toilet. !e next man might be hungry. (Chicago, 1960)
21.  Please 6ush the toilet. We want the niggers to starve to death. (A Missouri 
café, 1965)
!ere is also some instruction designed to keep the toilet seat clean.
22. Here is the place we all must come
 To do the work that must be done
 Do it quick and do it neat
 But please don’t do it on the seat.
23. Boys we all must use this throne
 Please keep it clean and neat
 Shit down the hole God damn your soul
 And not upon the seat. (Camp Maxey, Paris, Texas, 1945)
!e reference to “throne” recalls the euphemisms in other cultures which speak of going to 
the place where the king goes on foot or alone (Pudney 1954:97). A common American 
fantasy technique designed to minimize one’s awe of a great personage is to imagine that 
individual at stool.
24. For those in a hurry
 With no time to sit
 Please li5 the lid
 For a more direct hit. (Women’s restroom, Berkeley, 1963)
!is may refer also to the practice of many women of not actually sitting on a toilet seat 
but of squatting over it.
One commentary complains about the nature of men’s clothing as opposed to women’s 
clothing with special reference to defecation.
25.  Women women what a blessing
 You can shit without undressing
 But we poor men we sons of bitches
 We must strip or shit in our britches. (Camp Maxey, Paris, Texas, 1945)
!e in6uence of television programs and such contemporary events as demonstrations 
by civil rights groups (e.g. the Congress of Racial Equality) is evident in some commands.
26. Smile, You’re on Candid Camera.
!is is usually written on the inside of the door of the toilet stall.
27. Stay seated. !is is a Core shit-in. (University library, Berkeley campus, 
April, 1964)
Some commands or requests are bitter parodies:
28. Support mental health or I’ll kill you.
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In the “directions” category, one 'nds mostly parodies. In the following text, the accu-
racy of the 'rst line and of the order of the remaining lines was questioned by the infor-
mant. It is, however, an excellent example of a latrinalia verse of the “how-to-do-it-your-
self ” variety.
29. If you want to shit at ease
 Place your elbows on your knees
 Place your hands upon your chin
 Work your asshole out and in. (cf. Read 1935:51, 73)
30. Directions to get to Texas: Go west until you smell shit, that’s Oklahoma. 
!en, go south until you step in it—that’s Texas. (Manchester, New 
Hampshire, circa 1953)
31. In case of atomic attack . . .
 1. Put your hands over your ears
 2. Put your head between your legs
 3. Kiss your ass goodbye. You’ve had it.
32. In case of attack, hide under this urinal.
 Nobody ever hits it. (Great Lakes, Illinois, 1951)
!ere are also false directions which are really a form of what folklorists sometimes call a 
catch. Repeated many times, each time in smaller writing is the line: “If you can read this 
come closer.” !en at the bottom right below a miniscule version appears the line: “You are 
now shitting at a 45° angle.” In similar vein is the sign on the ceiling over the urinal which 
says, “While you’re reading this, you’re peeing on your shoes.”
!e content of the latrinalia commentaries varies. Some are unexpectedly intellectual.
33. “God is dead.” Nietzsche
 “Nietzsche is dead.” God
However, not many commentaries have this kind of sophistication. Few American latrinalia 
verses are as philosophical, for example, as the following latrinalia verse popular in Spain:
 En este lugar cerrado
 donde viene tanta gente
 hace fuerza el más cobarde
 y se cagy el más valiente. (cf. Jiménez 1960:124)
!e majority of American commentaries stay close to home. An “x” marked high over the 
wall of a men ‘s urinal is accompanied by the explanatory line:
34. Anyone who can piss this high ought to be a 'reman.
One wonders if there is any insight here into the psychological rationale underlying the 
motivation to become a 'reman. (Note the slang term “hose” for penis and see text 10 in 
this paper.) One recalls the desire of many small boys to grow up to be 'remen and the 
custom of adolescent boys of urinating on camp'res to extinguish them (cf. Bettelheim 
1962:166–167).
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35. You are holding the future of America in your hands.
Here is a reminder during the act of urination that the same organ is one used for repro-
duction. Note the pseudo-patriotic responsibility to procreate.
One common commentary deals with the very real problem of those last drops of urine 
which all too o5en drip down into one’s pants or down one’s leg.
36. You can wiggle, jiggle, jump or dance
 But the last three drops go down your pants.
37. No matter how you dance and prance
 !e last two drops go down your pants.
38. You can shake and shake as much as you please 
 But there’ll still be a drop for your B.V.D.’s.
An English version has a di8erent rhyme for the same message:
39. However hard you shake your peg
 At least one drop runs down your leg.
!e “shaking” is also found in other latrinalia.
40. You are now shaking your best friend
 And he stood up for you on your wedding night. (Camp Maxey, Paris, 
Texas, 1945)
However, the shaking act can be suspicious if carried on too long. Excessive manipulation 
of the genitals could be construed as masturbatory activity:
41. If you shake it more than three times, you’re cheating. (cf. Read 
1935:68)
!ere are other anti-masturbation verses.
42. Be a man, not a fool
 Pull the chain, not your tool.
43.  !is is a teepee
 For you to peepee
 Not a wigwam
 To beat your tomtom.
Another topic of commentaries is the cleanliness of toilets.
44.  No need to stand on the toilet seat
 For the crabs in this place jump forty feet. (cf. Read 1935: 40, 44)
45. It does no good to line the seat
 !e crabs here jump '5een feet.
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!e last verse reveals the practice of putting sheets of toilet paper on the top of toilet seats 
as a means of avoiding contact with the seat. !is folk custom has recently become formal-
ized by the presence of paper seat cover dispensers.
!ere are occasional political latrinalia. Here are several demeaning presidential candi-
date Barry Goldwater:
46.  When I look down, I see Goldwater.
47. Urine is goldwater; the only bene't is derived from the comfort of its 
removal.
Mathematics, the language of science, has exerted some in6uence:
48. !e heat of the meat is inversely proportional to angle of the dangle.
!e heat of the meat, that is, the state of sexual excitement, is directly proportional to the 
degree of erection. !e greater the erection, the less the “angle of dangle.” !e internal 
rhyme in this last verse shows the poetic quality of latrinalia. (Poetic features are found 
in other obscenity. One thinks of the alliterative folk alternatives for saying “I’ve been 
screwed,” to wit: to be “fucked by the 'ckle 'nger of fate” or to be “dangled by the diddling 
digit of doom.”)
Another latrinalia comment on sexuality occurs in the folkloristic form of a toast:
49. Here’s to the hole that never heals
 !e more you rub it the better it feels
 All the water this side of hell
 Can’t wash away the cod'sh smell. (Camp Maxey, Paris, Texas, 1945)
!e language of advertising can be found too. A borrowing from a Ban deodorant 
advertisement was found in November, 1965, on a prophylactic dispenser in a Sha5er, 
Nevada, restroom:
50. It takes the worry out of being close.
By far the best poetry is to be found in the personal laments or introspective musings 
category. One of the most popular of these is:
51. Here I sit broken hearted
 Tried (Came) to shit and only farted. (cf. Read 1935:50)
!e sadness is actually economic inasmuch as one ordinarily pays to use many public toi-
lets. One must make a small deposit before entering the toilet stall. !e “failure to get one’s 
money’s worth,” an important theme in American culture, is explicit in some versions.
52. Here I sit broken-hearted
 Paid a nickel and only farted.
!is last verse has a traditional response:
53. Don’t cry brother
 You had your chance
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 I didn’t have a nickel
 And shit (in) my pants.
!ere is also a combination of both verses:
54. Here I sit broken hearted
 Tried to shit and only farted.
 But think of the man who took the chance
 Tried to fart and shit his pants.
!ere are other examples of American latrinalia with the introductory opening formula 
“Here I sit.”
55. Here I sit in stinking vapor
 Some sonuvabitch stole the toilet paper.
56. Here I sit in silent bliss
 Listening to the trickling piss
 Now and then a fart is heard
 Calling to the coming turd. (Los Angeles, 1918; cf. Read 1935:51, 81)
57. Here I sit in solemn bliss
 Listening to the dribble of piss
 And now and then a fart is heard
 !en followed by a thundering turd. (Camp Maxey, Paris, Texas, 1945)
!ese last two verses are obviously cognates and are related to the versions from Lake 
Tahoe and Visalia, California, reported by Read (1935:51).
Noteworthy is the sound aspect of the process of elimination. Most people are 
ashamed of anyone’s hearing the sound of their urinating or defecating. Even the sound 
of a toilet 6ush is embarrassing to some. !e whole philosophy of pretending that the 
activity doesn’t exist is of course threatened by the possibility of someone’s hearing the 
unavoidable telltale sound. !e listener, as opposed to the voyeur, is depicted in the fol-
lowing verse:
58. Sam, Sam, the janitor man
 Chief superintendent of the crapping can.
 He washes out the bowls and picks up the towels
 And listens to the roar of other men’s bowels. (cf. Read 1935: 39)
!e sound is also involved in some of the onomatopoeic euphemisms, e.g. “tinkle” mean-
ing to urinate.
Some latrinalia explore the motivations for visiting bathrooms.
59. Some come here to sit and think
 But I come here to shit and stink. (Camp Maxey, Paris, Texas, 1945; cf. 
Read 1935:21, 49, 74)
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60. Some come here to sit and think 
 And some come here to wonder
 But I come here to shit and stink
 And fart away like thunder.
A comparison of the last two reveals how a two-line verse may be expanded into a four-line 
verse. In the following verse, the expansion utilizes a di8erent rhyme scheme:
61. Some people come to sit and think
 Others come to shit and stink.
 But I just come to scratch my balls
 And read the bullshit on the walls.
All these latrinalia texts are representative and they should serve to illustrate the nature 
of this on-going mural tradition. However, these materials raise a number of questions. 
Probably the most intriguing questions about latrinalia are psychological. Why are they 
written at all and why in bathrooms? Why are they so much more common in men’s rest 
rooms than in women’s rest rooms?
!ere has been little theorizing about the psychological functions of latrinalia. Reynolds 
(1943:170) has stated that generations of lavatory wall writers simply write for the plea-
sure of breaking a taboo, presumably the taboo of referring to body elimination activities. 
Allen Walker Read suggests that latrinalia probably results from many di8erent motivations. 
Nevertheless, he notes (1935:17) that, “A principal reason is the well-known human yearning 
to leave a record of one’s presence or one’s existence.” If this is correct, the question remains, 
what is the psychological signi'cance of a yearning to leave a record of one’s presence?
Allen Walker Read has also observed (1935:17) that writing latrinalia was the same 
order of activity as the carving of initials or names on trees. Interestingly enough, psycho-
analyst Ernest Jones tried to explain the latter custom in his famous paper on “Anal-Erotic 
Character Traits.” Jones hypothesizes (1961:432) that it may possibly be a derived and sub-
limated form of what he terms a “primitive smearing impulse,” the desire that infants alleg-
edly have to handle and manipulate their feces, a desire whose ful'llment is invariably for-
bidden by toilet-training conscious parents. People who carve or write their names are leav-
ing a memento of themselves which may injure and spoil something beautiful (1961:432). 
Although Jones makes no mention of latrinalia, I suggest that it may well stem from the 
same impulse to smear feces or dirt on walls. Dirty words are dirt by themselves, indepen-
dent of the dirtiness of their referents. Certainly this theory would explain why the writing 
was placed on bathroom walls in particular. !e fact that much of the content of latrina-
lia does refer to defecation and urination would tend to support the assertion that there is 
some relationship between the acts of writing on walls and playing with feces. Farfetched 
as this may sound to some, it is precisely the explanation given by the folk! In one of the best 
known latrinalia verses, the rationale for writing latrinalia is as follows:
62. !ose who write on shithouse walls
 Roll their shit in little balls
 !ose who read these words of wit
 Eat the little balls of shit.
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Here is an explicit equation of the act of writing on walls with the manipulation of one’s 
own feces. It could not be said any more plainly than “!ose who write on shithouse walls 
roll their shit in little balls!”
From earliest childhood, the American is taught to deny his anus and its activities. !e 
smearing impulse is redirected to suitable substitute activities: working with modeling clay, 
'nger paints, or throwing mud pies (cf. Ferenczi). Using words, dirty words, some individ-
uals 'nally do give vent to the impulse to sully walls. Since “dirt” is supposed to be depos-
ited in the clean white receptacles found in bathrooms, what more 6agrant act of rebellion 
than to place symbolic dirt on the very walls surrounding the receptacles!
While Freudian explanations are not popular in anthropological and folkloristic circles, 
the fact that the folk con'rm the Freudian explanation must be taken into account and 
explained by anti-Freudians. !e independent congruence of analytic and folk or native 
theories does, it seems to me, present a reasonably convincing argument. Noteworthy also 
in this connection is the fact that the second couplet of the above mentioned metafolkloris-
tic text corroborates another psychoanalytic insight into toilet ritual. It has been suggested 
(Abraham 1948:385; Fenichel 1953:374) that the popular practice of reading while at stool 
is essentially an act of incorporation designed to balance the material which is lost through 
defecation. (!e common rationale for such reading is the desire not to waste time. By 
reading in the bathroom, one can save time and make it more productive. Additionally the 
reading also permits and encourages the prolongation of the defecation act.) !us “eating” 
the dirty words compensates for the evacuated fecal dirt. Once again, the folk apparently 
agree with the explanation: “!ose who read these words of wit eat the little balls of shit.”
A more recent localized bit of latrinalia appearing in Berkeley supports the writing-
feces equation:
63. Don’t write on our walls
 We don’t shit in your notebooks.
 !e Regents
 What’s found in our notebooks is shit anyway
 !e Students
 (Main Library, U.C. Berkeley, 1965)
!e equation of defecation and writing is not limited to American culture. Apparently in 
parts of Bulgaria, one who has gone to the “thinking place” is described as “thinking” or “writ-
ing” (Pudney 1954:25). !e writing-defecation equation suggests that the academic motto 
“publish or perish,” an oicotypal example of what might be termed the alternative structure 
proverb (cf. “do or die,” “put up or shut up,” “'sh or cut bait,” etc.), may be “shit or get o8 the 
pot” in symbolic disguise. One might remember that scholars are 'rst supposed to amass 
great quantities of data from which they are expected to “get stu8 out regularly” (Dundes 
1962c). (Cf. the notion of weighing the output on the scales at the end of the year.)
!e suggested anal erotic basis of writing may also explain why men rather than women 
write latrinalia. According to current theory, men the world over su8er from pregnancy 
envy (Bettelheim, Dundes 1962a:1038). In essence, men are envious of women’s ability to 
bear children and they seek to 'nd various substitute grati'cations, e.g. couvade behavior, 
having an intellectual “brainchild,” calling-their pet project their “baby,” etc. Bettelheim has 
assembled,a good deal of convincing anthropological evidence to document the pregnancy 
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envy hypothesis. However, although Bettelheim does cite (1962:128) the instance of the 
Chaga men’s practice of stopping up their rectums as a form of symbolic pregnancy, he does 
not see that males commonly use their anuses to provide substitutes for parturition. Feces, 
like babies, are produced by the body. When a man defecates, he is a creator, a prime mover. 
Women produce feces too, but since they can produce babies from within, there is less need 
for women to emphasize this type of body product. !at women have less need of fecal 
substitute activities is suggested by the fact that few women indulge in sculpture, painting, 
blowing wind instruments, etc. (cf. Jones 1961:435, n. 4). Certainly in American culture, 
it is men who are more concerned than women with creative feces metaphors. It is usually 
men, not women, who are “full of it,” who are “BS artists,” who tell “cock and bull stories.”
In American culture, the emphasis is on productivity and the male must make much 
more than feces. He must make something of himself and he must make a living. !e word 
“make” is itself indicative of the productive component of defecation. An infant may be 
told to make water, make weewee, make B.M., or just plain make (Sagarin 1962:47, 52). As 
an adult in a “man’s world,” he tries to make money or make time. Once he is successful, 
he may be told that he’s got it made. “Time is money,” the proverb says, but both time and 
money are symbolic fecal substitutes (Brown 1959:277; Carvalho Neto 1956:125–148; 
Ferenczi; Dundes 1962a, 1962b; Jones 1961:425–427) as folk speech and other folklore 
so abundantly attests (cf. to be 'lthy rich, to be rolling in it, to have money up the ass, to 
make one’s pile, to have time on one’s hands, to pass time or piddle the time away, etc.). 
Time and money can be saved or hoarded; time and money can be spent or wasted. In 
American ideal culture, saving is valued. !ink of all the money and time saving devices 
enjoyed by Americans. Yet in American real culture, prestige accrues to those who spend 
or waste time and money. If a man wants to make it big or make a splash, he has to produce, 
to put out. He can’t sit tight; he can’t sit on his material. Even God, a masculine 'gure, is 
termed a maker, which is entirely appropriate in view of the anal nature of man’s creation, 
that is, man’s being molded from dust or dirt (Dundes 1962a:1046). (Note also that the 
“fart-thunder” linkage so patent in the latrinalia hints at an infantile origin of thunder 
gods as Róheim [1952:515] almost says.)
!e make metaphor also applies to genital matters. A man is expected to make out, to 
make a woman and to make love. !e couching of genital a8airs in anal terms is paralleled 
by the whole concept of dirty words in American culture. Dirty jokes, for example, are 
largely genital, not anal in content. Yet jokes about sex are called “dirty jokes.” !e word on 
the sign at Berkeley was an obscene word which no false acrostic, “Freedom Under Clark 
Kerr,” could disguise, but it was thought of as a dirty word (cf. the 'lthy speech move-
ment—no pun on movement intended!). One reason why genitality is considered to be 
“dirty” may be guilt by association. !e organs concerned are recognized and identi'ed 
'rst as producers of urine, that is, as producers of dirt. Later it is discovered that the sexual 
act is performed by the same dirt-producing instrument. !is situation has been summed 
up by Yeats in his poem “Crazy Jane Talks With the Bishop” when he wrote: “But Love has 
pitched his mansion in the place of excrement.” Here is dirt by association.
!e desire to make one’s mark or to leave something behind for posterity is also very 
likely involved in the writing of latrinalia. Defecation as a technique to mark a place for 
identi'cation is found not only in folk tales (Freud and Oppenheim 1958:38) but among 
other forms of primate life who apparently demarcate territorial boundaries through uri-
nation and defecation (Harrisson). !e goal is also perhaps to achieve notice and immor-
tality by producing dirt. A 'nal example of latrinalia bears on this:
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64. To the shithouse poet
 In honor of his wit
 May they build far and wide
 Great monuments of shit.
One wonders about the signi'cance of leaving great stone memorials. Many great men 
have taken an active part in designing and building that which was to remain a5er they had 
departed. !ere is the obvious phallic signi'cance of some monuments. !e Washington 
monument is certainly appropriate for the father of our country. But the majority are mas-
sive pieces of stone, o5en in the shape of little rooms or houses. (Writing on these walls 
involves epitaphs rather than latrinalia.) !e psychology of making one’s mark, of leaving 
some memorial behind, may be related to American males’ desire to successfully compete 
with females who can “make” children as their form of immortality.
For those who may be skeptical of the theory that the psychological motivation for writ-
ing latrinalia is related to an infantile desire to play with feces and to artistically smear it 
around, I would ask only that they o8er an alternative theory. For those who doubt that the 
greater interest on the part of males in latrinalia is related to anal creativity stemming from 
pregnancy envy, I would ask the same. It is all too easy to elicit destructive criticism. We know 
that latrinalia exists. What we want to know is why it exists and what function it serves. One 
day when we have more information about the writers of latrinalia (and perhaps psychologi-
cal projective tests administered to such writers) and when we have better cross-cultural data, 
we may be better able to con'rm or revise the present attempt to answer the questions.
Note
1. !is paper was presented at the 1966 meeting of the California Folklore Society at Davis, 
California. I am indebted to many of my students and colleagues for contributing examples of 
latrinalia. Unless otherwise indicated, all materials were collected from men’s rooms in Berkeley 
and the surrounding Bay Area in 1964. I am especially grateful to psychologist Nathan Hurvitz 
who provided all of the items from Paris, Texas. My thanks also to Sam Hinton for his sugges-
tion that the paper be entitled “Ars(e) Poetica.” Explanations of the meaning of most of the 
slang terms appearing in the latrinalia may be found in the works by Read and Sagarin cited in 
the list of references for this paper.
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If folkloristics is ever to become an academic 'eld of inquiry truly respected 
by members of other disciplines, folklorists must do far more than simply collect and clas-
sify data. Yet despite the growing number of folklorists trained at university graduate cen-
ters o8ering advanced degrees including the doctorate in folklore, the vast majority of 
published articles in professional periodicals (and Festschri&en!) continue to consist of 
little more than pure descriptions with occasional forays into classi'cation and typology. 
!e essential question of what a given item of folklore might mean is typically ignored. I 
am convinced that unless or until questions of meaning are addressed by folklorists, they 
will inevitably remain second-class citizens in the world community of scholars. Field col-
lection and the construction of classi'catory schemes may well be necessary means to the 
end of interpreting possible meanings of folklore, but if that end is not achieved, folklor-
ists cannot claim to have progressed much beyond the nineteenth-century antiquarian 
mentality, according to which the primary goal was to record vestigial exotica surviving 
from earlier ages.
!e plight of folkloristics is exempli'ed by the state of current knowledge of the tale of 
the kushmaker, Richard M. Dorson devotes a paragraph in his American Folklore (1959) 
to the tale:
One of the most popular folktales of the last war dealt with the “Kush-Maker.” A 
dra5ee in the Navy states his occupation as a “kush-maker”—or kletch, splooch, 
kaplush, gleek, ka-swish, kloosch, squish; the designation varies in every telling. 
Not wishing to show ignorance, the CD assigned the man to duties in the hold, 
where he remained until the admiral came to inspect the ship. Running down the 
ship’s roster, he spied the kush-maker, and demanded an explanation. !e kush-
maker is summoned forth, and makes elaborate preparations for the display of 
his special skill; in the end a complicated steel sphere is hoisted over the ship’s 
side, or even lowered from an airplane, into the water below, making the sound of 
“kush,” or its equivalent. Curiously, a comparable tale, attached to a blacksmith, 
is credited both to Davy Crockett and Abraham Lincoln.1
Although Dorson gives us a useful synopsis of the tale’s plot, he o8ers no explanation 
whatsoever of the tale’s function or meaning. If it was truly “one of the most popular folk 
tales” of World War II, the obvious question is why? What is the point of the story? What 
is the meaning, if any, of the tale?
Dorson was not the 'rst to report the tale. Agnes Noland Underwood in her 1947 arti-
cle “Folklore from G.I. Joe” ends her essay with a 'ne account of Murgatroyd the Kluge 
Maker.2 No commentary on or analysis of the story is provided by Underwood. Similarly, 
William Hugh Jansen in his brief 1948 note entitled “!e Klesh-Maker” does little more 
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than report texts, although to his credit he did discover an apparent parallel to a tale attrib-
uted to Davy Crockett.3 Supposedly Davy Crockett was in the Tennessee legislature oppos-
ing a bill designed to create a county. Near the end of the debate, he rose to make the fol-
lowing speech:
Mr. Speaker,—Do you know what that man’s bill reminds me of ? Well, I ‘spose 
you don’t, so I’ll tell you. Well, Mr. Speaker, when I 'rst come to this country, 
a blacksmith was a rare thing; but there happened to be one in my neighbour-
hood; he had no striker, and whenever one of the neighbours wanted any work 
done, he had to go over and strike till his work was 'nished. !ese were hard 
times, Mr. Speaker, but we had to do the best we could. It happened that one 
of my neighbours wanted an axe, so he took along with him a piece of iron, and 
went over to the blacksmith’s to strike till his axe was done. !e iron was heated, 
and my neighbour fell to work, and was striking there nearly all day; when the 
blacksmith concluded the iron wouldn’t make an axe, but ‘twould make a 'ne 
mattock; so my neighbour wanting a mattock, concluded he would go over and 
strike till his mattock was done; accordingly, he went over the next day, and 
worked faithfully; but towards night the blacksmith concluded his iron wouldn’t 
make a mattock, but ‘twould make a 'ne ploughshare; so my neighbour wanting 
a ploughshare, agreed that he would go over the next day and strike till that was 
done; accordingly, he again went over, and fell hard to work; but towards night 
the blacksmith concluded his iron wouldn’t make a ploughshare. but ‘twould 
make a 'ne skow; so my neighbour, tired of working, cried, a skow let it be—and 
the blacksmith taking up the red hot iron, threw it into a trough of water near 
him, and as it fell in, it sung out skow. And this, Mr. Speaker, will be the way with 
that man’s bill for a county; he’ll keep you all here doing nothing, and 'nally his 
bill will turn out a skow, now mind if it don’t.4
Whether or not Davy Crockett actually told the story, we do know that the tale goes 
back to at least 1833 and that it illustrates “much ado about nothing.” !e version attrib-
uted to Abraham Lincoln makes use of a di8erent sound-word in the punchline:
I was not more successful than the blacksmith in our town, in my boyhood days, 
when he tried to put to a useful purpose a big piece of wrought-iron that was 
in the shop. He heated it, put it on the anvil, and said: “I’m going to make a 
sledge-hammer out of you.” A5er a while he stopped hammering it, looked at it, 
and remarked: “Guess I’ve drawed you out a little too 'ne for a sledge-hammer; 
reckon I’d better make a clevis of you.” He stuck it in the 're, blew the bellows, 
got up a good heat, then began shaping the iron again on the anvil. Pretty soon 
he stopped, sized it up with his eye, and said: “Guess I’ve drawed you out too 
thin for a clevis; suppose I better make a clevis-bolt of you.” He put it in the 're, 
bore down still harder on the bellows, drew out the iron, and went to work at it 
once more on the anvil. In a few minutes he stopped, took a look, and exclaimed: 
“Well, now I’ve got you down a leetle too thin even to make a clevis-bolt out of 
you.” !en he rammed it in the 're again, threw his whole weight on the bel-
lows, got up a white heat on the iron, jerked it out, carried it in the tongs to the 
water-barrel, held it over the barrel, and cried: “I’ve tried to make a sledge-ham-
mer of you, and failed; I’ve tried to make a clevis of you, and failed; I’ve tried to 
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make a clevis-bolt of you, and failed; now, darn you, I’m going to make a 'zzle of 
you”; and with that he soused it in the water and let it 'zz.5
So we have a twentieth-century tale with possible if not probable nineteenth-century 
analogues. What else has folkloristic research achieved with respect to the kushmaker? In 
1963, Jan Brunvand included the tale in his comprehensive shaggy dog story classi'cation 
scheme published in the Journal of American Folklore. In this scheme, we 'nd:
D500. !e Kush-Maker. A Navy man says he is a specialist. a “Kush-Maker” 
(also Klesh, Gluck, Gleek, Ka-Swish, Kloosch, Squish, Glug, Spleoch, Blook, 
Kaplush, and Ding-Dong.) A great deal of time and many tools and materials are 
used up until he announces that he has made one. A large fantastically-shaped 
box is dropped overboard and it goes “Kush!”6
!anks to Brunvand, the kushmaker can be neatly 'led in folklore archives under D500 
in the Shaggy Dog Story section. But texts, nineteenth-century analogues, and classi'ca-
tory designations are no substitute for content analysis. !at seems obvious enough. Yet 
what I have surveyed for the kushmaker is not unlike what folklorists have achieved with 
respect to the vast majority of folk-tales and legends. If one examines the Aarne-!ompson 
tale type index, for example, one can easily see that relatively few of the tales have double 
asterisked references following the plot summaries. (Double asterisked bibliographical ref-
erences indicate that a substantial monograph or article has been devoted to a particular 
tale7) !is fact con'rms the paucity of analytic studies devoted to the meaning of tales.
Before suggesting a possible interpretation of the kushmaker, let us present a typical 
version of the story rather than relying upon composite or synoptic summaries. !e fol-
lowing text was collected in 1975 from a Chief Petty O7cer in the U. S. Navy, stationed 
in San Diego, California.
Well, sure I’ve heard about a cushmaker. It goes back God knows how many 
years when a new crew of a ship were reporting. One by one they would walk 
up the gangplank, salute the American 6ag, and report to the OOD [O7cer 
of the Deck] for duty. You know, the same way it’s done today. Well, the 'rst 
man walked up the plank, saluted the 6ag, and reported, “Chief Boatswainmate 
Smith reporting for duty, sir.” !e second I think was quartermaster. !is went 
on and on until a man came up, saluted, and reported, “!ird Class cushmaker 
Jones reporting for duty, sir.” Well, the OOD was really surprised and couldn’t 
think what the hell a cushmaker was, but decided not to show his ignorance so 
he passed him on board. Each man then had to report to the Executive O7cer 
with his orders and then be assigned his station. Well, old Jones reported to the 
XO as a cushmaker, and that XO, just like the OOD, thought he just might have 
forgotten what a cushmaker was so he just told him to get to work. So every day 
Jones would go into one of the forward compartments, close the door, and go 
to work. Most of the o7cers eventually knew there was a cushmaker on board, 
but none of them wanted to admit they couldn’t remember what a cushmaker 
was and ask him what he was up to; they all le5 him alone. Well, this went on 
till his two year tour on the ship was about up. Finally the Captain decided that 
he couldn’t stand it any more and sent for Jones. “Well, Jones,” said the Captain, 
“you’re a cush-maker.” “Yes sir,” said ol’ Jones. “You’ve been on board almost two 
years now; so what the hell have you been doing for two years as a cushmaker!!” 
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“Making a cush, sir.” “A cush!! WHAT IS A CUSH!!” “I’ll show you, sir,” said 
Jones and he took o8. In a couple of minutes he came back topside with the 
strange contraption. He said, “Look sir,” and dropped it overboard. It hit the 
water, “CUSH!!!”8
!is version is representative. In other Navy versions, it is the annual inspection of the 
ship by the admiral which provides the occasions for the kushmaker to demonstrate his 
skills. Typically the kushmaker has insisted upon obtaining tons of scrap metal which he 
claims are needed to do the job. !e enormous mass of scrap is deposited on deck and then 
attached to a boom. At the magic moment when all hands are assembled to pay homage 
to the visiting admiral, the signal is given, the boom swung out over the side of the ship, 
and the mass of scrap is let go into the water where it produces the sound “kush” or some 
such sound.
Clearly on one level, the story involves a parody of military life. !e whole military 
chain of command is lampooned. No one is willing to admit that he does not understand 
something and everyone passes the responsibility to his immediate superior. !is “buck-
passing” behavior is common enough in military, government, and other large institutional 
establishments. In addition, the kushmaker plot provides a social commentary on the large 
amount of waste motion found in so many military maneuvers. Anyone who has spent any 
time in the military knows full well how much e8ort and energy is devoted to doing things 
for show, to impress admirals and inspecting o7cers. “Spit and polish” has long been a tra-
ditional part of military life—though not always in time of war! But I believe there is more 
to the story than a comical, literal re6ection of military hierarchy and values. !ere is, a5er 
all, an element of fantasy in the story. Besides the unrealistic acceptance of the kushmaker’s 
statement of his specialty, there is the elaborate playing out of the whole long process of 
making a kush. What then is the signi'cance, if any, of kushmaking?
I suspect that the story is an anal erotic fantasy. Speci'cally, the plot revolves around a 
projection of an infant or small child defecating in front of a parent or parent surrogate. 
!is explanation would provide a reason why a simple act of dropping a useless object 
into water could be part of an attempt to please an authoritarian 'gure such as a captain 
or admiral. An infant is taught to part with a valueless body product, his feces. At the 
same time, the very process of toilet training tends to give value to the feces. !e infant 
soon learns that releasing its feces pleases his parents in some way. So the valueless material 
seems to have great value.
!e words used in the punch lines of the story tend to support this interpretation. !e 
expression to “make a gush” or “kush” is reminiscent of parent-baby talk for the act of def-
ecation. In households where such a term is used, an infant might well be told to “make 
a gush” and he might well receive lavish praise from a parent or authority 'gure for hav-
ing successfully made a gush. Certainly there are numerous onomatopoeic words found 
among the various folk circumlocutions for urinating and defecating. A female term for 
urinating, for example, is to “go tinkle.” In this context, the use of “make” in kushmaker 
may also be relevant. !e verb “make” frequently has a de'nite anal association as in such 
idioms as to “make a B. M.” [bowel movement], “make a poo,” or just plain “make.”9 !e 
initial phoneme /k/ in “kush,” or the phonemic cluster /kl/ in “klesh” or “kluge” is not so 
strange in the light of such Latin terms as cacare and cloaca and their derivatives in related 
languages (cf. “cul,” meaning end or backside). In 1978, a word “kludge” or “kloodge” 
was used to refer to an unlikely conglomeration of items intended to 'x something in 
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an unusual way. Chewing gum, rubber bands, or clothes hangers might be employed as 
a means of temporary repair. !e 'nished product works, but it is called a “kloodge.” In 
computer science, a kludge is a program which is four or 've times as long as it should be. 
!e word thus implies waste products or waste motion. Something useless has been made 
useful (in the case of the repair idiom) or a computer program contains material which 
could have or should have been eliminated! !e word “gush” in English means to issue 
with force, to have a copious 6ow of something—for example, blood or tears. It conveys a 
connotation of emitting suddenly, forcibly, or copiously. !e adjective “gushy” connotes 
something messy.
!e word “cush” in American slang means money. According to the Dictionary of 
American Slang, “cushy” means money easy to obtain.10 !e money-feces equation is well 
established: consider, for example, such American idioms as “'lthy rich,” “to have money 
up the ass,” or the reference to payday in the military as “the day the eagle shits.”11 A cushy 
job supposedly refers to a kind of sinecure where one has comfort and is le5 alone, free 
from cares and responsibilities. (!e kushmaker would appear to have a “cushy” job.12) 
Making money is therefore symbolically equivalent to making feces. In fact, one does 
not literally make money, but rather earns money. !e use of “make” in connection with 
money is therefore a metaphor and hence susceptible to interpretation (cf. the discussion 
of “make” above).
If there is any validity to the hypothesis that making a kush is a symbolic equivalent 
of defecating, what does this add to our understanding of the kushmaker story? First of 
all, there is the initial detail that no one seems to know what a kush is. In American soci-
ety, one 'nds a strong tendency to deny one’s body, and speci'cally to deny one’s need to 
eliminate waste products. A host of euphemisms is employed to refer even to bathrooms. 
Even “bathroom” seems crude in some circles despite the fact that the reference to “bath” 
is already circumlocutory, just as “lavatory” literally refers to cleaning rather than urinat-
ing or defecating. Most of one’s visits to a bathroom or restroom are not concerned with 
either bathing or resting. At parties, one o5en tries to slip o8 unobserved to urinate or def-
ecate. When one returns, one hopes that his absence has not been noticed or at least that 
his reason for being temporarily absent has not been guessed. It may also be of interest that 
some individuals are particularly embarrassed by the sounds made by urinating or defecat-
ing. Such individuals have been known to turn on water faucets in a bathroom sink so as to 
“drown” the sounds made by urination or defecation (or perhaps also to pretend that the 
reason for going to the bathroom was only to “wash” or “freshen up”) !e importance of 
the sound “kush” in the punchline of the kushmaker tale makes sense in this context. In the 
version of the kushmaker presented here, it may be signi'cant that the Executive O7cer 
and other o7cers “might just have forgotten what a cushmaker was.” !is implies that 
they knew once, but have forgotten (or repressed) this information. Adults have all expe-
rienced toilet training, that is, making kush, but they have probably forgotten all about it 
inasmuch as it occurred early in their lives. !e point is really that in American culture one 
does not admit that one urinates and defecates. !us when the new recruit tells the inter-
viewer that he is a kushmaker, the interviewer does not know what to make of this. Even 
if the interviewer did recognize the activity, he presumably would not admit it. It is ulti-
mately only to please the captain or admiral, the highest-ranking 'gures in the local mili-
tary power structure, which forces the kushmaker to make a kush. Normally one can deny 
the activity and others can overlook the activity, but a powerful father 'gure can demand 
anything, even that a kushmaker make a kush.
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In the light of the present argument, we can better understand why the kushmaker 
seeks privacy. In Dorson’s summary, the kushmaker is assigned to the ship’s hold, that is, to 
the veritable bowels of the ship. Wherever the kushmaker is sent, he normally works in pri-
vate. At the end, the kushmaker is obliged to do in public what he has hitherto done only 
in private. Certainly the living quarters in the military force individuals to urinate and def-
ecate more or less in public. What an individual may have done in the privacy of his bath-
room at home before entering the military, he must now do in mass bathrooms, perhaps 
under the uncomfortable scrutiny of fellow sailors.
We can also appreciate those versions of the tale in which the kushmaker speci'cally 
sends for s(crap). It is signi'cant, symbolically speaking, that waste materials o5en form 
the mass which is to be dropped in the water, On older Navy ships in the 1940s and 1950s 
(when the kushmaker story was told), one did not always have 6ush toilets. Rather one 
sat on one of several wooden seats set upon a long trough. A stream of 6owing water ran 
along the bottom of the trough to carry o8 the feces. For that matter, even with modern 
6ush toilets, one can still hear the splashing noise of feces entering the water (cf. the range 
of sounds used in the kushmaker tale: splooch, kaplush, and so on ).
!e elaborate making of a kush at the request of a captain or admiral also 'ts well into 
the general set of fecal metaphors found in military usage. Strict military discipline is 
o5en referred to as chickenshit (cf. a chicken colonel used in the army). Enlisted men 
in the Navy (as in other armed forces) are sometimes treated like children. !ey are told 
when and what to eat, when to go to bed, what to wear, and just about when to urinate 
and defecate. Whether they are “shit on” by higher ranking individuals or forced to su8er 
because of being on someone’s “shit list,” or just stuck eating “shit on a shingle” (chipped 
beef on toast) for breakfast, enlisted men usually have to take it rather than dish it out. 
If the enlisted man is treated like a child, then why would it not make perfect sense for 
him to combat the system by using a childish device—such as making a great big kush for 
the admiral-father 'gure? Since so much of what the admiral or power structure asks the 
enlisted man to do seems to the enlisted man to be pointless and a complete waste of time 
and e8ort, it is only fair that the admiral be duped into watching a lowly enlisted man 
make a huge kush, thereby forcing the admiral in turn to be stuck wasting his time and 
e8ort. In addition, there seems to be a common tradition of imagining authority 'gures in 
the act of defecation. Even presidents and popes cannot ignore calls of nature. !us an old 
idiom in French for going to the bathroom is “aller où le roi va pied” (to go where the king 
goes on foot)13 has analogues in many European languages; for example, in German, “Ich 
gehe dahin wo der König zu Fuss hingeht.” !e kushmaker story could represent the indi-
vidual’s revenge on the whole military system. !e waste motion involved in accumulating 
a huge mass of material to be dropped over the side is very likely a metaphorical expres-
sion to the e8ect that Navy ritual (including inspections) is a bunch of shit. !e strict mili-
tary rank hierarchy is reversed. It is the admiral or captain who carries out the kushmaker’s 
orders (for example, by obtaining the necessary materials). !ere may even be a hint that 
any admiral who does not know what a kush is—that is, doesn’t know “shit from Shinola” 
(a brand of shoe polish)—richly deserves being made a fool of.
Regardless of whether or not one 'nds the above speculative interpretation of the mean-
ing of the kushmaker at all plausible, one should at least realize that there are details of the 
story which require explanation. Kushmakers do not exist in fact, only in 'ction. Fiction 
in the form of folkloric fantasy can and should be interpreted. Why should we laugh at 
the image of a captain or admiral watching a mass of material fall into water? What is the 
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point of a story whose punchline consists of a nonsense sound such as “kush?” !ese are 
precisely the kinds of questions that must be addressed if one wishes to try to understand 
the kushmaker. And these are the kinds of questions that folklorists must seek to answer if 
folkloristics is to progress beyond data gathering and classi'cation.
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The Ritual Murder or 
Blood Libel Legend: 
A Study of Anti-Semitic Victimization 
through Projective Inversion
Introduction
!is essay brings out an important principle in Alan Dundes’s work—that folkloristic 
analysis can help combat bigotry by illuminating the cause and content of material used to 
maintain prejudice from generation to generation. One problem he encountered was that 
collectors avoided or repressed o8ensive texts, because they did not 't into their precon-
ceived image of folklore as charming and quaint. Dundes countered that the collectors’ 
selectivity, driven by an urge to romanticize cultural expression, rendered folklore sterile 
and inconsequential. He wanted to show that folklore was a powerful cultural force, and 
could be used by scholars as evidence to objectively assess social divisions, as well as bonds. 
He maintained that folklore could have dire consequences, and necessitated serious atten-
tion as a source of social biases, beliefs, and actions. If a better world was to be constructed, 
he argued, then the folk processes by which attitudes were formed and spread needed to 
be uncovered—and understood.
Dundes used the terms evil, horrible, insidious, and dastardly to describe the subject of 
blood libel. It was, in his words, “one of the most bizarre and dangerous legends ever cre-
ated by the human imagination.” He blamed the narrative for causing Jews psychological 
pain and physical injury, and frequently death. Rather than suppressing awareness of the 
lore, Dundes called for holding it “up to the light of reason with the hope of nullifying its 
pernicious in6uence.” To him, this appeal to reason meant doing more than showing that 
the accusation was untrue. Many scholars had already established its falsehood, but that 
had not stopped its regeneration. As his contribution, Dundes sought to provide a psycho-
logical rationale to explain the content and persistence of the narrative that had apparently 
irrationally spread through several continents for many centuries.
Blood libel is the allegation that around Easter, Jews murder Christian children to 
obtain blood for rituals. A key motif of the narrative, in Dundes’s interpretation, was the 
accusation that Jews mixed the blood into the Passover ceremonial food of matzoh, an 
unleavened bread. Other ritual murder charges included taking blood for Purim pastries, 
medicinal remedies, and sorcery. Despite the fact that Jewish law expressly forbids blood 
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sacri'ces, the legend created an image of Jews as bloodthirsty, demonic, and depraved. 
Another questionable detail is the function of the blood in the end product, since mat-
zoh is white, but the implication was that Jews, as an ancient people with mystical powers, 
retained profane magical practices—represented by using blood as a magical ingredient—
that stood in contrast to sacred Christian norms.
!e blood libel legend is characterized by the narrative’s localized setting, and a tem-
poral reference to a contemporary moment or the recent past. As a legend, the narrative 
drew attention to itself because of its bizarre content, frequently thought to be true when 
it was circulated orally in song and story, in print and image, and even in courts of law. Or 
else its legendary context raised questions, if not doubts, about a central belief in blood 
sacri'ce, conveyed in the actions of the text. Structurally, its ending invited commentary 
on the unusual feature of murder-lust, resulting from inhuman or un-Christian ritual uses 
of blood. !e blood libel legend drew listeners from members of the dominant group and 
possessed symbolic characteristics because Jews, as a marginalized group, o5en conveyed a 
degree of mystery. It was as if a secret was revealed about their true nature, encapsulated in 
key actions and objects within a narrative.
From the viewpoint of Christians, the legend con'rmed the “othering” of Jews (or 
other minorities) as profanely despicable, and therefore socially intolerable. From the 
Christian perspective, the theological implication of the legend’s message was that the 
Jews were inconvertible and incorrigible. !is conclusion was signi'cant, in that it obvi-
ated the need to convert Jews (since Christians, particularly during the medieval period, 
believed that conversion was a prerequisite for the Second Coming of Christ). !e danger 
of the blood libel legend was that it encouraged mobs to spill Jewish blood in retribution, 
whereas the Christian theology of the New Testament would have called for preservation 
of the Jewish presence, as the precursor people of the “old” testament ( Jewish terminol-
ogy prefers the Torah or Hebrew Bible), until conversion was successful. Dundes viewed 
this background as a crucial context for the inclusion of converted or apostate Jews in the 
plots of blood libel variants. Extending the example of Jews to other victimized minori-
ties, Dundes’s essay stated: “When Jews resisted acting out their assigned part in this overt 
Christian fantasy [that the guilty Jew should accept his punishment and be converted to 
Christianity], Christians became angry, very angry—just as whites become angry if blacks 
don’t conform to the white stereotype of blacks and just as men become angry if women 
won’t conform to the men’s stereotype of women.”
Jewish chronicles and conversations refer to blood libel to epitomize an extremely vir-
ulent strain of anti-Semitism in a region, evident in a metafolkloric statement: “Scratch 
a (national identity), and you get an anti-Semite; they even had a blood libel case there.” 
Dundes mentioned several medieval examples in England, a concentration of blood libel 
trials in Eastern Europe during the nineteenth century, the revival of the legend by Nazis 
during the Holocaust, and several American examples in the early twentieth century. Since 
Dundes’s essay was written, a number of twenty-'rst century blood libel accusations have 
been identi'ed in Islamic countries (Israeli 2002, 2003). In speeches and in the media, 
Islamist demagogues demonized Jews as drinkers of Muslim children’s blood and ene-
mies of humanity. At 'rst glance, this development of a non-Christian victim negates 
Dundes’s thesis that blood libel projects Christian guilt (over the cannibalism implicit in 
the Eucharist) to Jewish blood-lust. Yet many sources claim that the Islamic manifestation 
of blood libel came from Christian in6uence and was adapted to the Islamist goal of elimi-
nating Jews; it contained the projective inversion of turning the wish ful'llment of “I want 
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to rid the world of them” to “!ey want to get rid of me.” !us, contemporary legends 
associated with blood libel include Jews poisoning Muslim wells, spreading plagues among 
Arabs in Jewish-prepared foods, and surreptitiously sterilizing Muslim men through vari-
ous products (Wistrich 2002; and Karsh 2006). 
Dundes was concerned with what associated texts revealed about blood libel in the 
Christian world. !e primary example he gave in this essay was the “Wandering Jew,” but 
he did not gloss it in detail, perhaps because he treated it separately in !e Wandering Jew: 
Essays in the Interpretation of a Christian Legend (Hasan-Rokem and Dundes 1986). !e 
central motif (!ompson Q502.1, !e Wandering Jew. Ceaseless wandering with inability 
to die as punishment for blasphemy) is that, because of not helping Jesus on his way to cru-
ci'xion, a Jew is punished by being doomed to remain homeless, roaming the land on foot, 
unable to die. !e most common legendary plot is of a modern sighting of an aged man 
of strange appearance, usually bearded and carrying a walking stick. !e unusual 'gure is 
introduced as a shoemaker named Ahasuerus, the Wandering Jew, who, when Jesus leaned 
against his house, drove him away. Jesus then is reported to have said, “I will stay and rest, 
but you shall go.” !us the story accounts for why Ahasuerus had to give up his home and 
his family, and roam the world. Along with blood libel, the Wandering Jew legend was 
used in Nazi propaganda and other anti-Semitic campaigns. Another connection between 
the two legends is in the Christian interpretation of the Jewish characters as Christ-killers. 
In the Wandering Jew, Ahasuerus (or Ahasver) is blamed for Christ’s demise, and pun-
ished. Set in the context of Christian ambivalence toward Jews as both the theological par-
ents of Christians and their enemies, an Oedipal theory, familiar to Dundes, claimed that 
the Christian son ( Jesus) is opposed to the Jewish father (Ahasuerus). A result of their sep-
aration is that Jesus is the father one can love, while the Wandering Jew is the father one 
can despise and abuse (Isaac-Edersheim 1986). !e Jewish character thus becomes trans-
formed into a symbol for all Jews. In blood libel, vengeance is exacted because the bleed-
ing innocent child is viewed as a Christ 'gure, in contrast to the demonic, predatory, older 
Jew. Jews were pictured as doing in reality what the Christian worshiper was doing in fan-
tasy: killing a child (son of God) and ritually drinking its blood. (Dundes’s source is Hyam 
Maccoby’s !e Sacred Executioner: Human Sacri%ce and the Legacy of Guilt [1982], which 
he excerpted in !e Wandering Jew). In a casebook he compiled about blood libel, Dundes 
included the psychoanalytical reading of blood libel as a re6ection of the Christian need to 
reenact the cruci'xion of Christ (see Rappaport 1991, excerpted from Rappaport 1975). 
According to Dundes, Christians directed against others the calumny once directed against 
themselves. A cognate text that Dundes cited in support of this symbolism—one that led 
him to an interpretation through projective inversion—was the anti-Semitic belief that 
Jews profaned the host by piercing the wafer and making it bleed (Strack 1909).
Dundes’s use of projective inversion in the blood libel legend has been applied, in con-
temporary life, to groups other than Jews. Folklorist Bill Ellis pointed out the way that, 
beginning in the late twentieth century, rumor-panics about the threat of satanic cults 
and brainwashed devil-worshipers in America and Great Britain related to Christian 
Charismatic views of teenagers as social menaces, all of which symbolized dissatisfaction 
with the decline of religious authority. He observed that the projective inversion suggested 
by Dundes revealed the “inner stresses” of the persecuting group. Documenting exam-
ples of legends involving the blood sacri'ces of children among occultists who are main-
streamed into society, Ellis discerned an othering function of the narratives by Christian 
Charismatics, to show that ordinary people, undetectable in everyday encounters, can 
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be diabolical, waiting for a chance to satisfy their blood-lust. He concluded that the 
Charismatic agenda was to scapegoat a “hidden source of social evil,” reminiscent of the 
demonization of Jews, that would explain the world’s economic, social, and moral prob-
lems, and rally citizens to the Charismatic cause. Ellis’s interpretation was that “recogniz-
ing the existence of this evil would then encourage people to adopt Charismatic religion 
in spite of its internal problems” (2000). Surveying African legends of sorcerers who were 
accused of eating souls, and of killing and devouring young children to acquire their vital 
force, folklorist Véronique Campion-Vincent extended Dundes’s use of blood libel as a 
Christian anti-Semitic legend to the Western ruling-class fears of minorities and deviants. 
She examined texts of conspiracy theories that were o5en linked to blood libel. To her, leg-
endary accusations of plots to deliberately infect populations (legends of a conspiracy to 
spread AIDS among Africans through Western food products) and to undermine sexual 
restrictions (Muslim beliefs in an aphrodisiac-laced gum given to women to undermine 
their chastity) took the role of the oppressed against outsiders (2005).
Anti-Semitism was a frequent topic of Dundes’s research. Although not religious, 
Dundes had come from a Jewish lineage. Becoming aware of the Holocaust a5er World 
War II, he o5en related his horror at the Nazi legacy of hate and genocide against Jews. 
Essays he wrote that deal with anti-Semitism and Holocaust themes included Dundes and 
Hauschild 1987; Dundes 1987f, 1987e, 1997f, and 1984a; and Banc and Dundes 1990.
For essays on bigotry expressed in folklore against various ethnic groups and women, see 
Dundes and Abrahams 1987; Dundes 1987d (both of these essays interpret the symbolism 
of African Americans in joke cycles told by whites); as well as Dundes 1980a, 1997d. See 
also Dundes’s comments on the educational uses of folklore to build tolerance in the 'rst 
chapter of this volume, “Folklore as a Mirror of Culture.”
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!e Ritual Murder or Blood Libel Legend: A Study of 
Anti-Semitic Victimization through 
Projective Inversion
If one were to poll most folklorists as to whether or not folklore was on the 
whole a positive force in human culture, I suspect there would be considerable consensus 
that indeed it was. A tale well told, a song well sung ordinarily give pleasure to the per-
formers themselves and almost certainly to those in the performer’s audience. Esthetically 
speaking, it would appear to be a safe generalization that life is more pleasant because of 
the charm of folk costume and the delight in participating in a favorite calendrical festi-
val. Shorn of its folkloric dress, daily life would be ever so much more drab and dull than it 
otherwise is. Yet it is important to keep in mind that there is some folklore which is highly 
pernicious and even life-threatening. I am thinking of various forms of racist and sexist 
folklore. Social scientists are normally reluctant to attach value judgments to the data they 
study, but it is my contention that one can make a convincing case for the label “evil folk-
lore” for selected individual items of tradition.1
Among the prime candidates for placement under the rubric of the folklore of evil, 
I would rank at or very near the top of the list the so-called blood libel legend. Other 
phrases designating this vicious legend include blood accusation and ritual murder (accusa-
tion). !ese terms are used almost interchangeably but there are several scholars who have 
sought to distinguish between ritual murder and blood libel, arguing that ritual murder 
refers to a sacri'cial murder in general whereas the blood libel entails speci'c use of the 
blood of the victim.2 In the case of alleged Jewish ritual murder, the blood motivation is 
nearly always present which presumably accounts for the equally common occurrence of 
both ritual murder and blood libel as labels.
!e relevant motif is V361, Christian child killed to furnish blood for Jewish rite. !e 
typical gist of the story line is that one or more Jews murder an innocent Christian infant 
or child, supposedly to obtain blood required for ritual purposes, e.g., to mix with unleav-
ened bread or to make matzah. !e legend has been in constant circulation in oral and 
written tradition from the twel5h to the twentieth centuries, o5en leading to deadly con-
sequences for Jews accused of the crime. Like all legends, the blood libel story is tradition-
ally told as true, that is, as an actual historical happening.
Joshua Trachtenberg begins his chapter of !e Devil and the Jews devoted to a discus-
sion of ritual murder as follows: “Of all the bizarre charges against the Jewish people the 
one that has enjoyed the hardiest tenacity and the utmost notoriety and has produced 
the direst consequences, is the so called ritual-murder accusation. In its popular version, 
it foists upon Jewish ritual the need for Christian blood at the Passover. !e subject of 
much study and in'nitely more polemics, its absurdity has been conclusively established, 
but the true nature of the accusation has never been made su7ciently clear.”3 Salomon 
Reinach made a similar comment: “Of all the accusations which fanaticism and ignorance 
have used as a weapon against Judaism, there is none which can be compared in terms 
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of improbability and absurdity to that of ritual murder.”4 Max Grunwald, the pioneer of 
Jewish folklore studies, had this to say: “Of all the attacks on Jews, there could scarcely 
be one capable of in6icting a deeper or more painful injury than the blood-lie.”5 Another 
major 'gure in Jewish folkloristics, Moses Gaster, in a strong letter to the London Times of 
2 October 1888 remarked: “Baseless and without foundation as these legends are, they are 
dangerous even in normal times; how much more in abnormal? Who can foresee to what 
terrible consequences such a superstition might lead, when the people fanatic with rage 
and terror, get hold of it and wreak their vengeance on innocent men?”6 Finally, American 
ballad scholar Francis James Child used the following language: “And these pretended 
child-murders, with their horrible consequences, are only a part of a persecution which, 
with all moderation, may be rubricated as the most disgraceful chapter in the history of 
the human race.”7
Anglo-American folklorists are reasonably familiar with the plot, in part because it 
occurs in ballad form, namely as “Sir Hugh, or, !e Jew’s Daughter,” Child Ballad 155. 
It has many titles in oral tradition, e.g., “Hugh of Lincoln” or “Little Sir Hugh” among 
others. In the ballad, a Jewish temptress induces a young Christian boy to enter her gar-
den where she brutally murders him, o5en taking special care to catch the blood in a 
basin or cup.8
!e narrative is also well known because it is one of Chaucer’s celebrated Canterbury 
Tales: the Prioress’s Tale. !e murder of Hugh of Lincoln supposedly occurred in 1255; 
Chaucer’s tale was written near the end of the fourteenth century. !e earliest subtype of 
the legend, according to the standard typology, goes back to before the year 1200 and con-
tains the following elements:
1. A boy sings the responsorium “Gaude Maria” as he passes daily along a 
street in which Jews dwell, thereby provoking their resentment.
2. He is slain (either by a single Jew or by a group of them in conspiracy), 
and his body is buried under the earth in the Jew’s house, in his garden, 
in a trench beside the door, in a stable under the manure, etc.
3. !e boy’s mother, in her search for him, passing by the Jew’s door, hears 
the voice of her child, and with the assistance of friends, a crowd of citi-
zens, forces an entrance.
4. !e boy is dug up from the earth alive and unharmed.
5. In consequence of this miracle, the Jew (or Jews) according to most ver-
sions is converted.9
In other versions of the legend, the boy’s body is thrown into a latrine. When the body 
is recovered, it miraculously continues to sing praise to the Virgin Mary, typically until a 
Christian priest removes a seed from under the child’s tongue whereupon the singing stops 
(cf. motif V254.7, Murdered boy still sings “Ave” a5er his death).
It would be one thing if this classic bit of anti-Semitic folklore existed only in ballad or 
legend form, but the sad truth is that what has been so o5en described in legend and litera-
ture is also alleged to have occurred in life. !ere have not been tens, but hundreds of actual 
cases of blood libel tried in various courts in various countries. !e map of Western and 
Eastern Europe and the Near East is profusely dotted with sites where ritual murders were 
said to have occurred.10 Moreover, one must keep in mind that many of these allegations 
led to lengthy trials (o5en involving torture to extract “confessions” from the accused Jews) 
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and eventual executions: “In 1171 at Blois, a5er due trial, thirty-eight Jews were burned 
at the stake; in 1191, at Bray-sur-Seine, the number of victims reached one hundred.”11 
Trials occurred in England, France, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, 
Russia, Spain, and elsewhere. !ere is no comprehensive or de'nitive list of all the alleged 
instances of ritual murder, despite the fact that many of the numerous books devoted to 
the subject consist of little more than synopses of reported instances. For example, Frank 
(1901) reviews 172 cases. Monniot (1914) in a chapter entitled “!e Facts” discusses more 
than 100 separate purported eases. Manzini (1930) lists 137 examples. Folklorist Peuckert 
(1935–36) gives some 175 examples in chronological order while Lyutostanskii (1934) 
summarizes 144 instances. Trachtenberg gives a round number of 150 charges of ritual 
murder but suggests these are not more than a “fraction” of the whole.12
Although one might have logically assumed that this strange medieval legend might 
have died out over time and that the number of recorded eases might have declined over 
the centuries, this does not appear to be the case at all. One observer noted that there seem 
to have been almost as many blood accusations in the nineteenth century as in all the pre-
vious centuries combined and that, for example, between 1887 and 1891, there were twen-
ty-two indictments in Europe alone with some '5y cases of blood libel reported between 
1870 and 1935.13 It should also be remarked that compared to the large number of Jews 
actually brought to trial on the basis of blood libel or ritual murder charges, only a tiny per-
centage of the anti-Semitic accusers were ever themselves brought to trial.14
Some readers may 'nd it hard to believe that Jews were dragged in front of tribunals 
accused of having performed ritual murder, o5en having been 'rst tortured on several 
occasions so as to elicit a confession of guilt from them. But a considerable number of 
monographic studies have detailed these heinous trials which have sometimes ended with 
condemning the “guilty” Jew(s) to death. Some of the trials, especially those which took 
place in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries attracted international notice.
One of the earliest trials was in Norwich, England, in 1144. Some even go so far as to 
claim that it was in England that the ritual murder charge 'rst appeared,15 and that it was 
with this account that “the continuous history of the Ritual Murder libel begins.”16 In 'f-
teenth-century Spain, we 'nd “El Santo Nino de la Guardia.”17 It was said that a group of 
Jews and Catholic converts (from Judaism) had ritually murdered a child at La Guardia, 
near Avila, in imitation of the Passion of Jesus. !is version of the blood libel legend, inci-
dentally, was apparently used as part of the pretext to expel Jews from Spain in 1492.18 
(!e infant was supposedly murdered in 1488 with the trial held in 1490 and 1491.) If this 
is so, then it would demonstrate the extraordinary power of folklore in general and legend 
in particular to e8ect political events. An annual ten-day holiday in La Guardia is said to 
continue to the present day and local clergy are not anxious to close down the La Guardia 
festival because it is the major village holiday and it brings in valuable income from tour-
ist-pilgrims.19) !is instance of a festival springing up from a legend shows that the blood 
libel story remains alive and that it is even celebrated annually in the twentieth century. 
Unfortunately, this is not an isolated instance. For example, the Domingo del Val cult is 
widespread in Spain. According to tradition, little Domingo was a choir boy whose sing-
ing hymns so enraged Saragossa Jews in the 1250s that they secretly cruci'ed him and bur-
ied his body. However, his body began to glow mysteriously, and in the twentieth century 
he is known as the patron saint of choir boys in Spain; in the Seo Cathedral in Saragossa, 
there is a brightly lighted chapel devoted to him, a chapel which actually serves as a site of 
destination for modern pilgrimages.20
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!e blood libel legend is not only the basis of ongoing festivals, but it has also been 
memorialized in church decoration. Legends proclaiming the Jewish “ritual murder” of 
Christian children or the profanation or desecration of holy wafers are celebrated in vari-
ous European towns in such artistic form as tapestries or stained glass church windows. 
For example, there are such windows or pictures or tapestries ornamenting the choir of the 
Saint Michael-Saint Gudule Cathedral in Brussels, a ceiling fresco in the small Tyrol vil-
lage of Judenstein, paintings in a church sanctuary in the Vienna suburb of Korneuberg, 
and a stained glass window in a Paris church chape1.21 !ese artistic renderings of the leg-
end provide daily reminders in such locales of the existence (and by extension presumably 
the truth or historicity) of the story. 
One might think that in modern times there would have been protests against festi-
vals or stained glass representations of the legend, but that is not the case. In only a few 
instances have campaigns waged against this blatantly anti-Semitic folklore had any suc-
cess. In the Judenstein case, we have perhaps a typical situation. A French Jew, Jean Hauser, 
whose brother died at Auschwitz, tells of a vacation trip in 1952 in Austria not far from 
Innsbruck when he took an unexpected detour to an apparently idyllic hamlet of Judenstein 
(the name meaning, of course, the stone of Jews).22 Entering the village church, he found in 
the nave, near the altar, in front of a tapestry, three 'gures made of wood or wax in a men-
acing pose with knives in hand surrounding a stone upon which was stretched out a sup-
plicating infant garbed in white. !e scene purportedly commemorated the ritual murder 
of Andrew of Rinn at Judenstein, as Hauser soon discovered when he purchased souvenir 
postcards in the shop located conveniently and immediately across from the church. He 
later learned that for nearly two centuries, Judenstein had been a place of pilgrimage where 
children led by their parents could see for themselves the reconstruction of the assassina-
tion by three Jews of a small child of about their own age.23
Interestingly enough, the Judenstein site had been noted a year earlier in 1951 by famed 
Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal who wrote a short essay “Tiroler Ritualmord Märchen” 
in protest. In that report, Wiesenthal voices his dismay at seeing full cars and busloads of 
school children making annual pilgrimages to Rinn under the tutelage of their religious 
instructors to see the ritual murder lie depicted as a historical event. Wiesenthal was su7-
ciently concerned to bother to write a letter of protest about these pilgrimages to Cardinal 
lnnitzer via Innsbruck Bishop Rusch, but he was rebu8ed by the latter when he replied that 
“. . . the Jewish writer goes much too far if he meant to claim that Jews had never done such 
things.”! 24 Prejudice and bigotry die hard if at all. Part of the problem is clearly that of try-
ing to disprove the negative. As one report of Bishop Rusch’s response to a protest from the 
Jewish community of Linz reads: “!e Jews have not up to the present time ever proved 
that they never committed a parallel crime [of ritual murder].”25
A5er several repeated unsuccessful attempts to halt the pilgrimages, a plaque was 'nally 
put up in 1961 in the Judenstein church by a secret order of Pope John XXIII. !e plaque 
stated that the case of Andrew of Rinn was nothing other than a legend and that “it is 
clear that the event had nothing to do with the Jewish people.” Pope John also directed 
that the cult of Andrew be suppressed and that the various tableaux, statues, and fres-
coes be removed from the church. But the villagers of Rinn became incensed. If the statue 
of the martyred Andrew were removed, they would openly revolt against the church. So 
despite the papal order, the statue was le5 intact, and a large fresco on the ceiling of the 
church showing a group of Jews in the act of burying little Andrew was similarly le5 alone. 
Moreover, the pilgrimages continued with the statue of the infant martyr surrounded by 
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6owers and candles le5 by those who came to pray from near and far.26 It may be concluded 
from this that it is not easy to legislate folklore out of existence. Since the Austrian authori-
ties decided not to suppress the artwork celebrating the legend or to remove the statue of 
the martyr,27 it remains to be seen if the installation of the plaque can succeed in defusing 
a legend which has circulated and 6ourished for centuries. (Andreas Oxner of Rinn was 
said to have been killed by Jewish merchants on the “Jew-stone” in 1462 and although he 
was never o7cially beati'ed or canonized by the Catholic church, a plenary indulgence 
for pilgrims to Rinn was granted on 15 January 1754.)28 All this attests to the remarkable 
staying power of folklore. While folklore’s resistance to censorship may be deemed a posi-
tive thing, e.g., when folklore opposes political repression or social injustice, this very same 
strength of tradition also means that dangerous and pernicious racist folklore cannot really 
be checked or halted either.
!ere have been so many famous cases and trials involving ritual murder that it is simply 
not possible to recount them all in a brief overview. In 1840, the Jews of Damascus were 
accused of the ritual murder of a Capuchin friar, Father Tommaso. To obtain “evidence” 
that it was a case of ritual murder, some seventy Jews were tortured to secure the necessary 
confessions.29 !ere was a concerted surge of international protest and it did have some 
e8ect.30 !e Sultan Abdul Mejid issued a 'rman or proclamation which said in part:
An ancient prejudice prevailed against the Jews. !e ignorant believed that the 
Jews were accustomed to sacri'ce a human being, to make use of his blood at 
their feast of Passover. . . . the religious books of the Hebrews have been exam-
ined by learned men, well versed in their religious literature, the result of which 
examination is that it is found that Jews are strongly prohibited not only from 
using human blood but even that of animals. It therefore follows that the charges 
made against them and their religion are nothing but pure calumnies. . . . we can-
not permit the Jewish nation whose innocence of the crime alleged against them 
is evident) to be vexed and tormented upon accusations which have not the least 
foundation in truth.31
!e sultan’s words—like the words uttered by various popes—proved to be insu7cient to 
put the legend to rest.
It should be noted that there were a number of papal bulls on the subject of ritual 
murder, e.g., in 1247, 1259, 1272, 1422, 1540, as well as Cardinal Ganganelli’s famous 
investigative report of 1759.32 Although a number of popes did honestly seek to repudi-
ate and deny the blood libel legend, it is also true that the semi-o7cial Vatican periodical, 
the Civiltà Cattolica from 1881 to 1914 promoted and systematically “documented” the 
legend,”33 and this was the case as well with other nominally Catholic periodicals, e.g., La 
Croix, in the late nineteenth century.34 In some instances, Catholic priests cleverly used the 
ritual murder accusation as a weapon against Jews.35
In his o5-cited report of 1759, Cardinal Ganganelli, the future Clement XIV (1769–74), 
reviewed a large number of the alleged ritual murder cases and rejected them all with the 
exception of Andrew of Rinn (1462) and Simon of Trent (1475). 1n Ganganelli’s words, 
“I admit, then, as true the fact of the Blessed Simon, a boy three years old, killed by the 
Jews in Trent in the 1475 in hatred of the faith of Jesus Christ. . . . I also admit the truth 
of another fact, which happened in the year 1462 in the village of Rinn . . . in the person 
of the Blessed Andreas, a boy barbarously murdered by the Jews in hatred of the Faith 
of Jesus Christ.”36 Ganganelli generously adjudged his own 'ndings as being generally an 
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exculpation of the Jews. In his own words, “It should then be concluded that, among so 
many infanticides imputed by writers to the Jews in hatred of our Holy Faith, only two 
can be said to be true, since these two only can be said to be proved by authentic proofs 
a5er much diligent search and a considerable lapse of time. . . . I do not believe, then, that 
by admitting the truth of the two facts . . . one can reasonably deduce that this is a maxim, 
either theoretical or practical, of the Jewish nation; for two isolated events are not enough 
to establish a certain and common axiom.”37 Vacandard plausibly suggests that Ganganelli’s 
views of these two cases was very probably in6uenced by the political fact that there had 
been previous papal decisions authorizing the cults of Simon and Andrew and the miracles 
attributed to these martyrs.38
Among the more famous cases of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are 
that of Tisza-Eslar, Hungary (1882);39 the murder of a nineteen-year-old Christian girl, 
Agnes Hruza, on 29 March 1899, in the Grzina Forest near Polna in Czechoslovakia,40 
a case which fortunately was in6uenced by the critical intervention of T. G. Masaryk, 
then a professor at the Czech university in Prague, who would later (1918) be elected 
as the 'rst president of Czechoslovakia;41 the ritual murder case in Kiev in 1911 involv-
ing a twelve-year-old boy, also known as the Beilis case, which came to trial in 1913;42 
and a case in Massena, New York, in 1928.43 Many of these and other cases are discussed 
at length in detailed essays and book-length monographs, many of which reprint actual 
trial transcripts.44
Even in those instances where the accused was eventually found innocent, the very fact 
that a trial took place in which the basis of the accusation was essentially the existence of 
the legend demonstrates the undeniable tenacity of the story. Some well-known individ-
uals went on record to state their conviction that the ritual murder story was true. !e 
celebrated traveler and amateur anthropologist-folklorist Sir Richard Burton in his book, 
!e Jew, the Gypsy and El Islam, published posthumously in 1898, ends his supposedly 
objective ethnographic description of the Jews with a list of “what history [my emphasis] 
tells us concerning the Jews, their crimes, and their condemnations,”45 a list which includes 
numerous alleged instances of ritual murder. !e editor of this curious volume claims he 
elected to suppress Burton’s special “Appendix on Human Sacri'ce among the Sephardim 
or Eastern Jews,” the data for which Burton was said to have gathered during the period 
from 1869 to 1871 when he served as British Consul in Damascus, although one anti-Se-
mitic source claimed that the appendix in question had been suppressed through pressure 
from in6uential Jews.46 !e important point is that Burton evidently considered blood 
libel legends as “history,” not 'ction.
Unfortunately, the research of folklorists has on occasion been utilized to “prove” the 
existence and veracity of ritual murder. Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign A8airs set up a special secret commission to investigate the 
supposed “use by Jews of the blood of Christian children” and this commission enlisted 
the aid of folklorist V. I. Dal. He wrote a book in 1844 on ritual murder based upon 
'eldwork carried out among the so-called Old Believers.47 Apparently, Dal was himself 
persuaded by his informants of the truth of the custom and his research was cited in the 
Kiev trial of Beilis in 1913.48 It may or may not be a total coincidence that Dal’s book was 
reprinted in 1913.49
In similar fashion, Sir James George Frazer’s writings were also cited in the Kiev trial. 
When Frazer learned of this, he immediately wrote a letter to the London Times protest-
ing the citation of his research in such a trial. !e particular passage from “!e Scapegoat” 
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volume of !e Golden Bough which had been quoted in the trial was actually published in 
the Times of the day preceding, that is, 10 November 1913. However, a close reading of both 
the passage itself and Frazer’s letter of protest of November 11 reveals considerable equivo-
cality on Frazer’s part. !e upshot is that he does not really deny the possibility of Jewish rit-
ual murder. His position is rather that if ignorant lower-class Jews did commit such crimes 
on occasion, that was no reason to hate all Jews. In other words, Frazer’s anti-Semitism was 
tempered by typical British class consciousness: It wasn’t Jews who committed the crime, 
but lower-class Jews. “If all the charges of ritual murder which have been brought against the 
Jews in modern times are not, as seems most probably, mere idle calumnies . . . the extraor-
dinary tenacity of life exhibited by the lowest forms of superstition in the minds of igno-
rant people, whether they are Jews or Gentiles, would su7ce to account for an occasional 
recrudescence of primitive barbarity among the most degraded part of the Jewish commu-
nity.50 Frazer acknowledges the debate about the issue of historicity, but he hedges by say-
ing, “Into this troubled area I prefer not to enter; I will only observe that, so far as I have 
looked into the alleged cases, and these are reported in su7cient detail, the majority of the 
victims are said to have been children and to have met their fate in spring, o5en in the week 
before Easter.” 51 !at statement could hardly be taken as any kind of a repudiation of the 
truth value of the ritual murder legend! Shortly therea5er, he again fails to take a stand: 
“If deeds of the sort alleged have been really done by Jews—a question on which I must 
decline to pronounce an opinion—they would then interest the student of custom as iso-
lated instances of reversion to an old and barbarous ritual which once 6ourished commonly 
enough among the ancestors both of Jews and Gentiles. . . . Such customs die hard.”52
In his letter to the Times, Frazer does not alter his position: “. . . while I discuss hypo-
thetically the possibility of an occasional crime instigated by superstition among the dregs 
of the Jewish as of the Christian population, I stigmatize such accusations against the 
Jewish people as ‘a monstrous injustice,’ and speak of all the charges of ritual murder as 
‘most probably’ mere idle calumnies, the baneful fruit of bigotry, ignorance, and malice” 
[emphasis mine].53 !e continued and insistent use of such words as “occasional” crime 
and “probably” certainly strongly suggest that Frazer may have harbored some personal 
conviction that Jewish ritual murder was in part a historical reality.
Some twentieth-century folklorists apparently believe in the historicity of the blood 
libel legend, e.g., Caro Baroja of Spain54 and Peuckert of Germany. !e latter called for a 
scienti'c study to determine which cases were false and which were fact. A5er having com-
piled a considerable chronological list of cases, Peuckert comments, “!ere remains only 
one question to be answered in connection with this shocking list: For what purpose did 
the Jews use the blood?”55 Moses Gaster, in his review of the volume of the Handwörterbuch 
des Deutschen Aberglaubens in which Peuckert’s extensive entry on “Ritualmord” appeared, 
remarked scathingly, “It is unfortunate that this volume should be dis'gured by a disgrace-
ful article on the foul blood-libel accusation of which author, publisher, and editors ought 
to be thoroughly ashamed.”56
If folklorists considered the blood libel legend credible, then it is no wonder that vari-
ous folk groups did so as well. It is, however, disheartening to realize that the legend has 
continued to exert its male'cent in6uence well into the twentieth century. A book pub-
lished in Russia in 1917 recapitulating the Beilis trial in Kiev in 1913 made the following 
shameful statement: “!e fanatic murder committed by the Zhidi [Yids] in order to obtain 
Christian blood is not a legend even in the twentieth century; it is not a blood libel; it is a 
terrible reality.”57 !e lie and legend also surfaced in the United States. Besides the Massena 
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incident of 1928, among others, there was also a pamphlet which claimed that the 1932 
kidnapping of Charles A. Lindbergh’s baby was an instance of Jewish ritual murder.58
!e striking revival or perpetuation of the blood libel legend in the twentieth century 
was very much nurtured by Nazi Germany. !e legend was obviously made to order for 
anti-Semitic propaganda e8orts. Lea6ets circulated in Berlin and Dresden in 1933 tell-
ing of ritual murder accusations and calling for the prosecution of Jews.59 A special rit-
ual murder of Der Stürmer was published in May of 1934. !e campaign of hate con-
tinued throughout World War II. Nazi researcher Hellmut Schramm compiled a massive 
475-page collection of blood libel legends entitled Der jüdische Ritualmord. Published in 
1943, the book struck a responsive chord. Here is part of a letter dated 19 May 1943, and 
addressed to SS Gruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner, chief of police in Berlin:60
Dear Kaltenbrunner,
I have ordered a large number of copies of the book Jewish Ritual Murder and 
I have distributed them to individuals up to the rank of Standartenführer [SS 
colonel]. . . . We should proceed to investigate ritual murders among the Jews 
with respect to those who have not yet been evacuated. Every case discovered 
should be submitted to me. We will organize then several trials for this category 
of crime. !e problem of ritual murder ought to be treated by experts in such 
countries as Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. I have the idea that we could pass 
on these ritual murder cases to the press in order to facilitate the evacuation of 
Jews from these countries . . . .
[!e letter concludes:] In short, I am of the opinion that we could give anti-
Semitism an incredible virulence with the help of anti-Semitic propaganda in 
English and perhaps even in Russian by giving huge publicity to ritual murders.
[Signed) Heil Hitler!
Heinrich Himmler
But the blood libel legend did not end with the end of World War II either in Germany 
or anywhere else where anti-Semitism 6ourishes. In November of 1960, Golda Meir, 
addressing Israel’s Knesset speci'cally protested against blood libel charges appearing in 
the o7cial newspaper of the Soviet Republic of Daghestan, which accused Jews of using 
the blood of Moslem children for ritual purposes—Moslems being the predominant 
group in Daghestan. Soviet authorities apparently ignored a delegation sent to Moscow 
seeking a retraction.61 !e legend may have been Christian in origin but it also can func-
tion in a Moslem context. In 1985, Mustafa Tlas, then Defense Minister and Deputy 
Prime Minister of Syria, holder of a law degree and at one time a doctoral candidate at the 
Sorbonne, published a book in Arabic entitled !e Matza of Zion, a two-hundred-page 
book which revives the 1840 Damascus legend. A quote from the book provided by the 
Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, which sought to alert people about the exis-
tence of this updated version of the legend, reads: “From that moment on every mother 
warned her child: Do not stray far from home. !e Jew may come by and put you in his 
sack to kill you and suck your blood for the Matza of Zion.”
It is not my purpose in this essay to document all the countless cases of blood libel 
which have occurred or even to demonstrate how the legend may have encouraged pros-
titutes or unwed Christian mothers to practice infanticide and then blame Jews for the 
crime. !ere is evidence that the victims of child abuse or child murder may have been 
“planted” on Jewish property.62
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My interest lies in other questions. Why did such a legend arise in the 'rst place? Why 
has it continued to be popular? Why should it have been believed to be true for at least 
eight centuries? !ere isn’t a shred of evidence whatsoever to indicate that Jews ever killed 
Christian children to obtain blood for sacri'cial or ritual purposes. We are dealing here 
not with fact but with 'ction, not with history but with folklore, not with life but with 
legend. But how could such a bizarre legend have come into existence to be used as a con-
tinuing basis for cruel prejudice and as a charter for anti-Semitic sentiments?
Psychology is necessary, I submit, for the analysis of fantasy material. Most of the writ-
ers who have studied the blood libel legend have tried to treat it historically or rather have 
tried to show that the legend lacks historicity. I have no quarrel with those of a historical 
turn of mind, but I remain convinced that historical analysis alone cannot fully explicate 
the content of fantasy. !e question can then be phrased: Why should Christians think 
that Jews murder innocent children to obtain blood to mix with their matzah?
Some scholars have recognized the need for psychological interpretation in con-
nection with the challenge of illuminating the blood libel legend. Isidore Loeb writing 
in 1889 remarked that savants searching for a historical origin of the blood accusation 
would search in vain. “!e problem is not one of history, but one of psychology.”63 Among 
the earliest psychoanalytic interpretations of the blood libel legend was that proposed by 
!eodor Reik in 1923.64 According to Reik, the legend represented a displacement of the 
reproach that the Jews had killed and eaten Christ who was substituting for the father god. 
!e reproach “derives from an unconscious feeling of guilt accomplished by projection. 
Mankind insofar as it has turned Christian confesses in this legend without any disguise 
the old tendency to deicide.”65 It is equivalent to the argument between two brothers who 
have together murdered the father and now want to shi5 the guilt to each other. But it is 
not immediately obvious—at least to me—why we are obliged to interpret the legend as 
an example of killing a father 'gure, especially keeping in mind that in the vast majority of 
reported instances, it is speci'cally a child or infant who is ostensibly murdered.
In a later (1967) psychoanalytic reading of the legend, Seiden argues along similar 
Oedipal lines to explain ritual murder by suggesting that Christian sons want to kill Jewish 
fathers—Judaism did historically give rise/birth to Christianity—claiming that this is why 
the Jew is “the monstruous father who threatens or destroys the lives of his innocent pri-
mordial children. He is the guilt-ridden father who must be punished by his imaginary 
Christian son.”67 In a further articulation of the Oedipal model, Seiden claims, “As a rit-
ual murderer of little children, the medieval Jew thus personi'es and re6ects the uncon-
scious fear of ‘the primordial male child’: the child’s fear that his father, whose rival he is 
for the latter’s wife (and consequently for his own mother), may one day castrate him.”68 
One di7culty here is that the “plot” of the blood libel legend rarely involves a battle for a 
female mother-wife 'gure. Moreover, the hypothetical suggestion that Christians want to 
kill their father-'gure Jews would not seemingly elucidate such details of the blood libel 
legend as the Jews requiring Christian infant blood to make matzah.
Rappaport argues in 1975, in yet another psychoanalytic reading of the legend, that “by 
committing the ritual murder the Jews are to act out the doctrine of the transubstantiation 
by mixing the blood into the host. . . . By the reference to Passover . . . the ritual murder is 
acknowledged as infanticide whose repetition is desired for the acquisition of the unlim-
ited life expectancy of the . . . eternal infant on the eternal lap of the eternal virgin.69 But 
it is by no means clear why ritual infanticide committed by Jews would ensure eternal life 
for the infant Jesus.
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Finally in 1982, Rosenman suggests that the blood libel legend gives “expression to 
the adult’s desire to destroy enviable youth.”70 Adults thus do to infants what they think 
infants will want to do to adults. According to this formula, adults believe that infants 
want to devour their (adult) blood and so to forestall that, the adults devour the infants’ 
blood. Supposedly this parental hatred for their children is projected onto Jews. In addi-
tion Rosenman contends, “Also projected upon the Jew in the blood libel is envy of the 
young sibling who drains all the mother’s nuturant 6uids, leaving the mother too depleted 
to succor the subject.” Here we 'nd the standard psychoanalytic arguments based upon 
the familiar parent-child as well as sibling rivalries. Yet the semantic 't, if any, between 
conventional psychoanalytic theory and the actual details of the blood libel legend seems 
a bit contrived or forced. A Jungian as opposed to a Freudian reading of the legend o8ers 
even fewer speci'cs insofar as a Jungian might simply label the legend as a re6ection of the 
dark or shadow side of man.71
I am persuaded that a more appropriate and revealing approach to the legend lies in 
the Christian need for a Jewish scapegoat and in the psychological process I have termed 
“projective inversion.”72 In a brilliant analysis of the legend of the Wandering Jew, Hyam 
Maccoby has proposed that Christians needed a dead Jesus to worship, but that they 
also needed someone to kill Jesus, to take the blame or bear the guilt for committing the 
crime.73 Although Jews did not kill Jesus (who, of course, was himself a Jew—the Romans 
did), Christian folklore insists that the Jews were Christ-killers. In this context, the blood 
libel is simply another example of the same kind of Christian folklore. Christians blame 
Jews for something which the Christians needed to have happen, a thing which the Jews 
never did.
Projective inversion refers to a psychological process in which A accuses B of carry-
ing out an action which A really wishes to carry out him or herself. Otto Rank described 
this process (but without calling it projective inversion) in his path-breaking !e Myth of 
the Birth of the Hero in 1909. In standard Indo-European biographies, the father tries to 
kill his own son. According to Rank, it is the son who wishes to kill his own father (along 
Oedipal wish-ful'llment lines), but since this is a taboo thought, it is expressed in folklore 
the other way round, namely that the father wishes to kill his son.
!is psychological process of “blaming the victim” is also found in female terms. A 
girl would like to remove or kill her own mother (so as to have her father for herself ), but 
this is a taboo thought. So in fairy tales, it is invariably the mother who tries to remove or 
kill her own daughter. In the tale of Hansel and Gretel (Aarne-!ompson tale type 327), 
it is really Gretel’s story. It is a girl-centered tale and therefore it is about a girl’s struggle 
with her mother. In the original oral tale, it is actually Gretel’s mother who sends the chil-
dren out to the forest to die, but the Grimms altered the tale and changed “mother” to 
“stepmother.”74 !e 'ght for nourishment involves Gretel and the witch (an evil mother 
imago) who seduces the children with the orally attractive gingerbread house so that she 
can eat the children. !e struggle ends when Gretel dupes the witch/mother into being 
burned up in her own oven—a symbol which suggests both the production of food and 
the production of infants—to have “a bun in the oven” is a conventional euphemism for 
pregnancy. Or in other fairy tales, the girl’s taboo wish to marry her own father is trans-
formed through projective inversion into a father who wishes to marry his own daughter.
In the case of majority-minority group relations, it is typically the minority group which 
is victimized by the majority group’s stereotype or image of the minority group. Blacks are 
victimized by having to conform to white stereotypes of blacks; women are victimized by 
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having to conform to men’s stereotypes of women; and in the present instance, Jews are 
victimized by having to conform to Christian stereotypes of Jews.
Let us be absolutely clear about this. I am saying that it is Christians, not Jews, who 
would like to commit the blood libel and in a way they do. It is, a5er all, Romans, not Jews, 
who killed a savior and it is Christians who use his blood in their ritual. !e Eucharist is 
one of the central rituals of Christianity and this is so whether one believes that the bread 
and wine actually turn into the body of Jesus Christ or simply commemorate Jesus’ last 
supper. Either way, it is an act of patent cannibalism. To incorporate the blood and body of 
one’s savior is at the very least symbolic cannibalism. !e doctrine of transubstantiation as 
found in Roman Catholicism and the Orthodox Eastern churches would seemingly entail 
literal rather than 'gurative cannibalism.
!e Eucharist is a fairly complex symbolic ritual for it entails not only cannibalism, but 
also the male usurpation of the female nurturant role. It is men who give their body and 
blood (no milk is available from males) to nurture their followers. !at is presumably why 
women are not permitted to give the Eucharist. It is a purely male ritual involving the imi-
tation of female nurturance.75
For the commission of an aggressively cannibalistic act, participants in the Eucharist 
would normally feel guilt,76 but so far as I am aware, no one has ever suggested that a 
Catholic should ever feel any guilt for partaking of the Host. Where is the guilt for such 
an act displaced? I submit it is projected wholesale to another group, an ideal group for 
scapegoating. By means of this projective inversion, it is not we Christians who are guilty 
of murdering an individual in order to use his blood for ritual religious purposes (the 
Eucharist), but rather it is you Jews who are guilty of murdering an individual in order to 
use his or her blood for ritual religious purposes, making matzah. !e fact that Jesus was 
Jewish makes the projective inversion all the more appropriate. It is a perfect transforma-
tion: Instead of Christians killing a Jew, we have Jews killing a Christian!77
Another indication that projective inversion underlies the blood libel legend comes 
from the supposed motivation for Jews to commit ritual murder. Almost invariably, the 
anti-Semitic tract will proclaim that the Jews killed the innocent Christian infant because 
Jews hate Christians.78 In the language of the 1759 report of Cardinal Ganganelli, infants 
Simon and Andrew were killed by the Jews “in hatred of the faith of Jesus Christ.”79 We 
know that in standard projective inversion, “I hate you” becomes transformed into “You 
hate me.” By transposing subject and object, the initial party is le5 free to hate his or 
her enemy and furthermore to be totally absolved of feelings of guilt therefore. So the 
Christian hatred of Jews is neatly transformed into Jews’ hatred of Christians. (Another 
modern example of this kind of projective inversion occurs when men accused of rap-
ing women claim that the women victims actually wanted sexual activity. !e undoubted 
power of this projective inversion is such that rape victims are sometimes made to feel that 
they, not the rapists, are on trial.)
Projective inversion also serves to illuminate the curious detail in which Jews are 
alleged to need Christian blood to make matzah. First of all, Jews are not supposed to 
consume blood. Genesis 9:4: “Only you shall not eat 6esh with its life, that is, its blood.” 
Leviticus 3:17: “It shall be a perpetual statute throughout your generations, in all your 
dwelling places, that you eat neither fat nor blood.” Leviticus 17:12: “!ere I have said 
to the people of Israel, No person among you shall eat blood.” As many authors have 
pointed out, Jews are expressly forbidden to incorporate blood and this is why Kosher 
butchers take great care to drain blood from any animal to be eaten.80 English folklorist 
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Venetia Newall goes so far as to suggest that it may have been the non-Jew’s misunder-
standing of such ritual rules of blood-letting that led to the formation of the blood libel 
legend in the 'rst place!81
!e consistency of the Old Testament rule prohibiting the eating of blood may perhaps 
be usefully contrasted with the New Testament words of Jesus ( John 6:53–56): “Truly, 
truly, I say to you, unless you eat the 6esh of the Son of man and drink his blood, you 
have no life in you; he who eats my 6esh and drinks my blood has eternal life, and I will 
raise him up at the last day. For my 6esh is food indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. He 
who eats my 6esh and drinks my blood abides in me, and I in him.” !e point is obvious: 
Whereas Jews are speci'cally forbidden to drink blood, Christians are speci'cally ordered 
to do so. !is is why Rappaport is correct when he says, “!e paradox of the blood accusa-
tion is that the Jews are accused by the Christians of consuming blood which is in accor-
dance with Christian ritual tradition, but is trespassing the Mosaic law.”82 But now thanks 
to the device of projective inversion, we can understand this paradox. In a Christian pro-
jection, the Jews operate under Christian, not Jewish, terms. One has only to compare the 
highly negative image of evil Jews standing with basins waiting to collect the blood from 
the slain innocent child with the very positive image in Christian iconography of Joseph 
of Arimathea who used a chalice (the Holy Grail) to collect the precious blood from the 
body of Jesus!83
!e fundamentally Christian aspect of the projection also explains why, as Maccoby 
reminds us, “the accusation is associated with the Christian festival of Easter, not with the 
Jewish festival of Passover; it was at Easter-time that these alleged crimes took place.”84 
Since Easter is the time of cruci'xion (as well as resurrection), this might be a period of 
maximum or intensi'ed guilt feelings on the part of Christians for eating the body and 
blood of their god. Other evidence that projective inversion is involved comes from the 
celebrated case of Simon of Trent in 1475 when Jews were alleged to have admitted that 
they required “fresh Christian blood” because it was a “jubilee year,” but as Trachtenberg 
astutely observes, it was a jubilee in the Catholic calendar, but not in the Jewish calendar.85 
!e Jews under duress and torture had to confess their “crime” in strictly Christian terms.
What about the blood being used or needed to make matzah? If the story needed a 
functional equivalent for the Christian Eucharist which involved wine (blood) and a 
wafer, then obviously the nearest thing in Jewish ritual to the Eucharistic wafer is the mat-
zah. !e obvious parallels between the Eucharist and the ritual murder/blood libel were 
pointed out by earlier writers, but were explained solely from a Christian perspective in 
terms of the Jews intentionally seeking to mock the Passion.86 Maccoby puts it this way: 
“!e Jews . . . were pictured as doing in reality what the Christian worshipper was doing in 
fantasy, i.e., killing a child and drinking its blood.”87
We can now better understand why the blood libel legend so o5en gets mixed up with 
related legends of profaning the host.”88 Using blood to make matzah is in symbolic terms 
not all that di8erent from making the host bleed. !e belief that Jews pierced the wafers 
making them bleed apparently goes back at least to the end of the thirteenth century.89 
Reports indicate that Jews were persecuted and burned as punishment for this alleged 
miraculous crime.
Again in terms of projective inversion, it is Christians who profane the Passover meal 
by claiming that Jews use blood to make matzah. !e Last Supper was in all probability 
a Passover meal, but that historical fact has little to do with the projective fantasy. !e 
Jews did not and do not profane Christian Eucharistic ritual. It is the underlying Christian 
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guilt for orally incorporating the blood and 6esh of their god, commonly perceived as the 
Christ child, which makes them project that guilt to the convenient Jewish scapegoat.
As Maccoby observes in his analysis of the Wandering Jew, Christians want Jews to 
accept the role assigned to them by Christian fantasy, e.g., as killers of Christ.90 Recall that 
in the summary of the major subtype of the Prioress’s Tale, the story ends with the Jews 
being converted. !is is straight, unadulterated wishful thinking on Christians’ part. !e 
guilty Jew should accept his punishment and be converted to Christianity. !is is perhaps 
why so many blood libel legends involve converted or apostate Jews in their plots. When 
Jews resisted acting out their assigned part in this overt Christian fantasy, Christians 
became angry, very angry—just as whites become angry if blacks don’t conform to the 
white stereotype of blacks and just as men become angry if women won’t conform to the 
men’s stereotype of women.
!e blood libel legend is clearly not a signi'cant part of Jewish folklore any more than 
the legend of the Wandering Jew is part of Jewish folklore.91 !e blood libel legend and the 
legend of the Wandering Jew are part of the Christian folklore about Jews. Unfortunately, 
because of the very nature of the legend genre—that is, a story set in the modern, post-
creation world and told as true—the blood libel legend has had a devastating e8ect upon 
Christian-Jewish relations in Europe and elsewhere.
!ere is yet one more piece of evidence to be adduced in support of the interpretation 
of the blood libel legend proposed here. To what extent is it reasonable to assume that the 
Christian celebration of the Eucharist is perceived as a form of ritual cannibalism or mur-
der? Has this perception existed in a documentable form? Relevant here is the fact that 
it was the Christians themselves who in the earliest years of Christianity were accused of 
killing infants to obtain their blood to be used for sacri'cial purposes.92 Presumably, the 
accusation was made by non-Christians who recognized the bloody cannibalistic under-
pinnings of the Eucharist, although not everyone agrees with this explanation.93 !ese 
charges were leveled very early in the history of Christianity. Pliny the Younger writing the 
Emperor Trajan circa A.D. 110 commented that he had interrogated Christian prisoners 
who adamantly denied that they had murdered children and drunk the blood.94 Tertullian, 
born in the middle of the second century, who became one of the most important early 
Christian writers, referred to Pliny’s letter in his famous Apologeticus, written near the end 
of the second century, before articulating the charges in somewhat gory detail. He begins 
his seventh chapter: “We are called abominable from the sacrament of infanticide and the 
feeding thereon.” !en a5er directing some well-chosen criticisms at rumor, which is what 
he aptly labels the blood accusation, he tries in the next chapter to show the absurdity of 
the rumor by recounting it: “Come, plunge the sword into an infant who is no one’s enemy, 
guilty of no crime, the child of all: or if such bloodshed is another’s duty, do you merely 
stand by a human dying before he has really lived; wait for the 6ight of the new life; catch 
the scarce-formed blood; with it soak your bread, and enjoy your meal.” Tertullian even 
imagines someone in charge of the ritual murder giving verbal instructions: “You have 
need of a little child, still so5, with no knowledge of death, who will smile under your 
knife; also bread, in which to gather the blood sauce.”95 !is enables us to understand a 
wave of persecutions of Christians in southern France in A.D. 177 in which mobs accused 
Christians of cannibalism. Reports of the Eucharist led to rumors that Christians had con-
sumed someone’s blood and 6esh.96
Anyone the least bit familiar with the simplistic attempts of small children to coun-
ter insults by turning the very same insults back upon the initial insulters ought to be able 
!e Ritual Murder or Blood Libel Legend 399
to see how Christians might try to de6ect the blood libel accusations aimed at them by 
claiming that it was instead another group which was guilty of performing ritual mur-
der. In one scholar’s words, “Unfortunately Christians, a5er the Christian religion became 
dominant, directed against others the calumny once directed against themselves.”97 As we 
have noted, through projective inversion, it was not Christians who were guilty of murder-
ing the Jewish son of a Jewish father god, but it was Jews who were guilty of murdering a 
Christian innocent (usually a boy).
Before the advent of psychoanalytic theory and the identi'cation or formulation of 
such concepts as projective inversion, as de'ned here, some scholars did intuitively under-
stand the basic psychodynamics of the blood libel legend. !e Dutch jurist and philoso-
pher Hugo Grotius, in a letter dated. 12 December 1636, suggested that the ritual murder 
accusation derived simply from the Christian hatred of the Jews and that the accusation 
was strangely similar to comparable accusations made against the early Christians them-
selves.98 Isidore Loeb who was one of the 'rst to recognize that the problem was one of 
psychology, not history, spoke astutely about the popular obsession with the mystical idea 
of blood. “!ose who accuse the Jews accuse or betray themselves. !e Jew is there only 
to put into action the dream [nightmare] they carry within themselves. !ey burden them 
[the Jews] with playing in their place the drama which simultaneously attracts and terri'es 
them.”99 Loeb appears to have understood that the blood libel legend is a Christian fantasy 
in which Jews were forced to act against their will.
In much the same way, twentieth-century scholars have understood the issue even if 
they fail to utilize such psychoanalytic concepts as projective inversion. For example, René 
Girard in his provocative 1987 essay “Generative Scapegoating” does not make speci'c 
mention of the blood libel legend, but he speaks eloquently of the “imaginary crimes and 
real punishments” of victims, and more to the point, he draws attention to the role rever-
sal of victimizer and victim: “!e victimizers see themselves as the passive victims of their 
own victim, and they see their victim as supremely active, eminently capable of destroying 
them.”100 So many Christians saw and for that matter still see the Jews.
!e sad truth about the blood libel legend is not so much that it was created—the 
need for such a psychological projection on the part of Christians is evident enough—but 
that it was believed to be true and accepted as such and that the lives of many individual 
Jews were adversely a8ected by some bloodthirsty Christians who believed or pretended 
to believe in the historicity of the blood libel legend.
Let me end as I began by remarking once again that not all folklore constitutes a posi-
tive and constructive force in human society. Folklore is powerful fantasy material and 
it unfortunately has the capacity to act as a dangerous and all too potent force for evil. 
I wish I could be sanguine about the blood libel legend’s eventually dying out. But the 
undeniable persistence of this pernicious legend for the past eight centuries must give one 
pause. Louis Ginzberg, the celebrated student of Jewish legends, probably summed up the 
problem best in the 'rst sentence of his unpublished 24-page “A Reply to Mr. Pranaitis,” 
inspired by the Beilis case in Kiev: “August Dillmann, the famous oriental scholar and 
Professor of Hebrew at the Berlin University, once remarked, ‘I do not see any use in refut-
ing the Blood-Accusation; those who spread it do not believe it, and the fanatical who 
believe it do not read the refutation, nor would it have any weight with them if they would 
read it.”101
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tional dialogue between a Greek Orthodox Priest and a Rabbi in which the blood libel is dis-
cussed at length. See Levinsohn 1841.
30.  Ezekiel 1900; Jacobs 1902; Meisl 1930; and Helfand 1980.
31.  Hyamson 1952:70, 71.
32.  For the papal bulls, see Anon. 1900; Strack 1909:250–59; for an English language text of 
Cardinal Ganganelli’s 1759 report, see Roth 1934; for additional references to Ganganelli’s 
'ndings, see Szajkowski 1963: 207n.33.
33.  Klein 1974.
34.  Sorlin 1967: 296n.114.
35.  Cohen 1982:43–44; cf. Burbage 1916.
36.  Roth 1934:83.
37.  Ibid., 85.
38.  Vacandard 1912:353, 359; cf. Poliakov 1974:272.
39.  Wright 1883; Handler 1980.
40.  Nussbaum 1947; Rychnovsky 1949.
41.  For details of Masaryk’s involvement, see Rychnovsky 1949.
42.  !is is one of the best-known cases of ritual murder in the twentieth century. !e best account 
is to be found in Tager 1935. For other discussions, see Polak 1949; Szajkowski 1963; Rogger 
1966; Samuel 1966; Zeitlin 1968; and Gi7n 1980. !e case was the inspiration for Malamud’s 
novel !e Fixer (1966), which in turn was the basis for an American (MGM) 'lm with the 
same title released in 1968. !ere is a long history of ritual murder trials being the source of 
poems, novels, and dramas. !e Endingen incident of 1470, for example, evolved into a full-
6edged folk drama. Trachtenberg 1966:149 claims that the Endingen Judenspiel was one of the 
most popular German dramas of the seventeenth century. See also Hsia 1988:36–40 for more 
detail. In the same way, the La Guardia incident in Spain in 1490 inspired a drama by Lope de 
Vega. For a discussion of this 1605 play, see Shepard 1968:71.
43.  See Friedman 1978; Jacobs 1979. For other American instances of blood libel, see Duker 
1980.
44.  !ere are simply too many individual case studies to list. See, for example, Chazan 1968 
for Blois (1171); Molinier 1883 for Valréas (1247); André-Michel 1914 for a case in 1297; 
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erences, see Lehr 1974 and Hsia 1988. For Russian cases, see Lintostanskii 1934; Wolpe 1961; 
and Slutsky 1972.
45.  Burton 1898:120; for the list, see 120–29.
46.  Ibid., xv; Monniot 1914:315; see also Holmes 1979:49–62; and Holmes 1981:269–70.
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48.  Polak 1949: 265.
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53.  Frazer 1913a; cf. Holmes 1981:282n.27.
54.  Shepard 1968:74.
55.  Peuckert 1935–36:734.
56.  Caster 1937:324.
57.  Tager 1935:225.
58.  Anon. 1938:8; Jacobson 1948:127–28.
59.  Tager 1935:xviii.
60.  For the full text of the letter, see Poliakov and Wulf 1959:292.
61.  Wolpe 1961:22; Newall 1973:113.
62.  Anderson 1964:97; Rappaport 1975:109. For a consideration of the blood libel legend from 
the perspective of parental treatment or mistreatment of children, see Schultz 1986 (pp. 273–
303 in this volume). For discussion of how “evidence” can be trumped up, see Strack’s “!e 
Pretended Evidence of History for Jewish Ritual Murder” 1909:169–235; or Bloch’s “Attempts 
at Fabricating ‘Ritual Murder’ 1973:365–73; or the intricate details of the e8ort to frame Beilis 
in Tager 1935.
63.  Loeb 1889:184.
64.  Reik 1923:128–129.
65.  Ibid., 129; cf. Rappaport 1975:113; Rosenman 1977:21.
66.  Reik 1923:129; cf. Rappaport 1975:113–14.
67.  Seiden 1967:78.
68.  Ibid., 145–46.
69.  Rappaport 1975:115.
70.  Rosenman 1982:243.
71.  Liefmann 1951:494.
72.  Dundes 1976.
73.  Maccoby 1982:167; cf. Hasan-Rokem and Dundes 1986:245–46.
74.  Ellis 1983:73.
75.  !is feature of the Eucharist was overlooked by Schuster 1970 in his psychoanalytic consider-
ation of the ritual.
76.  Rosenman 1977:19 mentions “the discom'ture that the Mass, so close to the parricidal crime, 
calls forth in its celebrants” in connection with the legend of the Jewish desecration of the con-
secrated wafer, but not with the blood libel legend.
77.  Schultz 1986:13 does rightly insist that the blood libel is the product of projection, but she does 
not explain the legend in terms of projective inversion.
78.  For a typical statement, see Desportes 1889:277–85.
79.  Roth 1934:83.
80.  Cf. Strack 1909:124 for additional biblical citations regarding the prohibition against con-
suming blood. !e lack of Old Testament or talmudic sanctions for Jews requiring Christian 
blood posed no problem for the true anti-Semite. !e sanctions came, supposedly, by means of 
a secret oral tradition passed on from generation to generation. Cf. Desportes 1889:252–53.
81.  Newall 1973: 114. !is speculation is somewhat analogous to Roth’s conjecture that the blood 
accusation arose from Christian misunderstanding of the Jewish feast of Purim. See Roth 
1933.
82.  Rappaport 1975:103.
83.  Cf. Bebbington 1971:33.
84.  Maccoby 1982:153.
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87.  Maccoby 1982:159, 155.
88.  Cf. Browe 1926; Despina 1971b.
89.  Strack 1909:59.
90.  Maccoby 1982:167; Cohen 1983.
91.  But see Noy 1967 and Alexander 1987 for Jewish texts of the blood libel legend. !ere is 
also the curious 'gure of the Golem (Motif D1635), a clay anthropoid mannikin which in 
Prague was thought to have been created by a rabbi who employed it to expose ritual mur-
der accusations against Jews and to apprehend the instigators of these blood libels. Cf. Bloch 
1925:37; Goldsmith 1981; and Sherwin 1985. I am indebted to Professor Dan Ben-Amos of 
the University of Pennsylvania for these references.
92.  Levinsohn 1841:171; Labriolle 1913; Schultze 1953–54; Cohn 1977:1–9.
93.  Cf. Harris 1914:200. Cohn 1977:8, however, is con'dent of this interpretation when he says, “As 
it happened, there was one feature of Christian ritual which could easily be interpreted as can-
nibalistic: the Eucharist.” In the light of the argument of the present essay, I am very tempted to 
see a possible correlation between the point in time when the doctrine of transubstantiation 'rst 
arose and the initial 6ourishing of the blood libel legend in the twel5h century. !e basic idea of 
transubstantiation apparently existed as early as the ninth century but it was not fully adopted 
until the Fourth Lateran council in 1215. Strack (1909:59) suggests a connection between the 
doctrine and the legends of Jews desecrating the host, but not the blood libel legend itself.
94.  Pliny 1925:168 (letter XCIV).
95.  Tertullian 1917:25, 29.
96.  Schuster 1970:231.
97.  Strack 1909:283.
98.  Balaban 1930:88.
99.  Loeb 1889:184–85.
100.  Girard 1987:87, 91.
101.  Pranaitis was an obscure Catholic priest who had written a pamphlet purporting to prove 
that the practice of ritual murder was advocated by Jewish religion and he had been called as 
an expert witness in the trial of Beilis in 1913. For details, see Tager 1935:199–212; Polak 
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On the Psychology of 
Collecting Folklore
(Postscript) Chain Letter: A Folk Geometric Progression
Introduction
!e question that drives this provocative essay is from Dundes’s senior mentor at Indiana 
University, Richard Dorson: “Why does the collector gather and publish tales?” Known 
for being a productive writer, Dorson answered the question with three motivating goals: 
Money, Art, and Truth. Dorson coined the term “fakelore”—used by Dundes in the pres-
ent essay to negatively describe commercial, cleverly packaged, uncritical, and random col-
lections of stories presented as genuine folklore—and he accused compilers of folklore 
anthologies, o5en titled “treasuries” (e.g., the American best-seller Treasury of American 
Folklore by B. A. Botkin in 1944), of being pseudo-collectors. Dorson implied that the 
grati'cation they provided was short lived or deceiving, and the money they made was 
tainted, drawing Dundes’s attention to a money/feces equivalence.
Dorson credited some highly regarded collectors, such as Vance Randolph from the 
Ozarks or Zora Neale Hurston in the African-American South, for using their artistic 
skills to render the work of folk narrators as literature to a reading public. While satisfy-
ing to their readers, Art, in Dorson’s view, concealed the raw power of the original source. 
He favored the natural material in its original context, which, aesthetically, raised images 
of folkloristic fascination with its “rough,” tactile-like stimulation. !e true, “pure” folk-
lorist, Dorson declared, was a5er Truth, in his or her protection of the sanctity of the 
text performed in the style of the narrator. According to Dorson, this goal o8ered a spiri-
tual reward, the intellectual honesty of preserving a natural state. His concluding com-
ment about a model folkloristic publication probably drew Dundes’s psychoanalytic atten-
tion: “!e electric excitement of 'eldwork and chance encounters with memorable folk 
can enliven the work, and save it from being a lifeless parade of texts. Such an ideal book 
will employ enough Art to make Truth more visible, and perhaps even a little Money 
will follow” (Dorson 1957). I have added emphasis to underscore the binary of life and 
death as the equivalent of varied, liberated stimulation (encounters) and uniform disci-
pline (parade). Besides the priority of the vital natural body—apparent in his statement 
of folkloristic practice in which money, a fecal substitute, “follows” in excretory fashion 
rather than coming 'rst—Dorson’s essay begged the question of how literally to take the 
On the Psychology of Collecting Folklore 411
identity-forming metaphor of folklorists’ “working,” indeed “digging,” in the 'eld outside 
the self, and bringing material back to examine and manipulate.
Dorson’s answer of “Money, Art, Truth” can be rephrased as collecting, organizing, and 
publishing data as human products. !at instrumental result raised the additional, more 
probing question that Dundes focused on: “Why collect?” !e condensed question has, 
on its surface, an epistemological implication of the kind of truth gained from the accre-
tion of variants from oral sources. On a psychological level, it provides an appeal to, or 
motivation of, workers sustaining this kind of e8ort. Indeed, collecting takes as its root 
the Latin collectus, for “gathering.” According to the Oxford English Dictionary, it is related 
to words of pleasure-deriving agency, such as attract, protect, and correct. !e collecting 
praxis is not unique to folklorists, but it has distinguished them, as Dorson’s following 
comment attested: “What the state paper is to the historian and creative work to the liter-
ary scholar, the oral traditional text is—or should be—to the student of folklore” (1964). 
!is point has been rea7rmed in folkloristic reference works extending into the twenty-
'rst century (see the entries for “'eldwork” and “ethnography and 'eldwork,” respectively, 
in Brunvard 1996 and Bronner 2006b). In previous essays in the present volume, Dundes 
problematized several assumptions implicit in this statement: the criterion of orality, the 
separation of literature and folklore, the reliance on text as a unit of analysis, and a histori-
cal or devolutionary bias in recovering texts. To turn the analytical lens from the tradi-
tional externalized, creative teller to the folklore collector (as a kind of creator who skill-
fully “draws out” expressions and cra5s products from them), Dundes asked for much of 
the same kind of life-history taking that is called for in contextualizing narrators in mod-
ern folkloristics, in order to answer the question “why tell?” (See, for instance, the chapter 
“Why Do !ey Tell?” [MacDonald 2006]).
Dundes’s essay drew attention to the need for 'eldworkers to take a re6exive position, 
a point later developed in self-re6ective studies such as Jackson and Ives 1996; Georges 
and Jones 1980; and Cli8ord and Marcus 1986. Since Dundes’s essay appeared, there have 
been fewer psychobiographies of individual folklorists than experiential accounts, but 
readers can still consult several examples: Bronner 2005b, 2005c; and Mechling 1989b.
Dundes contended that even if more 'eldworkers shared more biographical material 
about themselves in the research process, they probably would not be able to interpret their 
own motivations, because of repressed desires and anxieties developed early in infancy. 
!e analyst, aware of the personality characteristics of collectors and the symbolic equiva-
lences of the gathering and ordering praxis, might be able to present, in Dundes’s words, a 
“hypothetical framework” for underlying motivations, and, in the process of analysis, bring 
into consciousness the signi'cance of folklore as allurement and stimulus, in addition to 
“truth.” Dundes viewed folklore as a constructed object in the folklorist’s work of render-
ing oral expression into visible, and usually 'xed, readable form. !e background for this 
objecti'cation was Freud’s idea of “anal eroticism,” based on postulated infantile stages of 
psychosexual development in which sensuous pleasure was derived from stimulation of 
the anus. According to this theory, in the anal stage (from about two to three years old), 
the child builds object-relationships that have meanings associated with what to them are 
desirable, feces and defecation. Freud suggested, for example, the symbolic equivalences of 
feces/gi5s (A = B) and gi5s/money (B = C), leading to the conclusion that money con-
notes feces (A = C, represented in the phrase “'lthy rich”).
Other Freudian analysts, such as Karl Abraham and Ernest Jones, elaborated on anal 
character traits that could develop from the infantile stage, once as the child got older 
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adults repressed these into coprophilic activities . Dundes, especially, linked anal reten-
tion to collectors who “sit on” or “hold back” their accreting material, ordering and clas-
sifying it, in order to gain narcissistic pleasure in the act of possession. Another charac-
ter trait relevant to folklorists, and a hint of Dundes’s own attitude, was anal ejection, a 
process of molding and manipulating material, equivalent to the professional who “feels 
compelled to publish.” !e anal-ejective personality is more tolerant of dirt, and generally 
relaxed and sharing, according to this theory. One of the folkloristic implications was the 
methods and materials that attracted the 'eld’s workers. Dundes suggested that the anal-
retentive character was drawn to classi'catory systems, such as tale-type and motif indexes 
(o5en containing uncontaminated ideal forms and rare specimens), while the anal-ejective 
(or expulsive) personality was enticed by the abundance of earthy or “dirty” materials in 
jokes (as Dundes was) and possibly in legends, rituals, and speech. !e classi'catory praxis, 
to Dundes, was inward-directed, since it was intended for one’s own organization or for 
those separating themselves as folklorists, in contradistinction to the anal-ejective person-
ality, who reproduced and expanded the material to share it with others. Dundes made the 
anal-ejective argument that folklore is everywhere, and that the folk are us. Rather than 
following the convention of separating folk into layers of self and other, literate and non-
literate, and civilized and peasant, Dundes de'ned folk as “any group of people whatsoever 
who share at least one common factor.” Hence, in an ejective mode, di8erent overlapping 
folk identities can be held simultaneously. 
Dundes pointed to the popular association of folklore with childhood (e.g., nursery 
rhymes, playground games, taunts, and beliefs) as a source of the connection between anal-
ity and collecting. !us, the materials of folklore correlated with the anal stage of develop-
ment, even though Dundes, the analyst, had made a case for a “modern,” expulsive-sound-
ing de'nition of folklore as something constantly being adapted, and emerging anew, in 
all stages and groups of life. Indeed, to establish his symbolist position, Dundes expressed 
dissatisfaction for, and the limitation of, collection and classi'cation as an end in itself. 
Collection tended to preserve old materials as precious antiques (he referred to the pre-
modern concept pejoratively as antiquarianism), while his “modern” de'nition brought 
the “folk” and “lore” together as a living, renewable resource.
Dundes understood that readers might be skeptical of his interpretation of the col-
lecting praxis as an expression of anality, or that they might be able to come up with 
alternative readings. It could be pointed out, for example, that in the thrill attributed to 
'eldwork by Dorson and others, there are frequently hints of intimacy with one’s sub-
ject and informants. Further, it is possible to sketch an active, perhaps phallocentric, 
position of “getting into” communities, 'nding human “tradition-bearers” through a 
process of social intercourse, and using intrusive technology to distinguish folklorists 
from the allegedly “passive” historians and literary scholars, who are trapped in the con-
'nes of the library with “lifeless” documents and texts (see Jackson 1987 and Goldstein 
1964). Folklorists are o5en in the fertile 'eld (with its generative rhetoric in the lit-
erature, such as “harvesting,” “gathering,” and “hunting” lore), and they may shed the 
trappings of the “ivory tower” while engaging in a “hands-on” participant-observation 
approach Dorson claimed he did, in his classic account of 'eldwork a5er leaving the 
con'nes of Michigan State University for the “wilds” of Michigan’s Upper Peninsula 
(1952). However, folklorists share with other scholars the anal-retentive traits of edu-
cation—as a learned enterprise involving the accretion of books and knowledge—ex-
pressed in the lore of a B.S., M.S. (More of the Same), and Ph.D. (Piled Higher and 
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Deeper). Again, there may be infantilization suggested by the taunt that scholars have 
never le5 school! (See Bronner 1995.)
!e postscript to “On the Psychology of Collecting Folklore” took a di8erent kind of 
re6exive strategy, by pointing to the folklore of folklorists as a re6ection of their cognition 
and values (for an elaboration of the idea of the folklore of folklorists, see Reuss 1974). In 
this essay, Dundes discussed chain letters he received, as they gave him an opportunity to 
show the stability and change of a folk item. !ey also attested that folklore, in this case in 
the form of a printed letter (more recently adapted to e-mails), was not restricted to oral 
tradition. !e chain letter, as a wish-ful'llment fantasy, re6ected men’s folklore. Related 
to the previous essay, it also suggested the appeal of accretion, particularly in a capitalistic 
society, and, arguably, the objecti'cation of women in a phallocentric culture. For discus-
sions a5er Dundes’s essay on chain letters, see Duncan 1976, Boles and Myers 1988, and 
Fine and Boles 2006.
Lest folklorists think that the folk are always others, Dundes provided a second exam-
ple of a chain letter as folk letter, this time one transmitted by folklorists. He implied 
that to be successful, the chain should involve anal-ejective scholars who felt compelled 
to produce articles. It also represented what Dundes called “literalization of a metaphor,” 
for in setting up the chain, folklorists were linked by their discipline. Receiving scores of 
reprints, the reward for producing, made one’s piles accrete. As a re6ection of values, it 
also expressed folklore’s relation, as a productive 'eld, to other “traditional” disciplines. 
(For a related chain letter in the folklore of folklorists, see Jan Harold Brunvand 1977.) 
For Dundes, the example of folklorists’ folklore underlined essential points about the folk 
process: it provided a socially sanctioned outlet for desires, feelings, and taboos; and it was 
renewable, purposeful, and functional, adapting old forms to new or di8erent conditions 
and transmitting media. Consequently, Dundes asserted, “there will always be folklore.” In 
his exempli'cation, society needs folklore—and folklorists to make sense of it all.
414
On the Psychology of Collecting Folklore
Within recent decades, professional folklorists have placed 
more and more emphasis upon obtaining biographical and other background informa-
tion about informants. A collector of folklore is expected to do more than merely indicate 
his or her sources. He or she is encouraged to provide just as much pertinent data describ-
ing his or her informants as possible. !e purpose is presumably to aid in relating folklore 
to individual bearers of tradition and more especially to cultural context. In contrast to 
the previous practice of studying folklore materials in the abstract, the sociological and 
psychological study of folklore is facilitated by this new interest in particular informants. 
Nevertheless, one aspect of the collecting situation remains singularly untouched. While 
folklorists may be coming closer to an answer to the perennial question of why individuals 
tell tales, sing folksongs, etc., the motivation of folklorists in collecting folklore in the 'rst 
place is rarely considered. Richard Dorson, however, does ask, in an important article on 
collecting folktales, “Why does the collector gather and publish tales?”1
In order to answer this question satisfactorily, it will probably be necessary to study 
background information on the collectors of folklore. Unfortunately, most of the famous 
collectors, although they do occasionally give numerous details about their various infor-
mants, fail to give relevant biographical material about themselves. In the absence of such 
material, the psychology of collecting folklore must of necessity remain largely a matter of 
conjecture. !e following consideration of this question is admittedly speculative, but it 
is sincerely hoped that the hypothetical framework suggested will be supported or refuted 
by forthcoming data provided by honest self-critical collectors of the future. No attempt is 
made here to discuss the scienti'c value of folkloric materials collected nor are the various 
uses to which folklore may be put considered. Only the underlying psychological motivation 
for the collecting of folklore is the subject of the present inquiry.
It has long been recognized that collecting folklore is akin to collecting other objects. W. 
W. Newell in the very 'rst issue of the Journal of American Folklore quotes Charles G. Leland 
on the popular opinion of the collection of folklore, “that it amounts to gathering mere lit-
erary bric-a-brac and collecting traditionary postage-stamps and buttons.”2 More recently, 
Louise Pound expressed a similar view, but with the additional remark that folklore was a 
more worthwhile object for collection than many other materials diligently collected.
Teachers, clergymen, attorneys, writers, and others o5en feel prompted to hunt 
out the traditions, legends, songs, and tales of their own region. Why not? Such 
persons are of much the same type as those who search for antique furniture, old 
glassware, and the like. Some may call them dillettantes, but surely their hob-
bies are acceptable enough; and o5en, too, their activities are helpful to special-
ists. Indeed, popular traditions seem to me more laudable for collection than do 
many of the objects now o5en gathered ardently, such as match covers, pictures 
of ball players and cinema stars, and among children, of back of playing cards and 
even of colored milk bottle tops.3
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Dorson, however, suggests that the aimless collection of folklore is really not so di8erent 
from collecting less laudable materials when he states that “A collector guided by no larger 
purpose than the desire to accumulate new species of texts might as well collect buttons or 
butter6ies.”4 If collecting folklore is one aspect of the collecting tradition in general, then 
perhaps the motivation for collecting folklore is related to the motivation for collecting 
objects in general.
At the beginning of this century, it was assumed that there was a collecting instinct and 
that this instinct was manifested in the diverse collecting activities of children.5 Later studies 
of children’s collecting sought to avoid raising the question of the instinctive character of col-
lecting, although by and large the feeling was that the assumption of a collecting instinct was 
premature and that collecting was attributable not to a hereditary predisposition so much 
as to environmental conditioning.6 !e collecting instinct, therefore, became the collecting 
tendency. However, the environmentalists had di7culty in explaining why frequently the 
object collected was of little apparent value (e.g., bottle tops, match covers, etc.).
Probably the most comprehensive attempt to elucidate the rationale underlying collect-
ing activities is that formulated by psychoanalysts. According to psychoanalytic theory, the 
etiological basis of collecting was anal eroticism. Brie6y, Freud suggested that individuals 
from infancy onward 'nd genuine physical pleasure in the act of defecation. However, at 
least in Western society, the individual is soon made aware of adult demands that this activ-
ity should be strictly regulated. Toilet training consists largely of conditioning an infant to 
control his excretory activity. Psychoanalysts further claim that this controlling or holding 
back becomes in itself a source of pleasure. According to Ferenczi, “!e excrementa thus 
held back are really the 'rst ‘savings’ of the growing being, and as such remain in a con-
stant, unconscious inter-relationship with every bodily activity or mental striving that has 
anything to do with collecting, hoarding, and saving.”7 Moreover, from the Freudian point 
of view, the infant has a natural curiosity concerning the fecal material he or she produces. 
But the infant’s attempts to explore and play with this material are almost inevitably dis-
couraged by adults and the child is gradually introduced to a succession of less undesir-
able substances ranging from mud pies to sand piles to modeling clay and 'nger paints.8 
From this perspective, “Collecting is a sublimation of anal-retentive desires, and the collec-
tor’s pleasure in it is a continuation of his infantile narcissistic pleasure in his own feces.”9 
Actually, there appear to be two separate contributing factors to the genesis of collecting 
activity and Karl Abraham makes an important distinction between, on the one hand, the 
act of excretion which provides pleasure, and on the other hand, the products of the excre-
tory process in which an individual may 'nd pleasure.10
Although Freud in his paper, “Character and Anal Erotism,” did speak of three charac-
teristics of anal character: orderliness, parsimony, and obstinacy, he did not mention col-
lecting speci'cally.11 Rather it was Ernest Jones who referred to collecting when he devel-
oped Freud’s insights in greater detail in his paper “Anal-Erotic Character Traits.” Jones 
noted that there were basically two opposing tendencies resulting from anal conditioning: 
“the tendencies to keep and postpone production and to produce feverishly.” He suggested 
that the two tendencies might be termed the “retaining” and the “ejecting” tendencies.12 
Combining these two contrasting tendencies with the possibilities of sublimation and 
reaction formation, Jones delineated a fourfold typology of anal characterology. He was, 
of course, careful to say that these four classi'cations are by no means mutually exclusive.
!e 'rst classi'cation is retaining-sublimation and its two aspects are “the refusal to 
give and the desire to gather.” In discussing this classi'cation, Jones makes the categorical 
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statement that all collectors are anal-erotics. !e second classi'cation is retaining-reac-
tion formation. Reaction formation, in contrast to sublimation which consists of select-
ing a socially acceptable substitute for a tabooed object or activity, is basically a total 
rejection of the original pleasure-seeking tendency. !us pleasure is found, not in dirti-
ness, but in cleanliness. Cleanliness is o5en extended into orderliness. Individuals of this 
disposition are prone to systematize and organize so that objects may be neatly placed in 
their proper place. !e third classi'cation is ejection-sublimation. Individuals in this cat-
egory are generous and apt to “give out” material. Sublimation may be evidenced by the 
desire to manipulate the material and to mould it or create out of it. !e fourth classi'-
cation, namely ejection-reaction formation is somewhat similar to the second classi'ca-
tion in that it is characterized by a denial of an interest in dirt. Individuals of this type 
take little interest in their material or mental productions and o5en seek to discard or get 
rid of them.
Although the Freudian notion of anal character is by no means universally accepted, even 
critics admit that it is “the most clearly-drawn picture in Freud’s album of characterology.”13 
!e relevance of the Freudian hypothesis to the psychology of collecting folklore is some-
what dependent upon the idea of occupational determinism. Among psychoanalysts, there 
are those who insist that people choose vocations (usually unconsciously) on the basis of 
particular individual infantile conditioning. In fact, it has even been suggested that anal 
erotica would do well in occupations involving collecting and systematic indexing, as in 
positions as museum curators or archivists.14 An example of an anally conditioned occupa-
tion choice might be found in the life of Benvenuto Cellini who, in addition to collecting 
pebbles, shells, and eventually gems, decided at the age of '5een to become a goldsmith. 
Gold is a common symbolic equivalent of feces as numerous folklore motifs testify, and 
the aesthetic pleasure obtained from beating and moulding gold is derived from an early 
activity, namely the infantile real or fantasied play with excrement.
!ough most folklorists are skeptical of psychoanalysis, to say the least, perhaps some 
may see the application of Freudian theory to the psychology of the collecting of folk-
lore as well as to the speci'c methods employed in the treatment and study of folk-
lore. In addition, considerable light may be shed upon the personalities of various well-
known folklorists.
First of all, folklore as an object of collection is o5en regarded as a useless product 
of human activity. Just as cancelled stamps, empty beer bottles, etc., in one sense repre-
sent waste products, folklore has historically also been regarded in much the same, way. 
For example, when the indefatigable Danish collector, E. Tang Kristensen, obtained a new 
teaching position he had sought, a member of the parish council concerned said to him, 
“We won’t have you, you take up so much of your time with rubbish. . . .”15 In fact, folklor-
ists are still trying to convince both the public and the foundations that folkloric materials 
are valuable and worth collecting.
Another curious fact is the professional folklore collector’s insistence that the material 
be entirely oral. It must come from the mouths of informants, and preferably not from 
printed sources. In other words, the collector stands ready to gather the precious material 
as it falls from a body aperture, namely the oral cavity. In Freudian parlance, this might 
be construed as displacement from below upward. Strangely enough there is o5en the 
feeling that as soon as the material is put on paper, it is somehow less authentic. It is also 
of interest that if folklore is considered as survivals or if it is remembered that folkloric 
material is o5en 'rst encountered in early childhood, then collecting folklore is, in part, 
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collecting materials of the past and possibly in particular the materials of childhood. (No 
doubt many non-folklorists consider the study of folklore as something of a regression to 
childhood.)
It is somewhat of a surprise to discover that part of the accepted methodology of folk-
lore scholarship may be related to the psychology of collecting folklore. Collecting usually 
implies some order, namely that the objects collected are subject to some kind of classi'ca-
tion. Bearing in mind Jones’ second classi'cation of anal character (retaining-reaction for-
mation) with its emphasis upon orderly, systematic arrangement, one can appreciate the 
following statement, written not with reference to folklore, but about collecting in gen-
eral: “!e striving for form also manifests itself in the tendency of modern collectors to 
follow a speci'c sequence in forming and arranging collections, as well as in the desire to 
complete de'nite ‘sets’ or series of exhibits. !e nature of these sequences will vary accord-
ing to the subject of the collection itself, !ey may be historical or geographical. . . .”16  !e 
historical-geographical method is, of course, a highly organized and systematic form of 
collecting! !is may be seen by noting the representational or relational aspects of collec-
tions in general. W. N. Durost, in giving a basic de'nition of a collection stresses this very 
point. He suggests that the use or the value of the object collected is of secondary impor-
tance for purposes of de'nition. A collection may or may not be of practical use or of cul-
turally recognized value. What is important, according to Durost, are the representational 
or relational criteria. He points out that if an object or idea is valued chie6y for the relation 
it bears to some other object or idea, or objects, or ideas, such as being one of a series, part 
of a whole, a specimen of a class, then it is the subject of a collection.17 One can see that the 
historical-geographical method entails collecting specimens of a class: for example, ver-
sions of a single tale type. !e more specimens or versions one can amass, presumably the 
better the study. !e idea of considering an object in terms of its being one of a series calls 
to mind the ballad collector who specializes in collecting numbers in Child’s closed canon. 
A ballad collector obtaining a Child ballad is like a stamp collector obtaining an impor-
tant stamp in a certain series. D. K. Wilgus mentions the penchant of American ballad col-
lectors for collecting Child numbers and refers, for example, to Reed Smith’s score sheets 
showing which collectors in which states had collected the most Child ballads.18
Another aspect of folklore scholarship relating to the classi'catory aspect of collecting 
may be seen by recalling the elaborate book classi'cation scheme of Samuel Pepys. Pepys 
collected books (and also ballads) but later shi5ed his interest to arranging his collection. 
In a letter of August 10, 1663, he remarked that his chief delight was in the neatness of 
everything and that he could not be pleased with anything unless it was very neat, which 
he admitted was a strange folly. He had all his books bound alike and he arranged them 
symmetrically according to size. In order still to be able to use his library Pepys devised a 
complex cataloging system which provided for the numbering and lettering of shelves and 
books. According to one account of Pepys’ system, a key catalogue was prepared and “by 
consulting this for the title desired one could locate the volume’s position on the shelves 
by number: i.e., the 'rst book on the front row on the shelf fourth from the top in Press 
One would be marked ‘1.4a.1’”19 Had Pepys lived several centuries later, he might have 
compiled a motif index!
One can now see how Jones’ classi'cations may be used to distinguish di8erent empha-
ses among folklorists. Some folklorists are primarily interested in collecting (retaining-sub-
limation) while others are specialists in a classi'catory kind of collection (retaining-reaction 
formation). It might be noted that the latter’s reaction formation is clearly revealed by 
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their opposition to discussing so-called “dirty” folklore, or even acknowledging its exis-
tence. For example, classi'cation schemes might very well simply omit portions which 
have to do with obscene materials. !e anal retentive nature of some collectors is mani-
fested by their putting their manuscripts or tapes in a secret or locked place, o5en denying 
others access to their materials. Frequently, they refuse to publish. By a curious verbal coin-
cidence (which is probably no accident), one o5en hears such collectors described as “sit-
ting on” their material. (“Sitting tight” has somewhat the same connotation. “Tight” com-
monly means stingy in the sense of being reluctant to part with something.20) Here is the 
signi'cance of Abraham’s distinction between the pleasure of the act of excretion and the 
pleasure in possessing the products of excretion. To illustrate this type of folklorist, i.e., one 
who loves to collect but who hates to publish, is not di7cult. (Cf. the two aspects of Jones’ 
'rst classi'cation: the desire to gather and refusal to give.) One example should su7ce. It 
should not be necessary to state that no disrespect is intended nor is there any attempt to 
minimize, the e8orts of one of the most important collectors of American folklore in the 
following consideration of Frank C. Brown.21
Frank C. Brown was an enthusiastic and tireless collector, but he simply could not bring 
himself to publish. !ough a volume of folklore was scheduled to appear by Christmas of 
1914, the 'rst volume of Brown’s material did not appear until 1952, years a5er his death. 
Members of the North Carolina Folklore Society, not understanding Brown’s personal-
ity pattern, began dropping their memberships in protest over Brown’s failure to publish 
his wealth of materials. (Incidentally, one of the purposes of this study is to make folklor-
ists more tolerant of the foibles of some collectors and at same time to urge those who 
have material to make it available to others.) !e anal retentive nature of Brown’s behav-
ior is apparent in a statement opposing the suggestions made by members of the Society. 
He said, “I am quite, sure that I am not going to give up my own materials to anybody.” 
Brown obviously felt that the materials, though taken 'om others, were his personal pos-
sessions. He is a prime example of the collector described in the following passage written 
by a non-Freudian:
All the desires and interests which contribute toward making any sort of individ-
ual into a collector are given focus by the fact of personal possession. From the 
small boy to the great connoisseur; the joy of standing before one’s accumulated 
pile and being able to say, “!is belongs to me!” is the culmination of that feeling 
which begins with the ownership of the 'rst item.22
Newman I. White observes that Brown was “tenacious of his manuscripts” and that “he 
allowed nothing to stop him,” a personality trait in accord with the third of Freud’s charac-
teristics of anal character, obstinacy. Brown was especially interested in ballads and he took 
great pride in building up the number of Child ballads discovered in North Carolina. He 
was very pleased that he had been able to gather more than '5y numbers of the canonical 
series. However, his pleasure was con'ned to collecting. His own statement of his attempts 
to publish con'rm his personality pattern. “When I try to write an article, I almost invari-
ably lose interest in it before I get my notes copied. My interest is at fever heat in making an 
outline and in making a rough dra5, but as soon as this has been made, somehow my inter-
est lags and I almost become sick when I feel that it is necessary to tear the thing to pieces 
and rewrite it.” Apparently Brown could not bear to touch anything that he produced. 
Here also is clearly indicated his inability to part with or destroy anything he amassed or 
created. !is is in marked contrast to Jones’ fourth classi'cation in which individuals take 
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little interest in their materials and, in fact, seek to get rid of them. Brown gave only two 
papers at the North Carolina Folklore Society meetings and in view of his unmistakable 
anal character traits, it is noteworthy that one of them was entitled: “Treasure Hunting 
in North Carolina.”23 Treasure is a common coprophilic symbol, particularly when it is 
removed from the “bowels” of the earth in buried form.
While the anal retentive folklore collector is loath to publish, the anal ejective col-
lector is, on the contrary, o5en feels compelled to publish. Frequently the publication is 
extremely “regular.” Ferenczi refers to the latter type of anal personality as “tolerant on the 
matter of dirt, extravagant, and easy-going.”24 However, sometimes the anal ejective seeks 
to mould or manipulate his material. Here may be found one possible reason for the pro-
duction of fakelore.25 !e material is reshaped according to the aesthetic standards of the 
anal ejective. Consequently, coarse or dirty elements are fastidiously “eliminated.” If this 
kind of reaction formation and sublimation is combined with the general anal ejective ten-
dency, then such individuals would be quite likely to publish regularly “treasuries” of doc-
tored or re-worked texts. !is is in contrast to the anal ejective who is tolerant of, if not 
attracted by “dirty’ materials (e.g. jokes). !e latter would also publish regularly, but the 
materials would be le5 pretty much as collected, that is, with the crude elements remain-
ing.26 !is practice would undoubtedly annoy the fakelorist who goes to great lengths to 
eliminate such details in his or her attempt to deny any anal basis to the collection and 
study of oral tradition. One fakelorist, several years ago, wrote a letter to the o7cers of 
the American Folklore Society protesting the work of a collector who insisted upon pre-
senting texts as they were related by the folk. !e true nature of the anal-oral quarrel was 
unwittingly suggested when the author of the letter asked indignantly if the o7cers of the 
Society wanted a toilet in their dining room. Of course, to anyone who felt impelled to 
reshape or mould material, nothing could be more shocking than to be confronted with 
the anal reality so scrupulously avoided.
Although, as has been mentioned previously, biographical data on collectors is rarely 
available, one might, nevertheless, suggest certain possible personality characteristics of 
collectors of folklore. For one thing, it is very likely that they collect other items, such as 
books (some of which may be in languages they cannot really read), musical instruments 
(some of which they may be unable to play), records, bibliography, stamps, etc. Walter 
Anderson, for example, is a bibliographer and numismatist. Some folklore collectors may 
have the habit of reading in the bathroom. (According to psychoanalysts, such reading 
is an act of incorporation intended to balance the material which is lost through defe-
cation.28 If they are anal ejective and enjoy seeing their material in print, they may very 
well have the habit of looking at their feces a5er producing it. (!e relationship between 
publishing and bowel habits was supported by the case of one collector who, soon a5er 
he started publishing scattered articles in various journals, began to su8er from repeated 
diarrhea. It would be interesting to know whether those folklorists who have di7culty 
in publishing ever su8er from constipation. Unfortunately, there are no data available on 
this point and it is doubtful if those in a position to provide data would be self-sacri'cing 
enough to furnish it.) If they are anal retentive, they may have the habit of never being able 
to throw anything out. It has been noted that “An unwillingness ever to throw anything 
away, while in itself not enough to make a collector, is certainly a characteristic directly 
related to collecting.”29 !us it is no surprise to learn that the celebrated Norwegian.col-
lector Asbjörnsen is described as being “virtually incapable of destroying a scrap of paper if 
anything was written on it.”30
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While this by no means exhausts the possible anal personality characteristics of col-
lectors of folklore, it is at least an indication of some possible ones. It is to be hoped that 
someday there will be enough data to explain more fully the psychology of collecting folk-
lore as well as numerous other forms of collecting activity. It may well turn out that the 
reasons why folklorists collect folklore are related to the reasons why certain members of 
the folk collect folklore, the latter in some cases becoming prize informants for the profes-
sional folklorist.31
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Postscript
Chain Letter: A Folk Geometric Progression
The appeal of geometric progressions is at least as old as the tale of the 
origin of chess (Motif Z 21.1) in which the inventor asks one grain of wheat for the 'rst 
square, two for the second, four for the third and so forth. Part of the interest undoubt-
edly stems from the unexpected “magical” change from an insigni'cant initial number, 
namely, one, to an astronomical 'gure in a relatively short space of time. In the folktale, the 
e8ect of the magical incremental increase is the overwhelming of the king for whom the 
game of chess was invented. Another obvious source of pleasure derives from the fact that 
the inventor of the game and presumably of the clever mathematical stratagem receives an 
extraordinary amount of material reward. !ese same characteristics of overwhelming an 
antagonist and of “getting rich quick” are also found in a more contemporary traditional 
form based upon a geometric progression: the chain letter.
!e chain letter, probably one of the best known types of a number of equally tradi-
tional letters, has been noted by several folklorists. Halpert showed that the chain letter 
is popular in the United States and England while an earlier note by Deonna revealed the 
form’s existence in Europe (e.g., France, Italy, and Switzerland).1 In chain letters, there is a 
de'nite structural pattern, a pattern which appears to prevail regardless of the particular 
content of any one individual chain letter. First, there is a statement proclaiming that the 
letter is a chain letter. !is enunciation may perhaps be analogous to the opening formula 
found at the beginning of other forms of folklore: “Once upon a time,” “Riddle me, riddle 
me right,” “Ready or not, here I come.” !e formula serves to indicate either the nature of 
the traditional form which is to follow or the formal moment at which an example of a tra-
ditional form begins or both. !e second important feature in chain letters is the injunc-
tion or order to send copies of the letter to a speci'c number of friends or acquaintances, 
sometimes within a de'nite period of time. !e third item consists of a description, usu-
ally detailed, of the desirable consequences which will occur if the receiver of the letter 
complies with the terms of the injunction. Sometimes, a case history of a previous “win-
ner” is cited, which functions as an explanatory motif sometimes does in the sense of pro-
viding the requisite “ocular proof ” that the procedure is a bona 'de one. !e fourth part 
of the sequential structure is a warning. Typically it is in the form of a statement of the 
one or more undesirable consequences which will result if the injunction is ignored or dis-
obeyed. !is portion of the chain letter is o5en illustrated by a case history, but whereas 
the case history for the third segment was a positive one, the case history for the warning 
is de'nitely negative. Usually it is related how an unwise individual scorned the injunction 
and how by so doing he became a “loser.” !e structural pattern of chain letters is thus not 
dissimilar to sequential patterns found in other folkloric forms. In superstitions, one can 
obtain good luck by complying with an injunction just as one can incur bad luck by violat-
ing an interdiction.2
On the Psychology of Collecting Folklore 423
!e following examples of chain letters should serve to illustrate the nature of this form 
of non-oral tradition and to attest to its continued popularity in American culture. In 
addition, these examples show how folklore can both re6ect cultural values and institu-
tions and o8er an outlet or escape from these same values and institutions.
In the 'rst text, which is very similar to one reported by Halpert from Murray, 
Kentucky, bearing a 1955 date, the case history exempli'cation of the desirable conse-
quence is appended as a postscript.3
I
June 20, 1957 
Dear Friend :
!is chain letter was started by a man like yourself in the hope it will bring 
relief to tired business men.
!is does not cost you anything. Kindly send a copy of this letter to 've of 
your friends who seem equally tired and discouraged.
Bundle up your wife and send her to the man whose name appears at the top 
of the list and then add your name to the bottom of it.
When your name comes to the top of the list, you will receive 16,740 women. 
Some of them will be dandies.
You must always have faith. Do not break this chain. One man broke the 
chain and he got HIS OLD LADY back again.
Sincerely yours,
P.S. At the date of this writing, a friend of mine received 556 women. !ey 
buried him yesterday. It took three undertakers 35 hours to get the smile o8 
his face.
!e content of the letter is similar to the content of many jokes. !e traditional ingre-
dients of male impotence (“tired business men”), dissatisfaction with one’s wife, and the 
common male dream of having an in'nite variety and number of women available as sex-
ual partners are present. G. Legman has observed that this dream of being “husband of all 
the women in the world” is particularly prevalent among those who are of an age when 
they are least able physically to indulge in repeated or strenuous sexual activities.4 !e 'nal 
postscript con'rms the fact that men too tired to conduct business a8airs may be killed by 
excess. It is noteworthy that the fantasy is externally initiated. Within the chain letter con-
text, one does not necessarily himself decide to send his wife away while he awaits scores 
of other women. Rather, the receiver of the letter is ordered to send away his wife and he is 
thus free from the guilt and responsibility of making a decision of this kind. Similarly, he 
does not himself seek other women. Rather other women are automatically sent to him. 
Presumably the “logic” is: how can anyone be responsible for what others send him in the 
mail? !is function of the chain letter in projecting individual desires to an impersonal, 
mechanical process which requires the individual to ful'll his desires is also manifest in 
the following example.
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II
March 19, 1962 
Dear Alan,
Please send a reprint of your latest paper on ethnology and/or cultural anthro-
pology, folklore, linguistics, archaeology, etc., to the 'rst named person on the 
list below, and copies of this letter to four folklorists, anthropologists, etc., whom 
you know, within three days.
In about 26 days—if you answer promptly—you should receive 272 reprints 
from some amazing people.
Please don’t spoil this game, which has been going since 1956!
In your four letters copy the following list, leaving out the top name, and add-
ing your own name at the bottom.
Yours sincerely,
Butler Waugh
Assistant Professor of English
1. Prof. Wayland D. Hand, University of California, Los Angeles 24, 
California, U.S.A.
2. Prof. Francis Lee Utley, Dept. of English, Ohio State University, Columbus 
14, Ohio, U.S.A.
3. Prof. Holger Olof Nygard, Dept. of English, Duke University, Durham, 
N.C., U.S.A.
4. Prof. Butler Waugh, Dept. of English, University of Florida, Gainesville, 
Florida, U.S.A.
!is chain letter is one which circulated recently among folklorists.5 One reason for 
noting this particular specimen is that it demonstrates that professional folklorists are folk 
themselves. !ere is not only the folklore of folklore; there is the folklore of folklorists! 
Folklorists do not simply study tradition; they enjoy and participate in it as well, an occu-
pational characteristic which does not necessarily put folklorists in a favorable scholarly 
light—at least when viewed by suspicious colleagues in other disciplines. However, if stu-
dents of folksong sing folksongs, if students of jokes like to tell jokes, then it should really 
come as no surprise to learn that folklorists send chain letters. Of greater import is the 
evidence supporting the notion that a group will shape a particular folkloric form to 't 
their own peculiar needs. Folklorists, as a folk group, have transmuted the chain letter 
into a device for advertising their scholarly accomplishments. !e folklorists’ chain letter 
like the “publish or perish” oikotype of the “do or die” proverb is a re6ector of culture and 
of values, in this instance the culture and values of American folklorists. By means of the 
chain letter, folklorists ask their friends to send a reprint of their last paper to colleagues. 
(Heaven help the poor soul whose “last” reprint is dated several years back and of course 
breaking the chain might be construed as a tacit admission that one either had no recent 
reprint at all or had no recent reprint he or she felt worthy of circulating to professional 
peers.) Appropriately enough, the material reward consists of scores of reprints. One of 
the principal functions of folklore is the reinforcement of traditional values. Among the 
folk of academe, one of the unwritten laws is that one must not only publish, but one must 
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let others know that one is publishing. One of the conventional means of accomplish-
ing this is by sending o8prints of articles to colleagues and department chairs. One can 
see then that the folklorists’ chain letter makes mandatory what the folklorist wishes, but 
the motivation is externalized and removed from the individual, just as was the case in the 
'rst chain letter example. In folklore, the unpermitted or the unstated is permitted and 
stated. Heterosexual body contact might be taboo under ordinary circumstances to those 
performing folk dances, but by participating in folk dances, the order for body contact is 
dictated from without (e.g., from a “caller”). !us in the present instance, folklorists as 
members of an academic community might not like to admit that sending out reprints is a 
mechanical procedure done for personal and material gain. However, the chain letter, like 
other forms of folklore, provides a socially sanctioned outlet or excuse for the overt expres-
sion of an actual wish. By using the chain letter, the individual folklorist is free to feel that 
he or she is sending out a reprint, not because he or she wants to, but because he or she has 
to. Clearly the fact that folklore so o5en “obliges” us to do what we really want to do is one 
reason why there will always be folklore. . . .
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